Monday, June 29, 2020
From In re Dell Techs. Inc. Class V Stockholders Litig., No. CV 2018-0816-JTL, 2020 WL 3096748, at *20–30 (Del. Ch. June 11, 2020) [Hat tip to Steve Bainbridge, who comments here.]:
Coercion is a multi-faceted concept in Delaware law. At least five strands of case law use the term ….
The first strand of coercion jurisprudence does not involve the conduct of fiduciaries. It rather addresses the ability of a non-fiduciary to offer a reward or impose a penalty as a means of inducing action in an arm’s-length setting. The seminal case is Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986)….
A second strand of jurisprudence involves a third party taking action that a fiduciary (typically the board of directors) believes could have a coercive effect on the fiduciary’s beneficiaries (typically stockholders). In that setting, the fiduciary has both the power and an affirmative duty to defend its beneficiaries from the coercive threat. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954….
A third strand of coercion jurisprudence examines whether a fiduciary has taken action to coerce its own beneficiaries. By doing so, the fiduciary acts disloyally and violates the standard of conduct expected of fiduciaries. The fiduciary may only avoid a finding of breach by proving that the transaction was nevertheless entirely fair, notwithstanding the fiduciary’s use of coercion. The seminal case in this line of authority is AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986)….
A fourth strand of coercion jurisprudence has developed in response to the powerful cleansing effect of stockholder votes under Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). Two decisions—Saba Software and Liberty Broadband—have held that forms of coercion that would not have supported claims for breach of duty were nevertheless sufficient to prevent stockholder votes from having a cleansing effect and changing the standard of review to the irrebuttable business judgment rule….
A final strand of coercion jurisprudence shifts the focus from the stockholder vote to the special committee. As with the stockholder vote, a controller’s explicit or implicit threats can prevent a committee from fulfilling its function and having a concomitant effect on the standard of review. The leading case … is Lynch I, where Lynch’s controller (Alcatel) offered to acquire Lynch at $14 per share. Lynch I, 638 A.2d at 1113….