Monday, August 10, 2020
In the Spring of 2018, Justice Sonia Sotomayor visited the University of Houston law center, where I teach, and inspired our entire community. She shared some of her life experiences, and included the struggles that she encountered in college as she received feedback on her writing. We came away understanding that much of her success in law school could be credited to the work that she put in to strengthening her writing skills during her undergraduate studies. She was a brilliant student, but needed support to achieve her goals at the next level.
That same summer, I taught legal writing in the University of Houston’s award-winning Pipeline program for the first time. The program selects forty to fifty historically underrepresented and first generation undergraduate students to spend the summer in Houston learning about law school and the legal profession. I was energized to have the chance to work with undergraduate students who could build their skills before having them tested in the competitive law school environment.
Amid the COVID-19 pandemic and the protests and conversations around race that have happened this summer after the deaths of Ahmaud Arbery, George Floyd, and Breonna Taylor, I have been thinking about diversity in the legal field and the place of pipeline programs in increasing that diversity. Pipeline programs come in various forms. They target students earlier in the educational pipeline to try to give them educational support, information, and encouragement that will help keep them in the pipeline towards law school. This summer our pipeline programs moved online, as much of the rest of the education realm did. While students didn’t get to be in actual law school classrooms, they still experienced law professors, law classes, and virtual networking and mentorship.
How does this fit in with appellate advocacy? The same lack of diversity that affects the legal profession as a whole is magnified in the appellate bar and the judiciary. As an extreme example, those arguing before the Supreme Court are predominately white and male. The percentage of women arguing before the Supreme Court has hovered around 20% a term. When an African-American woman argues before the Supreme Court, it is newsworthy.
In the United States, 5% of attorneys are African American and 5% are Hispanic or Latino, while African Americans make up 13% of the overall population and Hispanic or Latino 18.5%. 2% of attorneys are Asian, while they make up 6% of the total population. On the other hand, 86% of attorneys are non-Hispanic Caucasian, while they make up only 60% of the overall population.
Pipeline programs are attempting to shift these numbers over time to have higher levels of representation of the underrepresented groups.
How can you be involved? There are several ways. First, many pipeline programs are free or low cost to the students, so programs need sponsors. The ABA provides resources related to various pipeline programs here.
Second, programs also need mentors and placements for their students. The ABA Diversity Site has a Pipeline Directory where you can find local pipeline programs and diversity initiatives.
Finally, when you have an opportunity to mentor a prospective law student, be a good mentor. Many of these students are first generation college students and your experiences can be valuable to them.
Pipeline programs are valuable tools to increase the diversity of our profession, and it has been fulfilling to get to work closely with students and encourage them along their educational journey. Many of us can demystify some of the law school process and help students identify areas to grow in as they prepare for law school.
Sunday, August 9, 2020
Chief Justice John Roberts’s influence on the United Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has been substantial. Importantly, however, Chief Justice Roberts’s judicial philosophy and approach to constitutional interpretation have raised more questions than answers.
By way of background, when former President George W. Bush nominated John Roberts to the Supreme Court, most commentators speculated that Roberts would be a reliably conservative justice and embrace an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. Indeed, during his confirmation hearings, Roberts emphasized the limited role of the judiciary, analogized judges to “umpires,” and rejected any suggestion that judges decide cases based on policy predilections. As Roberts stated during his confirmation hearing:
A justice is not like a law professor, who might say, ‘This is my theory... and this is what I'm going to be faithful to and consistent with,’ and in twenty years will look back and say, ‘I had a consistent theory of the First Amendment as applied to a particular area.’ Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules. They apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ballgame to see the umpire.
Based on these and other statements, legal scholars understandably expected that Chief Justice Roberts would decide cases based on the Constitution’s text and the original meaning underlying its provisions, and thus reach decisions that would favor conservative policy positions.
They were wrong.
Chief Justice Roberts’s jurisprudence has produced more confusion than clarity regarding his judicial philosophy and his approach to constitutional interpretation. To begin with, in National Federation of Independent Investors v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts surprised many legal commentators when he relied upon Congress’s power to tax and spend to uphold the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. In so doing, Chief Justice Roberts held that the Court should defer to the coordinate branches when a statute can reasonably be interpreted to pass constitutional muster. Importantly, however, in Shelby County v. Holder, Roberts authored the majority opinion in which the Court invalidated Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 even though the United States Senate had voted 98-0 to re-authorize the Act. And in McCutcheon v. FEC, Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion in which the Court invalidated limits on contributions that individuals can make to candidates for federal office. The decisions beg the question of why deference to the coordinate branches is acceptable in some cases but not others.
In the Supreme Court’s recent terms, some of Chief Justice Roberts’s decisions have engendered confusion regarding his judicial philosophy and approach to constitutional interpretation. For example, in June Medical Services, LLC v. Russo, Chief Justice Roberts concurred in a 5-4 decision that invalidated a Louisiana law requiring abortion providers to obtain hospital admitting privileges. In so doing, Chief Justice Roberts relied on principles of stare decisis to hold that the Court’s prior decision in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstadt, which invalidated a nearly identical statute in Texas, controlled the outcome. Chief Justice Roberts’s decision was surprising in many respects. Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts dissented from the Court’s decision in Whole Women’s Health and had previously stated in a brief drafted on behalf of the Department of Justice that Roe v. Wade – the foundation of the Court’s abortion jurisprudence – was “wrongly decided” because it had no “support in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution.” Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts’s reliance on stare decisis in June Medical Services was troubling because in other cases, most recently in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council, Roberts rejected stare decisis as a basis upon which to uphold precedent that he believed was wrongly decided. Perhaps more surprisingly in Bostock v. Clayton County, Chief Justice Roberts joined a six-member majority that construed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which when enacted prohibited discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, to encompass a prohibition against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Although many would agree that the Court reached a favorable outcome, the legal basis for that outcome was questionable. And in joining the majority, Chief Justice Roberts appeared less like an umpire and more like a cleanup hitter.
Of course, there are ways in which to construe Roberts’s decisions as entirely consistent with his judicial philosophy of being an “umpire,” as these cases involved entirely different facts and legal issues. Moreover, most, if not all, judges would eschew labels such as ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal,’ and assert that their decisions are predicated upon a faithful interpretation of the relevant constitutional or statutory text and a respect for precedent. Additionally, most, if not all, judges would state that it is improper to focus exclusively or even substantially on the outcomes that judges reach because doing so politicizes the judiciary and ignores the process by which judges decide cases.
All of this may be true. Notwithstanding, Chief Justice Roberts’s jurisprudence – at least in some cases – arguably deviates from his judicial philosophy, particularly his statement that the Court’s role is tantamount to an “umpire,” and his approach to constitutional interpretation, which prioritizes the text and history over contemporary societal attitudes. As Chief Justice Roberts stated in Obergefell v. Hodges:
[A] much different view of the Court’s role is possible. That view is more modest and restrained. It is more skeptical that the legal abilities of judges also reflect insight into moral and philosophical issues. It is more sensitive to the fact that judges are unelected and unaccountable, and that the legitimacy of their power depends on confining it to the exercise of legal judgment. It is more attuned to the lessons of history, and what it has meant for the country and Court when Justices have exceeded their proper bounds. And it is less pretentious than to suppose that while people around the world have viewed an institution in a particular way for thousands of years, the present generation and the present Court are the ones chosen to burst the bonds of that history and tradition.
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts’s approach to deference and stare decisis has been inconsistent and unpredictable, thus casting doubt upon whether Chief Justice Roberts’s reliance on either doctrine was merely a vehicle by which to reach an outcome that had less to do with legal interpretation and more to do with political calculations.
So what is going on here?
The most likely explanation is that Chief Justice Roberts is striving to maintain the Court’s institutional legitimacy and credibility with the public. In so doing, Roberts may be particularly focused on avoiding decisions that are perceived as politically motivated or far removed from the mainstream of contemporary political attitudes. Although this approach is certainly understandable, it can have unintended consequences that cause the very problem that Chief Justice Roberts seeks to avoid. For example, if institutional legitimacy and the desire to be perceived as apolitical influences the Court’s decisions, those decisions will, by their very nature, be political because they will be guided by inherently political rather than legal considerations (e.g., the text of a statute or constitutional provision, and precedent). The unintended consequence is that the Court will become inextricably intertwined with, rather than removed from, politics, and further divorced from, rather than reliant upon, legal doctrine as the basis for judicial decision-making. Perhaps most importantly, the determination of precisely what decisions will maintain the Court’s legitimacy is invariably subjective, which risks rendering decisions that, in the name of legitimacy are, as a matter of constitutional law, illegitimate.
Ultimately, this is not to suggest that Chief Justice Roberts is deserving of criticism or has acted with anything but the utmost integrity when deciding cases. Indeed, before joining the Court, Chief Justice Roberts was one of the most influential, respected, and brilliant advocates in the United States, and by all accounts, is an extraordinary colleague and person.
It is to suggest, however, that Chief Justice Roberts’s view of judges as “umpires” was probably correct and should remain as the judiciary’s guiding principle. After all, “[n]obody ever went to a ballgame to see the umpire.”
 Chief Justice Roberts Opening Statement, Nomination Process, available at: https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/chief-justice-roberts-statement-nomination-process.
 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
 See id.
 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
 572 U.S. 185 (2014).
 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
 Dylan Scott, John Roberts is the Supreme Court’s new swing vote. Is he going to overturn Roe v. Wade? (July 9, 2018), available at: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/7/9/17541954/roe-v-wade-supreme-court-john-roberts
 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2017).
 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
 Chief Justice Roberts's Opening Statement, Nomination Process, available at: https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/chief-justice-roberts-statement-nomination-process.
Thursday, August 6, 2020
This is a post by the Hon. Pierre H. Bergeron, a judge on the Ohio First District Court of Appeals. Judge Bergeron will be joining us as a regular blogger.
We live in an era of instant replay. Every sports fan, when witnessing a close play in a game, reflexively thinks, “I wonder what the replay will show?” In our instant replay culture, with video coverage of almost every move we make, this begs the question of what standard of review should appellate courts use when assessing video evidence. In days gone by, several witnesses might have testified at trial as to what they saw when the crime occurred, and appellate courts rightly deferred to the jury or trial judge in their assessment of credibility of these witnesses. But now, in many cases, we have video evidence of the crime (or other critical events) that we can watch. As video evidence becomes an almost indispensable element of the modern trial, what does that mean for the modern appeal?
Some appellate courts apply a deferential standard of review to the trial court’s findings, rooted in how appellate courts historically have reviewed evidentiary matters, whereas other courts gravitate towards de novo review, as a pragmatic response to the power of video evidence. I would submit, though, that, more often than not, many courts do not squarely acknowledge the standard of review on this point and probably (maybe reflexively) default to a Potter Stewart-esque “know it when you see it” perspective. The debate on this point is real and legitimate but it is important to have it in the open. Our appellate courts should be asking the question of how should we review video evidence.
Courts applying deferential review generally do so on grounds that largely mimic accepted justifications for deferential review of a trial court’s credibility and factual determinations generally. Because video-recorded evidence may be susceptible to varying interpretations, reviewing courts typically highlight the trial court’s unique vantage point for resolving these conflicts. Courts also justify deferential review because it preserves a trial court’s role within the judicial system as the factfinder. Finally, appellate courts remain leery about the danger of making litigants essentially retry issues on appeal, needlessly squandering judicial time and resources. State v. S.S., 162 A.3d 1058, 1060 (N.J. 2017); Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 366 (Ind. 2014).
By contrast, when selecting de novo review over a more deferential approach, appellate courts begin their analysis with a cautionary tale about providing deference to a trial court’s factual determinations. Trailing closely behind this point is usually a caveat: when the appellate court sits in a similar position to review the content or significance of video evidence as the trial court below, the appellate court may independently evaluate that evidence under de novo review. Now what appellate courts deem a “similar” position is up for debate, but ordinarily courts consider whether the trial court primarily relied upon the video evidence, whether controlling facts contained within the video are in dispute, and the thoroughness of the trial court’s factual findings (some cases without factual findings pave the way for de novo review). See State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tenn. 2000); People v. Madrid, 179 P.3d 1010, 1014 (Colo. 2008).
I know there are at least a couple of cases during my tenure as an appellate judge when the video evidence swayed me from affirm to reverse (or vice versa). In these instances, the power of the video evidence was simply impossible to ignore, regardless of what standard of review governed. Even the staunchest supporters of deferential review would probably have allowed for such meddling with the trial results when the video paints a decisive picture. Powerful policy justifications certainly animate both sides of this debate. And, overall, there is some need for flexibility here. The important take-away is that, whatever side of this debate you prefer, courts need to be candid about this standard of review point. After all, the standard of review in a lot of these cases can prove dispositive. The parties need to understand what they have to work with, and the trial courts likewise need to internalize what is being asked of them (for example, if the appellate court faults the trial court for a lack of findings). I look forward to seeing this debate unfold, and to potential new and innovative ways to approach this evidence that is becoming prevalent in the modern appeal.
Saturday, August 1, 2020
Each week, the Appellate Advocacy Blog Weekly Roundup presents a few tidbits of news and Twitter posts from the past week concerning appellate advocacy. As always, if you see something during the week that you think we should be sure to include, feel free to send a quick note to either (1) Dan Real at DReal@Creighton.edu or on Twitter @Daniel_L_Real or (2) Catharine Du Bois at DuBoisLegalWriting@gmail.com or on Twitter @CLDLegalWriting.
US Supreme Court Opinions and News
- The Supreme Court refused to lift a July 2019 order that stayed a permanent injunction against the use of Pentagon funds to build the border wall. The Ninth Circuit had affirmed the injunction, finding that the administration’s “transfer of funds here was unlawful.” The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “the Constitution delegates exclusively to Congress the power of the purse” and that “[t]he executive branch lacked independent constitutional authority to authorize the transfer of funds.” In July 2019, the Supreme Court stayed that injunction pending the resolution of the administration’s appeal. This order denies a request to lift that stay, allowing construction to continue. See the order here and reports from The New York Times, CNN, The Washington Post, and Reuters.
- The Court rejected another church challenge to Covid-19 restrictions, this one to Nevada’s 50-person limit to religious services. The challenge argued that churches faced tougher restrictions than casinos. The decision was without explanation and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh dissented. See the order here and reports from The New York Times, The Associated Press, and Reuters.
- UCI held its 10th Annual Supreme Court Term in Review discussing the key cases from the Court’s October 2019 term. The event is available at this link.
- Justice Breyer spoke with ABA President Judy Perry Martinez on July 29 during the organization’s annual meeting. Find the discussion at this link.
Federal Appellate Court Opinions and News
- The First Circuit vacated the Boston Marathon bomber’s death sentence, finding that the lower court did not adequately consider the effect of publicity on the jury that recommended the sentence. The order affirmed most of the conviction but ordered a new trial over only the sentence of death. The order concludes: “But make no mistake: Dzhokhar will spend his remaining days locked up in prison, with the only matter remaining being whether he will die by execution.” See the order and reports from The Washington Post, Reuters, and The Wall Street Journal.
- The D.C. Circuit ordered a rehearing en banc on the dismissal of the case against Michael Flynn and vacated a decision that dismissed the case. The order directs the parties to “be prepared to address whether there are ‘no other adequate means to attain the relief’ desired,” which presumably relates to the principle argument that the writ of mandamus that directed the trial judge to dismiss the case was unwarranted because an alternative was available. The court will hear argument on August 11. See the order and reports from APNews, The New York Times, Reuters, and Bloomberg News.
The Times-Picayune of New Orleans reports that Louisiana is among the states that have granted diploma privileges in light of concerns about sitting the Bar exam during the pandemic. Diploma privileges allow recent law school graduates to practice without taking the Bar exam. States have handled the concerns in a variety of ways, including administering the exam as usual, postponing the exam, offering the exam online, and granting diploma privileges. For a full list of the status of the 2020 bar by state, see this link.
Saturday, July 25, 2020
Tired of seeing yet another post on how to ______ [fill in the blank: teach, write, argue, live] in our new virtual reality? Exhausted from never leaving your home and Zooming all day? Me too.
In fact, I was reluctant to write one more blog on online writing tools. However, my efforts to add new virtual tools to my teaching arsenal introduced me to two peer review software systems I believe can help us in the classroom: Peerceptiv, https://peerceptiv.com/, and Eli Review, https://elireview.com/. These peer review programs make anonymous online feedback easy, and encourage the writers to learn by editing others. They also reminded me how much any law practice can increase attorney writing skills by using peer review. See, e.g., Kwangsu Cho and Charles MacArthur, Learning by Reviewing, 103 J. of Ed. Psych. 73, 84 (Feb. 2011) https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ933615
As an of counsel appellate lawyer at a large law firm, I often had the chance to be an “intermediate editor” who reviewed junior lawyers’ briefs before sending them on to the partners. While I had been using informal peer review in my adjunct teaching for a few years at that point, I did not truly see how much editing others’ work makes us better writers until I experienced the phenomenon in practice. When I noticed I was making the same annoying mistakes I’d been correcting as an editor, I knew my work for the junior associates was making me a far better writer. Eli Review has a nice blog post on this “giver’s gain.” https://elireview.com/2017/03/28/givers-gain/.
My positive reviewing experience prompted me to add more ungraded peer review in my teaching and made me an advocate for the review process with clients and supervisors. Like in-house moot court, the practice of adding an intermediate editor is not possible in every situation. However, if you practice in a large firm or agency, consider adding a layer of review by mid-level writers to young attorneys’ work. This review can actually save fees, by shortening partner review time, and can help create better briefs across the board. And if you are in a smaller practice or have no budget for formal peer review, think about the techniques you like in your opponents’ papers, and incorporate those into your own writing.
In the digital classroom, we can use technology to enhance the peer review process. Many thanks to Prof. Tracy Norton of the Touro Law Center for introducing me to Peerceptiv and for being incredibly generous with her time by running a Peerceptiv demo for the LRW community. Similarly, I send thanks to Prof. Brian Larson of the Texas A&M University School of Law, who introduced me to Eli Review and also spent an incredible amount of time helping the LRW community with an Eli Review demo. Neither Prof. Norton or Prof. Larson have any connection to these products, and I also have no affiliation with these companies and am just sharing their information to help others.
From Profs. Norton and Larson, I learned both programs ask students to submit a writing assignment online and then provide feedback on other students’ writing for the same assignment. Students follow a set rubric in their reviews, and instructors can include the quality of the reviews students provide as part of their writing grades. The whole process can be anonymous. Professors using these programs raved about the technical support and positive student feedback from both. Peerceptiv costs students slightly less than Eli Review, and both can be “textbooks” for your classes at less than $30 a year.
The genius in each product is the science and math behind the assessment scores and review prompts. Each product truly helps students grow as writers by combining the established science on peer review and some neat online features. The math and engineering majors in my home called the programs “elegant.”
For example, Peerceptiv has the peers give a grade of 1-7 on the assignment and complete a four-part review. Then, each student grades the reviews he or she received on a 1-7 scale. Peerceptiv then assigns an overall rating for the assignment of 1-7 based on a combination of the student’s writing score and reviewing score. The professor can set the percentages each score is worth, and the prof can also give reviews him/herself and assign a higher level of credit in the grade to his/her review. Peerceptiv docs points when a review or assignment is late. See https://www.peerceptiv.com/why-peerceptiv-overview/#curriculum.
If the Peerceptiv number system seems too much like the dreaded undergraduate “peer grading” to you, consider Eli Review. Instead of assigning a number ranking to a student's writing and reviews, Eli Review asks students to pull the most helpful comments out of their peers’ reviews and make an express revision plan saying how they will incorporate the comments. Eli Review does ask students to rate the quality of the reviews on a 1-5 star basis, with only truly exceptional reviews earning five stars. See https://elireview.com/learn/how/. This level of assessment forces the writer to give better reviews and thereby learn more about writing, but can help avoid concerns about someone other than a professor grading work.
This fall, I will use Eli Review for short writing like simple case illustrations, and then will progress to peer-reviewed trial brief argument sections in the spring. I plan to use Eli Review only for anonymous, ungraded work. My goal is to give students the “aha” moment I had when reviewing briefs as an intermediate editor, and to help them gain the skill of self-diagnosing writing problems.
Thanks for reading another note on online writing tools. I wish you all good health, and a safe trip outside sometime soon too.
Saturday, July 11, 2020
We are thrilled to welcome Professor Susan Smith Bakhshian of Loyola Law School Los Angeles as our guest author. Susan has taught LRW and doctrinal law for many years at Loyola, where she is a Clinical Professor of Law and Director of Bar Programs. She is the co-author of Clearing the Last Hurdle: Mapping Success on the California Bar Exam. This summer, she taught entirely online using Brightspace and Zoom. You can reach Susan at email@example.com.
Caution Ahead: Breakout Groups Can Fail
Breakout rooms are great. But. Wait for it. They can fail. Break out rooms are terrific for everything from a way to let students chat and get to know each other, to in class exercises and writing assignments. And the experience is usually great.
Breakout rooms are not a substitute for physical classrooms, but they can give students a few minutes to socialize, provide variety in instruction, and accomplish learning objectives.
So when do breakout rooms go wrong? Groups can go wrong a variety of ways. While the tech can fail, which is a new problem, the other failures are nothing new. A student may decline to participate fully. Group dynamics can unravel. Disputes can arise.
An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Groups need clear instructions to stay on track. Using a slide in class or posting a handout before class goes a long way to making sure students understand that breakout groups are real assignments and not a class break. By posting slides before class, shy or anxious students are able to preview the group assignment and more fully participate in class.
Pop in. Video conference software simulates walking around the room. Once students realize the professor might drop in the group, they stay on track. This feature is especially helpful when I see that the random assignment has created a group of several weaker students or one with too many natural leaders. I usually go to those groups first. Even if all of the groups are doing fine without any help, I also just like to say “hello.”
Require a deliverable. If the groups know going into the exercise that a written product is due or that anyone in the group may be called on, they will stay on task better. Formal and informal deliverables both work well. Ask for each group to craft an email to the professor, require a post, or ask the group to return to the full class ready to answer a question or present their best ideas.
For those who have not tried a breakout room, an easy, but effective assignment is to have the groups make a list of best (and worst) practices for online learning. They have great tips for each other ranging from natural lighting solutions to how to use the “hide my video” feature to get more comfortable being on video. This assignment works as an ice-breaker in an early class or anytime you want to cover professionalism. As attorneys, they will need to be proficient at using video conferencing software, even after a return to more live interaction. A quick mention that job interviews may be online gets everyone in the group more interested in discussing best practices.
Bottom line, breakout groups are flexible and effective in online teaching.
Saturday, June 27, 2020
Moving from Pandemic Emergency Zoom Oral Arguments to True Oral Argument Online: Preparation and Professionalism
In March, we had only hours to transition from in-person teaching and law practice to remote options. As many internet memes show, that led to some memorable court appearances sans pants, from closets and bathrooms. Recently, we’ve been able to step back and assess our remote experiences to see what we can use for better practice and teaching, even as we return to in-person work. I’ve attended several excellent sessions on online teaching, and I send kudos to William & Mary Law for its fantastic two-day Conference for Excellence in Teaching Legal Research & Writing Online. (If you could not attend, you can view asynchronous postings here: https://law.wm.edu/academics/intellectuallife/conferencesandlectures/excellence_online_teaching/index.php.) Like many of you, my inbox is full of invites for even more webinars and conferences I am not able to attend.
Luckily, Jill Wheaton of Dykema Gossett recently wrote a summary of the May 4, 2020 ABA Appellate Judges Council CLE webinar on “Appellate Advocacy in the Age of COVID-19.” The ABA’s program featured judges, a state appellate court chief clerk, and appellate practitioners speaking on how appeals courts will use remote appearances moving forward. As Wheaton explained, the panel presented “thoughts about, and recommendations regarding, telephone or video appellate arguments” and suggested counsel “do everything they can to make a remote argument as much like an in-person argument as possible.” Jill M. Wheaton, Appellate Advocacy in the Age of COVID-19, Appellate Issues--2020 Special Edition 1 (ABA May 27, 2020). Overall, the recommendations for practitioners stressed professionalism in how we approach video appearances. In other words, be prepared and yes, wear pants.
Part of our preparation for oral argument today should include a test run of our technology. Whenever possible, appellate practitioners should do moot courts before oral arguments. Now, we should make our moot courts a test of both online systems and legal arguments. Since many courts already used some type of internal video conferencing before COVID-19—and a few trial and appellate courts allowed video argument on occasion before 2020--the clerks and judges are already familiar with some remote platforms. Id. They expect us to be familiar with the platforms as well. In fact, many courts have videos of past virtual oral arguments online, and counsel can watch the videos as part of their oral argument preparation.
We should also be as professional as possible in every detail of our online appearances. Hopefully, we know to avoid the meme-worthy mistakes of March and April, by dressing in full suits and using a professional-looking digital background or physical space free of clutter and noise for a video appearance. The ABA panel stressed smaller points as well. For example, many courts still expect counsel to rise when the bailiff calls the case, and the panel judges noted they prefer advocates to stand when speaking. Id. at 2. Therefore, consider either using an adjustable desk, so you can stand when speaking but sit when opposing counsel argues, or use a stool so you can stay at eye level. The practitioners on the ABA panel suggested using a stack of books to raise your computer to standing level if needed, and to be sure your camera is on the top of your monitor to help you look directly at the judges during the argument. Id. Finally, counsel should remember they will be on camera for the entire hearing, even when opposing counsel is speaking. Id. Thus, find a way to communicate unobtrusively with co-counsel and your client, if needed.
We all want life to “return to normal,” but some form of remote oral arguments will no doubt remain after COVID-19 leaves. For now, “courts have been forced to become creative to continue to advance their dockets, requiring the bench and bar to become creative as well.” Id. at 3. Hopefully, these tips from the ABA panel can help us all be more creative, prepared and professional for this new normal.
June 27, 2020 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Federal Appeals Courts, Legal Profession, Moot Court, Oral Argument, State Appeals Courts, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0)
Sunday, June 21, 2020
This week, the United States Supreme Court issued rulings in two cases – Bostock v. Clayton County and Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California – that surprised some court observers. In Bostock, the Court held by a 6-3 margin that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. In so holding, the Court, per Justice Neil Gorsuch, held that discrimination on either basis necessarily entailed discrimination on the basis of sex. In Department of Homeland Security, the Court held, by a 5-4 margin (with Chief Justice Roberts joining the Court’s four liberal members), that the manner in which the Trump administration terminated the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program (DACA) violated the Administrative Procedure Act.
The decisions surprised some court observers. For example, in Bostock, some scholars expected that Justice Gorsuch, who embraces a form of statutory interpretation known as textualism, would hold that the word “sex” as contained in Title VII referred only to discrimination on the basis of biological sex. After all, when Title VII was enacted, legislators neither expressly nor implicitly suggested that sexual orientation or gender identity came within the purview of sex-based discrimination. Likewise, in Department of Homeland Security, some scholars expected that Chief Justice Roberts would uphold the Trump administration’s decision.
So what is going here? In short, the answer is that the justices rely on extralegal factors when making decisions and those factors explain why decision-making at the Court is not, as Justice Elena Kagan once stated, “law all the way down.”
Below is a brief summary of several factors that may – and likely do – influence the Court’s decision-making process.
I. Concerns for institutional legitimacy matter – particularly for Chief Justice John Roberts
The Court is undoubtedly – and rightfully – concerned with its institutional legitimacy. Indeed, inspiring public confidence in the Court’s decision-making process, which includes cultivating the perception that the justices are neutral arbiters of the law, is essential to maintaining the Court’s legitimacy and credibility. For that reason, the Court is understandably reluctant to issue decisions that are inconsistent with precedent, overly broad, politically unpopular, and unnecessarily divisive. Put simply, the Court is dedicated to preserving its status as an independent legal institution that is neither influenced by nor concerned with political ideology.
Some court observers posit that Chief Justice Roberts is particularly concerned with preserving the Court’s institutional legitimacy. For example, Roberts’s desire to avoid 5-4 decisions (to the extent possible) and refrain from deciding socially and politically divisive cases underscores his commitment to the Court’s legitimacy. In fact, concerns for institutional legitimacy arguably motivated, at least in part, Chief Justice Roberts’s decision in National Federation of Independent Investors v. Sebelius, where he upheld the Affordable Care Act on the basis that the Act’s individual mandate constituted a permissible tax.
But the desire to protect the Court’s institutional legitimacy is a questionable basis for judicial decision-making. Simply put, it is difficult to identify the criteria or circumstances in which a specific outcome will preserve, rather than undermine, the Court’s legitimacy. For example, in Shelby County v. Holder, Chief Justice Roberts voted with the Court’s conservative members to invalidate portions of the Voting Rights Act, which was a politically and publicly unpopular decision. And despite the increasing public and political support for same-sex marriage, Chief Justice Roberts dissented in Obergefell v. Hodges, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution did not encompass a right to same-sex marriage. Reasonable people would certainly disagree regarding whether these decisions protected the Court’s legitimacy.
Such disagreement highlights the problem when placing emphasis on institutional legitimacy as a basis for rendering decisions. To begin with, the concept of institutional legitimacy can be defined differently. For example, does a decision further the Court’s institutional legitimacy if it is consistent with public opinion or the policy predilections of legislators? Do concerns for institutional legitimacy require the Court to adopt an originalist philosophy or, at the very least, ensure that its decisions are consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution’s text? Does the Court’s institutional legitimacy depend on whether the outcome is considered just and fair? These questions highlight the problem: preserving institutional legitimacy depends on each justice’s subjective view of what decisions (and interpretative) methods achieve that goal. For that reason, an exclusive or predominant focus on preserving the Court’s institutional legitimacy can inadvertently undermine the very legitimacy that the justices seek to preserve.
II. Ideology matters – for conservative and liberal justices
For both conservative and liberal justices, ideological considerations and policy predilections influence their decision-making process. Of course, this is not true in every case, as many cases do not implicate ideological considerations to a significant degree or require the application of other principles, such as stare decisis, that constrain a justice’s ability to predicate a decision on ideology alone.
However, in politically or socially divisive cases, such as those involving affirmative action, abortion, the death penalty, or the right to bear arms, ideology arguably plays a role. Indeed, a substantial body of research suggests that the justices render decisions that are consistent with their political beliefs. Perhaps for this reason, in some cases, lawyers and scholars can accurately predict how the justices will rule. For example, the Court’s four liberal justices will almost always abortion restrictions. The Court’s most conservative justices will often be unreceptive to arguments that the imposition of the death penalty in a given case violates the Eighth Amendment. Justice Sotomayor will almost certainly be hostile to challenges to affirmative action programs and Justice Alito will almost certainly be receptive to such challenges. Justice Ginsburg will almost certainly invalidate restrictions on abortion access while Justice Thomas will almost certainly uphold such restrictions. Not surprisingly, these outcomes align perfectly with the justices’ policy and political preferences.
Of course, a substantial portion of the Court’s cases are decided unanimously, and, as stated above, in many cases, ideology is not implicated to a substantial degree. But make no mistake: ideology does influence at least a portion of the Court’s decisions.
III. Bias matters – for both liberal and conservative justices
Social science research suggests that bias affects liberal and conservative justices and that this bias reflects, in part, each justice’s personal background and experience. For example, gender bias is prevalent in criminal sentencing, as men often receive harsher sentences than women. In fact, “the sentencing disparities among gender are some of the most visible and persistent sentencing disparities in this country.” Additionally, African-American defendants often receive harsher sentences than white defendants. As one scholar explains:
[T]he body of research on the potential for invidious biases in judges arising from reliance on emotion or implicit stereotypes supports a troubling conclusion: Judges do not easily set such extralegal matters aside. The feelings and biases that influence most adults seem to also affect judges.
Of course, this research should not suggest that the justices are motivated primarily or even secondarily by explicit or implicit bias. It does suggest, however, that the justices, like all individuals, are susceptible to confirmation bias, which is an “effort to seek out information that is consistent with one’s prior beliefs, while ignoring or avoiding information that could refute them.” In so doing, the potential for reaching an improper result increase substantially.
IV. `Emotion matters – it’s not, as Justice Elena Kagan once stated, “Law all the way down”
Empirical research demonstrates that a judge’s emotions matter in the decision-making process. To be sure, a “series of experiments with hundreds of judges from numerous jurisdictions concluded that emotions influence how judges interpret law when evaluating hypothetical cases.” As researchers explain:
[J]udicial reliance on emotion in decision making can be defensible. Judges should temper their application of law and logic with expressions of compassion and empathy. Indeed, one set of studies finds that judges seem to largely ignore apologies in both civil and criminal cases, making the judges seem overly dispassionate. [Studies in other contexts], however, go well beyond a sensible level of compassion. No one can defend taking a football loss out on juveniles, setting lower bail for more attractive litigants, or treating Muslim litigants differently after 9/11. Nevertheless, these studies show judges to be vulnerable to several such untoward influences.
Emotion would certainly seem relevant because, in many cases, a constitutional or statutory provision is susceptible to different interpretations, and because judges probably want to reach what they believe is the most equitable and fair result.
V. Intuition matters
Studies show that, in some instances, judges base decisions in large part on intuition, rather than on evidence or empirical data. Indeed, “[i]n one study, 160 federal judges evaluating a hypothetical case neglected statistical evidence in favor of intuition in the assessment of negligence.” As one study demonstrated, “judges rely heavily on intuitive reasoning to evaluate legal disputes,” “use simple mental shortcuts to guide how they think about legal materials,” and “do not improve with experience or specialization.” In fact, the “excessive reliance on an intuitive response” is responsible in substantial part for the prevalence of confirmation bias.
Ultimately, the relevant research on judging suggests that judges strive to achieve what they believe is the fairest and most just result. Put differently, judges do not necessarily reach decisions based on what they are compelled to do but based on what they are able to do in a given case. This supports the proposition that judging is strategic and personal, not merely legal. For that reason, law students and advocates should consider the influence of the above factors when developing and making legal arguments. Judges, including the justices on the Supreme Court, are human beings and judging is a human enterprise.
 See 590 U.S. ___ , 2020 WL 3146686.
 See id.
 See 590 U.S. ___, available at: https://d2qwohl8lx5mh1.cloudfront.net/Xpikua_BIGWtET0SEU1fDQ/content.
 Josh Blackmun, Kagan- Law All The Way Down, Stephen Hawking- Turtles All The Way Down (2010), available at: http://joshblackman.com/blog/2010/06/30/kagan-law-all-the-way-down-stephen-hawkingng-turtles-all-the-way-down/.
 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
 See id.
 Id. at 28 (internal citation omitted).
 Id. at 29.
 Id. at 32.
 Id. at 16.
 Id. at 24.
 Id. at 27.
 Id. at 14.
 Id. at 21.
Friday, June 12, 2020
Addressing Bias in Our Briefs and in the Legal Writing Classroom: If You Want Peace, Work for Justice
Like so many of us, I have spent the last few months worrying. I have been very worried about my law students’ physical and mental well-being. As a parent, I’m losing sleep over concerns for my high-school and college-aged children. But for the last two weeks especially, I have been incredibly anxious about the lack of justice in our country.
As a teen, I loved the statement, “if you want peace, work for justice.” I did not know then the phrase has roots in Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, but I knew it made sense. See, e.g., Ronald C. Smith, If You Want Peace, Work for Justice, 16 Crim. Just. 1, 2 (ABA Fall, 2001) (using the phrase to call for justice after 9/11 and discussing the role of the criminal justice bar in ensuring freedoms and liberties to bring peace); Samuel J. Levine, The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating Spirituality, Scholarship and Profession, 27 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1199, 1206-09 (1996). To me, one small way we can all start to make changes for more justice is by being more intentional in discussing bias in our writing, practice, and teaching.
As appellate lawyers, we often have a good overview of problems in the trial court, and sometimes we can see racism and bias as well. While we cannot present something beyond the record in a brief, we can do better at discussing what the record supports, and in having painful conversations with our trial counsel and clients. Our courts have been increasingly willing to discuss bias, and one recently stressed the need to take “teachable moments” to end bias. See Briganti v. Chow, 42 Cal. App. 4th 504, 510-13 (2019); Debra Cassens Weiss, “Appeals court sees lawyer's reference to 'attractive' judge in brief as a 'teachable moment' on sexism,” http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/appeals-court-sees-lawyers-reference-to-attractive-judge-in-brief-as-a-teachable-moment-on-sexism (Nov. 27, 2019). We too should advocate for professionalism, and against bias, in our practice. Of course, this is easier said than done, and our obligation is to our client, but if we start more conversations about what happened at trial and seize more opportunities to start a dialogue on professionalism, we will be working for justice.
Moreover, as legal writing teachers, we have great opportunities to include discussions of racism in our work. In doing so, we need not stray from our “assigned” role as writing teachers, since we also have an obligation to teach ethical practice as part of legal writing and analysis. In fact, we already stress important topics of professionalism in myriad ways. For example, many of us use cases on disbarment when we teach case briefing, and discuss the results of missed deadlines or failure to follow court rules as part of our teaching for memos and briefs. Additionally, I used problems on curing attorney errors for my trial brief problems for years. Now, we can include cases leading to discussions of bias as well. Using problems based in some legal areas, like Fourth Amendment pretextual stops and Title VII discrimination, will easily lead to discussions of racism and how writers and lawyers can address injustice. Using problems based in other substantive areas, like false imprisonment or real property, can create wonderful openings for discussing implicit bias and raising awareness, all while teaching crucial legal analysis and writing skills. I am not suggesting professors should or should not share their own views in these discussions, I am just noting a discussion of bias in the law and legal profession is a logical and important part of the ethical issues we already teach.
As Ronald Smith said of working for justice to bring peace: “think of another saying, ‘It is better to light one candle than to curse the darkness.’ [When] we seek justice each of us lights candles, [and] light[s] the way for others to see how they . . . can light candles and work for justice, too.” Smith, If You Want Peace, Work for Justice, 16 Crim. Just. at 3.
I wish you all good health and less worry, with hopes for a more just future.
Monday, June 8, 2020
Two weeks ago I shared an interview that I did with Sean Marotta and Raffi Melkonian. Today I am sharing an interview that I did recently with David Lat. David is the founding editor of the popular blog Above the Law. He is also now a managing director at Lateral Link. In this interview, David talks about his personal, near death experience with COVID-19. He also shares his thoughts on the future of the legal practice post-COVID, the future of oral arguments in the appellate and Supreme Court, and which Justice he thinks would have the best Zoom background. Thanks David for joining me for the interview!
Edited: Sorry about the video issues, I think that it is fixed.
June 8, 2020 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Court Reform, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Current Affairs, Federal Appeals Courts, Legal Profession, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)
Sunday, June 7, 2020
The death of George Floyd was tragic and appalling. The video that showed Officer Derek Chauvin’s knee on Floyd’s neck for almost nine minutes was disturbing. Sadly, many unarmed African-Americans have been fatally shot by law enforcement, and although most officers have been acquitted of criminal conduct based on these events, they have been tragic and involved the questionable, if not unnecessary, use of force.
This is not to say that the majority of law enforcement officers are bad people. Most strive to – and do – protect their communities. But the events this past week have rightfully renewed a call to address problems in the law enforcement community and issues related to inequality. Below are a few thoughts regarding how to address the broader issue of inequality and achieve a society where equal opportunity exists for all citizens.
I. Focus on Institutional Corruption, not merely Institutional, or Systemic, Racism
There can be no doubt that racism and discrimination exist throughout the United States. Indeed, the legacy of, among other things, slavery, segregation, and Jim Crow have caused incalculable social and economic harm to African-Americans that continue to this day. As such, achieving equality and eradicating discrimination in all of its forms is a moral and categorical imperative.
To do so, however, it is not sufficient to rely upon an overly general assertion that the United States is currently an institutionally or systemically racist society. Although institutional racism certainly existed for much of this country’s history, it does not exist to nearly the same degree in contemporary society. For example, federal and state laws outlaw discrimination. Public universities have prioritized diversifying their student bodies and faculty. Private employers have made laudable efforts to diversify their workforces. Affirmative action programs have increased access to education for traditionally disadvantaged groups. This is merely a representative sample of the efforts reflecting a commitment to equality of opportunity and evincing a condemnation of practices that, by design or in effect, discriminate against particular groups.
Of course, although institutional racism is no longer ubiquitous, there can be no doubt that some institutions remain racist or, at the very least, retain policies that disparately impact traditionally marginalized groups. Accordingly, the best path to achieving equality would be to identify, at the county, state, and federal level, the specific institutions that remain institutionally or systemically racist – and to develop workable policy prescriptions to remedy the infirmities in these institutions. Put differently, it does little, if any, good to recite the proposition to institutional or systemic racism exists because these terms are overly broad and thus make it difficult to develop workable and sustainable remedies for specific problems.
Additionally, scholars and policymakers place insufficient emphasis on institutional corruption. This concept, which was developed by Harvard Law School Professor Lawrence Lessig, states as follows:
Institutional corruption is manifest when there is a systemic and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical, that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose, including, to the extent relevant to its purpose, weakening either the public’s trust in that institution or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness.
Simply put, institutional corruption does not involve violations of the law. Rather, it refers to the degradation of an institution’s underlying values, and how the institution’s actions, although not illegal, undermine the public trust.
The United States Department of Justice’s investigation into the tragic death of Michael Brown – and the Ferguson Police Department – is instructive. The Department cleared Officer Darren Wilson of wrongdoing but, in so doing, found that the Ferguson Police Department was institutionally corrupt. That is, although the Ferguson Police Department did not engage in illegal activity per se, its policies and practices disproportionately and unfairly impacted African-American residents, thus highlighting the need for principled reforms.
II. Focus on Crime Prevention by Addressing the Underlying Causes of Criminality
There can be no doubt that reforms to policing practices (and legal doctrines, such as qualified immunity) are necessary in some jurisdictions to ensure that police brutality ends and that the lives of African-American suspects (and all suspects) are not needlessly lost. This may include eliminating specific physical restraints, making changes to police training methods, and revisiting the qualified immunity doctrine.
But such reforms are not enough.
Legislators and policymakers must address a critical issue that has nothing to do with law enforcement – the underlying causes of criminality in the African-American community (and all communities, for that matter) – and strive to reduce criminal behavior.
Regarding this issue, the landmark report of former Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan is also instructive, albeit controversial. In that report, Senator Moynihan found that, by the mid-1960s, nearly half of African-American families were in the middle class. In subsequent years, however, that progress stalled. Senator Moynihan posited that the decline of the nuclear family and the increase in single-parent families contributed to this problem as part of a “tangle of pathology,” which included “delinquency, joblessness, school failure, crime, and fatherlessness.” These factors, Moynihan concluded, created a “self-perpetuating cycle of deprivation, hardship, and inequality.” Decades after its publication, the Urban Institute revisited Senator Moynihan’s report and concluded that African-Americans “still suffer from the intersecting disadvantages that Moynihan called a ‘tangle of pathologies,’ with each negative factor reinforcing the others.” Specifically, the Urban Institute noted that children “born into single-mother families [approximately 72% of African-American children] are far more likely to be poor and persistently poor than children born into two-parent families,” and that “[h]igh-poverty neighborhoods suffer from high rates of crime and violence, poor schools, and weak connections to the labor market.” Consequently, these factors may be responsible, in part, for criminality and inequality of opportunity.
But the Moynihan Report’s findings do not tell the whole, or even most important part, of the story. Perhaps the most deleterious effect of the systemic discrimination that continued until the mid-twentieth Century was the disparity in the quality of education at the grade and high school levels. To make matters worse, in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that the funding of public schools based on property tax revenue did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The practical effect was far-reaching and long-lasting: children from wealthy neighborhoods received a better education than children from poor neighborhoods. That, in a nutshell, made equality of opportunity illusory for poor children of all races. As the Urban Institute noted, “[y]oung people from high-poverty neighborhoods are less successful in school than their counterparts from more affluent communities: they earn lower grades, are more likely to drop out, and are less likely to go on to college.”
Make no mistake: racism is and continues to be part of the problem. Indeed, the Urban Institute noted that “race remains a factor in determining economic opportunities and outcomes,” and that “aggressive enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes as well as affirmative action policies are required to ensure equal opportunity.” Police brutality, of course, is also a problem, and the recent protests are a testament to citizens’ rightful anger, at such brutality although those citizens who engaged in violence and other criminal activity should not be considered protesters in any sense whatsoever.
But the path to equality requires policymakers and scholars to do far more than focus on law enforcement. For the promise of equality to become a reality for all citizens, researchers and scholars must develop policies that address community and family issues, and that remedy the disparities in education at the grade and high school levels.
III. Reform Federal and State Sentencing Guidelines – and Reentry Programs
At the federal and state level, sentencing guidelines often authorize the imposition of unnecessarily long and unprincipled sentences. Additionally, during incarceration, the criminal justice system often provides inadequate support and treatment for mentally ill inmates. And upon release, these individuals, many of whom are members of traditionally disadvantaged groups, have deteriorated substantially and lack the social and economic support to successfully reintegrate into society. Not surprisingly, they frequently engage in criminal conduct and return to prison, where the cycle continues.
Thus, reforming sentencing law to enhance rehabilitation-based programs for inmates – and prioritize support for inmates upon release – is critical to reducing crime.
IV. The Millennial Sequence
The path to the middle class – and away from criminality – is attainable for citizens of all backgrounds. Specifically, the American Enterprise Institute has found that, among millennials, “getting at least a high school degree, working full-time, and marrying before having any children,” facilitates upward mobility into the middle class:
[The] divergent paths toward adulthood are associated with markedly different economic fortunes among Millennials. Young adults who put marriage first are more likely to find themselves in the middle or upper third of the income distribution, compared to their peers who have not formed a family and especially compared to their peers who have children before marrying … This pattern holds true for racial and ethnic minorities, as well as young adults from lower-income families. For instance, 76% of African American and 81% of Hispanic young adults who married first are in the middle or upper third of the income distribution, as are 87% of whites.
In fact, this sequence is almost certain to reduce, if not eliminate, the likelihood that an individual will live in poverty:
97% of Millennials who follow what has been called the “success sequence”—that is, who get at least a high school degree, work, and then marry before having any children, in that order—are not poor by the time they reach their prime young adult years (ages 28-34). The “success sequence,” so named by Brookings Institution scholars Ron Haskins and Isabel Sawhill, has been described as the path into adulthood that is most likely to lead towards economic success and away from poverty.
The problem, however, is that “young adults aged 28 to 34 from lower-income families are about half as likely to have completed the success sequence, or be on track with the sequence, compared to their peers from upper-income families.”
This short article cannot capture in sufficient detail the many issues relevant to inequality. Ultimately, however, and perhaps most importantly, the solution to this problem requires citizens of all races and backgrounds to come together in a spirit of reconciliation, with a commitment to eradicating racism and discrimination, and with an openness to diverse perspectives. It does no good to maintain an almost-exclusive focus on, for example, white privilege (the extent of which cannot be quantified and differs based on intersectional factors), and implicit bias (which evidence suggests does not correlate with biased behavior). These arguments rightfully identify problems impacting inequality, but without more, they have no practical impact on improving the day-to-day lives of African-Americans. If anything, now is the time to come together and recognize that what we have in common far outweighs that which we do not, and to collectively devote our efforts to achieving equality – and equal protection of the law – for all citizens. After all, what happened to George Floyd, and many others, should never happen again. The United States Constitution guarantees equality for all citizens and whenever the effects of inequality manifest – as they did in Minneapolis – the Founders’ vision for a more perfect union vanishes.
 Institutional racism is generally defined as state-sponsored policies that discriminate against or disproportionately impact traditionally marginalized groups.
 Edmond J. Safra, Institutional Corruption, available at: https://ethics.harvard.edu/lab
 See United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (March 4, 2015), available at: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
 Kay S. Hymowitz, The Black Family: 40 Years of Lies, (2005), available at: https://www.city-journal.org/html/black-family-40-years-lies-12872.html
 Gregory Arcs, The Moynihan Report Revisited (June 2013), available at: https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/23696/412839-The-Moynihan-Report-Revisited.PDF
 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
 Arcs, supra note 6, available at: available at: https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/23696/412839-The-Moynihan-Report-Revisited.PDF\
 W. Bradford Wilcox, The Millennial Success Sequence: Marriage, Kids, and the ‘Success Sequence’ Among Young Adults (June 2017), available at: https://www.aei.org/research-products/working-paper/millennials-and-the-success-sequence-how-do-education-work-and-marriage-affect-poverty-and-financial-success-among-millennials/
Sunday, May 31, 2020
Drafting an appellate brief (or any brief) is often a challenging and time-consuming endeavor. Among the best ways to ensure that a brief is of the highest quality is to adhere to the three stages of the writing process.
Specifically, the writing process consists of: (1) the drafting stage; (2) the rewriting stage; and (3) the revision stage. The tips below will help law students and attorneys through each stage of the writing process and, ultimately, maximize the quality of briefs and other legal documents.
I. The Drafting Stage
The purpose of the drafting stage is to put your story, ideas, and arguments on paper. As such, you should write freely and creatively. Do not attempt to produce a perfect or even well-written document. And never attempt to write and edit simultaneously because it will stifle your creativity, divert your attention from the substantive arguments that you want to include in your brief, and slow the writing process.
In so doing, understand that although the first draft may, among other things, lack flow and effective organization, contain grammar and style errors, be redundant, or contain poorly phrased sentences and paragraphs, these problems will be fixed during the rewriting and revision stages.
After you have completed the first draft, take a few hours or a day (if time permits) to reflect on what you have written, and ask another person to read your first draft. You will likely generate new ideas regarding, for example, how to present or refine particular arguments, what facts and arguments to include, and how to organize the brief. Indeed, these and other issues will be the focus of the rewriting stage. As author David Sedaris said, “[y]ou need to do the best that you can do, and then you need to take the best that you can do, and you need to rewrite it, and rewrite it, and rewrite it, and rewrite it.”
II. The Rewriting Stage
The purpose of the rewriting stage is to refine your first draft. During this stage, attorneys should focus on improving the structural and substantive aspects of a brief. This should include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:
- Ensuring that the brief is organized effectively, which will likely require reordering specific paragraphs or sections of a brief;
- Improving the flow of your brief, which includes making sure that you transition seamlessly when presenting various facts and arguments and use subheadings where necessary to improve the flow and clarity of your arguments;
- Eliminating unnecessary repetition;
- Eliminating irrelevant facts;
- Considering whether you have omitted important facts or legal arguments. For example, you may have failed to address a relevant counterargument, distinguish an unfavorable case, or include a favorable fact; and
- Making sure that your paragraphs begin with a clear topic sentence that focuses on a specific issue and end with sentences that transition effectively to the next paragraph and section.
Importantly, lawyers (and writers generally) often perform several rewrites. And during the rewriting stage, you should print out and read aloud your brief because it will ensure that you discover errors or areas for improvement that you may not have otherwise noticed.
III. The Revision Stage
During the revision stage, you should concentrate on the smaller but equally important details of your brief. Put simply, the revision stage is where you perform a line and copy edit of your brief. This should include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:
- Making paragraphs and sentences shorter;
- Varying sentence length;
- Eliminating complex or esoteric words, adverbs, and unnecessary adjectives;
- Ensuring that your brief contains no grammatical, stylistic, or spelling errors;
- Including transition words to ensure flow and clarity;
- Eliminating words that convey ambiguous or unintended meanings;
- Reducing the number of quotes;
- Deleting repetitive sentences;
- Eliminating cliché phrases and colloquial language;
- Ensuring that your brief is written in the active voice (for the most part);
- Using the CTRL+F feature to search for overused and unnecessary words; and
- Submitting your document to an online editing service, such as Grammarly.
Additionally, you should perform multiple revisions to ensure that you identify all errors and maximize the persuasive value of your brief.
Finally, you should never combine any of these stages. For example, if you combine the rewriting and revising stages, you will almost certainly fail to identify both large and small-scale problems with your brief and compromise your brief’s persuasive value. Lawyers who adhere to the three stages of the writing process will – and do – produce briefs of the highest quality.
Tuesday, May 26, 2020
In May, while the world was still trying to adjust to life during quarantine, the Texas Office of Court Administration was hit by a ransomware attack. While the details are still a bit sketchy because of an ongoing investigation, we do know that the State refused to pay the demanded ransom, shut down the infected systems, and has struggled since then to continue its work via alternate channels.
For appellate attorneys, this has been particularly frustrating. The systems that were shut down include some of the case notification mechanisms, so attorneys are finding out via social media whether they won or lost an appeal. In some cases, the court's access to the record appears to have been lost, so advocates are being asked to help provide case information and records back to the court. Throughout it all, Texas courts have somehow managed to not only continue to work but to lead in holding remote oral arguments and hearings and in continuing to push their dockets despite the quarantine and a crippled IT infrastructure.
In a past life, I worked as a systems administrator and technician, and even wore a "white hat" while hacking to test security. So I am familiar with the challenges in preventing ransomware attacks. This post, however, isn't written for the IT crowd. I hope to give some advice to the attorneys and professors who generally ignore such posts, but are often the source of the problem.
First, you need to know that ransomware attacks generally follow a set pattern. The attackers implant software that helps them gain control of a system, usually be encrypting data so it is no longer usable. They then notify the victim of the attack and demand a ransom, usually in bitcoin or another cryptocurrency. If the ransom is paid, they promise to decrypt the data. Sometimes they do, sometimes they do not.
Where do you, the user, fit into this scheme? Usually, you are the point of infection. By taking a few precautions you might prevent the next attack, or help with the restoration that follows.
1. Don't be the Source of the Infection.
Most ransomware is spread by Phishing, or emails that entice you to click a link that then loads the software onto your computer. Your IT department is serious when it asks you not to click on links from outside sources. The same goes for email attachments, and for links sent via text.
Some attacks start with "social engineering," or gaining access to sensitive information from users that can be used to guess passwords. Avoid the social-media posts that ask you cute personal questions and share with your friends. Even if your password isn't related to your date of birth, favorite pet, child's name, or other seemingly harmless bit of data, one of your friends' passwords might well be. Or, the attacker might use that information to personalize an email phishing attack that is just too hard to resist.
Finally, avoid using public wifi, or if you do, use the VPN that your employer has most likely set up for you. This is probably less common now that we are trying to stay in place, but is still a common source of attack.
2. Help Preserve your Data.
If there is an attack, the target is the sensitive data that you hold. Most likely, that data will be locked away and inaccessible for awhile, if not forever. If your firm or court is going to recover, it needs your help.
Make sure that you keep up with backups. And, if you are working from a court's electronic record available online, do yourself (and the court) a favor and download that information rather than just relying on the online version. After suffering data corruption and other issues, I even email myself drafts of briefs as I progress in writing so that nothing is lost. The idea is to keep multiple copies on multiple storage devices, so that if one fails, there is still a way to recover. Some sensitive data will have to be more restricted, but in general, on appeal at least, we are working with public records that can be stored in multiple places.
3. Remember that Confidentiality is a Ethical Responsibility.
Ransomware attacks are up across the board. There are even some healthcare providers that have been targeted, although some of them have been offered "discounts" on the ransom because they are essential service providers. Don't think that you are not a target. More importantly, don't think that your client's confidential information is not a target.
Indeed, law firms are increasingly the target of security intrusions. To protect clients, Comment 8 to Rule 1.1 of the ABA Model Rules imposes a duty of competence that includes keeping abreast of the "benefits and risks associated with relevant technology." Recently, Formal Opinion 483 clarified that the lawyer's duties include both taking all reasonable efforts to protect clients from data breaches and informing them when one occurs.
In the end, protecting client data is the professional responsibility of the attorney. You can't just blindly rely on your IT department or contractor and avoid that responsibility. Instead, you must be aware of the vulnerable world we live in, and take steps to be safe with not just your personal health, but the health of your data as well.
(Image attribution: "Virus" by kai Stachowiak, CC0 public domain license)
Monday, May 25, 2020
My colleague, Prof. Susie Salmon, recently started a podcast called Practice in Place: Law and Justice Go Viral. You can find the first episode here. The premise of the podcast is as follows:
[H]ow does a profession governed by precedent respond to the unprecedented? Practice in Place investigates how the practice of law and the administration of justice have adapted under the abrupt constraints of the COVID-19 era, how that has affected how and whether we achieve justice, and how those changes and that experience might or should change the practice, the profession, and its procedures forever. Produced by University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law and hosted by Professor Susie Salmon and the Legal Writing Program.
I am pretty excited about the project. For a forthcoming episode, I interviewed Sean Marotta, a partner at Hogan Lovells, and Raffi Melkonian, a partner at Wright Close & Barger, for their thoughts on the pandemic and the future of appellate practice. For those who would like to hear our full discussion, I have posted the video below. Sean and Raffi had insightful tips on surviving the pandemic, keeping your kids occupied, what they saw legal practice looking like in the next few months, and keeping sane. I also provide my insights on the going rate for finding typos in briefs. Enjoy!
Saturday, May 23, 2020
In Kahler v. Kansas, the United States Supreme Court confronted the question of whether a state could effectively eliminate the insanity defense.
I. The Court’s Decision
By way of background, in criminal prosecutions nearly all jurisdictions provide an insanity defense that enables defendants to prove that they are not legally responsible for a charged offense. Although the elements of the insanity defense differ somewhat among the states, most follow or closely track the M’Naghten rule, which requires defendants to demonstrate that: (1) they suffered from a diagnosed mental illness; and (2) due to such illness, they did not appreciate the wrongfulness or of their conduct (i.e., could not distinguish between right and wrong). The insanity defense is used in approximately one percent of criminal cases and only succeeds in about one-quarter of those cases.
In Kahler, the State of Kansas did not eliminate the insanity defense per se. Instead, Kansas adopted a different approach in which defendants could be absolved of criminal responsibility if they could demonstrate that their mental illness negated the intent element of a particular crime. Writing for the majority, Justice Elena Kagan held that state laws regarding criminal responsibility are only unconstitutional if they violate "some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Applying this rather vague and subjective standard, the majority held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require states to adopt an insanity defense that focuses on moral wrongfulness. Rather, the insanity defense is “substantially open to state choice” and “animated by complex and ever-changing ideas that are best left to the States to evaluate and reevaluate over time.” Thus, the majority rejected the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment required states to adopt a particular test for insanity, including a test that focused on whether defendants knew that their actions were morally wrong. Indeed, as the majority stated, “no single version of the insanity defense has become so ingrained in American law as to rank as ‘fundamental.’”
The Court got it wrong.
There should be a constitutional minimum – a baseline – that ensures the fair and just treatment of mentally ill defendants at both the adjudicatory and sentencing stage. Indeed, the Court – and state legislatures - should recognize that severe mental illness reduces culpability and in some cases, criminal responsibility, regardless of whether a defendant knew that the conduct in question was legally proscribed or morally wrong. Doing so would demonstrate that Kansas's approach, and the standard used in most jurisdictions (the M’Naghten rule), is woefully inadequate. It leads to grave injustices. And it demonstrates an alarming indifference to the direct and indirect consequences that mental illnesses exact on individuals' ability to reason and make informed choices.
Indeed, although some mental illnesses do not necessarily negate the intent element, these illnesses often cause a person to act with an ‘intent’ that is not culpable or even worthy of criminal responsibility. In his dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer highlighted the flaw in Kansas’s approach. Justice Breyer explained that “Kansas has not simply redefined the insanity defense,” but instead “has eliminated the core of a defense that has existed for centuries: that the defendant, due to mental illness, lacked the mental capacity necessary for his conduct to be considered morally blameworthy.”
Justice Breyer explained as follows:
A much-simplified example will help the reader understand the conceptual distinction that is central to this case. Consider two similar prosecutions for murder. In Prosecution One, the accused person has shot and killed another person. The evidence at trial proves that, as a result of severe mental illness, he thought the victim was a dog. Prosecution Two is similar but for one thing: The evidence at trial proves that, as a result of severe mental illness, the defendant thought that a dog ordered him to kill the victim. Under the insanity defense as traditionally understood, the government cannot convict either defendant. Under Kansas’ rule, it can convict the second but not the first.
That, in a nutshell, is the point – and the problem. To hold that the second individual in Justice Breyer’s hypothetical acted with the requisite intent is to reduce intent to a standard that is divorced from context and deliberately indifferent to empirical evidence demonstrating that, in some circumstances, mentally ill individuals do not – and cannot – act rationally. They act impulsively. They act under a false set of beliefs that influence their decisions and motivate their actions.
III. Broader Problems With the Insanity Defense
The problems with Kansas's approach represent only the tip of the constitutional iceberg. The standards governing insanity in many jurisdictions, which largely track the M’Naghten rule, are deeply troubling. Specifically, requiring defendants to show that they could not appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions (i.e., distinguish right from wrong) ignores the deleterious effects of mental illness on human behavior. Severely mentally ill individuals may know that an action is legally proscribed or morally wrong, but that fact is irrelevant to such individuals because, in some instances, they form a distorted set of beliefs, experience an inability make rational decisions, and struggle with an emotional state that can allow impulse to trump reason. By ignoring or failing to sufficiently account for this, the extant approaches make it all but certain that severely mentally ill individuals will be found guilty of various criminal offenses, face substantial periods of incarceration where they will receive inadequate treatment (and inevitably decompensate), and struggle to reintegrate into society upon release.
As a policy matter, this is problematic, if not fundamentally unjust. Mentally ill individuals often deteriorate while incarcerated, as they lack the support and structure necessary to effectively treat their illnesses. Upon release, such individuals frequently find it difficult, if not impossible, to successfully transition into the community, obtain meaningful employment, and achieve the stability necessary to lead functional lives. These deleterious consequences result in part from instituting a narrow and underinclusive insanity defense at the adjudication stage, and defaulting to incarceration rather than treatment at the sentencing phase, notwithstanding that there is little, if any, evidence that incarcerating mentally ill individuals serves any purpose of criminal punishment (e.g., deterrence). Simply put, the manner in which mentally ill individuals are treated in the criminal justice system is a national disgrace.
Principled reforms should include broadening the insanity defense to eliminate the moral wrongfulness requirement (i.e., that defendants lack appreciation of the wrongfulness of their conduct), recognizing the mitigating effects of mental illness on culpability and, in some cases, criminal responsibility, providing convicted but mentally ill defendants with treatment rather than incarceration (or at least ensuring a competent treatment protocol), reducing sentences, and establishing effective reentry programs to facilitate mentally ill defendants’ transition into society upon release.
Put simply, states, like Kansas, should no longer be allowed to ‘experiment’ with the insanity defense. A uniform approach at the adjudication and sentencing phase is necessary to ensure that mentally ill defendants receive equal protection under the law.
 See Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18–6135, available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-6135_j4ek.pdf
 Id. (internal citation omitted).
 A minority of states have adopted broader versions of the insanity defense and thus provide defendants with fairer and more just opportunities to demonstrate that their mental illnesses substantially reduce, if not eliminate, responsibility for a particular crime.
 This is not to say, of course, that mentally ill individuals are more likely to commit crimes. It is to say, however, that when individuals with severe and diagnosed mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, engage in criminal conduct, the law should provide a remedy, at the adjudication and sentencing stages, to ensure that such individuals receive treatment for such illnesses.
Wednesday, May 13, 2020
This blog post might provide you with information you already know. The information is new to me, which made me think sharing it might assist others as well. As I was looking at the Louisiana Supreme Court’s website recently, a reference caught my eye. That reference was to the publication, “Preparing for a Pandemic: An Emergency Response Benchbook and Operational Guidebook for State Court Judges and Administrators.” The publication can be downloaded here: https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/facilities/id/194.
A team from the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators worked on a Pandemic and Emergency Response Task Force to create this document, which was published by the National Center for State Courts in 2016! That date caught my eye because, like so many of you, I have been stunned over the past few months (yes, months that sometimes feel like years) by what has been going on in the world: stunned by the magnitude of this pandemic. And now, I am stunned by the fact that this group created this resource four years ago that is so relevant to what the world is experiencing in 2020.
The benchbook/guidebook urges state courts to create their own books tailored to their states in which they include both federal and state laws that will be relevant should a pandemic occur. It raises issues to be considered in a pandemic, such as maintaining constitutional protections during a pandemic; operating courts during a pandemic; searches, seizures, and other government actions to maintain public health; and jurisdiction of public health issues. It suggests that courts create certain model orders and court rules to use in the event of a pandemic. It also provides a resources list that includes citations to state courts that already had such plans back then. From back in 2016, it discusses and suggests many of the things that we are now discussing and suggesting.
I highly recommend you review this document, if you have not already seen it. Perhaps it will be helpful to you in your law practice, in your law school, in your court, and even in your personal life as you grapple with and consider issues that do not often present themselves. Thank you to the National Center for State Courts https://www.ncsc.org/, the Conference of Chief Justices https://ccj.ncsc.org/, and the Conference of State Court Administrators https://cosca.ncsc.org/ for thinking ahead. I only wish we did not need your good book.
May 13, 2020 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Court Reform, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Current Affairs, Legal Profession, Oral Argument, State Appeals Courts | Permalink | Comments (2)
Sunday, May 10, 2020
The criminal justice system’s treatment of mentally ill offenders is woefully inadequate and alarmingly ineffective. Indeed, the treatment of such offenders – from arrest to conviction – often exacerbates their psychiatric disorders and enhances the likelihood that they will re-offend – or die while trying to reintegrate into society.
Below is a summary of various aspects of the criminal justice system that highlight the inadequate treatment provided to mentally-ill defendants.
I. Before trial
First, criminal defendants with mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression, often languish for many months in state prisons while awaiting trial. During this time, many mentally ill defendants, some of whom have been declared incompetent to stand trial, fail to receive adequate psychiatric care and often receive little to no counseling or other support services. As a result, their mental health frequently deteriorates substantially while awaiting trial in overcrowded and underfunded prisons, or in psychiatric hospitals where the primary, if not exclusive, objective is to restore the defendant to a minimum level of competence. The deleterious effects of these substandard and, in some cases, inhumane conditions are debilitating and long-lasting.
II. During trial
At a criminal trial, mentally-ill defendants often find it difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate that their respective mental illnesses were a substantial or proximate cause of a crime's commission and that, accordingly, they are less culpable (or not responsible at all). Although defendants may plead the insanity defense, this defense is only used in approximately one-percent of cases and is unsuccessful in approximately seventy-five percent of those cases. The reason is that most jurisdictions follow the M'Naghten rule, which requires a showing that a defendant was mentally ill or impaired at the time of the crime’s commission and that the defendant did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct (i.e., could not distinguish between right and wrong).
The latter prong of the M’Naghten test makes it extremely difficult for defendants to prove insanity. Simply put, a mentally ill defendant may technically or abstractly understand that particular conduct is unlawful but, due to the deleterious effects of mental illness (e.g., impulse control, irrationality, delusions), the defendant may lack the intentionality necessary to comport with the law.
III. Incarceration after conviction
Many mentally-ill defendants are found guilty and sentenced to lengthy periods of incarceration in an environment that is highly likely to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, their respective mental illnesses. Specifically, being confined for prolonged periods of time without meaningful social interaction, receiving insufficient psychiatric care and evaluation, and having little to no support services (e.g., counseling, cognitive behavioral therapy) all but guarantee that mentally-ill inmates will deteriorate, if not decompensate, while incarcerated. The result is that, upon release, mentally-ill defendants struggle to reintegrate into society and achieve emotional and financial stability.
IV. Inadequate post-release support
Upon release, mentally ill defendants often receive insufficient mental health treatment. Although mental health courts in some states have improved the type and quality of care provided to some defendants, particularly those convicted of minor crimes, many defendants with mental health issues who have deteriorated substantially while incarcerated receive substandard care upon release.
Indeed, courts are often reticent to approve a post-release in-patient treatment program for mentally-ill defendants. Thus, these defendants, some of whom are suffering from severe mental health issues, typically receive only out-patient care, and the compliance rates for these defendants vary substantially. Furthermore, the outpatient care that mentally ill defendants receive is often woefully inadequate, consisting of only periodic psychiatric assessments, including regarding the efficacy of medication, and only a modest degree of individualized counseling at state-run hospitals of dubious quality. Moreover, in some cases, the implementation of an outpatient program is delayed upon release, which leaves mentally ill defendants without any care whatsoever for days, if not weeks.
V. The results – recidivism and suicide
Not surprisingly, upon release, and lacking adequate mental health support, a substantial portion of mentally ill defendants fail to successfully reintegrate into society:
Once in jail, many individuals don't receive the treatment they need and end up getting worse, not better. They stay longer than their counterparts without mental illness. They are at risk of victimization and often their mental health conditions get worse. After leaving jail, many no longer have access to needed healthcare and benefits … Many individuals, especially without access to mental health services and supports, wind up homeless, in emergency rooms and often re-arrested. At least 83% of jail inmates with a mental illness did not have access to needed treatment.
And in some instances, these defendants commit suicide. This was precisely the result that occurred when my brother, Marc Lamparello, committed suicide three weeks ago by jumping off the Verrazano Bridge in New York.
On April 17, 2019, Marc, who had previously been diagnosed as schizophrenic, was arrested and charged with attempted arson after entering St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York City with four gallons of gasoline. For the next year, Marc spent most of his time at Riker's Island prison in New York, with an intermittent stay at a psychiatric hospital in New York before he was transferred back to Riker’s Island while he awaited trial.
During his time at Riker's Island, including in the last five months, Marc received psychiatric medication but was provided with no therapy or other support services whatsoever. Incarcerated in an overcrowded and underfunded prison, Marc’s condition continuously deteriorated while it took the state criminal court months to approve a plea bargain and effectuate his release. As part of his release, Marc was required to immediately undergo intensive outpatient therapy – five times per week for six hours per day. And by the time of his release in mid-March, Marc's condition had deteriorated so substantially that immediate and sustained treatment was necessary to save his life.
But that never happened. For thirty days, Marc did not receive any treatment whatsoever. At first, Marc’s caseworker and psychiatric hospital explained that, due to coronavirus concerns, Marc had to quarantine for fourteen days. Subsequently – and without explanation – Marc was dropped from the treatment program.
Only days later, on April 10, 2020, Marc attempted to jump off of the George Washington Bridge in New York City. His life was saved when law enforcement officers rescued him before he could jump. In the next few days, Marc’s family implored doctors at the psychiatric hospital to which he was admitted to enroll Marc in the hospital’s in-patient program. They declined.
Instead, the hospital released Marc only five days later.
Two days after his release, Marc jumped off of the Verrazano Bridge in New York and died. Marc's death highlights the woefully inadequate treatment that he received during and after incarceration. In short, the manner in which Marc was treated during and after incarceration was disgraceful.
This is not to say, of course, that incarceration is neither necessary nor desirable for many defendants, including those with mental illnesses, particularly those convicted of violent crimes. It is to say, however, that the criminal justice system's approach to treating mentally ill defendants is glaringly inadequate. Given this fact, scholars, practitioners, and public policy experts should continue to emphasize before courts and legislatures the need to reform the criminal justice system’s substandard treatment of mentally ill defendants.
The current paradigm is fundamentally unjust.
*This post is dedicated to my younger brother Marc Lamparello, who died on April 17, 2020, at the age of 38. Rest in peace, Marc.
 See The Sentencing Project, Mentally Ill Offenders in the Criminal Justice System: An Analysis and Prescription, available at: https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Mentally-Ill-Offenders-in-the-Criminal-Justice-System.pdf
 See Paul Tullis, When Mental Illness Becomes a Jail Sentence (Dec. 2019), available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/12/when-mental-illness-becomes-jail-sentence/603154/
 See Natalie Jacewicz, 'Guilty But Mentally Ill' Doesn't Protect Against Harsh Sentences (Aug. 2016), available at: https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/08/02/486632201/guilty-but-mentally-ill-doesnt-protect-against-harsh-sentences
 See Human Rights Watch, Ill-Equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders with Mental Illness (Oct. 2003), available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/10/21/ill-equipped/us-prisons-and-offenders-mental-illness
 See Jo Sahlin, The Prison Problem: Recidivism Rates and Mental Health (May 2018), available at: https://www.goodtherapy.org/blog/prison-problem-recidivism-rates-mental-health-0520187
 See generally, Released inmates need programs to meet basic mental health needs, study shows (Jan. 2014), available at: https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/01/140106103737.htm
 National Institute of Mental Health, Jailing People with Mental Illness, available at: https://nami.org/Advocacy/Policy-Priorities/Divert-from-Justice-Involvement/Jailing-People-with-Mental-Illness
 See Jan Ransom, An Arrest at St. Patrick's, a Struggle for Help, Then a Suicide (April 30, 2020), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/30/nyregion/marc-lamparello-suicide-st-patricks-arson.html
Sunday, April 19, 2020
In law school, students study legal doctrine in many areas of the law and spend a substantial amount of time reading case law, writing memorandums and briefs, and engaging in real-world simulations.
Of course, while the law is relevant to the disposition of any case, it does not often determine the outcome of a particular case. For example, statutes or constitutional provisions may be ambiguous and precedent may not adequately address the relevant legal question. Rather, the most important aspect of a case is the facts. The facts often determine how the law is applied and present equitable considerations that counsel in favor of a particular outcome.
Thus, when drafting a trial brief, appellate brief, or pretrial motion, the statement of facts is critical and, arguably, the most important part of your brief. Below are several tips that will help to maximize the persuasive value of your statement of facts.
1. Tell a story
In your statement of facts, do not simply list the facts or describe the facts in a bland or boring manner. Instead, tell a story – and make it interesting. Doing so will capture the reader’s attention and engage the reader in your story. Consider the following examples:
When the plaintiff was terminated, the defendant (the plaintiff’s employer) completely disregarded the relevant terms of the plaintiff’s employment. Furthermore, the defendant made disparaging and insulting remarks to the plaintiff that caused the plaintiff to suffer substantial distress, and that demonstrated the wrongfulness of the termination,
When terminating the plaintiff, the defendant unapologetically stated, “I don’t care what the contract says because I can do what I want and you could never afford a lawyer.” Additionally, the defendant repeatedly berated the plaintiff, calling her “pathetic, a loser, and an embarrassment to the company.” The plaintiff left the defendant’s office in tears, and as she existed, the defendant yelled, “get the f*** out.”
The second example is far more effective. Through the use of specific facts, it shows, rather than tells, the court why you should win.
Of course, when drafting the statement of facts, you should avoid unnecessary adjectives and over-the-top language.
Finally, remember that you do not have to state the facts in chronological order. Although this may be appropriate in some cases, you can – and should – be creative in your organization. For example, if your case involves the breach of a contract, you may want to begin by describing the events constituting the breach and detailing the damages that your client suffered. Simply put, just as some movies begin with the ending, some briefs can too if doing so enhances the persuasive value of your argument.
2. Don’t be argumentative
One of the worst things that you can do in a statement of facts is to argue. First, your facts should be drafted in a manner that makes you appear objective. Doing so will engender credibility with the court. Second, arguing in the facts may lead a court to believe that you are presenting an incomplete or biased version of the facts. Third, and perhaps most importantly, when you argue, you are telling, rather than showing, the court why you should win. No one likes to be told what to do.
3. You can – and should – still advocate
Although you should not argue, you should still advocate. For example, you should emphasize favorable facts over non-favorable facts. You should organize the statement of facts in a manner that highlights the most favorable facts and de-emphasizes unfavorable facts. In so doing, you will be advocating without arguing, and persuading without misleading.
4. Acknowledge unfavorable facts
Be sure to acknowledge unfavorable facts. In so doing, you should rely on other facts to show why the unfavorable facts should not affect the outcome you seek. If you conceal or misrepresent unfavorable facts, your adversary will highlight this error and your credibility with the court will diminish substantially.
5. Eliminate irrelevant facts
You should never include irrelevant facts in your brief. Doing so will undermine the persuasive value of your statement of facts and distract the reader. Consider the following example:
The plaintiff is a private figure and employed as a cashier at Whole Foods Supermarket. On January 11, 2012, while the plaintiff was in the midst of her shift and serving customers, the defendant (the store manager) loudly stated that the plaintiff was a “liar, a whore, a criminal, and a disgusting human being.” As a result of these statements, several customers ridiculed the plaintiff and the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress.
The plaintiff is a private figure who was born in Austin, Texas. A talented musician and artist, the plaintiff attended the University of Texas for two years before deciding to pursue a career as an actor. The plaintiff enrolled at the Texas Academy of the Arts and completed a twelve-week intensive dramatic acting program. Soon thereafter, the plaintiff auditioned for many roles, including on the well-known soap opera General Hospital and the primetime television show Breaking Bad. During this time, the plaintiff obtained a job at Whole Foods Supermarket to make ends met while auditioning. The plaintiff enjoyed good relationships with her colleagues. Unfortunately, two months after being employed, and during her afternoon shift, the defendant (the store manager) loudly stated that the plaintiff was a “liar, a whore, a criminal, and a disgusting human being.” As a result of these statements, several customers ridiculed the plaintiff and the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress.
The first example is far more effective than the second. The second example contains facts that are entirely irrelevant to the legal issues (who cares about the plaintiff’s acting career?), and these facts distract the court from the facts that support the relief plaintiff seeks.
6. Describe the record accurately
Always describe the record accurately. If you misrepresent facts in the record, you will immediately – and perhaps irreparably – damage your credibility with the court.
7. You can include law in the facts if it's appropriate
When writing the statement of facts, you can, in appropriate circumstances, include relevant case law or statutory language if doing so would assist the court in resolving the legal issue. For example, assume that your client was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated, and upon arrest, law enforcement, in violation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Riley v. California, searched your client’s cell phone without a warrant. In your statement of facts, you could – and should – say the following:
On February 20, law enforcement officers stopped the defendant while he was driving home. During the stop, the officers detected the smell of alcohol and subsequently administered a breathalyzer test. The defendant’s blood-alcohol level was .09, in violation of the legal limit of .08, and the defendant was placed under arrest. While under arrest, and over the defendant’s objection, law enforcement conducted a warrantless search of the defendant’s cellular telephone. This search was unlawful because, in Riley v. California, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that warrantless searches of cellular telephones incident to arrest violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, all evidence seized from the defendant’s cellular telephone should be suppressed.
As you can see from the above example, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Riley is relevant to the legal question and demonstrates that the search was unlawful. Thus, in a situation like this, including the relevant case law will enhance the persuasive value of your argument and demonstrate beyond doubt that the court should grant the relief you seek.
8. It's not just what you say, but how you say it
Be sure to draft a well-written, well-organized, and concise statement of facts. For example:
- Avoid long sentences (over twenty-five words)
- Avoid complex or esoteric words (and Latin)
- Use transition words to ensure flow and clarity
- Avoid unnecessary repetition
- Avoid long paragraphs (paragraphs should be approximately three to five sentences)
- Eliminate unnecessary adjectives and minimize the use of adverbs
- Avoid nominalizations
- Never insult the lower court or your adversary
- Ensure that your brief is free of spelling errors and grammatically correct
- Know when to break the rules to maximize persuasion
Ultimately, the statement of facts is your best opportunity to explain why you should win. Following the above tips will ensure that you avoid the common errors that courts frown upon and that undermine the persuasive value of your brief.
Sunday, April 12, 2020
Given the unprecedented and challenging times that have arisen due to the coronavirus, many courts (and law schools) are now conducting oral arguments online (e.g., via Zoom). For many lawyers and most law students, this is likely the first time in which they have been required to deliver oral arguments online.
Below are several tips (some rather obvious) to help lawyers and law students deliver effective and persuasive online oral arguments.
1. Make sure that you are positioned correctly
When giving an oral argument – or any presentation – online, be sure to observe the following guidelines.
First, whether you are seated or standing, make sure that the camera on your computer is at eye level. Second, you should position yourself so that you are approximately at arm’s length from the camera. Third, to ensure that you are making eye contact with the judge (or professor) always look straight into the camera and avoid looking at the screen. Fourth, make sure that your volume is at the appropriate level so that you can be heard clearly.
2. Choose a professional background
Be sure to position your desk and computer in an area that includes a professional background and that omits any distracting images. Additionally, eliminate all excess noise.
Also, make sure that the lighting is properly set. For example, if there is too much light in the background, it can cast a glare on the screen and distract the person to whom you are speaking. Finally, be sure to dress professionally.
3. Avoid Unnecessary Physical Gestures
When presenting your argument, avoid unnecessary movements (e.g., hand gestures), particularly those that will take you out of the camera’s range. Unnecessary movements will distract your audience and detract attention from the substance of your argument.
4. Get to the point quickly – the judge (or professor, or anyone) may get more easily distracted in an online format
In an online oral argument, there is an increased possibility that a judge (or professor, or anyone) may get distracted more easily, particularly if the environment within which a judge or professor is hearing the argument is less than ideal (e.g., in a home where other family members are present in the immediate vicinity). As such, you should prepare a short, one-page outline that contains the strongest legal and factual arguments supporting the remedy you seek and state them at the beginning of your argument. Indeed, the most persuasive oral arguments include a powerful beginning where an attorney: (1) states clearly the outcome and remedy that the attorney seeks; and (2) explains why the law and facts support that outcome. In doing so, be sure to omit extraneous or irrelevant facts and legal authority.
5. Follow all of the rules regarding oral argument as if you were giving the argument in person
You should approach online and in-person oral arguments in the same way. For example:
- Have a powerful introduction and roadmap
- State clearly the outcome you seek and begin with the most favorable law and facts that support this outcome
- Address weaknesses in your case (e.g., unfavorable law and facts) and explain why they do not affect the outcome you seek
- Answer the judge’s questions directly
- Be prepared to adjust your argument strategy depending on the questions and concerns expressed by the judge (or judges)
- Always be honest – never mislead the court or attempt to hide unfavorable law or facts
- Don’t be a jerk – never attack your adversary and never use over-the-top words or unnecessary adjectives
6. Be prepared for technical issues
Technical issues sometimes arise when using online platforms such as Zoom or Skype. For example, when I was interviewed via Skype for a faculty position several years ago, my screen suddenly went black and I could not see the faculty members who were interviewing me (although they could still see me). If any technical issues arise, be sure to maintain your composure and go with it. Indeed, in the interview where my screen went black, I still got the job.
7. Remember that this is new for everyone
Don’t be intimidated or overly concerned about performing an effective online oral argument. This is a new experience for many judges and law professors. At the end of the day, just be yourself – speak conversationally and remember that the skills needed to deliver excellent in-person oral arguments are largely the same as those needed to deliver excellent online oral arguments. And appreciate that, in delivering an online oral argument, you are learning a new skill that may prove valuable in the future.
Sunday, March 29, 2020
The spread of the coronavirus has resulted in law schools transitioning to online learning. The delivery of legal education online certainly presents challenges for law students and legal writing professors (and professors generally). Below are tips (some rather obvious) that can hopefully contribute to facilitating a reasonably smooth transition to teaching legal writing online, and in a manner that: (1) maximizes students’ attainment of relevant learning outcomes; and (2) creates a supportive learning environment.
1. Be clear about the requirements and expectations going forward
The spread of the coronavirus – and the transition to online legal education – will cause many students to experience increased stress, uncertainty, and anxiety, the severity of which will vary based on each student's circumstances. Indeed, these effects will impact some students more directly and substantially than others.
To facilitate the transition to online education, professors should communicate clearly to students the requirements and expectations regarding assignments and grading, particularly if assignments or grading policies have been modified. For example, many law schools have decided to transition to pass/fail (or credit/no credit) grading for all courses. As such, professors should explain to students the criteria that distinguish passing from failing grades (e.g., a passing grade is the equivalent of a ‘C’ or better).
2. Provide students with writing checklists to make them aware of your grading criteria and to help students edit their work
Professors should consider creating a one or two-page checklist that sets forth the criteria (essentially, the rubric) that they will use when assessing the students’ work. Doing so will enable students to focus their writing and editing on the most relevant aspects of an assignment (e.g., effective topic sentences, proper IRAC structure), and help them to produce their best work.
3. Draft a one or two-page summary each week highlighting the major points of that week's classes
As stated above, the transition to online learning will likely cause many students to experience increased stress and anxiety due to, for example, increased family obligations and financial difficulties. Indeed, students may have less time to devote to their studies or simply struggle to focus on their work, particularly if they are living with family members or home-schooling children. For these and other reasons, students may struggle to complete reading assignments or otherwise dedicate sufficient time to mastering the material.
Drafting a one or two-page summary of the major points covered each week (with examples) will simplify the material and help students focus their attention on the most relevant legal writing skills.
4. Shorten the remaining assignments
In courses where students are required to write, for example, a pre-trial motion, appellate or trial brief, professors should consider shortening their assignments if the circumstances warrant. For example, professors may consider requiring students to write only the legal argument section of a pretrial motion or appellate brief. And professors can consider incorporating smaller, problem-based assessments to focus on areas that may not be required in a summative assessment.
5. Consider reducing or even eliminating the research aspect of an assignment
Some students will have reduced access to internet service and to electronic platforms such as Westlaw, Lexis, and Casetext. As such, professors should consider closed universe assignments that provide students with relevant legal authority.
6. Be as accessible as possible and provide as much feedback as possible
The transition to online learning will significantly impact students’ ability to meet with their professors for individualized feedback and support.
Two approaches may lessen the resulting impact on students. First, professors can hold a few optional classes for the entire class, in which the professor provides generalized feedback on the students’ work and offers suggestions for improvement. Second, professors can, at the outset of online learning, hold 10-minute conferences in which the professor provides support and feedback to each student (based on, for example, prior assignments). And in providing feedback, be mindful that students lack access to some, if not all, of the support services (e.g., a writing center, face-to-face interaction, academic success) that were previously available. This should cause law schools who remain on a grading system to consider adjusting their grading curve upward or permitting students who are particularly disadvantaged the option to take one or more courses on a pass/fail basis.
7. Consider holding online legal writing classes only once per week
This suggestion may not apply to some law schools, but at law schools where legal writing courses are held two or more times per week, professors should consider switching to a once-a-week format. Doing so will enable law professors to devote sufficient time to discussing the relevant material and reduce the burden on students who may struggle to coordinate their schedule in light of personal circumstances.
8. Take ten minutes at the end of each class to show that you care
Certainly, this is a difficult time for law students and law professors. One way to help students is to devote ten or fifteen minutes at the end of each class to simply asking the students how they are doing and encouraging them to share their respective experiences. Doing so will help to create a constructive ad supportive learning environment.
9. Be optimistic and inspire students
Many students will probably rely to some degree on professors and others to provide support during this difficult time. This places professors in a position to offer encouragement, optimism, and inspiration to their students, and to show students that they can succeed despite adverse circumstances.
10. Balance compassion with rigor
Certainly, this is an extraordinary time that requires compassion and understanding for students. At the same time, compassion should be balanced with rigor. Professors should continue to challenge students to put forth their best effort and reward those who produce the highest quality work. Indeed, just as this is a time for compassion, it is also an opportunity to teach students that, no matter what circumstances they may face in life, they must possess the mindset and coping skills to succeed despite adversity.
11. Take care of yourself
Law students and law professors should be particularly mindful of their physical and mental health during this period. Exercise. Eat healthy foods (and junk food in moderation). Practice mindfulness techniques. Communicate with friends and family. Do things that make you happy (listening to Elvis Presley’s music is likely to create substantial happiness) and remember that this, too, shall pass.