Monday, July 2, 2018
What would the world look like if a public company officer or director, recognizing the value of material nonpublic firm information in his possession and intending to benefit people of limited means, gave this valuable information to those less fortunate without the knowledge or consent of the firm and without any expectation of benefit in return? How, if at all, do we desire to regulate that behavior? The officer or director apparently would be in breach of his or her fiduciary duty absent a valid, binding, and enforceable agreement to the contrary. Does that conduct also, however, violate U.S. federal insider trading rules? Should it? This article, a relatively short piece that I wrote for a "virtual symposium" issue of the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, offers answers to those questions.
Other symposium authors with insider trading pieces in this volume include:
Great reading on this topic, all around. As we await the next insider trading regulation volley after Salman v. United States, this collection of essays and articles fills a nice gap. Although the issue is not yet posted to the journal's website, it soon should be. In the mean time, here is a photo of the relevant page from the table of contents:
(Sorry for the faint image and the shadows! I took this in my office; no natural light was available, if you know what I mean . . . .)