Business Law Prof Blog

Thanks to Guest Blogger Greg Day

Thanks to Greg Day, assistant professor of economics and legal studies at the Spears School of Business at Oklahoma State University, for joining us as a guest blogger for the month of November.

Greg's posts are collected below and his scholarship is available here:

Following up on Arbitration and Human Rights

Cobras and Housing Markets

Do Sophisticated Parties Really Prefer the Freedom of Contract?

And Now Another Corporate Inversion--And More Corporate Inversion Restrictions

A Really Interesting Book About . . . Punctuation?

I never thought I would say this, but my favorite book this year is about punctuation. That’s right. Punctuation! The book is Making a Point: The Pernickety Story of English Punctuation, by David Crystal, and it's well worth reading.

It’s an enjoyable romp through the English language, with limited attention to writing in other languages as well. (I just placed something in a German English-language publication and discovered that Germans don’t know how to “correctly” use quotation marks.)

This isn’t a rule book; Crystal talks about current usage, including areas where the “experts” disagree. (Oxford comma, anyone?) But he also covers the history—how the use of punctuation has evolved over time. One of the book's recurring themes is how two functions of punctuation--clarifying the writer's meaning and providing cues to speakers--can sometimes be at odds.

The history is fascinating. I have to admit that, after reading this book and seeing what excellent writers have done in the past, it’s harder to argue for a prescriptive position. I don’t always agree with Crystal’s position on disputed issues, but his case is always cogent.

Crystal covers all the major punctuation marks: , , ;, :, . . . , ., and ( ). (Yes, I did write this sentence just to see what it would look like.) But he also covers other lesser-known punctuation marks that have fallen into disuse, as well as the use of capital letters and spacing. (I was surprised to learn that early Anglo-Saxon writing often didn’t have spacing between words.)

I’m a writing geek, so I love to read books like this. But this book isn’t just for people like me. Anyone who writes for a living or wants to write for a living—and that includes all lawyers and law students—should read this book. Making a Point is entertaining and informative, and the writing is clear. (I almost restrained the urge to write “crystal-clear.”) Check it out.

ICYMI: Tweets From the Week (Nov. 29, 2015)

"Proposals on Gender Pay Gap, Compensation Principles Will Not Reach Apple Shareholders" https://t.co/SSYa0tUbTA #corpgov

— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) November 26, 2015

"Companies that employ strong risk management practices have better operating performance" https://t.co/1YIS0sKOdy #corpgov

— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) November 27, 2015

"Robert Reich discusses how to make the so-called 'sharing economy' work for all workers." https://t.co/kX8ezAIOVy #corpgov

— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) November 28, 2015

"natural experiment ... appears to validate the idea that proxy access adds to shareholder value" https://t.co/mtaZPm0N68 #corpgov

— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) November 28, 2015

"financial innovation can undermine ... governance mechanisms" https://t.co/XP7DyjQChe #corpgov

— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) November 28, 2015

And Now Another Corporate Inversion--And More Corporate Inversion Restrictions

A short while ago, some commentators declared that the Treasury had successfully ended corporate inversions. But after several recent corporate migrations, reports of the inversion’s death appear to have been greatly exaggerated.

A corporate inversion is a complicated and costly transaction used by American corporations to avoid particularly burdensome aspects of the U.S. tax code. The United States not only enforces the OECD’s highest corporate tax rate (the tax rate for most U.S. corporations ranges between 35% to 39%) but also worldwide taxation. This latter feature subjects an American corporation’s entire revenue stream to the United States’ extraordinary tax rate, whereas most countries tax only what is earned inside their territorial borders. In simplified terms, a corporation hoping to invert must merge with a foreign corporation—while satisfying some very idiosyncratic conditions—in order to reorganize in the foreign company’s country. After inverting, a company’s foreign generated income becomes subject to more favorable foreign tax rates, though it must still pay U.S. taxes on domestically generated revenue.

The rhetoric surrounding inversions has been heating up since Pfizer announced its intentions to invert into an Irish entity after acquiring Allegran in a $160 billion deal. The chief complaint against inversions is that inverted companies avoid their “fair share” of taxes (the United States likely lost 33.6 billion in tax revenue in 2014 alone). Not only that, the inversion trend perhaps shifts research and development and intellectual property innovation to foreign countries (see this excellent article by Omri Marian). President Obama famously declared that inversions are “unpatriotic,” Jon Stewart warned his viewers of the “Inversion of the Moneysnatchers,” and countless politicians have proposed ending the inversion loophole.

But why should we demonize inverted companies. First, consider an old Learned Hand quote: “[a]nyone may arrange his affairs so that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose the pattern which best pays the treasury.” And considering that inverted companies must still pay U.S. taxes on U.S. generated income, the process shields only foreign-based revenue with which the United States has limited association. In fact, if the internal affairs doctrine incentivizes companies to incorporate in whichever U.S. state they wish, why should this policy not include foreign countries? 

In the end, what to do about inversions presents a number of complex issues. Critics offer very accurate arguments concerning the deleterious effects of inversions. However, in light of previous attempts, it seems quite unlikely that the tax code could be amended to prohibit future companies from inverting. As of a couple days ago the Treasury just added new inversion restrictions with the caveat that there is only so much that the Treasury can do. Indeed either lowering the corporate tax rate or ending worldwide taxation would likely be the most effective anti-inversion policy. Or the United States could take better aim at the income shifting transactions that corporations use to repatriate foreign income into the United States. But probably the best first step is for us to quit viewing inversions normatively; any well-informed policy prescription should avoid the very commonly used rhetoric of “good” guys and “bad” guys. After all, companies are just following incentivizes that the law offers.

For an excellent discussion of inversions, please read this Virginia Law Review article by Eric Talley.

The role of the 10b-5 class action

Hillary Sale and Robert Thompson have published a new article to SSRN discussing the role of 10b-5 class actions, and, in particular, how private class actions function to protect the goals of securities regulation more broadly, including investor protection and general confidence in U.S. securities markets.  One of their key insights is that the concept of market efficiency is critical both to the current system of regulation, and to the 10b-5 class action - and that there is a basic hypocrisy when large, publicly-traded issuers take advantage of the concept of market efficiency to reduce their regulatory disclosure burdens while simultaneously arguing against market efficiency to defeat securities claims.  They contend the presumption of reliance - and what should be a very narrow space for defendants' rebuttal of price impact, thus allowing classes to be certified - fits well with the class action's role in protecting markets.

I agree with their thesis generally, namely, the role that securities class actions play in policing markets, rather than as a direct system for compensating defrauded investors.  In fact, I argued in a recent paper that courts have altered their definitions of organizational scienter to account for the changing role of the securities class action, namely, one focused more on policing markets and promoting the various goals of our regime of securities regulation rather than compensating investors for their losses.  And I believe there's a strong case to be made - which James Park has explored - that there is value to having private actors, in addition to the SEC, play a role in deterrence/enforcement. 

The problem, of course, is that right now, the 10b-5 cause of action is in something of a transitional stage.  The element of reliance - as constructed via the fraud on the market mechanism - is well-suited to a deterrence/enforcement purpose, but other elements (including damages and loss causation) are not.  These elements remain tied to some construct of specific investor harm that becomes harder and harder to determine the more than the "front end" of the securities class action focuses on marketwide distortion/corruption.   If class actions are deterrent devices rather than compensatory ones, there needs to be some kind of rational calculation regarding appropriate damages due to degree of market harm, balanced against the wrongfulness of the defendants' conduct.  Right now, nothing in the cause of action provides space for that kind of calculation - instead, all we have are the increasingly artificial constructs of price impact, materiality, and loss causation, which, I believe, is at least one of the reasons for courts' incoherence  on this subject.

Last-Minute Call for Papers - Microfinance (ITEM 7)

Please accept my apologies for not posting this notice sooner.  I received the call for papers a few weeks ago and meant to post it then.  But I now see that the deadline for abstract submissions is Monday!  Mea culpa.  Please feel free to post a comment here or contact me by email for more information if you want to submit.  I have a more full-blown version of the call for papers that I can send by email to those who are interested in more information.  (I omitted here prior conference locations as well as the names and affiliations of members of the conference academic and practice review boards and organizing committee.) 

I have participated in this conference for the past two years.  While there are few law academics in attendance, I have found the work of our international colleagues from the business side of the aisle to be both very informative to my work and interesting in many other respects.  This conference also has enabled me to forge new relationships that have positively impacted my scholarship.

Call for Papers
7th Conference on Innovative Trends Emerging in Microfinance (ITEM-7)
Pumping up Innovations In and Around Microfinance
(Microfinance, Crowdfunding and Community Development Finance)
Organized by the
Banque Populaire Chair in Microfinance of the Burgundy School of Business, Dijon, France
In collaboration with
The Chinese Association of Microfinance
And
Shanghai Jiao Tong University Centre for Financial Inclusion

March 15-17, 2016
In Shanghai, China

Poverty is a deep-rooted problem. Science magazine has published research indicating that poverty is even associated with cognitive problems. One hope to eradicate poverty is to provide the poor with the resources necessary to cope with it, the resources being specific to their situation. One possible resource is microfinance. Today, more and more researchers are getting involved in research that makes a difference to practitioners who want to create a new world of hope for the poor. Although it is too early to prove either a positive or a negative impact of financial leverage on the poor, other financial products are being offered to the poor so that they are financially included.
The international conference on Innovative Trends Emerging in Microfinance (ITEM) is aimed at researchers, both from academic field and from the industry, who are looking at institutional and technological environmental factors that could increase outreach or reduce costs or both. Previous editions of this conferences have been held in India, France and Morocco.

Conference themes
The 7th edition brings together researchers from three areas: Microfinance, Crowdfunding and Community Development Finance. However, the conference is open to other closely related microfinance fields and papers on impact measures, social governance, innovation, and sustainable development are welcomed.
The ITEM conference provides a forum for both researchers and practitioners to discuss and exchange on financial inclusion. The conference in March 2016 seeks quantitative, qualitative and experience-based papers from industry and academia. Case studies and PhD research-in-progress are also welcomed. It encourages reflections on the potential and use of technology in microfinance in developed and developing countries.
Papers can be in English, French and Chinese. Normally, there is no provision for translations. So, English is preferred.

Publication opportunity
The conference invites both professional presentations and research papers. Since we are all aiming for high level publications, we do not publish books or copyrighted proceedings. It is expected that the review process and the partnerships developed would help the researchers develop the paper towards a high impact journal and that, perhaps, they would think of acknowledging their participation in the conference. However, if researchers want, their papers are directly considered for journal special issues or books that the organizers or other participants may be associated with. These journals include Strategic Change (Wiley) and Cost Management (Thomson-Reuters).

Submission procedure
Proposals: All contribution types require a proposal in the first instance, including a short abstract between 300 and 500 words, up to five keywords, the full names (first name and surname, not initials), email addresses of all authors, and a postal address and telephone number for at least one contact author.

The abstract should indicate:

Title of the paper

Track of the paper (see below)

Authors and affiliations

Research purpose

Research design/methodology/approach

Key results

Impact: (on new research or on new practices, policies)

Value added/originality

Tracks proposed:

Stream 1: Microfinance

Track 10: Microfinance (all other)
English / French
Track 11: Communication and Microfinance
English/ French
Track 12: Experiments in Microfinance
English
Track 13: Market research in microfinance
English
Track 14: Microfinance in China
Chinese/English

Stream 2: Crowdfunding

Track 20: Crowdfunding (all other)
English / French
Track 21: Communication et crowdfunding
English/ French
Track 22: Regulation in Crowdfunding
English / French
Track 23: Engaging the crowd
English
Track 24: Strategies of crowdfunding
English/French
Track 25: Governance in Crowdfunding
English / French

Stream 3 : Community Development Finance

Track 30: Community Development (all other)
English / Chinese
Track 31: Impact Investment Funds
English
Track 32: Community Development Funds
English
Track 33: Slow Money / Agricultural Investment
English

Full Papers are only required after acceptance of abstract. Papers should not to be more than 5000 words including abstract, keywords and references. Submission period for the full papers is till December 31st, 2015. These will be sent for review after the registration fee has been paid. Each author of a full paper will also be required to review a paper and be a discussant at the conference.

Deadline / Timeline
November 30, 2015: Submission of abstract of proposals
December 10, 2015: Confirmation of acceptance
December 31, 2015: Early-bird registration ends
January 15, 2015: Full papers for those who want their papers reviewed
January 31, 2016: Normal registration ends
March 15-17, 2016: Conference

Registration and Payment: instructions will be sent at the time of confirmation of acceptance of abstract.
There are special discounts available for early-bird registration and for students. These will be posted on the conference website.

Contacts:
[email protected]
Web site: http://www.bmicrofinance.org/item7.html

Thanksgiving Break Reading: The Reconfiguring of Revlon

I try to read everything Lyman Johnson writes, so my Thanksgiving break reading is his recent book chapter The Reconfiguring of Revlon. The abstract is below:

Three decades later, an irksome uncertainty still impedes a settled understanding of the Delaware Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. For such a towering doctrine, Revlon’s underlying rationales remain controversial, its exact contours and demands continue to be surprisingly unclear, and it holds out scant hope for remedial relief. In spite of these troubling features of today’s Revlon jurisprudence, however, Revlon is slowly being worked back into the larger fabric of Delaware’s fiduciary duty law and away from being a gangling, standalone doctrine. The organizing themes of this judicial project are strong deference in the deal context to decisions made by independent directors without regard to deal structure, the substantially reduced likelihood of equitable or monetary remedies in all types of deal-related lawsuits, and a nascent effort at harmonizing Revlon with Delaware’s more general, and ill-defined, doctrine on corporate purpose.

This chapter discusses the original Revlon decision and its rapid expansion before turning to lingering uncertainties surrounding the reach of Revlon, the decline of Revlon’s remedial clout, and where Revlon stands today in relation to Delaware’s overall fiduciary duty law. Revlon’s sharp focus on immediate value maximization was a breakthrough pronouncement on corporate purpose, a subject of longstanding national debate but one on which the Delaware Supreme Court had been strangely silent. However, grave reservations about whether and when corporate directors should be required to pursue short term goals found useful cover in sustained judicial murkiness over the boundaries of Revlon. Only if Delaware courts resolve the underlying issue of corporate purpose more generally will Revlon either be fitted into the larger body of Delaware law or continue to stand uncomfortably to the side as a doctrinal loner of diminished significance.

Thanksgiving is about . . . ?

It’s Thanksgiving, which means it’s time to do Christmas shopping. No, that’s not it. I’m sure Thanksgiving is supposed to be about more than that. Food? Football? No, there’s something else. It’s on the tip of my tongue; I just can’t quite remember. . . . . . . . .

Oh, yeah: being thankful.

I’m thankful for many things, but I want to use this column to thank some of the people who have touched my professional life.

First, thanks to my co-bloggers (in alphabetical order): Josh Fershee; Joan Heminway; Ann Lipton; Haskell Murray; Marcia Nanine; Stefan Padfield; and Anne Tucker. Their blog posts are always interesting and informative, and usually, I have to admit, better than anything I write. But, if you think their blog posts are good, you ought to see the incredible behind-the-scenes e-mail conversations we share. I have learned a lot from each of them. Believe it or not, I’ve only met two of them in person, but I’m happy to have all of them in my academic life.

Second, I’m thankful for my colleagues here at the University of Nebraska—well, most of them anyway. All of them are deserving of thanks—if for nothing else, just for putting up with me. But I want to pick out one of my colleagues for special mention. My long-time friend and colleague Bill Lyons is retiring at the end of this year (as a colleague; not as a friend, I hope), and I’m really going to miss him. (I never would have thought anyone would miss a tax lawyer, but apparently it's possible.) Bill and I have shared conversations about law school, teaching, children, Monty Python, Star Trek, Babylon 5, Douglas Adams, and a number of equally important matters. I will miss those conversations when Bill retires. Bill has helped keep me sane, or at least as close as I’ll ever get. Thanks, Bill.

I have already publicly thanked two other former colleagues who, sadly, are no longer with us: John Gradwohl and Alan Bromberg. But I can’t thank either of them enough, so I again want to express my thanks for what each of them did for me.

The final person I want to thank is my mother, Bettie Johnston. What's my mother doing on a list of people who touched me professionally? For one thing, I wouldn't be here today but for her. She helped me through the hard times; I don't think I would have survived without her. (And there was that womb thing, too.) But she also taught me to question, and sparked a lifetime love of learning. Our kitchen conversations when I was in junior high and high school started me on the path to be a law professor.

The list of people who deserve thanks could go on and on. My students, who have made teaching so fun—and challenging. The many good teachers I had, who molded me into what I am today. (Blame them.) The many people who have used, commented on, and responded to my scholarship. But if I tried to list everyone who positively affected me professionally, this post would go on forever. To all of you, wherever you are, thank you. I haven't forgotten you. (Well, some of your names, but that's an age thing.)

I’ll be back to business law next week. In the meantime, have a happy Thanksgiving. Eat a lot of turkey. Watch a lot of football. And, if you must, do some shopping. But, whatever else you do, don’t forget to thank all of the people who have touched your lives—professionally or otherwise.

Giving Thanks for Amazing Colleagues

 

Last year, in my first Thanksgiving week post, I gave public thanks for my students. I could just as easily have done that again this year.  My students continue to impress and inspire me.  And that is certainly something to be grateful for--year in, and year out.

This year, however, I also want to acknowledge my thanks for all of the special colleagues I have in the academy (and yes, fellow BLPB editors, that includes you!) and the bar that make my job complete.  When I have needed assistance, support, or just a good laugh, it is my fellow law peeps--and especially my business law peeps--to whom I most often turn and on whom I almost always rely.

You, my law teacher and lawyer friends, have:

• read and edited my early syllabi, exams, and assignments, preventing me from making mistakes that new law professors often make;
• taught my Business Associations class when my mother was dying so I could be by her side;
• helped my son learn about e-discovery and various types of law practice so that he could launch his career;
• provided assistance to my Corporate Finance students when they needed specialized guidance or advice on their planning and drafting projects;
• reviewed innumerable drafts of law review articles and provided honest, insightful criticism and comments;
• supplied (whether knowingly or unknowingly) material that I can and do use to help educate my students about real-world legal problems that impact businesses and the people who engage with them;
• forgiven me when I have done stupid sh*t in conducting my professional activities that doesn't warrant mercy or amnesty;
• stayed up with me late at night to draft portions of self-study reports, legislation, and other important documents; 
• invited or elected me to serve in professional leadership positions, on academic panels, on professional association and bar committees, and in other capacities that have enabled me to both serve and continue to learn;
• collaborated with me on materials and presentations for important continuing legal education programs; 
• extended publication or submission deadlines to give me time and space to handle emergent personal or professional obligations that I determined were important; and
• built solid foundations in theory, policy, and doctrine from which I can build my teaching and scholarship.

I am sure I am forgetting important things, large and small, in this list.  But you get the picture and the point.  And I am sure that each of you reading this could come up with your own similar list of things about which you are thankful relative to our colleagues--truly remarkable, extraordinary people.

In any event, I am grateful for you all.  Have a blessed Thanksgiving.

Misstating the LLC in the Thanksgiving Season

Like many people, I am traveling for the holiday this week.  Because of that, I'll keep this short. Since November 15, 2015, several more courts have listed an LLC as a "limited liability corporation," instead of the correct, ""limited liability company."  The culprits:

Editorial Note: A case was removed from this listing on September 3, 2017 at the request of a reader after consultation with the author.

1) Ironridge Glob. IV, Ltd. v. Securities and Exch. Commn., 1:15-CV-2512-LMM, 2015 WL 7273262, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 17, 2015) ("Notwithstanding the plain text of § 1391(c), the SEC argues that (1) § 1391(c) was intended to apply to corporations, partnerships, limited liability corporations, and labor unions—not federal agencies—according to “a natural reading of the full text of the statute” and its legislative history; and (2) to read § 1391(c) otherwise would facilitate forum shopping.").

2) In the caption: Perez v. Sophia's Kalamazoo, LLC, d/b/a SOPHIA'S HOUSE OF PANCAKES, a limited liability corporation, et al., Defendants., No. 1:14-CV-772, 2015 WL 7272234 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 2015).

3) In the caption: Oracle America, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff, v. The Oregon Health Insurance Exchange Corporation, dba Cover Oregon, an Oregon Limited Liability Corporation, and The State of Oregon, by and through The Oregon Health Authority and The Oregon Department of Human Services, Defendants, No. 3:14-CV-01279-BR, 2015 WL 7296233 (D. Or. Nov. 18, 2015). 

4) In re Jeffries, No. 14-50656, 2015 WL 7348214, at *3 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2015) ("The Debtor did not disclose her affiliation with GQM, a limited liability corporation organized in North Carolina in May, 2005. The Debtor was listed as the registered agent and signed the Articles of Organization as the President [member organizer]. This LLC was dissolved in August 2010.").

5) HUA LIN, HENG CHEN, FEI HU, WEI LIN, ZHEN ZU, and JIU TAO WANG, Plaintiffs, v. W & D ASSOCIATES LLC doing business as KUDETA, CHRISTINA TAN, DOUG MCSHANE, ALBERT WONG, ELAINE PI YUN CHAO, EMILY PI SHIA CHAO, HERRY DARBI, TERRENCE KUM, and TOM HO, Defendants, and W & D ASSOCIATES LLC doing business as KUDETA, CHRISTINA TAN, DOUG MCSHANE, ALBERT WONG, ELAINE PI YUN CHAO, and EMILY PI SHIA CHAO, Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. HERRY DARBI, Third-Party Def.., 3:14-CV-164 (VAB), 2015 WL 7428528, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 20, 2015) ("W&D was founded as a Connecticut limited liability corporation in 2005 for the purpose of funding and managing Kudeta Restaurant in New Haven, Connecticut.").

 

Contract Is King Micro-Symposium Wrap Up

This post concludes the Contract Is King, But Can It Govern Its Realm? Micro-symposium.  The symposium was hosted as part of the AALS section on Agency, Partnership, LLCs and Unincorporated Associations in advance of the section meeting on January 7^th at 1:30 where the conversation will be continued.

I summarized the conversation and provided links to all of the individual posts.  Bookmark this page-- there is great commentary at your finger tips on a range of topics.  Please keep reading (and commenting) on these great contributions by our insightful participants to whom we are very grateful.

Jeffrey Lipshaw kicked off the symposium conversation with his post (available here) questioning, in practice, how different LLCs are from traditional corporations.  He used a great map analogy to talk about the role of formation documents and default rules as gap fillers. 

“The contractual, corporate, and uncorporate models are always reductions in the bits and bytes of information from the complex reality, and that’s what makes them useful, just as a map of Cambridge, Massachusetts that was as complex as the real Cambridge would be useless.” 

After asserting that LLCs differ from corporations only in matters of degrees, Jeff went on to to them illustrate how degrees of difference may still matter.  He provided a good example of a situation where the ability to eliminate fiduciary duties may produce the right result—an option only available in alternative entities not corporations.  

Mohsen Manesh contributed two posts (available here and here).

Mohsen argued that if contract is king, business revenue rules the reign in Delaware.  Franchise taxes and revenues generated from being the business domicile of so many businesses, in all forms, is a source of riches, one that Mohsen argued will be protected by preserving a commitment to freedom of contract.

“Delaware’s annual tax charged to alternative entities is flat. All LLCs and LPs, no matter how large or small, whether publicly traded or closely held, pay the state only $300 annually for the privilege of being a Delaware entity. Thus, unlike the corporate context, where Delaware’s business is dependent on attracting large, publicly traded corporations, in the alternative entity context, Delaware’s business depends on volume alone.”

In his first post, Mohsen also addressed Delaware Chief Justice Strine and Vice Chancellor Laster’s provocative “Siren Song” book chapter, where the pair advocate for mandatory fiduciary duties in publicly traded LLCs and LPs.  Mohsen questioned the limitation arguing that

“[M]any of critiques that Strine and Laster levy at publicly traded alternative entities– unsophisticated investors, the absence of true bargaining, and confusing contract terms that often unduly favor the managers—could be levied at many private entities as well. If so, then why should Strine & Laster’s proposal be limited to public entities?”

Sandra Miller blogged here about investor sophistication and its relationship to fiduciary duty waivers.  She highlighted her scholarship in the area and provided helpful links to her papers discussing her points in greater detail.

“[T]here are asymmetries in the marketplace that make it unlikely that the marketplace will efficiently discount the effects of waivers.  Given the investor profile, at a very minimum, the duty of loyalty should be non-waivable for publicly-traded entities.” 

Joan Heminway questioned whether LLC operating agreements are contracts, and if not the implication for fiduciary duties, statue of frauds, capacity and public policy challenges and enforceability against third parties.

“[W]ith judicial and legislative attention on freedom of contract in the LLC, the status of the LLC as a matter of contract law may shed light on the extent to which contract law can or should be important or imported to legal issues involving LLC operating agreements...So, while contract may be king in LLC law, we may question whether a contract even exists under LLC law.”

Joan also highlighted her recent appearance at the ABA LLC Institute in a related post available here and shared the many functions of an operating agreement (whether contract or not!).

Daniel Kleinberger contributed to the conversation in four parts (appearing in three separate posts here (1), here (2) and here(3)).  Daniel focused on Delaware’s implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the covenant’s role in Delaware entity law.  He carefully distinguished the covenant from the UCC implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and from the corporate standards of good faith as articulated in Stone v. Ritter and Smith v. Van Gorkum.  Thirdly he addressed waivers of good faith and fair dealing both in the governing agreement and arising from contract in Delaware and under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. 

“Perhaps ironically (or some might even say “counter-intuitively”), the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (2006) (Last Amended 2013) permits an ULLCA operating agreement to go where a Delaware operating agreement cannot.” 

In his final post, available here, Kleinberger addressed interpretation questions with implied covenants analogizing the analysis to that used with impracticability. 

“For impracticability or a breach of the implied covenant to exist, the situation at issue must have been fundamentally important to the deal and yet unaddressed by the deal documents.  Put another way:  the notion of a “cautious enterprise” means that only a condition that is egregious or at least extreme is capable of revealing a gap to be remedied by the implied covenant.”

BLPB editor, Joshua Fershee, was inspired by the topic and contributed his own post to the micro-symposium.  In his post, he declared himself a Larry Ribstein devotee and highlighted how the structural differences in the LLC form, as opposed to the corporate form, provide business benefits for LLC members.

“The flexibility of the LLC form creates opportunity for highly focused, nimble, and more specific entities that can be vehicles that facilitate creativity in investment in a way that corporations and partnerships, in my estimation, do not.”

Greg Day, another BLPB-generated contribution to the conversation, blogged about sophisticated parties’ utilization of freedom of contract in LLC, and sophisticated investors demand for the conformity of traditional corporate formation over LLCs.

“[W] hen Delaware LLCs become big, and attract big funds, a condition of investment almost always requires an LLC to convert into a Delaware corporation. It seems that the lack of predictability associated with the freedom of contract scares potential investors who prefer the comforts of fiduciary duties, among other corporate staples. …So the parties who ostensibly are best served by contractual freedoms—i.e., sophisticated parties—appear to be the ones most likely to demand the traditional corporate form. And on a related note, this helps to explain why such a paltry number of LLCs and LPs have become public companies.”

Finally, Peter Molk & Verity Winship also contributed a last-minute addition to the symposium highlighting their empirical work on LLC operating agreement dispute resolution provisions as it relates to the question of contracting rights in unincorporated entities.  They reported some of their early findings and linked it to the discussion about contractual freedom and the implications of mandatory fiduciary duties. 

“More than a third of the agreements in our sample selected the forum for resolving disputes, primarily through exclusive forum provisions or mandatory arbitration provisions.  The agreements also modified litigation processes through terms that imposed fee-shifting, waived jury trials, and, less commonly, through other means like books and records limitations.”

Participants in the Micro-Symposium were asked to respond to a series of questions (available here) that will be further discussed at the AALS section meeting.  Joan MacLeod Heminway (BLPB editor), Dan Kleinberger, Jeff Lipshaw, Mohsen Manesh, and Sandra Miller.will be panelists at the AALS meeting and joined by Lyman Johnson and Mark Loewenstein. 

Daniel Kleinberger: Delineating Delaware’s Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Contract Is King Micro-Symposium)

Guest Post by Daniel Kleinberger

Part IV– Delaware’s Implied Contractual Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Delaware case law applying the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing to a limited partnership dates back to at least 1993,[i] and Delaware’s limited partnership and limited liability company acts have expressly recognized the covenant since 2004.[ii] However, the contents of the implied covenant have not always been crystal clear.[iii]

     A passage from a 2000 Chancery Court decision is illustrative:

The implied covenant of good faith requires a party in a contractual relationship to refrain from arbitrary or unreasonable conduct which has the effect of preventing the other party to the contract from receiving the fruits of the contract.  This doctrine emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party.  The parties' reasonable expectations at the time of contract formation determine the reasonableness of the challenged conduct.  [C]ases invoking the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be rare and fact-intensive.  Only where issues of compelling fairness arise will this Court embrace good faith and fair dealing and imply terms in an agreement.[iv]

     This formulation was correct as far as it went, but it omitted the all-important frame of reference.  In the “fact-intensive” inquiry, what types of facts matter?  Where does the court look to determine “the agreed common purpose” and “the justified expectations of the [complaining] party”?  What evidence is admissible to prove the expected “fruits of the bargain”?

     The answers to these questions determine whether “implying obligations based on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing [remains] a cautious enterprise.”[v]  The broader the frame of reference, the more likely is the covenant to become “a judge's roving commission for determining fairness.”[vi] 

     Fortunately, over the past five years the Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court have provided both clarity and context.  The frame of reference is confined to the actual words of the agreement; the reasonable expectations must be gleaned from those words.[vii]

     Thus, the actual words of the agreement control the application of the implied covenant, both as to “fair dealing” and “good faith”:

“Fair dealing” is not akin to the fair process component of entire fairness, i.e., whether the fiduciary acted fairly when engaging in the challenged transaction as measured by duties of loyalty and care …. It is rather a commitment to deal “fairly” in the sense of consistently with the terms of the parties' agreement and its purpose.  Likewise, “good faith” does not envision loyalty to the contractual counterparty, but rather faithfulness to the scope, purpose, and terms of the parties' contract.  Both necessarily turn on the contract itself and what the parties would have agreed upon had the issue arisen when they were bargaining originally.[viii]

     When a court considers a fiduciary claim, the “court examines the parties as situated at the time of the [alleged] wrong….  [and] determines whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, considers the defendant's obligations (if any) in light of that duty, and then evaluates whether the duty was breached.”[ix]  In contrast, because the actual words of the agreement control the application of the implied covenant:

An implied covenant claim ... looks to the past.  It is not a free-floating duty unattached to the underlying legal documents.  It does not ask what duty the law should impose on the parties given their relationship at the time of the wrong, but rather what the parties would have agreed to themselves had they considered the issue in their original bargaining positions at the time of contracting.[x]

     A successful implied covenant claim depends on finding a gap in the contractual language; therefore, an implied covenant claim cannot override an express contractual provision.[xi]  For example, if a limited partnership agreement creates options for limited partners under specified circumstances and not otherwise, the implied covenant will not extend the option right to circumstances not specified.[xii]  Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[xiii]  There is no gap.

     But inevitably gaps will exist:[xiv]

No contract, regardless of how tightly or precisely drafted it may be, can wholly account for every possible contingency. Even the most skilled and sophisticated parties will necessarily fail to address a future state of the world ... because contracting is costly and human knowledge imperfect. In only a moderately complex or extend[ed] contractual relationship, the cost of attempting to catalog and negotiate with respect to all possible future states of the world would be prohibitive, if it were cognitively possible. And parties occasionally have understandings or expectations that were so fundamental that they did not need to negotiate about those expectations.[xv]

     For example, suppose that: (i) a limited partnership agreement authorizes the general partner to restructure the organization as the general partner sees fit provided a competent expert provides a “fairness opinion” stating that the restructuring is fair to the limited partners; (ii) a competent expert furnishes the opinion; but (iii) the expert omits to consider the value of certain contingent assets of the limited partnership, namely the value of pending derivative litigation.[xvi]  Because the limited partnership agreement “[does] not specify whether the fairness opinion [has] to consider the value of derivative litigation,” the expert’s omission reveals “a gap for the implied covenant to fill.”[xvii]  The gap is filled with what the court concludes “the parties would have agreed to themselves had they considered the issue in their original bargaining positions at the time of contracting.”[xviii]

     In this respect, the implied covenant analysis resembles the analysis for determining whether a party’s contractual duties are discharged by supervening impracticably.  “In order for a supervening event to discharge a duty …, the non-occurrence of that event must have been a ‘basic assumption’ on which both parties made the contract.”[xix]  For impracticability or a breach of the implied covenant to exist, the situation at issue must have been fundamentally important to the deal and yet unaddressed by the deal documents.  Put another way:  the notion of a “cautious enterprise”[xx] means that only a condition that is egregious or at least extreme is capable of revealing a gap to be remedied by the implied covenant.[xxi]

Endnotes:

[i] Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199, 1207 (Del. 1993) (“Desert Equities alleges that the defendants breached their implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when they, in bad faith, breached the Partnership Agreement.”).

[ii] 74 Del. Laws, c. 265, §15 (revising Del. Code tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) to provide inter alia that “the partnership agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing”).  The same change was made to the limited liability company act by 74 Del. Laws, c. 275, § 13 (revising Del. Code tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) to provide inter alia that “the limited liability company agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing”).

[iii] Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1998) (stating that “[t]he articulation of the standard for implying terms through application of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing represents an evolution from previous Delaware case law” and that “Delaware Supreme Court jurisprudence is developing along the general approach that implying obligations based on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a cautious enterprise”).  See also, e.g., Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199, 1207 (Del. 1993) (reversing the Chancery Court’s dismissal on the pleadings of plaintiff’s implied covenant claim; accepting the seemingly redundant notion that bad faith breach of the partnership agreement could breach the implied covenant; and suggesting the general partner may have acted in bad faith by “act[ing] unreasonably”).  For a decision that addresses the redundancy issue, see Painewebber R & D Partners, L.P. v. Centocor, Inc., No. C.A. 96C-04-194, 1998 WL 109818, at *4 (Del. Super. Feb. 13, 1998) (“The Court is satisfied that the payment obligations of Centocor are encompassed by the express terms of the PPA and, as a matter of law, cannot be the subject of any implied covenant.”)

[iv] Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., 750 A.2d 1219, 1234 (Del. Ch. 2000) (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).

[v] Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1998).

[vi] Daniel S. Kleinberger, Two Decades of "Alternative Entities": From Tax Rationalization Through Alphabet Soup to Contract as Deity, 14 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 445, 469 (2009) (first presented as the keynote address at the 2lst Century Commercial Law Forum – Seventh International Symposium 2007 – sponsored by School of Law, Tsinghua University, Beijing, People’s Republic of China).  See also Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1128 (Del. 2010) (“Crafting, what is, in effect, a post contracting equitable amendment that shifts economic benefits from [one set of shareholders to another] would vitiate the limited reach of the concept of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing…. The policy underpinning the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing does not extend to post contractual rebalancing of the economic benefits flowing to the contracting parties.”); Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1019 (Del. Ch. 2010) (criticizing and rejecting attempts to “re-introduce fiduciary review through the backdoor of the implied covenant” of good faith and fair dealing).  This point is precisely what divided the majority and dissent in Nemec. The core of the dissent is this statement: “[U]nder Delaware case law, a contracting party, even where expressly empowered to act, can breach the implied covenant if it exercises that contractual power arbitrarily or unreasonably.”  Nemec, at 1131 (Jacobs, J. dissenting).  The statement does not recognize that the frame of reference must be the words of the contract.  Cf. ULLCA (2013) § 409(d), cmt. (stating that “the purpose of the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing is to protect the arrangement the members have chosen for themselves, not to restructure that arrangement under the guise of safeguarding it”).  But cf. HB Korenvaes Inv., L.P. v. Marriot Corp., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 12922, Mem. Op. at 11, Allen, C., (June 9, 1993) (“Indeed the contract doctrine of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be thought in some ways to function analogously to the fiduciary concept.”) (quoted in Gale v. Bershad, No. CIV. A. 15714, 1998 WL 118022, at *5 n. 24(Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 1998); Gale v. Bershad, No. CIV. A. 15714, 1998 WL 118022, at *5 (“The function of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in defining the duties of parties to a contract, is analogous to the role of fiduciary law in defining the duties owed by fiduciaries.”); Blue Chip Capital Fund II Ltd. P'ship v. Tubergen, 906 A.2d 827, 832 (Del. Ch. 2006) (stating that “[t]he court [in Gale v. Bershad] explained that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing defines the duties of parties to a contract and is analogous to the role of fiduciary law in defining the duties owed by fiduciaries”) (citing Gale v. Bershad, No. CIV. A. 15714,.1998 WL 118022 at *5, (Del.Ch. Mar. 3, 1998)).

[vii] These points are analogous to Professor Williston’s four corners approach to determining ambiguity for the purposes of the parol evidence rule.  See, e.g., Wallace v. 600 Partners Co., 86 N.Y.2d 543, 548, 658 N.E.2d 715, 717 (1995) (stating that “[t]he question whether a writing is ambiguous is one of law to be resolved by the courts” and that “excursion beyond the four corners of the document” is warranted only when the wording is not “clear and complete”) (citing Williston, 4 Williston, Contracts, § 610A, at 513 [3d ed.]).  The “roving commission” notion resembles Professor Corbin’s approach to the ambiguity question.  “According to Corbin, the court cannot apply the parol evidence rule without first understanding the meaning the parties intended to give the agreement. To understand the agreement, the judge cannot be restricted to the four corners of the document.”  Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 175 Ariz. 148, 153, 854 P.2d 1134, 1139 (1993) (citation omitted).  Delaware takes the Williston approach.  GMG Capital Investments, LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P., 36 A.3d 776, 781-84 (Del. 2012) Schwartz v. Centennial Ins. Co., No. CIV. A. 5350 (1977), 1980 WL 77940, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 16, 1980) (stating that “parol evidence may not be used to show an ambiguity in the first place”).

[viii] Gerber v. Enter. Products Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 418-19 (Del. 2013) (quoting ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC, 50 A.3d 434, 440–42 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 68 A.3d 665 (Del. 2013)) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted without ellipsis by Gerber). 

[ix] Gerber v. Enter. Products Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 418 (quoting ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC, 50 A.3d 434, 440–42 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 68 A.3d 665 (Del. 2013)) Del. 2013).  Gerber was overruled on other grounds by Winshall v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 76 A.3d 808 (Del. 2013).  See also Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1142-43 (Del. 1990) (enforcing express conditions pertaining to a tender offer; stating that “[a]lthough an implied covenant of good faith and honest conduct exists in every contract … such subjective standards cannot override the literal terms of an agreement”).

[x] Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 418 (Del. 2013) (quoting ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC, 50 A.3d 434, 440–42 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 68 A.3d 665 (Del. 2013)) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted without ellipsis by Gerber).  In this respect, the implied covenant parallels the contract law doctrine of unconscionability.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981) (stating that the unconscionability analysis addresses whether “a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made”) (emphasis added); UCC § 2-302 (stating that the doctrine applies only if “the court finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made”) (emphasis added).

[xi] Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Del.2010) (“The implied covenant will not infer language that contradicts a clear exercise of an express contractual right.”).

[xii] See Aspen Advisors LLC v. United Artists Theatre Co., 843 A.2d 697, 707 (Del. Ch.) aff'd, 861 A.2d 1251 (Del. 2004) (“By specific words, the parties to the Stockholders Agreement and the Warrants identified particular transactions that would provide the Warrantholders with the right to receive the same consideration paid to common stockholders (e.g., in mergers involving United Artists) and the right (if they had exercised their Warrants) to tag along (i.e., in certain change of control transactions). Similarly, the parties also (by omission) defined the freedom of action other parties to those contracts (such as United Artists, the UA Holders, and Anschutz) had to engage in transactions without triggering rights of that nature.”).

[xiii] “[T]o express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.” EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

[xiv] However, whether a gap matters depends on whether a party’s conduct makes the gap apparent – i.e., whether one party’s conduct exposes an issue on which the parties would have agreed had the issue arisen when the deal was being made.

[xv] Allen v. El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C., No. CIV.A. 7520-VCL, 2014 WL 2819005, at *11 (Del. Ch. June 20, 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

[xvi] In simplified form, this example reflects one of the transactions – the 2010 merger – addressed in Gerber v. Enter. Products Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400 (Del. 2013), overruled on other grounds by Winshall v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 76 A.3d 808 (Del. 2013).

[xvii] Allen v. El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C., No. CIV.A. 7520-VCL, 2014 WL 2819005, at *14 (Del. Ch. June 20, 2014).  The opinion refers to the omission “creating a gap,” id. but the author respectfully disagrees.  The gap existed ab initio.  It remained hidden until revealed by the expert’s omission.

[xviii] Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 418 (Del. 2013) (quoting ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC, 50 A.3d 434, 440–42 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 68 A.3d 665 (Del. 2013)) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted without ellipsis by Gerber).  It might be more consistent with actual practice to revise the quoted language so that the sentence read: “The gap is filled with what the court concludes the now complaining party would have insisted on as a condition to going forward with the deal, if the party had then considered the issue in the party’s original bargaining position at the time of contracting.”

[xix] Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261, cmt. b (1981)

[xx] See n. 66.

[xxi] In this respect, the implied covenant is similar to the unconscionability doctrine of contract law.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208. cmt. b (1981) (“Traditionally, a bargain was said to be unconscionable in an action at law if it was ‘such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other….”) (quoting Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889), which in turn was quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves.Sen. 125, 155, 28 Eng.Rep. 82, 100 (Ch.1750)).

Moran Turns 30; Poison Pills Party

Last week was the 30th anniversary of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). In Moran, decided on Nov. 19, 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld what has become the leading hostile takeover defensive tactic, the poison pill.

Martin Lipton, the primary developer of the pill, even makes an appearance in the case—and obviously a carefully scripted one: “The minutes reflect that Mr. Lipton explained to the Board that his recommendation of the Plan was based on his understanding that the Board was concerned about the increasing frequency of ‘bust-up’ takeovers, the increasing takeover activity in the financial sector industry, . . . , and the possible adverse effect this type of activity could have on employees and others concerned with and vital to the continuing successful operation of Household even in the absence of any actual bust-up takeover attempt.”

I’m not sure the takeover world would be that different today if Moran had rejected poison pills. I’m reasonably confident the Delaware legislature would have amended the Delaware statute to overturn the ruling, as they effectively did with another ruling decided earlier that same year, Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Shortly after Van Gorkom made it clear that directors might actually be liable for violating the duty of care, the legislature added section 102(b)(7) to the Delaware law, allowing corporations to eliminate any possibility of damages for duty-of-care violations.

As my colleague Joan Heminway has pointed out, 1985 was an incredibly important year for M & A practitioners. In addition to Moran and Van Gorkom, a third major case was also decided that year: Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).

Van Gorkom was decided in late January of 1985, Unocal in June, and Moran in November. Corporations casebooks and treatises are filled with Delaware Supreme Court decisions, but that has to be one of the most important ten-month periods in Delaware corporate law jurisprudence—especially in the mergers and acquisitions area.

ICYMI: Tweets From the Week (Nov. 22, 2015)

ICYMI: "Investors Want More From Sustainability Reporting, Says Former SEC Head" https://t.co/S1sE3XlV4Z #corpgov

— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) November 15, 2015

Should "good Samaritan and duty to rescue laws ... [be] applied to corporations"? https://t.co/4huKT6EAVD #corpgov

— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) November 17, 2015

"The “great recession” of 2007-2009 .... Those who did not see the risk were willfully blind." https://t.co/7HVRpge21j #corpgov

— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) November 17, 2015

2013: "India passed..legislation mandating that boards of..certain..companies..include 1 woman director" https://t.co/YVBluPbIee #corpgov

— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) November 17, 2015

"The structure of global economic power is reflected in the network of ownership ties of companies" https://t.co/G8OUhxuley #corpgov

— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) November 18, 2015

And speaking of dispute resolution provisions....

... but going back to corporations for a moment - a while ago, I speculated that corporate forum-selection bylaws could unfairly work to favor management, because management can choose to invoke them at will - they can deploy them to dismiss cases when it will benefit them, but also can refuse to invoke them when it would work to their advantage to have plaintiffs' firms compete with each other in different jurisdictions.

Alison Frankel now reports that the FX company is doing just that.  According to her report, FX enacted a forum-selection bylaw choosing Utah as the forum; but now, faced with shareholder lawsuits in Nevada and Utah, it is choosing not to enforce the bylaw - precisely because, according to the Utah plaintiffs, it benefits management to have the plaintiffs compete for the opportunity to settle the case on sweetheart terms.

The basic problem is that these bylaws do not resemble contractual forum selection clauses, in that they can only be invoked by management - not plaintiffs.  And at least according to Delaware, they are only valid because they allow management the freedom to choose whether to invoke them (i.e., they contain a fiduciary out).  As a result, it's critical that courts police their use, and, in particular, make sure they do not bring about the forum-shopping evil they were intended to prevent.  Better than that - and I realize it's heresy to suggest  - multiforum litigation perhaps is not a problem that should be addressed privately, but instead should be addressed through coordinated action by the states.

LLC Agreements and the Private Ordering of Dispute Resolution (“Contract Is King” Micro-Symposium)

The micro-symposium has generated interest in a broad range of topics, so we are adding the following post by Peter Molk & Verity Winship discussing their recent scholarship on dispute resolution in LLC operating agreements and its intersection with the "contract is king" discussion this week.

Guest post by Peter Molk & Verity Winship:

This post highlights a particular area of private ordering within the LLC and other alternative entities: contractual provisions within the operating agreement that set the rules for resolving internal disputes.  These terms determine how disputes are resolved, such as by specifying when claims must be submitted to arbitration, where disputes can be heard, and whether parties waive the jury right or impose fee-shifting of litigation costs.  They apply to internal disputes, meaning they govern the dispute process among the LLCs’ members, managers, and the LLC itself.

How do these provisions fit with the debate over whether contract should be king?  The broadest connection is straightforward.  Dispute resolution provisions allocate rights and duties within LLCs, so the debate about the proper bounds of freedom of contract in the LLC space has implications for them as well.  But how firms set the rules for internal disputes is also relevant to the particular debate about the imposition of fiduciary duties.  Suppose that fiduciary duties were to become mandatory in publicly traded LLCs and LPs, as Delaware Chief Justice Strine and Vice Chancellor Laster have proposed and as Sandra Miller and Mohsen Manesh discuss in their posts in this micro-symposium.  Imposing fiduciary duties, by expanding the actions that disgruntled members can bring, in turn puts particular pressure on the dispute resolution clauses. 

To see the connection, look no further than the debate in the corporate context about private ordering of shareholder litigation in corporate charters and bylaws.  Contract is not king in the corporate context – a host of mandatory rules, including fiduciary duties, are imposed to protect investor rights.  Since corporations cannot respond by waiving fiduciary duties, some have instead taken the step of nevertheless effectively eliminating these protections by contracting out of enforcement mechanisms.  Recent efforts at imposing fee shifting can be characterized as indirectly weakening mandatory protections by reducing the probability of enforcing them. 

For corporations, the Delaware legislature eventually stepped in to ban fee-shifting provisions in the organizational documents of Delaware stock corporations.  The legislative response is telling.  It targets only stock corporations, using the business form as a proxy for characteristics that trigger a need for additional protections.  This takes us back to the question of whether contract should be king, and whether business form is a good rough indicator of characteristics (sophistication, consent) that we care about.

In an empirical study we are conducting, we identified dispute resolution provisions in a sample of operating agreements of privately owned Delaware LLCs.   More than a third of the agreements in our sample selected the forum for resolving disputes, primarily through exclusive forum provisions or mandatory arbitration provisions.  The agreements also modified litigation processes through terms that imposed fee-shifting, waived jury trials, and, less commonly, through other means like books and records limitations.  

We can think of these practices as altering the calculus parties engage in when deciding whether to enforce their rights that exist under the agreement.  While looking at dispute resolution provides a more accurate picture for LLCs’ governance regimes, it also complicates the contract-as-king debate.  Strengthening LLC members’ mandatory protections beyond the duty of good faith and fair dealing, as several earlier posts propose, does little good if LLCs respond by cutting back parties’ ability to enforce these protections.

A Few Thoughts on “Poverty, Inc.”

This past Sunday afternoon, I attended a screening of the film Poverty, Inc.

The trailer is available here.

I share a few, somewhat disconnected, thoughts on Poverty, Inc. under the page break.

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Contract Law, Fiduciary Duties, Good Faith, Fair Dealing, and the Legal Status of LLC Operating Agreements (Contract Is King Micro-Symposium)

The title of this post undoubtedly promises too much.  But that won't prevent me from trying to establish a few points that approach the many topics that could be discussed under a title that includes this much great stuff.  I make that attempt here.

I start with contract law.  As I noted in my prior post for this micro-symposium, one of my appearances at last week's ABA LLC Institute included a debate on whether an operating agreement is a common law contract.  This question arose in connection with my teaching of operating agreements (and also has arisen in my teaching of partnership agreements) in Business Associations.  Of course, lawyers understand that not all agreements are contracts.  A significant amount of energy is spent on this matter in the beginning of the standard contracts course in law school.  

Is an LLC operating agreement a contract?  I like the question not just for its face value, but because I believe that the answer does or may matter for purposes of resolving other questions arising in and outside LLC law.  I captured some thoughts about this question in a draft essay soon to be published in revised form in the SMU Law Review.  (I blogged about it here over the summer.)  Among other things, with judicial and legislative attention on freedom of contract in the LLC, the status of the LLC as a matter of contract law may shed light on the extent to which contract law can or should be important or imported to legal issues involving LLC operating agreements.

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Do Sophisticated Parties Really Prefer the Freedom of Contract? (Contract Is King Micro-Symposium)

I would like to thank the Business Law Professor Blog for this very important symposium. My brief thoughts are filling in for Marcia Narine. I became well acquainted with LLCs when I practiced in the alternative entities group of a Delaware law firm. What most stood out during my time there was the freedom enjoyed by LLCs and LPs to abridge fiduciary duties and deviate from other corporate orthodoxies. I constantly thought about whether this freedom of contract was a good thing; after all, case law tells only the tragic stories.

As mentioned in other posts, contractual freedom is ideal when sophisticated parties of comparable strengths are allowed to define their relationships. And generally, few problems arise from the LLC form. Law firms typically provide those seeking to form an LLC one of their standard, boilerplate operating agreements, which includes fiduciary duties. In turn, business owners are able to enjoy limited liability while avoiding many of the formalities, transactions costs, and tax burdens associated with traditional corporations. However, there seems to be an increasing number of cases where operating agreements resemble adhesion contracts, creating opportunities for abuse. Is it wise that unsophisticated are more at risk for contractual related harms so that sophisticated parties can contract freely?

The above narrative suggests that sophisticated parties benefit and enjoy the organizational flexibilities provided by the LLC form. It goes unnoticed, though, that sophisticated parties often reject this freedom of contract. Without question the trend in Delaware is towards the formation of LLCs and LPs versus corporations (at seemingly a 3:1 rate). But that doesn’t mean alternative entities always choose to keep their form. I was discussing this issue with a friend and practicing lawyer who mentioned that, in his transactional practice, when Delaware LLCs become big, and attract big funds, a condition of investment almost always requires an LLC to convert into a Delaware corporation. It seems that the lack of predictability associated with the freedom of contract scares potential investors who prefer the comforts of fiduciary duties, among other corporate staples. Upon some reflection, this anecdotally lines up with my experience as best as I can remember. So the parties who ostensibly are best served by contractual freedoms—i.e., sophisticated parties—appear to be the ones most likely to demand the traditional corporate form. And on a related note, this helps to explain why such a paltry number of LLCs and LPs have become public companies.

Exalting the Distinct Nature of the LLC (Contract Is King Micro-Symposium)

Regular readers of this blog know that I am fervent that the distinction between entities matters, particularly when it comes to LLCs and corporation.  I’m happy to be a part of this micro-symposium, and I have enjoyed the input from the other participants. 

My comments relate primarily to the role of contract in LLCs and how that is different that corporations. Underlying my comments is my thesis that LLCs and corporations are meaningfully distinct. This view is in contrast to Jeff Lipshaw, who argued in his post:

[I]f uncorporations differ from corporations, it’s more a matter of degree than of any real difference.  Both are textual artifacts.  We have created or assumed obligations pursuant to the text at certain points in time, and we use the artifacts and their associated legal baggage opportunistically when we can.  I am not convinced that organizing in the form or corporations or uncorporations makes much difference on that score.

I tend to be more of a Larry Ribstein disciple on this, and I wish I had the ability to articulate the issues as eloquently and intelligently as he could.  Alas, you’re stuck with me. (Editor's note: As Jeff Lipshaw says in his comment below, he did not say the forms of LLCs and corporations are not distinct. He is, of course, correct, and I know very well he knows the difference between the forms. In fact, a good portion of what I understand of the practical implications of the LLC comes from him. I do believe that the choice of form matters, and at least should matter in how courts review the different entities, as I explain below. And I do think the LLC is better, or should be (if courts will allow it), because of what the form allows interested parties to do with it. The flexibility of the LLC form creates opportunity for highly focused, nimble, and more specific entities that can be vehicles that facilitate creativity in investment in a way that corporations and partnerships, in my estimation, do not.]

In his book, The Rise of the Uncorporation, Ribstein stated, “Uncorporations [his term for noncorporate entities] come in all shapes and sizes, and are increasingly encroaching on traditionally ‘corporate’ domain.  The thesis is that form matters.” He goes on to explain that the differences between corporations and noncorporate entities have practical implications for those in business (and their lawyers).  I think he was right. 

It seems that some view the limited liability protection that comes with both an LLC and a corporation as the main, if not sole, defining function of the firm. If that were true, then it would be accurate that LLCs and corporation are functionally the same. I think the evolution and purposes of the limited partnership, the LLC, and the corporation suggest that these entities at least should (if they don’t in fact) serve different purposes and roles for those who create them.

The LLC Revolution helped facilitate formation of entities with pass-through taxation and limited liability protection. And it is true, that limited liability one chief benefit of the corporation, and the rise of the corporation can be tracked to that benefit.  But, entity choice is more that just liability and taxation, too, at least where there are real entity choices that provide options. 

Corporations are far more off-the-rack in nature, and they have a tremendous number of default rules. These rules facilitate start up, and help skip a number of conversations that promoters and initial investors might otherwise need to have. (Of course, they probably should have these conversations, but if they don’t, there are more significant gap fillers than for other entities.) 

Ribstein observed, “Uncorporations not only explicitly permit, but also indirectly facilitate contracts.  A firm’s contractual freedom should be evaluated not only in terms of the flexibility permitted by a given business association statute, but in light of the alternative available standard forms.”  As such, the clearer and more distinct the terms of the various entity-form statutes are, the more significant a firm’s choice of form can be.  And if the choice is an LLC, that choice should be respected.

As my countless posts lamenting the fact that courts can’t seem to get the distinction between LLCs and corporations clear, there’s evidence that Lipshaw is right as to the current state of the law, or some meaningful portion of it. But that doesn’t make it right.

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