Wednesday, October 28, 2015

Delaware Affirms "Effective" Control Standards for Non-Majority Shareholders

Earlier this month BLPB editor Ann Lipton wrote about the Delaware Supreme Court opinion in Sanchez regarding director independence (Delaware Supreme Court Discovers the Powers of Friendship).  On the same day as the Del. Sup. Ct. decided Sanchez, it affirmed the dismissal of KKR Financial Holdings shareholders' challenge to directors' approval of a buyout.  The transaction was a stock-for-stock merger between KKR & Co. L.P. (“KKR”) and KKR Financial Holdings LLC (“Financial Holdings”). Plaintiffs alleged that the entire fairness standard should apply because KKR was a controlling parent in Financial Holdings.  The controlling parent argument hinged on the facts that:

Financial Holdings's primary business was financing KKR's leveraged buyout activities, and instead of having employees manage the company's day-to-day operations, Financial Holdings was managed by KKR Financial Advisors, an affiliate of KKR, under a contractual management agreement that could only be terminated by Financial Holdings if it paid a termination fee.

Chief Justice Strine, writing an en banc opinion for the Court,  upheld Chancellor Bouchard's finding that KKR could not be considered a controlling parent where "KKR owned less than 1% of Financial Holdings's stock, had no right to appoint any directors, and had no contractual right to veto any board action."

The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the familiar standard of effective control, absent a majority, which focuses on "a combination of potent voting power and management control such that the stockholder could be deemed to have effective control of the board without actually owning a majority of stock."

Chancellor Bouchard had noted that plaintiff's complaint stemmed from dissatisfaction at the contractual relationship between KKR and Financial Holdings which limited the growth of Financial holdings.  Chancellor Bouchard wrote:

At bottom, plaintiffs ask the Court to impose fiduciary obligations on a relatively nominal stockholder, not because of any coercive power that stockholder could wield over the board's ability to independently decide whether or not to approve the merger, but because of pre-existing contractual obligations with that stockholder that constrain the business or strategic options available to the corporation.

 

 

Sometimes a "nothing new" case provides a good reminder of an established standard and provides clear language for recapping the concept to students.  This will become a note case on "effective" control in my ChartaCourse corporations casebook and also a good illustration of the role of private agreements in shaping how legal standards are applied.  

You can read the opinion at: Corwin et al. v. KKR Fin. Holdings et al., No. 629, 2014, 2015 WL 5772262 (Del. Oct. 2, 2015). 

-Anne Tucker

 

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2015/10/delaware-affirms-effective-control-standards-for-non-majority-shareholders.html

Ann Lipton, Anne Tucker, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Delaware, M&A, Teaching | Permalink

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