Saturday, February 27, 2021

Simmons on Delaware as a De Facto Federal Agency

Last week, I blogged about the dominance of Delaware organizational law and its implications for the laws of other states.  Which is why I was so interested to when Omari Scott Simmons posted his new paper, The Federal Option: Delaware as De Facto Agency, which takes a (sort of) different view.  He argues that Delaware has become de facto federal agency, delegated by the federal government the power to make corporate law nationally, and that this system works well for now, though there might be circumstances where federal chartering – and the structural oversight that would come with it – might be appropriate.  These could include situations where companies have received governmental bailouts, or where companies have committed significant wrongdoing and subject themselves to federal oversight as part of their settlement.

Of course, the concerns I’ve expressed in my posts are of a slightly different order – they’re about Delaware organizational law extending beyond the boundaries of internal affairs (and Delaware’s ability to define those boundaries in the first place) – but still, it’s an interesting holistic look at Delaware’s role in the corporate governance ecosystem.  Here is the abstract:

Despite over 200 years of deliberation and debate, the United States has not adopted a federal corporate chartering law. Instead, Delaware is the “Federal Option” for corporate law and adjudication. The contemporary federal corporate chartering debate is, in part, a referendum on its role. Although the federal government has regulated other aspects of interstate commerce and has the power to charter corporations and, pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, preempt Delaware, it has not done so. Despite the rich and robust scholarly discussion of Delaware’s jurisdictional dominance, its role as a de facto national regulator remains underdeveloped. This article addresses a vexing question: Can Delaware, a haven for incorporation and adjudication, serve as an effective national regulator? Following an analysis of federal chartering alternatives, such as the Nader Plan, the Warren Plan, the Sanders Plan, and other modes of regulation, the answer is yes, but with some caveats and qualifications. Delaware’s adequate, if imperfect, performance as a surrogate national regulator of corporate internal affairs argues against the upheaval of the existing corporate law framework federal chartering would bring. Even in the contemporary moment where longstanding concerns about corporate power, purpose, accountability, and the uneasy relationship between corporations and society are amplified, Delaware can continue to perform an important agency-like role in collaboration with federal regulators, and regulated firms. A deeper examination comparing the merits of federal corporate chartering with Delaware’s de facto agency function illuminates the potential of existing and future reforms. This article concludes that federal chartering proposals have an important impact despite not being adopted for centuries. First, federal chartering proposals encourage policymakers to look beyond the status quo toward greater hybridization in regulatory design. Second, elements of previous federal chartering proposals have historically become successful “à la carte” reforms or part of other successful reform measures. Third, federal chartering proposals provide value as a bargaining tool where the threat of more intrusive federal regulation makes other reform methods more palatable to diverse corporate constituencies.

Ann Lipton | Permalink


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