Thursday, January 19, 2017

The Importance of the Business Judgment Rule

Bernard Sharfman, a prolific author on corporate governance, has written his fourth article on the business judgment rule. The piece provides a thought-provoking look at a subject that all business law professors teach. He also received feedback from Myron Steele, former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, and William Chandler III, former Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery during the drafting process. I don’t think I will assign the article to my students, but I may take some of the insight when I get to this critical topic this semester. Sharfman has stated that he aims to change the way professors teach the BJR.

The abstract is below:

Anyone who has had the opportunity to teach corporate law understands how difficult it is to provide a compelling explanation of why the business judgment rule (Rule) is so important. To provide a better explanation of why this is so, this Article takes the approach that the Aronson formulation of the Rule is not the proper starting place. Instead, this Article begins by starting with a close read of two cases that initiated the application of the Rule under Delaware law, the Chancery and Supreme Court opinions in Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. By taking this approach, the following insights into the Rule were discovered that may not have been so readily apparent if the starting point was Aronson.

First, without the Rule, the raw power of equity could conceivably require all challenged Board decisions to undergo an entire fairness review. The Rule is the tool used by a court to restrain itself from implementing such a review. This is the most important function of the Rule. Second, as a result of equity needing to be restrained, there is no room in the Rule formulation for fairness; fairness and fiduciary duties must be mutually exclusive. Third, there are three policy drivers that underlie the use of the Rule. Protecting the Board’s statutory authority to run the company without the fear of its members being held liable for honest mistakes of judgment; respect for the private ordering of corporate governance arrangements which almost always grants extensive authority to the Board to make decisions on behalf of the corporation; and the recognition by the courts that they are not business experts, making deference to Board authority a necessity. Fourth, the Rule is an abstention doctrine not just in terms of precluding duty of care claims, but also by requiring the courts to abstain from an entire fairness review if there is no evidence of a breach in fiduciary duties or taint surrounding a Board decision. Fifth, stockholder wealth maximization (SWM) is the legal obligation of the Board and the Rule serves to support that purpose. The requirement of SWM enters into corporate law through a Board’s fiduciary duties as applied under the Rule, not statutory law. In essence, SWM is an equitable concept.

 

 

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2017/01/the-importance-of-the-business-judgment-rule.html

Business Associations, Corporate Governance, Corporate Personality, Corporations, Delaware, Law School, Marcia Narine Weldon, Teaching, Writing | Permalink

Comments

Marcia, thank you very much for your post. Hopefully, given this is my fourth attempt at writing about the business judgment rule, I finally got it right, at least to some extent. My own post on the article can be found on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/19/the-importance-of-the-business-judgment-rule/#more-77526 .

Posted by: Bernard S. Sharfman | Jan 19, 2017 7:56:10 AM

I am going to be presenting the paper at the Wharton School’s inaugural Conference on Business Law and Ethics (University of Pennsylvania, March 31, 2017).

Posted by: Bernard S. Sharfman | Jan 23, 2017 11:28:32 AM

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