Friday, January 9, 2015

A Few Recent Delaware Cases

There are many Delaware cases from 2014 that are worth reading, but below are three relatively recent Delaware cases that I found worthwhile.  I provide the case name, my very short takeaway, and links to the case and additional commentary for those who wish to dive deeper.

In re Zhongpin Inc. Stockholders Litigation, controlling stockholders, decided Nov. 26, 2014. In denying a motion to dismiss, the Delaware Court of Chancery found a reasonable inference that a 17.3% stockholder/CEO could be a “controlling stockholder.” I have not done an exhaustive search on this issue, but this is a lower percentage of ownership for a “controlling stockholder” than I have seen in most cases, though (of course) the analysis is case specific. Additional commentary by Toby Myerson (Paul Weiss).

C.J. Energy Services, Inc. et al v. City of Miami General Employees’ and Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust, M&A/Revlon, decided Dec. 19, 2014. The Delaware Court of Chancery held that “there was a ‘plausible’ violation of the board’s Revlon duties because the board did not affirmatively shop the company either before or after signing.” (pg. 3). The Delaware Court of Chancery enjoined the shareholder vote on the transaction at issue for 30-days and “required [the defendant] to shop itself in violation of the merger agreement . . . which prohibited [the defendant] from soliciting other bids.” Id.  In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court reserved, stating that the Court of Chancery did not fulfill the stringent requirements for issuing a mandatory injunction, reminding that there are various ways to satisfy Revlon, and mentioning that this case did not have evidence of “defensive, entrenching motives,” as seen in Revlon and QVC. Note that the 38-page opinion was cranked out in just two days after the case was submitted. The handling of these expedited cases by the Delaware courts is one of the things that make Delaware attractive to corporations. Additional commentary by Brian Quinn (Boston College).

United Technologies Corp. v. Lawrence Treppel, books and records, decided Dec. 23, 2014.  The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Delaware Court of Chancery’s holding that the Court of Chancery did not have authority to restrict documents produced in a books and records inspection to use only in cases filed in Delaware courts. The Delaware Supreme Court remanded to the Delaware Court of Chancery to decide whether the Court of Chancery will exercise its discretion to so restrict the use of the information obtained in the books and records inspection. In this case, United Technologies insisted that Treppel sign a confidentiality agreement when he sought to inspect books and records, which is fairly common, but the confidentiality agreement also limited the forum, of any claim brought using the information inspected, to Delaware courts. At the time of the inspection request, United Technologies did not have a forum selection clause in its bylaws, but it later adopted one. As the broader forum selection debates continue, it will be interesting to see how the Delaware Court of Chancery handles this case in the books and records context, especially because the Delaware Court of Chancery has been encouraging plaintiffs to use the “tools at hand,” such as books and records requests, before filing derivative lawsuits.  Beyond the substance, one remarkable thing about this decision is that Chief Justice Leo Strine authored an opinion that was only 14 pages. When he was on the Court of Chancery he would author 100+ page opinions with some regularity. Granted, the Court of Chancery is a trial court and their opinions tend to be a good bit longer than the Delaware Supreme Court opinions, regardless of the judge. Additional commentary by Celia Taylor (Denver Law).  

For reading beyond these three cases, former Delaware Supreme Court Justice Jack Jacobs comments on two additional recent Delaware cases here (M&A related). 

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2015/01/a-few-recent-delaware-cases.html

Business Associations, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Delaware, Haskell Murray, M&A | Permalink

Comments

Haskell, when I was at Skadden, we talked about effective control being a distinct possibility at as low as a 5% beneficial ownership level--i.e., right at the Schedule 13D filing threshold. But as you point out in the post, a determination as to control is a heavily fact-based analysis--facts as to the players and the circumstances all must be carefully assessed. Stockholdings are but one fact . . . .

Thanks for this post.

Posted by: joanheminway | Jan 10, 2015 10:51:19 AM

Interesting, Joan. Have you seen any published cases around that 5% level? Most of the cases I remember are above 20%, but again, I know it is a case-by-case determination and I haven't done a search on the issue recently.

Posted by: Haskell Murray | Jan 11, 2015 4:58:21 AM

I remember there were cases, but I no longer have that research available to me. It's been a while since I wrote the reasoned opinions that required a knowledge of those cases! Others may be able to supply those citations.

But there are numerous examples outside decisional law--state anti-takeover statutes, disclosure regulation (including, but not limited to, that governing the Schedule 13D), poison pills that trigger at that level, etc. Still, the decision-making bodies adopting those laws, regulations, and devices must come to a control determination in the relevant context. So, your main point that the facts rule the day is a very valid one.

Posted by: joanheminway | Jan 11, 2015 9:28:04 AM

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