14a-8 alternatives

Not a whole lot going on this week in terms of legal developments, so I thought I'd reach back to an older post of mine, where I talked about a case pending before the Fifth Circuit regarding 14a-8.  The original petitioner, the National Center for Public Policy Research, argued that the SEC engages in viewpoint discrimination when it issues no-action letters; an intervenor challenged the entire basis for Rule 14a-8 as unauthorized by statute and unconstitutional to boot.  The SEC, for its part, addressed these substantive arguments but concentrated most of its energies on arguing that no-action letters are not final orders subject to challenge in the first place.

Normally, I'd assume a case like this wouldn't have much chance of succeeding, but it's the Fifth Circuit, which tends to take an entrepreneurial approach to issues like corporate rights, standing, and administrative authority.  Even then, I'd say the petitioners were likely out of luck, because the panel turned out to be Jones, Douglas, and Dennis - meaning, two Democrats and a Republican - and, indeed, only Judge Jones demonstrated any sympathies for the petitioners during oral argument.  But! The last time sec reg ended up before a 2-1 Democratic panel of the Fifth Circuit, the Democrats' ruling in favor of the NASDAQ's diversity rule was taken en banc where its prospects apparently are rather dim.

So what happens if Rule 14a-8, at least in the form we know it, dies?

Well, that brings me to the United Mine Workers' tactic against Warrior Met.  As Mike Levin described in his Activist Investor blog here, United Mine Workers took advantage of the universal proxy rule to run a shareholder proposal proxy contest.  That is, because it can now list incumbent director candidates on its own proxy card, that's just what it did - it offered several shareholder proposals (14a-8 would limit it to just one), ignored all of Rule 14a-8's other strictures, filed its own proxy materials, sent out proxy cards, and hired a vendor to collect them.  Having done that, Warrior Met was backed into a corner and forced to include the proposals in its own proxy materials - because otherwise it risked losing control over, and insight into, how proxy cards collected by Mine Workers were being voted or if they were being returned at all.  The expenses for this entire effort by the Mine Workers totaled just $15,000, which sounds very feasible for at least some repeat-player proposal proponents.  It also may just scratch the surface of what the universal proxy enables in the future.

But that, of course, assumes the proposal is one that United Mine Workers can, in fact, bring to the floor - i.e., state corporate law has to allow shareholders to raise these proposals at a shareholder meeting and vote on them, before anything else can happen.  Mohsen Manesh lays out the argument for how corporations can - via bylaw or charter provisions - limit shareholders' power to make proposals in the first place, which would not only prohibit United Mine Workers' tactic, but also limit the use of 14a-8 (which is only supposed to enable shareholders to exercise their state-law created governance rights).  If he's right, and if companies/management take advantage of that ability, we could lose a lot of shareholder proposals entirely (and a major source of entertainment for corporate academia).  Prof. Manesh explains that companies might not want to limit shareholders' ability to bring proposals - maybe investors would be annoyed if their rights were curtailed that way - but, as I previously observed, there wasn't much pushback when Exxon sued its own shareholders over a proposal, so maybe there's space for companies to rid themselves of proposals entirely.