Tuesday, September 7, 2021
The Supreme Court of Ohio, Commission on Professionalism, has published Professionalism Dos & Don’ts: Legal Writing. Each Do and Don’t has several subpoints. Over the next few months, I plan to take a more in-depth look at some of these Dos and Don’ts and offer examples and suggestions for how appellate advocates can implement the Dos and avoid the Don’ts. This is the fifth post in the series.
Do provide appropriate signposts:
- Do consider using headings and summaries.
- Do use transitions between sections that guide the reader from one argument to the next, especially in longer pieces of writing.
The Commission on Professionalism asks us to consider using headings and summaries, but there’s nothing to consider, we should use headings and summaries. It is always our goal to make our writing clearer and thus to make our reader’s job easier. Headings and summaries help us do that. Transitions do too. They allow our reader to move seamlessly from one topic to the next
1. Point headings make our writing better.
Headings (here we’re talking about point headings) make our writing clearer because they show the structure of our writing, convey key points, and create white space. So let’s talk about how to create useful headings.
A. Point headings are topic sentences.
Point headings serve as the topic sentences of the paragraphs that follow. They tell your reader what you’re going to discuss. Be sure that the paragraphs that follow a point heading, and the sentences within each paragraph, relate directly to the point heading. If they don’t then you need to re-think your point heading or the paragraphs that follow it.
B. Point headings should be full sentences.
Your point headings should be full sentences and they should convey substantive information. Which of these point headings is better
1. Strict Scrutiny.
2. The statute creates a class of disfavored speakers, so it is subject to strict-scrutiny review.
The second heading tells the reader the substance they should be learning in the subsequent paragraphs—how the statute creates a class of disfavored speakers and why strict scrutiny applies.
C. Point heading should look like sentences.
Because point headings are full sentences, they should look like sentences. They should not be written in ALL CAPITAL LETTERS, nor should they be written in Initial Capital Letters. Save those styles for your section headings.
D. Point headings are not just for the argument section.
Point headings are helpful in the fact section of briefs too. Again, they convey substantive information, show the structure of the fact section, and create white space. Here is an example:
1. In 2007 the National Parties negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement that contained a two-tier wage system.
The sentences that follow that point heading explain how and why the National Parties negotiated a two-tier wage structure.
E. Point headings serve as a check on your analysis.
If you’ve created good point headings, you should be able to look at them and understand the structure of your argument. If you can’t, then you need to re-write your point headings or re-organize your analysis.
F. Good point headings start with a good outline.
The simplest way to ensure that you’re creating good point headings and that you’ve created a well-reasoned argument is to spend time outlining your brief. You can then turn the points of your outline into point headings.
G. You should include point headings in your Table of Contents.
Once you’ve written your brief and included good point headings, be sure to include the point headings in your Table of Contents. Doing so allows you to start persuading your reader sooner because they can see the key facts of your case and the key points of your argument just by reading your Table of Contents. Compare these examples:
Good point headings make your writing clearer and allow your reader to follow the structure of your argument. Summaries do too.
2. Summaries make our writing better.
Summaries should provide a brief overview of what you will discuss. Summaries allow you to orient a reader who is unfamiliar with a topic or issue. They give the reader a base of knowledge from which to work and help them better understand the information that you provide. Think of your summary as your elevator pitch.
After you’ve created good point headings and helpful summaries, think about ways you can transition your reader smoothly from one topic to the next.
3. Transitions make your writing easier to follow.
A good transition should remind your reader what they just learned and prime them to receive additional information. Good transitions connect the parts of your writing to avoid sudden shifts between topics or arguments. They allow your reader to move smoothly from one subject to the next and show that there is a logical structure and flow to your writing.
Good point headings, summaries, and transitions work together to create a logical flow to your writing. The effort you put into crafting these parts of your brief will make your reader’s work easier and thus help you be a better advocate.
September 7, 2021 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Federal Appeals Courts, Legal Ethics, Legal Profession, Legal Writing, Moot Court, Rhetoric, State Appeals Courts, Tribal Law and Appeals, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)
Saturday, August 21, 2021
In a climate of extreme partisanship and polarization, platforms such as Facebook and Twitter – with the express authorization of Congress under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act – exercise unprecedented power to censor the content and viewpoints that individuals express on these platforms, particularly concerning political speech. And social media platforms have done precisely that, censoring views that they subjectively deem objectionable or inappropriate – with no repercussions whatsoever. In so doing, social media platforms thwart the robust exchange of opinions and thus undermine the marketplace of ideas that is so essential to a properly functioning democracy and a diverse society.
If the federal government engaged in such conduct, it would unquestionably violate the First Amendment. Social media platforms, however, are private companies, not government (state) actors, thus rendering the First Amendment inapplicable and enabling social media to engage in content and viewpoint-based discrimination with impunity.
That has to change – now.
For the reasons set forth below, the United States Supreme Court should hold that social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are state actors and, as such, prohibited from engaging in conduct that would violate individuals’ free speech rights.
1. Through Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, Congress gave (and delegated to) social media the power to engage in content-based discrimination.
A private company can be deemed a state actor when there is a close relationship between the private party's actions and the government's objectives, or when the private party performs a traditional government function. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, for example, Congress empowered private companies to conduct drug tests of their employees. The Labor Association objected, arguing that the drug tests violated the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court held that, although the railroad was a private company, the tests, which the government explicitly authorized, rendered the railroad a state actor for this purpose. Additionally, in Marsh v. Alabama, the Court held that when a private company exercises powers that are traditionally reserved to the states, it is engaging in a public function and thus must respect constitutional safeguards.
Based on Skinner, social media can arguably be deemed a state actor. Through Section 230, Congress explicitly authorized social media platforms to do precisely what the First Amendment prohibits: censor information based on content or viewpoint. As one commentator explains:
Section 230 … grants a … “good Samaritan” immunity to online platforms as well. In this second immunity, Section 230 authorizes internet platforms to block content deemed “lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” Section 230 explicitly exempts websites from most civil and state criminal liability for any action they take in a “good faith effort” to exclude such “offensive” material.
As Professor Dawn Nunziato states, “Congress encouraged private Internet actors to do what it could not do itself—restrict harmful, offensive, and otherwise undesirable speech, the expression of which would nonetheless be protected by the First Amendment.”
Simply put, Section 230 “effectively immunizes and induces private conduct that would be unconstitutional if governmental actors did it themselves.” And that is the problem. Congress should not be permitted to evade First Amendment protections simply by giving social media platforms – the modern-day marketplace of ideas – the power to do that which it could never do.
2. Social media is the new public forum and the modern-day marketplace of ideas.
Most citizens do not express their political views on Main Street, in public parks, or in the public square. Rather, they express their views online, such as on their Facebook and Twitter pages. Indeed, the views that millions of social media users express often relate directly to political and public policy issues, such as judicial nominees, abortion, climate change, campaign finance reform, and infrastructure. To be sure, a person need spend only a few minutes on Facebook or Twitter – or read Alexandria Ocasio Cortez’s Twitter feed (among others in both parties) – to realize that these platforms are the primary vehicle by which users express a diverse array of political views and engage in often heated debates on public policy issues.
Put simply, the marketplace of ideas – the forum in which diverse ideas on matters of public concern, however unpopular or distasteful, are welcome – is now located on social media platforms.
By censoring information that it subjectively and arbitrarily deems “objectionable,” social media is compromising the marketplace of ideas by doing precisely what the First Amendment prohibits – engaging in content and viewpoint discrimination. If legislators are to remain committed to respecting all points of view, rejecting discrimination and arbitrariness, and recognizing that unpopular ideas are essential to public discourse, they should conclude that social media platforms, particularly due to the power Section 230 grants, are state actors.
3. A robust public discourse – including welcoming offensive and unpopular ideas – is essential to democracy, liberty, and diversity.
Politics and public discourse have become so divisive and polarized that diverse and unpopular viewpoints – regardless of political affiliation – are often met with scorn and ridicule. By censoring diverse views that challenge widely accepted and prevailing views, social media exacerbates this problem.
It encourages groupthink.
It discourages critical analysis of public policy issues.
Don’t be fooled by the claim that social media platforms are simply preventing the dissemination of “misinformation.” That determination is subjective and arbitrary. It is also anathema to the principle that liberty, democracy, and diversity depend on tolerating speech that we hate and views that we abhor. Ultimately, welcoming all viewpoints and eschewing discrimination vindicates every individual’s interest in having a voice in democracy. As Erwin Chemerinsky stated:
Freedom of speech is defended both instrumentally—it helps people make better decisions—and intrinsically—individuals benefit from being able to express their views. The consensus is that the activity of expression is vital and must be protected. Any infringement of freedom of speech, be it by public or private entities, sacrifices these values. In other words, the consensus is not just that the government should not punish expression; rather, it is that speech is valuable and, therefore, any unjustified violation is impermissible. If employers can fire employees and landlords can evict tenants because of their speech, then speech will be chilled and expression lost. Instrumentally, the “marketplace of ideas” is constricted while, intrinsically, individuals are denied the ability to express themselves. Therefore, courts should uphold the social consensus by stopping all impermissible infringements of speech, not just those resulting from state action.
Upholding the social consensus – and the First Amendment’s original purpose – supports a finding that social media platforms, due both to Section 230 and their status as the new public forum, are state actors.
The solution to this problem is simple: social media should retain immunity for the comments posted by its users. However, social media should only be prohibited from censoring speech that the Court has held receives no First Amendment protection. This includes, for example, obscenity and speech that incites violence.
Otherwise, the marketplace of ideas should remain a place where diverse and unpopular ideas are welcomed.
 489 U.S. 602 (1990)
 See id.
 See id.
 See id.
 Jed Rubenfeld, Are Facebook and Google State Actors? (Nov. 4, 2019), available at: Are Facebook and Google State Actors? - Lawfare (lawfareblog.com) (emphasis in original).
 David L. Hudson, Jr., In the Age of Social Media, Expand the Reach of the First Amendment, available at: In the Age of Social Media, Expand the Reach of the First Amendment (americanbar.org) (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky) (emphasis added).
Tuesday, July 27, 2021
Professionalism in Legal Writing – Dos & Don’ts, Part IV
The Supreme Court of Ohio, Commission on Professionalism, has published Professionalism Dos & Don’ts: Legal Writing. Each Do and Don’t has several subpoints. Over the next few months, I plan to take a more in-depth look at some of these Dos and Don’ts and offer examples and suggestions for how appellate advocates can implement the Dos and avoid the Don’ts. This is the fourth post in the series.
Do adopt a clear and persuasive style:
- Do put material facts in context.
The facts we select to include in a brief and how we present those facts are important. But which facts should we include, and which should we omit? We must include all legally relevant facts and background facts that are necessary to understand the legally relevant facts. But we also have to present the facts (both good and bad as I discussed in an earlier post) in a way that tells our client’s story effectively and persuasively. And sometimes that means including context or material that makes the story more interesting.
Take this example from a brief filed by now Chief Justice Roberts in State of Alaska v. EPA, No. 02-658:
The Red Dog Mine. For generations, Inupiat Eskimos hunting and fishing in the DeLong Mountains in Northwest Alaska had been aware of orange- and red-stained creek beds in which fish could not survive. In the 1960s, a bush pilot and part-time prospector by the name of Bob Baker noticed striking discolorations in the hills and creek beds of a wide valley in the western DeLongs. Unable to land his plane on the rocky tundra to investigate, Baker alerted the U.S. Geological Survey. Exploration of the area eventually led to the discovery of a wealth of zinc and lead deposits. Although Baker died before the significance of his observations became known, his faithful traveling companion—an Irish Setter who often flew shotgun—was immortalized by a geologist who dubbed the creek Baker had spotted “Red Dog” Creek. Mark Skok, Alaska’s Red Dog Mine: Beating the Odds, Minerals Today, at 8 (June 1991).
The case was about the Clean Air Act, “best available control technology,” and permitting authorities. Adding details about a bush pilot and his dog was a way to make what most would view as a boring case a bit more interesting. And of course, the author tied these details into his argument, at least indirectly, later in the brief.
- Do write in a professional and dignified manner.
Legal writing is professional writing and thus, we should write in a manner that recognizes the importance of our work as writers; and in a way that recognizes the importance of our primary audience—appellate judges. We shouldn’t write in a way that insults our opponents or the court. We must not include ad hominem attacks or sarcasm in our briefs. Attempts at humor should be avoided too—none of us are as funny as we think we are.
I know some (perhaps many) will disagree, but I think it’s ok to use contractions. They make our writing more conversational and less stilted, but not less professional. And start a sentence with and, but, or, or so now and then. Doing so has the same effect.
- Do put citations at the end of a sentence.
We must cite the authorities we rely upon, and we must do so each time that we rely upon them. That’s simple enough. There is some debate, however, about whether citations should be placed in footnotes or the text. I think they should be placed in the text for two reasons. First, judges are used to seeing citations in the text not in footnotes and our job is to make the judge’s job easier. By doing something the judge doesn’t expect or isn’t accustomed to, we make their job more difficult. Second, citations convey more information than just where to find an authority. Citations tell us the value of the authority, i.e., is it binding or persuasive, the age of the authority, etc. Of course, there are ways to convey that information and still use footnotes, but it is easier to just include the citation in the text.
- Do use pinpoint citations when they would be helpful.
They’re always helpful.
 Yes. I used “their” as a singular pronoun. That’s ok too. https://public.oed.com/blog/a-brief-history-of-singular-they/
Tuesday, June 29, 2021
The Supreme Court of Ohio, Commission on Professionalism, has published Professionalism Dos & Don’ts: Legal Writing. Each Do and Don’t has several subpoints. Over the next few months, I plan to take a more in-depth look at some of these Dos and Don’ts and offer examples and suggestions for how appellate advocates can implement the Dos and avoid the Don’ts. This is the third post in the series.
Do present an honest, accurate position:
- Do include all relevant facts.
Appellate counsel must provide the court all the facts that are relevant to the issues raised in the appeal—yes, even the bad facts. Of course, we want to use word choice, sentence structure, and other techniques to deemphasize the facts that are unfavorable to our client and highlight those that are favorable. And while appellant’s counsel might be tempted to save those “bad” facts for a reply brief—don’t. First, we have an ethical obligation to provide the court all of the relevant facts. Second, it is better to present those “bad” facts first and in the way that is best for our client than to have opposing counsel bring them out first. Finally, disclosing the “bad” facts may enhance our credibility with the court.
- Do cite the record accurately.
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require the appellant’s brief to contain “a concise statement of the case setting out the facts relevant to the issues submitted for review . . . with appropriate references to the record (see Rule 28(e).” Rule 28(e) provides:
References to the parts of the record contained in the appendix filed with the appellant's brief must be to the pages of the appendix. If the appendix is prepared after the briefs are filed, a party referring to the record must follow one of the methods detailed in Rule 30(c). If the original record is used under Rule 30(f) and is not consecutively paginated, or if the brief refers to an unreproduced part of the record, any reference must be to the page of the original document. For example:
Answer p. 7;
Motion for Judgment p. 2;
Transcript p. 231.
Only clear abbreviations may be used. A party referring to evidence whose admissibility is in controversy must cite the pages of the appendix or of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected.
Accurate record cites are important. They allow the court to confirm the accuracy of our representation of the facts, which again, allows us to build credibility with the court. Accurate record cites also allow the court to confirm that we preserved for appeal the issues we raise. Failure to include record cites may result in sanctions.
- Do disclose relevant authority, including adverse controlling authority.
Of course, we’re going to disclose relevant authority that supports our arguments. But what do we do about unfavorable authority that doesn’t control? (We’ll discuss controlling adverse authority in a minute.) If our opponent is likely to cite the unfavorable authority, or the court is likely to discover it, then I think the best approach is to disclose it and find a way to distinguish it. Just as with “bad” facts, disclosing adverse authority allows us to shape how the court views that authority.
We have an ethical duty to disclose adverse controlling authority. For example, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide, “A lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.”
Counsel ignored controlling precedent in Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co., which led to an interesting set of photographs in the Federal Reporter. After noting counsels’ failure to disclose controlling adverse authority, the court wrote:
The ostrich is a noble animal, but not a proper model for an appellate advocate. (Not that ostriches really bury their heads in the sand when threatened; don't be fooled by the picture below.) The “ostrich-like tactic of pretending that potentially dispositive authority against a litigant's contention does not exist is as unprofessional as it is pointless.”
The court then included these images in its opinion:
- Do update all cited authorities and exclude any reversed or overruled cases.
Modern research tools make “Shepardizing” authorities a relatively simple task—far less laborious than for those of us who learned using books. But, we can’t just rely on the flags or signals that appear on your screen. We must read the authorities to ensure the flag or signal is accurate for the point upon which we wanted to rely.
An honest, accurate writing style builds credibility and makes our reader’s job easier.
 Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(6).
 Fed. R. App. P. 28(e).
 E.g. Dennis v. Intl. Paper Co., 58 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Dennis's brief does not comply with this rule. We are satisfied, based upon the evident carelessness in which Dennis's attorney has presented this appeal and its obvious deficiency on the merits, that Dennis's attorney has persisted in prosecuting a meritless appeal in contravention of § 1927. We find, therefore, that some measure of sanctions is appropriate.”); Plattenburg v. Allstate Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 562, 564 (5th Cir. 1990) (“This brief also fails to make even one citation to the record where relevant . . . .”)
 ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(2).
 662 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2011).
 Id. at 934, quoting Mannheim Video, Inc. v. County of Cook, 884 F.2d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir.1989), quoting Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1198 (7th Cir.1987).
Saturday, May 15, 2021
While avoiding grading recently, I found an interesting analysis of inclusive language as a lawyer’s professional responsibility, and as a form of allyship. Jayne Reardon, a former Illinois State Bar disciplinary counsel, posted a thoughtful piece on inclusion and allies on the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Professionalism’s 2Civility website. See Jayne Reardon, Inclusive Language Is Allyship (Apr. 22, 2021).
Reardon aptly concludes: “Given that ‘effective communicator’ is part of a lawyer’s job description, we should be sensitive to how listeners may interpret our language.” Id. As lawyers, “our stock in trade is language. We can choose language that makes our points persuasively or language that is distracting and possibly offensive. Distracting or offensive language, of course, doesn’t serve our clients, our profession, or our image in the eyes of the public.” Id.
As appellate lawyers, we are in an especially good position to combine our duty to communicate clearly with the goal of using language non-offensively. In so doing, we can also use our privilege to serve as allies for underrepresented groups.
How do we combine communication with allyship? Hopefully, in many ways, including using our writing skills and engaging in conversations on bias and inclusion.
Reardon suggests we start by avoiding metaphors and by thinking carefully about the way phrases like “Chinese wall” and “the blind leading the blind” can be offensive and painful. Id. Ellie Krug, founder and president of Human Inspiration Works, LLC, finds “the language of ‘us vs. them’ particularly pernicious to our democratic values and “exhorts lawyers to embrace the diversity, equity, and inclusion practices that the business community adopted long ago.” Reardon, Inclusive Language Is Allyship.
We can also connect our language to allyship with a full understanding of what being an ally can entail. As Nicole Asong Nfonoyim-Hara, the Director of the Diversity Programs at Mayo Clinic, defines, “allyship” is "when a person of privilege works in solidarity and partnership with a marginalized group of people to help take down the systems that challenge that group's basic rights, equal access, and ability to thrive in our society." Samantha-Rae Dickenson, What Is Allyship? (Nat’l Inst. of Health Jan. 28, 2021). “Allyship” can also focus on “help[ing] humans who often lack a voice to speak on their own behalf or who aren’t always in the room when demeaning or marginalizing comments/behaviors occur, or marginalizing policies or plans are made.” Ellie Krug, Allyship for Lawyers in an Awakened America (Apr. 21, 2021).
As Reardon notes, “[w]hen we disregard how others may interpret our language or are unthoughtful with our words, we risk offending members of our professional community, like the judge, judge’s staff, opposing counsel, or others who may hear the oral argument or read the brief. In choosing more inclusive language, we choose allyship.”
I am working to choose allyship in my writing and teaching, and I appreciate the resources and conversations about being an ally from 2Civility and others. If you are interested in seeing more of the 2Civility website and programs, you can subscribe here for the Commission’s weekly newsletter.
Saturday, April 17, 2021
Lawyer Who Protested Trial Court’s Interlocutory Ruling, Instead of Filing a Writ or Waiting for Appeal, Agrees to Public Reprimand & Judge’s “Bart Simpson” Punishment
On April 9, 2021, the Board of Professional Conduct of the Ohio Supreme Court recommended the court accept an attorney’s agreement to a public reprimand. See Order (Apr. 9, 2021) http://supremecourt.ohio.gov/pdf_viewer/pdf_viewer.aspx?pdf=901849.pdf. As Debra Cassens Weiss explained for the ABA Journal, the attorney, Anthony Baker, also agreed the trial judge’s “well-publicized and unusual punishment” was proper. Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer deserves reprimand for courtroom protest that led to 'Bart Simpson-esque' punishment, ethics board says ABA Journal (Apr. 14, 2021).
Baker represented a criminal defendant in the Cuyahoga County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas, before Judge Nancy Fuerst. See https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2020/02/judge-doles-out-bart-simpson-esque-punishment-to-lawyer-held-in-contempt-for-acting-out-at-trial-in-cleveland.html. The state charged defendant with felonious assault and domestic violence, and Baker filed a timely notice of defendant’s intent to rely on a claim of self-defense. Order at 1-2. The parties tried the case to a jury, and at the close of evidence, Baker requested a self-defense jury instruction. After hearing argument from counsel, Judge Fuerst denied the jury instruction request. Id. at 2.
Baker then staged what the parties before the Board called a “protest,” making “repeated efforts to stop the trial from proceeding.” Id.; Weiss, ABA Journal at 2. Judge Fuerst ordered Baker “to sit at the defense table and be quiet,” but while the judge was instructing the jury, “Baker left the defense table and stood behind a television stand.” Order at 2. Baker admitted to the Board: “’I moved away from the table so it was clear I'm not participating.’" Id. Judge Fuerst then dismissed the jury for a lunch break and documented Baker’s conduct for the record. When trial resumed, the jury returned a guilty verdict for the lesser offense of aggravated assault and domestic violence, and defendant appealed. Id.
In a February, 2021 post-trial proceeding, the judge found Baker guilty of contempt and fined him $500. Judge Fuerst also ordered what Cleveland.com called a “Bart Simpson-esque dose of punishment” by requiring Baker to hand-write 25 times each:
- I will not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or in any other conduct that adversely reflects on my fitness to practice law.
- I shall not engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal or engage in undignified or discourteous conduct that is degrading to a tribunal.
Baker immediately complied with Judge Fuerst's order and paid the $500 fine. In fact, Cleveland.com published photos of Baker sitting at counsel table and writing out his Bart Simpson-style phrases as well as the first page of his phrases.
Baker also “admitted to the inappropriate nature of his conduct and to deserving the contempt citation.” Order at 3. Baker told the ABA Journal he was “’discourteous,’ and that ‘the judge was right in the discipline she gave.’” Weiss, ABA Journal at 2. “’As I’ve maintained throughout, what I did in the courtroom was not justified,’” Baker told the ABA Journal. But Baker also explained he “didn’t engage in any kind of outbursts, and the judge noted that [his] protest did not create a circus atmosphere.” Id.
Based on media reports of the sanctions, the Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, as Relator, initiated a proceeding against Baker with the Ohio Supreme Court. Id. Baker and the Bar Association agreed to an additional sanction of a public reprimand, noting Baker immediately complied with the trial court’s sanctions order and admitted to the inappropriate nature of his conduct. An ethics hearing panel accepted the public reprimand after finding additional mitigating factors, including the “highly public nature” of the contempt proceedings against Baker, the lack of prior discipline against him, and his cooperative attitude in the ethics proceedings. Order at 3.
Judge Fuerst’s punishments—and the Ohio bar sanction—seem to have succeeded where Bart Simpson’s teacher’s punishment failed. Nonetheless, the real answer here was a properly-perfected appeal, or an interlocutory device like a writ (in jurisdictions allowing writs). As Baker’s client’s appeal proceeds, it will be interesting to see if the appeals court finds the failure to instruct on self-defense as troubling as Baker did.
Sunday, April 11, 2021
Recently, Georgia Governor Brian Kemp signed legislation that substantially revised Georgia’s election laws. As discussed in more detail below, the law, among other things, requires voters to present a valid state identification when voting in person (similar requirements apply to mail-in ballots), limits the number and location of drop boxes for mail-in ballots, reduces the time for requesting such ballots, and expands early voting in most of Georgia’s counties.
Almost immediately, critics claimed that Georgia’s law was racist. Such critics claimed, for example, that the law will suppress voter turnout and limit access to voting through provisions that will disproportionately impact people of color and various marginalized communities. The result, critics argued, would benefit the Republican party and diminish the voices of Georgia’s increasingly diverse electorate.
Additionally, Major League Baseball joined the chorus of critics in condemning the law as racist and decided to move its annual All-Star Game from Atlanta, even though doing so will likely have a deleterious impact on Atlanta’s minority-owned businesses. Likewise, Delta Airlines, United Airlines, and Coca-Cola criticized the law, with Delta Airlines CEO Ed Bastian stating that the law is “unacceptable and does not match Delta’s values.”
And President Joe Biden stated that Georgia’s voter identification law was “Jim Crow on steroids.”
But is the law racist? Is the law really “Jim Crow on steroids?” A brief analysis of the relevant provisions of Georgia’s law suggests that the answer is a resounding no.
First, the law requires individuals to present a valid state-issued ID when voting in person. For individuals voting by mail, the law requires individuals to submit a valid driver’s license or state identification number, or provide the last four digits of their social security number. Importantly, the Georgia Department of Driver’s Services and county registrar’s offices issue state ID cards at no cost to voters. Given that a valid ID is required, for example, to pick up tickets at an Atlanta Braves game or to board a Delta Airlines flight, it seems rather sensible to require one before voting.
Second, the law expands early voting in most Georgia counties. Specifically, counties must designate at least two Saturdays in which to conduct early voting; counties also have the authority to offer early voting on Sundays. Indeed, because this portion of the bill increases early voting – as Georgia’s previous law only required one Saturday of early voting – it appears that this provision is the antithesis of racist.
Third, Georgia’s law requires one drop box per county (and only one drop box per 100,000 voters). In so doing, the law reduces the number of drop boxes, and limits the locations where, and times in which, they can be accessed. The rationale for this reduction is likely because the coronavirus pandemic, particularly due to current vaccination efforts, is nearing an end and thus does not justify the number of drop boxes made available for the 2020 election.
Fourth, the law bans giving food or water to voters who are waiting in line at the polls, ostensibly to prevent groups from campaigning to voters before they enter the ballot box. However, the law permits poll workers to create self-service areas where voters can hydrate. And, of course, voters are not prohibited from making the sensible decision to purchase water and food before arriving at their designated precinct. Although this provision seems rather unnecessary, there is simply no basis to conclude that it is racist.
Fifth, voters are required to request absentee ballots and must do so within approximately two-and-a-half months (seventy-eight days) of an election. Again, the racist aspect of this provision is not immediately apparent.
Sixth, and in what is perhaps the most problematic (although not racist) provision in the law, the secretary of state will no longer chair the state election board. Instead, the General Assembly will elect the chair and board members, which gives Republicans in the state an unnecessary degree of power in controlling how elections are conducted and how the results are processed.
The law also includes provisions striving to report election results more quickly by allowing counties to begin processing absentee ballots fifteen days before election day, and establishes a hotline that voters can call to report voter intimidation or illegal activity. 
Consequently, given that a state-issued ID in Georgia is free, that early voting is expanded, and that little, if any, evidence suggests that any of these provisions will suppress voter turnout, can Georgia’s new law properly be characterized as “Jim Crow on steroids?” Of course not. The assertion is ridiculous on its face – just about as ridiculous as harming minority-owned businesses by removing the All-Star Game from Atlanta.
Importantly, empirical evidence does suggest that voter ID laws are not effective in preventing voter fraud and that instances of voter fraud are relatively rare. However, voter ID laws can increase the perception that elections are being conducted honestly and with integrity, which will enhance public confidence in our electoral and democratic process. Perhaps that is why most states have enacted such laws. To be sure, voter ID laws in states that are the darkest shade of blue, such as New Jersey, New York, and Delaware – President Biden’s home state – are similar to, if not more restrictive than, Georgia’s new law. In short, Georgia’s law isn’t racist. It’s not “Jim Crow on steroids.”
Ultimately, racism is despicable. Racists should be universally condemned. And efforts to increase access to the polls for marginalized groups, and conduct free and fair elections, is a legal and moral imperative. But neither of these objectives is accomplished when leaders make irresponsible and factually inaccurate statements regarding voter ID laws, and causally make allegations of racism. Doing so only serves to further divide an already divided society and promote misinformation campaigns that are anathema to a healthy democracy.
 See, e.g., Adam Brewster, What Georgia’s New Voting Law Really Does – 9 Facts (April 7, 2021), available at: What Georgia's new voting law really does — 9 facts - CBS News
 See, e.g., Ben Nadler and Jeff Amy, Georgia’s New GOP Election Law Draws Criticism, Lawsuits (March 29, 2021), available at: Georgia's new GOP election law draws criticism, lawsuits (apnews.com)
 See, e.g., Natasha Dailey, Coca Cola, Delta, United, and 7 Other Companies Blast Georgia’s New Voting Law In a Wave of Corporate Backlash (April 5, 2021), available at: Coca-Cola, Delta, Others Speak Out Against Georgia Voting Law (businessinsider.com)
 Gabe Kaminsky, Biden’s ‘Jim Crow’ Label for Georgia’s Election Laws is Insane – Here’s Why (April 9, 2021), available at: Biden's 'Jim Crow' Label For Georgia Election Laws Is Insane. Here's Why (thefederalist.com)
 See Brewster, supra note 1, available at: What Georgia's new voting law really does — 9 facts - CBS News
 See id.
 See id.
 See id.
 See id.
 See id.
 See id.
 See id.
 See id.
 See e.g., German Lopes, A New Study Finds Voter ID Laws Don’t’ Reduce Voter Fraud – Or Voter Turnout (Feb. 21, 2019), available at: Study: voter ID laws don’t reduce voter fraud — or voter turnout - Vox
 See, e.g., Katie Daviscourt, MLB’s Decision to Pull All Star Game from Atlanta ‘Crushing’ for Small Businesses (April 7, 2021), available at: MLB's decision to pull All Star Game from Atlanta 'crushing' for small businesses | The Post Millennial
Saturday, March 20, 2021
Law school can be a stressful experience, particularly in the first year. Indeed, during the first year, a significant amount of stress results from the uncertainty regarding law school (e.g., not knowing how to study effectively or how to prioritize tasks) and the pressure to perform well in your courses. The tips below will help to reduce the uncertainty, relieve the pressure, and ensure that your transition to and performance in law school will be successful.
1. Learn the Rule of Law and Do Not Brief Cases
As a law student – and as a lawyer – your primary responsibility is to know the relevant rules of law governing a particular legal issue and apply those rules to the facts of your case. Thus, from day one in law school, when reading cases, you should focus primarily on extracting the relevant rule of law from each case. For example, in New York Times v. Sullivan, the relevant rule of law is that to succeed in a defamation action, a public figure must show that an alleged defamatory statement was made with actual malice, namely, with knowledge of the statement’s falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth. You need not – and should not – focus on memorizing the facts of the case or the reasoning underlying the court’s decision, or on the concurring or dissenting opinions. Simply identify the rule of law because on your exams and in law practice, your primary responsibility will be to apply that rule (and precedent) to the facts of your client’s case.
As a corollary, do not brief your assigned cases (i.e., do not summarize the facts, procedural history, legal question, reasoning, and holding, or summarize the reasoning underlying the concurring and dissenting opinions, if any). This will require you to spend countless hours on aspects of cases that will neither be tested on the final examination nor improve your ability to apply the rule of law to a hypothetical fact pattern. Thus, just extract the rule of law and move on to the next case.
2. Use Commercial Outlines
Sometimes, particularly for first-year law students, it can be difficult to identify the rule of law in a specific case. Indeed, in your first-year courses, for each legal topic, such as personal jurisdiction, you will often read many cases that track the evolution and development of a specific legal rule. Your focus should be to identify the current and governing legal rule because that is the rule you will be required to apply to a hypothetical fact pattern on your exam. To assist you in doing so, commercial outlines, such as Emanuel Law Outlines, are an invaluable resource. These outlines provide you with the current rules of law for each subject that you are studying (e.g., criminal law, civil procedure, torts, contracts) and for every legal topic within that subject. By helping you to quickly identify the relevant rules of law, commercial outcomes allow you to begin – early in each semester – the critical task of preparing for the final exam, which you do by taking practice exams.
3. Take Practice Exams Early and Often – Under Timed Conditions
One of the best ways to excel in law school is to take practice exams, which your professor may make available to you or which you can find on the internet. Taking practice exams enables you to gain experience in, among other things, applying the relevant rules of law to hypothetical fact patterns, addressing counterarguments, and ensuring that your writing is well organized and follows the “IRAC” or “CRAC” structure (i.e., state your conclusion first, followed by a summary of the relevant rules of law, an analysis in which you apply those rules to the facts, and a conclusion). Taking several practice exams – under timed conditions – will prepare you effectively for the final (or midterm) examination and maximize your likelihood of obtaining an excellent grade.
4. Purchase the LEEWS Essay Exam Writing System
Just as commercial outlines will assist you in identifying the relevant rules of law, the LEEWS Essay Exam Writing System, which can be found at https://leews.com, will help you to perform extremely well on your exams. The LEEWS system teaches you, among other things, how to organize and structure your exam answer, how to identify legal issues in hypothetical fact patterns, how to address counterarguments, and how to distinguish relevant from irrelevant facts. LEEWS has been used by thousands of law students and is among the best resources available to maximize your performance in law school.
5. Your Research and Writing Skills Are Essential to Your Success as a Lawyer
Excellent research and writing skills – particularly persuasive writing skills – are essential to good lawyering. Thus, during your three years of law school, focus on mastering your research and writing skills, including when drafting real-world documents such as complaints, motions, and trial and appellate briefs. If you cannot write effectively and persuasively, you will struggle to succeed in the legal profession.
6. Develop Your ‘Soft Skills’
You can be the smartest and most talented law student in your law school, but if you’re a jerk, you won’t succeed in the legal profession. Being an excellent lawyer is not simply about knowing how to write persuasively and argue effectively. Rather, excellent lawyers know, among other things, how to cooperate and collaborate well with others, listen actively, accept constructive criticism, demonstrate humility, honesty, and decency, and learn from failure. Simply put, your personality influences how others perceive you – and impacts your likelihood of succeeding in the profession. So, don’t be a jerk. Don’t have an ego. Don’t gossip. Be someone who others want to work with – and who are happy when you walk into the office every day.
7. Take Care of Your Physical and Mental Health and Remember that Mindset is Everything
Law school is stressful, but the legal profession is infinitely more stressful. It’s particularly important during law school and in your life to take care of your physical and mental health. Regardless of your workload, take time each day or several days a week to exercise. Eat healthy food. Do things that make you happy. And make sure to address any mental health or other issues that may arise. If, for example, you are struggling with depression or anxiety, consult a psychiatrist or a psychologist. If you are struggling with a substance abuse problem, seek help. Don’t ignore it or feel shame. Taking care of your physical and mental health in law school will help you to develop the habits and coping skills necessary to succeed in the legal profession.
Most importantly, remember that mindset is everything. All of us encounter adversity and unexpected challenges in life. The key to overcoming them is you. If you have a strong mindset and an empowering thought process, you can – and will – cope effectively with adversity. And remember that your choices, not your circumstances, determine your destiny.
8. At the End of the Day, Only Happiness Matters
Don’t let law school or the legal profession consume you. Don’t judge your worth on whether you received an A in Civil Procedure or passed the bar exam on the first try. Don’t be affected by what others say about you. Don’t associate with toxic people. Ultimately, what matters is your happiness. So, put yourself first and do what makes you happy. Pursue your passions, whether in law or elsewhere. And remember that there’s more to life than the law.
9. Don’t Just Help Yourself – Help Others
Going to law school and becoming a lawyer provides you with a tremendous opportunity to improve the lives of other people and to fight for a fair and more just society. So, remember that your career isn’t just about your success – it’s about whether you used your talents to make a difference in the world.
Sunday, March 14, 2021
Many academic institutions, professional organizations, and private corporations have embraced implicit bias training as a method by which to combat discrimination. The concept of implicit bias states that all individuals harbor unconscious biases that lead to, among other things, discrimination and the unequal treatment of individuals based on race. Although certainly well-intentioned (eradicating discrimination is a moral imperative), empirical studies suggest that: (1) the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which is used to detect individuals’ implicit biases, is flawed; (2) there is a weak correlation between implicit biases and biased behavior; and (3) few, if any, attempts have been made to quantify the degree to which implicit bias, particularly in light of explicit biases, impacts behavior.
1. The Implicit Association Test is Flawed
Some scholars and commentators have relied on the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to diagnose an individual’s implicit biases. The problem is that the IAT is flawed in many respects.
To begin with, the IAT sets arbitrary cutoff scores to determine whether an individual’s responses reveal implicit biases, yet fails to provide any assessments of the differences, if any, between the many individuals who score above or below those cutoffs. Additionally, IAT scores are arguably context-dependent, as the IAT produces different results for individuals when they complete the test multiple times. Furthermore, the IAT fails to meaningfully distinguish between implicit and explicit bias. As one scholar explains, “the IAT provides little insight into who will discriminate against whom, and provides no more insight than explicit measures of bias.” One commentator states as follows:
The IAT is impacted by explicit attitudes, not just implicit attitudes … It is impacted by people’s ability to process information quickly on a general level. It is impacted by desires to want to create a good impression. It is impacted by the mood people are in. If the measure is an amalgamation of many things (one of which is purportedly implicit bias), how can we know which of those things is responsible for a (weak) correlation with behavior?
To be sure, one scholar acknowledged that “what we don’t know is whether the IAT and measures like the IAT can predict behavior over and above corresponding questionnaires of what we could call explicit measures or explicit attitudes.”
2. Neither the Implicit Association Test Nor The Presence of Implicit Bias Reliably Predicts Biased Behavior
Empirical studies suggest that implicit biases do not predict biased behavior. Indeed, one researcher acknowledged that the IAT “cannot predict behavior at the level of an individual.” In fact, the evidence shows precisely the opposite:
Researchers from the University of Wisconsin at Madison, Harvard, and the University of Virginia examined 499 studies over 20 years involving 80,859 participants that used the IAT and other, similar measures. They discovered two things: One is that the correlation between implicit bias and discriminatory behavior appears weaker than previously thought. They also conclude that there is very little evidence that changes in implicit bias have anything to do with changes in a person’s behavior. These findings, they write, "produce a challenge for this area of research.
Additionally, researchers recently “examined 63 studies that explicitly considered a link between changes in bias and changes in actions … [but] they found no evidence of a causal relationship." Put simply, very few, if any, sociological or psychological studies have established with any degree of reliability that implicit bias directly or proximately caused biased, or discriminatory, behavior. As one social psychologist explains:
Almost everything about implicit bias is controversial in scientific circles. It is not clear, for instance, what most implicit bias methods actually measure; their ability to predict discrimination is modest at best; their reliability is low; early claims about their power and immutability have proven unjustified.
This is not to say, of course, that implicit bias does not exist, or that it does not have a material impact on biased behavior. It is to say, however, that the IAT – and evidence supporting a connection between implicit bias and biased behavior – is, at best, premature and, at worst, untenable. As two prominent scholars explain:
[M]uch murkiness surrounds (a) the proper causal explanation for alleged IAT effects, (b) the psychological meaning of IAT scores, (c) the statistical generality and potency of alleged relations between IAT scores and actual behavior, and (d) boundary conditions on alleged IAT effects.
What’s more, even where researchers have claimed to reduce implicit biases, they found no concomitant reduction in biased behavior. That fact alone should cause scholars who have championed implicit bias to think that, just maybe, they have jumped the proverbial gun.
3. Few, If Any, Attempts Have Been Made to Quantify Implicit Bias’s Impact on Biased Behavior
Assuming arguendo that implicit bias impacts biased behavior, scholars have made little, if any, attempt to quantify implicit bias’s impact on biased behavior. For example, is implicit bias responsible for 5%, 10%, 20%, or 50% (or more) of biased behaviors? This is particularly problematic given that the presence of other factors, such as explicit biases and prejudices, directly impact biased decision-making. This flaw should not be surprising. After all, if implicit bias is the product of unconscious – and thus involuntary – actions, it would appear difficult for researchers to credibly claim that they possess the ability to reliably measure and quantify a phenomenon that resides outside of their conscious awareness. But without attempting to do so, reliance on implicit bias as a predictor of biased conduct raises more questions than answers.
The research cited above is merely a sample of the articles that have cast doubt on the nexus between implicit bias and biased behavior. To be sure, the point of this article is not to say that implicit bias bears no relationship to biased behavior. It is to say, however, that the evidence for such a relationship is inconclusive, contested, and, quite frankly unpersuasive. As such, the adoption of programs in universities and corporations that strive to educate students and employees on the allegedly negative effects of implicit bias is, at best, premature and, at worst, misguided. What’s more, relevant research has produced “little evidence that implicit bias can be changed long term, and even less evidence that such changes lead to changes in behavior.”
Ultimately, eradicating discrimination, addressing inequality, and ensuring equal opportunity are moral imperatives. The question, however, is how best to do that.
 See id.
 Bartlett, T. (2017). Can We Really Measure Implicit Bias? Maybe Not. Retrieved from: https://www.chronicle.com/article/Can-We-Really-Measure-Implicit/238807.
 Lopez, G. (2017). For Years This Popular Test Measured Anyone’s Racial Bias. But It Might Not Work After All. Retrieved from: https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/3/7/14637626/implicit-association-test- racism.
 Lee Jussim, Mandatory Implicit Bias Training is a Bad Idea (2017), available at: https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/rabble-rouser/201712/mandatory-implicit-bias-training-is-bad-idea.
 Bartlett, supra note 3, retrieved from: https://www.chronicle.com/article/Can-We-Really-Measure-Implicit/238807.
 Brandie Jefferson, Change the Bias, Change the Behavior? Maybe Bot (Aug. 2019), available at: https://source.wustl.edu/2019/08/change-the-bias-change-the-behavior-maybe-not/
 Jussim, supra note 6, available at: https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/rabble-rouser/201712/mandatory-implicit-bias-training-is-bad-idea.
 Gregory Mitchell & Philip Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading. 67 Ohio St. L. J. 1023- 1121 (2006).
Saturday, January 16, 2021
It’s no surprise that opinions regarding the constitutionality – and wisdom – of the death penalty vary greatly among judges, legal scholars, commentators, and the public.
Arguments concerning the death penalty consist primarily of the theoretical and the practical. Regarding the theoretical component, some may argue that the death penalty rightfully expresses society’s moral condemnation of and outrage toward heinous criminal acts, such as domestic terrorism (e.g., Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma, which killed over 160 people) and premeditated murder, particularly murders that involve torture, children, and multiple victims (e.g. Ted Bundy’s premeditated killings of dozens of women). Others may argue that the intentional murder of an individual by the government, particularly where less severe measures can ensure public safety and exact severe punishment (e.g., life imprisonment), is inherently wrong. Certainly, theoretical disagreements involve a variety of religious, philosophical, and moral perspectives, all of which lead to reasonable disagreements concerning the death penalty’s theoretical justifications.
The practical component, however, reveals facts that cannot arguably be disputed. For example, although the Supreme Court held decades ago that the death penalty must be reserved for the “worst of the worst,” the evidence suggests that executions do not even remotely adhere to this principle. First, innocent individuals have been executed; if there is any doubt about this fact, one need only consider the hundreds of death row inmates who, after convictions and pending execution, were freed when evidence surfaced to demonstrate their innocence. Second, many individuals who have been executed suffered from severe mental health issues, intellectual disability, and brain damage. Third, many individuals on death row were raised in horrifically abusive and impoverished families. Fourth, many young people, whose brains had not yet fully matured, have been executed. Fifth, the likelihood of receiving the death penalty depends in substantial part on a defendant's socioeconomic status, a defendant's state of residence, the quality of a defendant’s attorney, and a defendant's (and victim's) race. Sixth, empirical evidence suggests that the death penalty does not deter crime; in states that outlaw the death penalty, the murder rate is lower than in states that authorize the death penalty. Seventh, substantial evidence exists that the most common method of execution – lethal injection – leads to intolerable suffering.
The United States Supreme Court is well aware of these problems and the Court has repeatedly strived to limit the death penalty's application. For example, in Furman v. Georgia, the Court recognized that the death penalty was often arbitrarily imposed and required states to develop criteria that would lead to fairer and more standardized decisions regarding when and under what circumstances the death penalty would be imposed. Likewise, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of individuals for crimes committed while under the age of eighteen. Additionally, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of intellectually disabled defendants. And in Hall v. Florida, the Court held that a defendant’s IQ score alone could not be the basis for determining intellectual disability.
However, the practical problems regarding the death penalty remain. As Justice Stephen Breyer emphasized in his noteworthy dissent in Glossip v. Gross, the death penalty continues – for a variety of reasons related to race, socioeconomic status, and geography – to be unfairly and often arbitrarily imposed. Justice Breyer was correct. These problems render the death penalty's administration troubling as a matter of law and policy.
Indeed, the time has long passed for the United States Supreme Court to address the death penalty’s constitutionality. But the Court has repeatedly refused to do so, whether through denying certiorari or refusing last-minute petitions to stay executions despite evidence that, at the very least, warranted further review. Nowhere was this more evident than recently, when the Court, over the vigorous dissents of Justices Sonya Sotomayor and Stephen Breyer, allowed the federal government to execute the thirteenth death row inmate in the last six months. In so doing, the Court made no attempt to address the persistent and ongoing issues relating to the fairness of imposing the death penalty. These issues exist – and they aren’t going away.
After all, if the likelihood of receiving the death penalty depends in substantial part on race, socioeconomic status, and geography, how can the death penalty be anything but arbitrary? And if the individuals executed are overwhelmingly poor, mentally ill, or cognitively impaired, how can we plausibly claim that they are the worst of the worst? We can’t.
Until the Supreme Court addresses these issues, the death penalty will be administrated under a cloud of illegitimacy and injustice. And when the Court finally does confront such issues, the death penalty will likely be relegated to the “graveyard of the forgotten past.”
 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
 572 U.S. 701 (2014).
 576 U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 2726 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
 See James Romoser (Jan. 16, 2016), available at: Over sharp dissents, court intervenes to allow federal government to execute 13th person in six months - SCOTUSblog
 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (internal citation omitted).
Tuesday, September 8, 2020
On January 1st, 2020, while on vacation with my family, I was pushed by a passing speadboat into a concealed piece of broken pipe while snorkeling, resulting in a quick trip to the emergency room and 18 stitches. At least I got my bad luck out of the way, I consoled myself, and the rest of 2020 would be better. Right?
I thought about that naivete while I was writing a motion for extension of time in an appeal yesterday. I sought the extension because, the week the clerk certified the record to the court, I was caring for my mother and eventually admitting her to the hospital. The next week, one of my partners at work tested positive for Covid-19, and we had to unexpectedly extend and tighten our work-from-home rules. This week, my wife is going to have surgery. And while I am trying to care for everyone and help my children with school, while keeping up with work, I am hobbling around on a broken foot that is not healing as it should.
Fortunately, the court I am preparing this appeal in has adopted a code of appellate practice, in this case, the Texas Standards for Appellate Conduct. Adopted in 1999, Texas was the first jurisdiction to adopt such standards specifically for its appellate practitioners. Since then, several courts have adopted similar standards and expect those practicing in the courts to follow them.
In many ways, these standards codify a practice of civility that has traditionally been followed by those who practice regularly in appellate courts. And while the standards are not mandatory, and cannot provide a basis for sanctions, following them is expected and deviation is strongly disfavored.
Being gracious with requested extensions is addressed twice in the standards. First, Standard 10 of a "Lawyer's Duties to Clients," requires that "Counsel will advise their clients that counsel reserves the right to grant accommodations to opposing counsel in matters that do not adversely affect the client's lawful objectives. A client has no right to instruct a lawyer to refuse reasonable requests made by other counsel." And again, Standard 2 of a "Lawyers' Duties to Lawyers," states that "Counsel will not unreasonably withhold consent to a reasonable request for cooperation or scheduling accommodation by opposing counsel."
These two rules are based on different stated principles. First, that the lawyer's duties to the client must be placed in the context of the system in which they work, which also involves duties owed to the courts and opposing counsel. And second, that only if opposing counsel treat each other with dignity and respect can the effectiveness and integrity of the system be preserved.
Some refer to these rules of comity as part of "the golden rule" You should treat opposing counsel as you would wish to be treated. By including this instruction in the section referencing client duties, and by requiring that the standards be given to clients, the rule is placed in the proper context and explained before any accommodations are sought.
If these general principles are not enough to convince you to act fairly with opposing counsel, then the potential loss of credibility should. Courts do not appreciate it when opposing counsel oppose reasonable requests for extension of time. As the Ninth Circuit explained, "Such uncompromising behavior is not only inconsistent with general principles of professional conduct, but also undermines the truth-seeking function of our adversarial system." Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 2010).
If there is some reasonable basis for the extension, then it will likely be granted. Opposing such a request not only makes you look unreasonable, but can create a stigma for you to carry around the next time you appear in that court.
Coronavirus, murder hornets, ransomware attacks, fires, rioting, and whatever comes next have already made this an extraordinarily difficult year. Indeed, the practice of law is difficult even in the best of times. A bit of grace is always appreciated, even in good years, and is doubly appreciated now. Not just by opposing counsel, but also by the Courts.
(Image Credit: Andreas Praefcke, Wikipedia U. "Diogenes in Search of an Honest Man." Ancient History Encyclopedia. Last modified August 06, 2014. https://www.ancient.eu/image/2908)
Tuesday, July 14, 2020
In a 2015 Justice Elena Kagan quipped that, when it comes to statutory interpretation, "we're all textualists now." She noted that, when she was in law school, statutory interpretation was not taught, and that judges were often left to make what were essentially legislative decision in implementing the law as they believed the legislature intended.
Justice Scalia's tenure on the Court changed that. Scalia argued strongly for textualism as the primary methodology in statutory interpretation, and emphasized its value as a neutral starting point for judges who were meant to be more like umpires than congressmen.
Those watching on the outside questioned the approach. Textualism and originalism are often associated with political conservatism. Some scholars looked at Scalia's decisions and questioned whether they were true methodologies, or just means to a political end. Many political conservatives believed that the increasing influence of textualism meant an increased likelihood that the Court would support their agendas.
Recently, in Bostock v. Clayton County, Justice Gorsuch addressed the meaning of "because of ... sex" in Title VII from a textualist standpoint. Gorsuch explained that under this approach, what the drafters intended in 1964 did not matter. What mattered where the words they used. And because those words prohibited treating a person different "because of sex," whenever sex is a “but-for” cause of an employment decision, Title VII is violated.
In his words: "If the employer intentionally relies in part on an individual employee’s sex when deciding to discharge the employee—put differently, if changing the employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer—a statutory violation has occurred."
Commentators have had a field day in analyzing this decision. Many of those who are politically conservative are frustrated with the decision because it does not follow their agenda. Many of those who are progressive politically are ready to embrace Justice Gorsuch as a new torchbearer. And on both sides, there are concerns with how this simplistic "but-for" test will work out, with hypotheticals flying.
A short time later, Gorsuch penned another decision, this time in McGirt v. Oklahoma. Once again, Gorsuch's focus was on the text. First, the text that Congress had written to create a reservation for the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, and second, on the lack of any plain text disestablishing that reservation. Again, Gorsuch noted that Congress likely had the desire and intent to do so, but that it never issued any actual laws that would effectuate that intent.
These decisions are both solid evidence that textualism is a methodology, not an ideology. At least for Justice Gorsuch. Gorsuch applied the methodology in a way that permitted him to chart an objective path regardless of ideology.
Indeed, neuroscientists and jurists alike suggest that in order to overcome implicit bias, it is essential to employ objective methodologies. An approach that is rooted in textualism engages the brain in a way that requires "slow" thinking, and can avoid snap judgments based on presupposition.
When it comes to textualism, then, we really are all becoming textualists. Regardless of political affiliation. And we should not be surprised that when judges apply objective standards to statutory interpretation, that interpretation might not always be favorable to the platforms of the party that appointed them. Indeed, the Justices may not even agree with the eventual outcome itself. And that is the point.
Friday, June 12, 2020
Addressing Bias in Our Briefs and in the Legal Writing Classroom: If You Want Peace, Work for Justice
Like so many of us, I have spent the last few months worrying. I have been very worried about my law students’ physical and mental well-being. As a parent, I’m losing sleep over concerns for my high-school and college-aged children. But for the last two weeks especially, I have been incredibly anxious about the lack of justice in our country.
As a teen, I loved the statement, “if you want peace, work for justice.” I did not know then the phrase has roots in Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, but I knew it made sense. See, e.g., Ronald C. Smith, If You Want Peace, Work for Justice, 16 Crim. Just. 1, 2 (ABA Fall, 2001) (using the phrase to call for justice after 9/11 and discussing the role of the criminal justice bar in ensuring freedoms and liberties to bring peace); Samuel J. Levine, The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating Spirituality, Scholarship and Profession, 27 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1199, 1206-09 (1996). To me, one small way we can all start to make changes for more justice is by being more intentional in discussing bias in our writing, practice, and teaching.
As appellate lawyers, we often have a good overview of problems in the trial court, and sometimes we can see racism and bias as well. While we cannot present something beyond the record in a brief, we can do better at discussing what the record supports, and in having painful conversations with our trial counsel and clients. Our courts have been increasingly willing to discuss bias, and one recently stressed the need to take “teachable moments” to end bias. See Briganti v. Chow, 42 Cal. App. 4th 504, 510-13 (2019); Debra Cassens Weiss, “Appeals court sees lawyer's reference to 'attractive' judge in brief as a 'teachable moment' on sexism,” http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/appeals-court-sees-lawyers-reference-to-attractive-judge-in-brief-as-a-teachable-moment-on-sexism (Nov. 27, 2019). We too should advocate for professionalism, and against bias, in our practice. Of course, this is easier said than done, and our obligation is to our client, but if we start more conversations about what happened at trial and seize more opportunities to start a dialogue on professionalism, we will be working for justice.
Moreover, as legal writing teachers, we have great opportunities to include discussions of racism in our work. In doing so, we need not stray from our “assigned” role as writing teachers, since we also have an obligation to teach ethical practice as part of legal writing and analysis. In fact, we already stress important topics of professionalism in myriad ways. For example, many of us use cases on disbarment when we teach case briefing, and discuss the results of missed deadlines or failure to follow court rules as part of our teaching for memos and briefs. Additionally, I used problems on curing attorney errors for my trial brief problems for years. Now, we can include cases leading to discussions of bias as well. Using problems based in some legal areas, like Fourth Amendment pretextual stops and Title VII discrimination, will easily lead to discussions of racism and how writers and lawyers can address injustice. Using problems based in other substantive areas, like false imprisonment or real property, can create wonderful openings for discussing implicit bias and raising awareness, all while teaching crucial legal analysis and writing skills. I am not suggesting professors should or should not share their own views in these discussions, I am just noting a discussion of bias in the law and legal profession is a logical and important part of the ethical issues we already teach.
As Ronald Smith said of working for justice to bring peace: “think of another saying, ‘It is better to light one candle than to curse the darkness.’ [When] we seek justice each of us lights candles, [and] light[s] the way for others to see how they . . . can light candles and work for justice, too.” Smith, If You Want Peace, Work for Justice, 16 Crim. Just. at 3.
I wish you all good health and less worry, with hopes for a more just future.
Sunday, March 1, 2020
The Friendship Between Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg – A Lesson in Professionalism, Civility, and Respect for Diverse Viewpoints
Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsberg were, as Justice Ginsburg stated, “best buddies.”
Some might find their friendship surprising. After all, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg embraced very different views regarding constitutional theory and interpretation. Justice Scalia was an originalist and thus believed that the Constitution’s words were fixed and should be interpreted based on what the drafters intended those words to mean. Justice Ginsburg is arguably a “living constitutionalist" and believes that the Constitution’s meaning may change over time to comport with contemporary understandings and present-day realities.
Not surprisingly, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg disagreed – often strenuously – in many significant and controversial decisions, such as in Lawrence v. Texas, where the Court invalidated a statute banning same-sex sodomy, Atkins v. Virginia, where the Court held that the execution of intellectually disabled defendants violated the Eighth Amendment, National Federation of Independent Investors v. Sebelius, where the Court upheld the Affordable Care Act, Obergefell v. Hodges, where the Court invalidated same-sex marriage bans, and Bush v. Gore, where the Court overturned the Florida Supreme Court’s decision ordering a statewide recount of votes cast in the Presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore.
Despite these disagreements – and despite fundamentally different approaches to constitutional interpretation – Justices Scalia and Ginsburg were, as Justice Ginsburg stated, “best buddies.” As Justice Ginsburg explained:
Toward the end of the opera Scalia/Ginsburg, tenor Scalia and soprano Ginsburg sing a duet: “We are different, we are one,” different in our interpretation of written texts, one in our reverence for the Constitution and the institution we serve. From our years together at the D.C. Circuit, we were best buddies. We disagreed now and then, but when I wrote for the Court and received a Scalia dissent, the opinion ultimately released was notably better than my initial circulation. Justice Scalia nailed all the weak spots — the “applesauce” and “argle bargle”—and gave me just what I needed to strengthen the majority opinion. He was a jurist of captivating brilliance and wit, with a rare talent to make even the most sober judge laugh. The press referred to his “energetic fervor,” “astringent intellect,” “peppery prose,” “acumen,” and “affability,” all apt descriptions. He was eminently quotable, his pungent opinions so clearly stated that his words never slipped from the reader’s grasp. Justice Scalia once described as the peak of his days on the bench an evening at the Opera Ball when he joined two Washington National Opera tenors at the piano for a medley of songs. He called it the famous Three Tenors performance. He was, indeed, a magnificent performer. It was my great good fortune to have known him as a working colleague and treasured friend.
Justice Scalia was similarly complimentary of Justice Ginsburg, describing her as an “intelligent woman and a nice woman and a considerate woman — all the qualities that you like in a person.” Indeed, when asked about their friendship, Justice Scalia replied: “what’s not to like?”
In fact, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg “frequently dine[d] and vacation[ed] together,” and “[e]very Dec. 31, they [rang] in the new year together.” As one commentator described:
They and their families spent New Year's Eve together every year. They rode together on an elephant in India (Scalia joked that Ginsburg betrayed her feminism by sitting behind him), and Scalia watched Ginsburg go parasailing in the south of France (“She's so light, you would think she would never come down. I would not do that”).
Ultimately, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg demonstrate that it’s ok to disagree – even strenuously – on various issues and still be friends. After all, people come from different backgrounds and experiences. They see the world differently and have different perspectives. This doesn’t mean that one person’s viewpoint is more ‘right’ than another’s. It simply means, as Justices Scalia and Ginsburg sang in a duet, “[w]e are different, [but] we are one.”
Lawyers and law students should remember the example set by Justices Scalia and Ginsberg. Put simply, “[t]hey weren't friends despite their divergent interpretations of the Constitution … [t]hey were friends, in part, because of it.”
 Pete Williams and Elisha Fieldstadt, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Justice Antonin Scalia: ‘We Were Best Buddies’ (Feb. 2016), available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-justice-antonin-scalia-we-were-best-n518671 (emphasis added).
 See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1243 (2019); see also Justices Ginsburg and Scalia, A Perfect Match Except for Their Views on the Law (Feb. 2015), available at: https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/02/13/386085342/justice-ginsberg-admits-to-being-tipsy-during-state-of-the-union-nap
 See id.
 539 U.S. 558 (2003); 536 U.S. 304 (2002); 567 U.S. 519 (2012); 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
 Williams supra note 1, available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-justice-antonin-scalia-we-were-best-n518671 (emphasis added).
 Id. (emphasis added).
 Joan Biskupic, Scalia, Ginsburg Strike a Balance (Dec. 2007) available at: https://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=4053142&page=1
 Ariane de Vogue, Scalia-Ginsburg Friendship Bridged Opposing Ideologies (Feb. 2016), available at: https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/14/politics/antonin-scalia-ruth-bader-ginsburg-friends/index.html
 David G. Savage, From the Archives: BFFs Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia agree to disagree (June 2015), available at: https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-na-court-odd-couple-20150622-story.html (brackets added).
 Dara Lind, Read Justice Ginsburg’s Moving Tribute to her “Best Buddy” Justice Scalia (Feb. 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/2/14/10990156/scalia-ginsburg-friends.
 Williams and Fieldstadt, supra note 1, available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-justice-antonin-scalia-we-were-best-n518671 (brackets added).
 Sasha Zients, Justice Scalia's Son: Washington Can Learn From Dad's 'Rich Friendship' with RBG (Aug. 2018), available at: https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/23/politics/scalia-son-rbg-podcast-cnntv/index.html (emphasis added).
Tuesday, January 14, 2020
Last year was a rough year for the doctrine of stare decisis, the rule that prior precedent should be followed in subsequent similar cases. In 2018, in Janus v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Justice Alito quoted from Payne v. Tennessee, a 1991 Rehnquist opinion, reasoning that stare decisis as important because it "promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. Thus, although stare decisis is not an "inexorable command," past precedent should not be overturned without "strong grounds" for doing so. These grounds included an analysis of the quality of the reasoning, the workability of the rule established, its consistency with related decisions, developments since the rule was handed down, and subsequent reliance on the decision.
In his May 2019 majority opinion in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, Justice Thomas concluded, after analyzing four of these factors, that the first three justified overruling prior precedent. In reaction, Justice Breyer noted in his dissent that believing that a case was wrongly decided cannot justify "scrapping settled precedent." Instead, according to Breyer, since the dissent in the prior precedent had considered the majority decision to be wrongly decided, but still "plausible," overruling a decision that is not "obviously wrong" simply because the majority now agrees with the prior dissent is "obviously wrong."
The next month, Justice Kagan, writing for the majority in Kisor v. Wilkie, again quoted from Payne regarding the importance of stare decisis, and argued that any departure from the doctrine must be supported by some "special justification" beyond the argument that the prior case was wrongly decided. Finding that the precedent at issue was not "unworkable" or a "doctrinal dinosaur," the majority refused to overturn it. Justice Gorsuch, writing a concurring opinion, seemed to reject Kagan's strict approach, instead returning to the Janus factors created by Alito and suggesting that such factors should permit the overturning of precedent when it "no longer withstands careful analysis."
This back-and-forth battle involves more than just a disagreement over the legal standard for overturning precedent. There are political and social subcontexts that are being flagged in these cases. But that is a subject for a different blog. What I am concerned with is what a practitioner, after all of this sparring, is supposed to do with adverse authority now.
First, it should go without saying that you can't ignore adverse authority. ABA Model Rule3.3(a)(2) states that “a lawyer shall not knowingly … fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.” Even if you think you can distinguish the authority, or that it is a dead doctrine, you must deal with it.
Second, be sure that you are actually dealing with precedent that is directly applicable to your case. If the authority is distinguishable, you don't need to directly attack it. Just show why the decision does not dictate a result in your case. As Justice Frankfurter wrote, "If a precedent involving a black horse is applied to a case involving a white horse, we are not excited. If it were an elephant or an animal ferae naturae or a chose in action, then we would venture into thought. The difference might make a difference." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 50 (1957) (Frankfurter, concurring). Explain why your differences dictate a different outcome.
Third, when you do have to discuss applicable adverse authority,and you cannot distinguish it, use the structure applied by both sides of the debate whenever possible. Both sides of the debate in the Court give lip service to the idea that stare decisis is not a rigid doctrine. One side seems to focus on whether the prior decision is unworkable or out-of-touch with current law, while the other prefers the multifactoral approach under Janus. Using both approaches therefore seems to be the best bet - quote and use the Janus factors, but focus on why the prior case has become unworkable or is out-of-touch with current law.
Fourth, enlist aid when showing why the prior case is unworkable. Surveys of former Supreme Court Clerks indicate that they find amicus briefs particularly helpful when dealing with complex issues beyond their experience. See Lynch, Best Friends?: Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & Pol. 33 (Winter 2004). If a doctrine has had an unworkable impact in a particular field, then briefing from amicus in that field may be necessary to get across the point. Consider soliciting that briefing at an early stage, as well as setting out the issue even in intermediate appellate courts.
Fifth, and finally, know your enemy. Understand the underpinnings and history of your adverse authority, so you can help the Court understand how some of those underpinnings may have changed over time. This will require extensive research, but if the Court is going to require "special justification" to change the adverse authority, it will require special effort on your part to explain and justify that departure. This may require some legal digging, but if you can show, at the end, that the adverse case is really a dinosaur, all that digging is worth it.
Thanks goes to appellate lawyer Scott Rothenberg's paper, "Prevailing in the Face of Adverse 'White Horse" Authority" for inspiring this post.
(image credit: Dinornis Elephantopus, Roger Fenton c1854 (Digital image courtesy of the Getty's Open Content Program)).
Saturday, December 21, 2019
Graduating from law school is a significant accomplishment and you should be proud and excited to begin your legal career. Whether you are employed in a private law firm, a government position, or a clerkship, be sure to conduct yourself in a manner that will maximize your chances of achieving success in the legal profession. Below are some tips to help with the transition from law school to law practice.
1. Understand that ‘soft skills’ are extremely important to your success
Success as an attorney doesn’t depend solely or even primarily on your ability to analyze precedent, apply the law to the facts, or draft persuasive briefs. In the legal profession, attorneys who possess ‘soft skills’ are valued highly and often achieve greater degrees of success. Thus, understand that it’s not just your legal ability that matters. Rather, you must demonstrate to colleagues, judges, and clients that you possess the requisite soft skills to succeed in the profession. These skills include:
- Interpersonal skills
- Work ethic
- Listening skills
- Having a positive attitude
- Coping with stress effectively
Accordingly, focus on developing these and other soft skills because they are essential to becoming a competent and successful attorney.
2. Don’t be a jerk – you want people to like you
In any organization, one of the most critical determinants of success is whether your colleagues and your clients like you. The following are some, but not all, of the characteristics that enhance your likeability:
- Be humble. It doesn’t matter how highly ranked you were in law school or what law school you attended; being humble demonstrates an awareness that your colleagues are as smart or smarter than you (or at the very least, more experienced) and that you have a lot to learn as a new attorney.
- Be honest. If you make a mistake, own it and learn from it.
- Be respectful. Treat everyone with respect and kindness. Don’t ever treat the staff poorly. The fact that you have a law degree doesn’t mean that you are superior to or better than those who do not. Indeed, how you treat others reveals much about your character and integrity.
- Never gossip. Gossiping is disrespectful to others and it demonstrates that you cannot be trusted.
- Be receptive to criticism and be willing to learn.
- Be authentic. People don’t want to associate with individuals who are fake or shallow. Be real -- and be yourself.
Put bluntly, don’t be a jerk. In the end, it will negatively affect your career (and probably your personal life).
3. Work very hard and persevere
In law practice (and in life), those who achieve high levels of success aren’t always or even often the smartest or the most talented. Rather, they work hard. They persevere. They sacrifice. They have the same work ethic and dedication regardless of whether they enjoy a particular assignment. Hard work and perseverance separates you from others and demonstrate your value as an attorney.
4. Be confident and remember that you control how others perceive you
At the beginning of your legal career, you may feel nervous, insecure, and intimidated. These feelings are normal. It doesn’t mean, however, that you have to convey anxiety and insecurity to your colleagues and clients. You control how others perceive you and, to a degree, you control the opinions that others form of you. As such, be sure to project confidence, conscientiousness, self-awareness, and self-assurance. Your employer wants to know that you are reliable and can be trusted with difficult assignments under high-pressure circumstances. Projecting confidence is essential to gaining that trust.
5. Continue improving your research and writing skills throughout your career
Excellent research, writing, re-writing, and editing skills are essential to achieving success in the legal profession. As such, dedicate yourself to improving these skills throughout your career. And it doesn’t matter if you obtained an ‘A’ in your legal research and writing classes in law school; becoming an excellent writer is a lifelong process and you should continually strive to improve your research and writing skills.
6. Communicate honestly and openly with your colleagues
Effectively communicating with your colleagues and clients is essential. For example, if you receive an assignment and you aren’t sure how to complete it, don’t be afraid to ask for help, such as from a mentor that your firm assigns to you or from one of your colleagues. It is far better to ask for help than to complete a project in a substandard manner. And asking for help demonstrates humility and a willingness to learn. Likewise, never promise more than you can deliver or take on too much work. If, for example, a partner asks you to draft a brief on a very tight deadline and you are already extremely busy, be honest with the partner. It doesn’t mean that you are lazy or unwilling to take on a significant workload. It means that you recognize your limitations, which will enable the partner to find someone else who can meet the deadline and complete the brief with the requisite quality.
7. Accept criticism and failure – and learn from those failures
Even if you graduated first in your class from law school, received a perfect grade point average, and received numerous awards, you will inevitably fail in the legal profession, particularly in your first few years. For example, a partner may be dissatisfied with the quality of your writing on an assignment. Your research memorandum may inadvertently omit a recently-decided and very relevant case. And you may lose a motion because the judge simply disagrees with your position. The point is that you will face criticism and you will experience failure. What matters is how you react to criticism and failure. The most successful attorneys view failure as an opportunity to learn, to grow, and to become better advocates. Thus, don’t be afraid to fail and never waste a failure. Learn from failure. Remember that becoming an excellent lawyer is a process and you have to embrace that process to achieve your goals. So don’t be too hard on yourself. After all, if you cannot accept criticism and learn from failure, you will never grow as a lawyer (or, most likely, as a person).
8. Set goals and objectives for each day
Lawyers are often very busy and handle many cases simultaneously. To avoid feeling overwhelmed and to avoid mistakes (e.g., missing a deadline to file a motion), be sure, at the beginning of every day, to make a list of the most important assignments or tasks that you must complete. Although other unexpected assignments may arise during the course of a day, make sure that you complete the assignments on your list. In short, you must be organized. Prioritize your tasks and give yourself sufficient time to produce a high-quality product.
9. Be reliable (always show up on time and always meet deadlines)
As a new attorney, you must demonstrate that you are reliable and trustworthy. Gaining trust begins by always being on time for a meeting or a deposition. If, however, you will be late in a given situation, be sure to communicate with your colleagues and have an exceedingly persuasive reason for your lateness. And never miss a deadline, such as for the completion of a memorandum or brief. When you miss deadlines, it gives the impression that you did not dedicate sufficient effort to completing the assignment in a timely manner, did not prioritize effectively, were not organized, or simply didn’t care.
10. Pay attention to detail
Excellent lawyers pay attention to every detail, no matter how seemingly minor or inconsequential. As a new lawyer, you demonstrate your reliability and trustworthiness by paying attention to detail. For example, make sure that your brief complies with state or local court rules governing font type and size, and word count. When drafting a memorandum, be sure to include precedent that is not favorable to your position and explain why it does not affect your conclusion. When you bill time for a particular case, make sure that you specify in detail the tasks that you completed. Paying attention to detail demonstrates that you are conscientious and thorough in your work.
11. Find a healthy balance between your professional and personal life
At the end of the day, what matters most is that you are happy. A critical aspect of being happy as a lawyer is finding a healthy balance between your work life and your personal life. If you become consumed by your work, your personal relationships will suffer. You will miss out on important events in your family. You may become burned out and no longer enjoy practicing law. Your health may suffer. For these and other reasons, you should strive to achieve a healthy balance between your professional and personal life that enables you to have healthy relationships and pursue other interests.
12. Take care of your health and well-being – and ask for help if you need it
The practice of law can be very stressful at times. You may, for example, have to draft multiple briefs on very tight deadlines while also conducting depositions, appearing in court, and meeting with clients. To best prepare yourself to handle the stress of law practice, you should focus on being as healthy as possible. Take time to exercise. Eat healthy foods. Practice meditation or yoga (or whatever works for you). Get sufficient sleep each night because a lack of sleep will likely impact the quality of your work. And remember that coping with the stress of law practice with alcohol or other substances will cause you great harm over time, both professionally and personally. If you are struggling with alcoholism or drug abuse or suffering from depression, anxiety, or other mental health issues, please ask for help. Most jurisdictions have organizations that assist attorneys on a confidential basis. Additionally, you can seek psychological or psychiatric help, which can help you to develop coping mechanisms or provide you with medication in appropriate circumstances. Whatever you do, prioritize your health and happiness because both are perquisites to achieving success as a lawyer.
13. Remember that your reputation is everything
In the legal profession, and in most professions, your reputation is everything. You should always conduct yourself in an honest and ethical manner, and demonstrate that you have integrity and strong values. Don’t ever lie. Don’t avoid problems. Don’t try to conceal facts or law from the courts that are unfavorable to your case. Don’t promise your client more than you can deliver. Don’t gossip about your colleagues. Don’t take credit for work that you didn’t do. Remember that your credibility as a lawyer is essential to maximizing the chances of success for your clients (and it shows that you are a decent human being).
14. Be cautious about dating your colleagues
In law practice, you’ll spend a significant amount of time with your colleagues and make meaningful friendships. But be careful about dating or getting into a relationship with one of your colleagues. If your relationship is not successful, it could lead to an awkward environment at work and distract you from your work. Of course, this is not always the case, but as a new attorney, it is advisable to keep your professional life separate from your personal life.
15. Network and get to know your colleagues
Get to know your colleagues and the members of the bar in which you are practicing. Attend your firm’s social events and those sponsored by your bar association. Getting to know people in your profession enables you to establish connections in the profession and demonstrates your interest in becoming a valued member of the bar. But in doing so, don’t be fake or superficial. Be yourself. Be real. Be friendly. Be humble. Be respectful.
16. Remember that it’s about how happy you are, not how much money you make
Don’t focus solely on making money. The legal profession provides you with an extraordinary opportunity to positively affect the lives of other people and your community. The best way to contribute meaningfully to the lives of others is to pursue what you are most passionate about, not what will make you the most money. Accordingly, you should evaluate whether you are happy at your firm or whether you are satisfied practicing in a particular area of the law. At the end of the day, your happiness – and health – matters more than anything else. Thus, don’t force yourself to stay in a job that you dislike or give up on dreams that you’d still like to pursue. Although change (and the resulting uncertainty) is difficult, you’ll be much happier pursuing goals that you truly desire rather than resigning yourself to a job that doesn’t satisfy you.
17. Focus on what you can control and don’t waste your time lamenting the past or worrying about the future
The best attorneys learn from their mistakes but do not lament about the past. They do not spend time worrying about the future. Instead, they live in the present and focus on what they can control. You should do the same because it empowers you to devote your attention to excelling at your current responsibilities. After all, if you cannot change the past or predict the future, why should you devote any attention to either? Doing so only compromises your ability to succeed in the present.
Ultimately, listen to your inner voice and do what makes you happy. Life is short, so live it the way you truly desire.
Tuesday, December 17, 2019
Oral arguments rarely make the news. Normally, the advocates and the court are staid and respectful, the issues are esoteric, and the only discussion following is from law wonks and Appellate Twitter members discussing the finer points of the argument and reading tea leaves. But occasionally, something so extraordinary happens that the oral argument catches the attention of a much wider audience.
Last week, an oral argument went viral after an advocate was removed from the courtroom following a very truncated oral argument. Lawyers, law students, and even those not involved in the law are talking about the event. So while people are thinking about oral arguments, I thought it would be good to learn a few lessons from what happened.
1. Respect the Tribunal, Even if you Disagree.
The easiest lesson to draw from the argument is that respect for the court must be shown at all times, even (and especially) when you are frustrated. Oral argument can be a very tense experience, with rapid-fire questions from a seemingly hostile bench. The presenter, however, cannot be equally hostile.
This seems unfair. After all, most of us argue that an oral argument should be more like a conversation than a presentation, and in a conversation, if someone fires at you, you fire back. But this is not a conversation between equals. This is a conversation between advocates and a tribunal. The tribunal gets the last word on our client's fate, and we, as attorneys, have obligations to help uphold public trust in that tribunal, whether we agree with its rulings or not.
Thus, when we disagree with a tribunal, we have to make every effort to disagree with the tribunals' reasoning, not with them personally. And when the advocate in the video seemingly implied that the judge had not "done his homework" by reading the briefing, the panel believed he did just that.
2. Do Not Assume that Questions Show the Panel Has Made Up Its Mind.
Another lesson to draw is that we should not be quick to assume that a given question means that a panel has either made up its mind, or that it has not read our briefing. Questions can come from a variety of motivations. They can signal that the Court does not know the answer, as the advocate here assumes. But they can also be a way for the panel to test the strength of an argument, or even as a way for the judges to open up a discussion they have already had behind closed doors.
Whatever the motivation behind a question might be, we need to see questions as opportunities. If the Court actually does not know an answer, we have not communicated that point well enough, and the Court is giving us an opportunity to explain it. If the Court is asking the question to test the strength of our argument, we need to demonstrate that strength. If the questioner is trying to flag a discussion with another panelist, then you now have an opportunity to advocate for your client in that discussion. These are all good things, and we need to keep that mindset in place even when being hard pressed.
3. Know When to Keep Quiet.
After the Appellant in the recording had his exchange with the Justice and had been told to sit down, I couldn't help but keep muttering "stay quiet, stay quiet!" to myself as the Appellee approached the podium. The best thing that the Appellee could do was what he did - stand up, introduce himself, and say that he had nothing to add.
It is difficult to scrap your written outline and preparation, but there are times when that is the best move. When an Appellant has had a bad exchange with the panel, and the panel seems to have made up its mind (but be wary of lesson 2!) it may be best for that exchange to be the last thing the panel hears.
Oral argument is designed to raise issues not addressed in the briefing. If the advocate had stood up and tried to justify his client's position after that exchange, he risked doing just that. By staying quiet, he avoided that potential.
He also negated any need for a rebuttal. Although the panel said that the Appellant had "waived" his right to rebuttal by his comments, there really was no need for a rebuttal, because the Appellee had given nothing to rebut. This silence may also be useful when an Appellant appears to have withheld a point in order to make it more strongly in a rebuttal. If you don't address anything that can be rebutted, you can take away that opportunity to have a scripted "parting shot" in rebuttal.
Arguments like this one are, thankfully, rare. Hopefully, by learning from them when they arise, we can keep them that way.
(image credit: Honore Daumier, "Une peroraison a la Demosthene," plate 33 from Les Gens de Justice, November 1, 1847)
Saturday, December 14, 2019
In this season of giving, we have the gifts of two new scathing appellate opinions on poor persuasion and civility to remind us all our courts really want for Christmas (and any holiday) is clear, ethical writing. While we have plenty of past examples of appellate courts taking poor writers to task, in November, we gained two more published opinions building on past decisions and reminding us truly persuasive writing is both straightforward and civil.
The blogosphere has already discussed the November 7, 2019 Seventh Circuit opinion in McCurry v. Kenco Logistics, where the court explained: “Bad writing does not normally warrant sanctions, but we draw the line at gibberish.” 942 F.3d 783, 792 (7th Cir. 2019). For a fun review of McCurry listing the many biting phrases the court used, including the new signal “(all errors in original),” see Kevin Underhill’s November 8, 2019 blog. https://loweringthebar.net/2019/11/seventh-circuit-we-draw-the-line-at-gibberish.html.
The McCurry court cited Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 801–02 (7th Cir. 2011), a Seventh Circuit decision ordering an attorney to should show cause why he should not be disciplined for poor writing and lack of civility. Counsel in Stanard first gained notoriety representing alleged repeat wife-killer Drew Peterson in civil litigation, and faced criticism for his past litigation tactics. See Howard Posner, “Mind Your Grammar,” Cal. Lawyer (Nov. 2012). In Stanard, the court chastised counsel for “Lack of punctuation,” “Near incomprehensibility,” “Failure to follow basic directions,” “Grammatical and syntactical errors,” and incorrect statements of fact and law. 658 F.3d at 797-800. According to Judge Sykes, who also authored McCurry: “At least 23 sentences [in the Stanard brief] contained 100 or more words. This includes sentences of 385, 345, and 291 words.” Stanard, 658 F.3d at 798. Moreover, counsel’s refusal to follow court orders and lack of respect for the trial court hindered his representation of his landowner client in Stanard. Id. at 800-02.
For years, I have used Stanard in appellate advocacy teaching to support the idea truly persuasive writing is accurate and precise. I also use the case to show how lack of civility to the court and others inhibits persuasion.
Now, we can also point students to McCurry, and we have a new case from California expressly saying lack of civility is unpersuasive. On November 22, 2019, the California Court of Appeal issued its opinion in Briganti v. Chow, ___ Cal. App. 4th __, 2019 WL 6242111, *1 (Nov. 22, 2019), and ordered the opinion published “to draw attention to our concluding note on civility, sexism, and persuasive brief writing.” See Debra Cassens Weiss, “Appeals court sees lawyer's reference to 'attractive' judge in brief as a 'teachable moment' on sexism,” http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/appeals-court-sees-lawyers-reference-to-attractive-judge-in-brief-as-a-teachable-moment-on-sexism (Nov. 27, 2019).
Briganti involved, in part, an anti-SLAPP motion regarding claims based on Facebook posts. 2019 WL 6242111, *2-4. In the trial court, then Superior Court Judge Feuer, now a Court of Appeal Justice, made several rulings for and against defendant Chow, and the Briganti court affirmed those rulings. Id. After discussing the merits, the court added an opinion section titled “A Note on Civility, Sexism, and Persuasive Brief Writing,” explaining: “we would be remiss if we did not also comment on a highly inappropriate assessment of certain personal characteristics of the trial judge, including her appearance, [in] Chow’s reply brief. We do so not to punish or embarrass, but to take advantage of a teachable moment.” Id. at *4.
This “teachable moment” was a chance to remind us all sexism, in any form, is unprofessional, unpersuasive, and uncivil. Chow’s reply brief began with comments Justice Feuer was “an attractive, hard-working, brilliant, young, politically well-connected judge on a fast track for the California Supreme Court or Federal Bench,” noting “[w]ith due respect, every so often, an attractive, hard-working, brilliant, young, politically well-connected judge can err! Let’s review the errors!” Id. at *4. When questioned at oral argument, Chow’s counsel “stated he intended to compliment the trial judge.” Id. Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded the brief “reflect[ed] gender bias and disrespect for the judicial system.” Id. According to the court: “Calling a woman judge — now an Associate Justice of this court — ‘attractive,’ . . . is inappropriate because it is both irrelevant and sexist. This is true whether intended as a compliment or not. Such comments would not likely have been made about a male judge.” The court cited the California Code of Judicial Ethics, which compels judges to require lawyers “to refrain from” bias based on gender. Id. at *5. As the Briganti court explained, “as judicial officers, we can and should take steps to help reduce incivility,” by “calling gendered incivility out for what it is and insisting it not be repeated.” Id.
The court ended its opinion: “We conclude by extending our thanks to the many talented lawyers whose excellent briefs and scrupulous professionalism make our work product better and our task more enjoyable.” Id According to Briganti, good brief-writing “requires hard work, rigorous analysis, and careful attention to detail.” Thus, while courts “welcome creativity and do not require perfection,” Briganti “simply did not find the peculiar style and content of [Chow’s] brief’s opening paragraph appropriate, helpful, or persuasive.” Id.
Counsel for Chow appears unrepentant, telling the Metropolitan News-Enterprise the court “totally missed the boat on this one, attacking the messenger . . . for using one generally descriptive word ‘attractive’” and exclaiming “Shame on the DCA! Shame on the DCA!” regarding what used to be called the District Court of Appeal. MetNews Staff Writer, “Reference in Brief to Female Judge as ‘Attractive’ Is Sexist: Justice Currey Says Note Is Made of Inappropriateness of Conduct for Instructional Purpose,” http://www.metnews.com/articles/2019/attractive112519.htm (Nov. 25, 2019). While the Briganti court noted the case did not warrant sanctions, the California State Bar has sanctioned Chow’s counsel in the past. Id.
Despite the Briganti counsel’s rejection of the opinion, the rest of us can add Briganti to McCurry and Stanard, among others, on our personal lists of cases reminding us all courts really want is clear, honest writing that helps them reach proper decisions. And for those of us teaching and mentoring new legal writers, these November gifts from appellate courts help us remind young attorneys true persuasion is civil and thoughtful. Happy holidays!
December 14, 2019 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Federal Appeals Courts, Legal Ethics, Legal Profession, Legal Writing, State Appeals Courts | Permalink | Comments (0)
Saturday, December 7, 2019
In recent years, social scientists have demonstrated that all individuals likely harbor implicit, or unconscious, biases. Additionally, based on empirical research, some scholars contend that laws or policies that disparately impact marginalized groups result, at least in part, from implicit biases. Other studies suggest that certain behaviors, such as statements reflecting subtle prejudice against marginalized groups (e.g., microaggressions) result from implicit biases. As a result, many organizations in the public and private sector have instituted training programs that focus on implicit bias, its allegedly deleterious effects, and the methods by which to alleviate such bias in, for example, the hiring and promotion of employees or admission of applicants to universities throughout the United States. And researchers at Harvard University have developed the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which purportedly measures the degree to which an individual harbors implicit biases in a variety of contexts, including those affecting traditionally marginalized groups.
Certainly, striving to eradicate biases that produce discriminatory or disparate impacts on individuals or groups is a moral and legal imperative; discrimination in any form is intolerable and contravenes the guarantee that citizens of all backgrounds enjoy liberty, equality, and due process of law.
But does implicit bias actually – and directly – correlate with biased behavior?
Recent research in the social sciences suggests that the answer to this question remains elusive and that the effect of implicit bias on biased behavior may not be as significant as previously believed.
To begin with, there is a general consensus among scholars that implicit bias exists. Put simply, all individuals, regardless of background, arguably harbor implicit biases or prejudices. Importantly, however, the distinction between implicit and explicit bias is difficult to ascertain and operationalize. In other words, how can researchers claim with any degree of confidence that discriminatory behaviors or policies that, for example, disparately impact marginalized groups are the product of implicit rather than explicit bias? Currently, there exists no reliable and objective criteria to make this distinction.
Furthermore, if, as some researchers contend, implicit bias resides outside of consciousness, it would seem difficult, if not impossible, to remedy the effects of such bias. After all, if we cannot be aware of these biases, how can we regulate their manifestation in particular contexts? Also, how can researchers reliably claim that implicit bias predicts biased behavior if not a single person, including researchers, can be aware of its presence and influence? This is not to say, of course, that individuals are unable to develop an increased awareness of the explicit biases that they harbor and take steps to minimize the effect of such biases on their behaviors. It is to say, though, that the relationship between implicit bias and biased behavior remains uncertain, and that there is no method by which to quantify the effect of implicit bias on biased behavior given the presence of other relevant factors (e.g., explicit bias).
Moreover, recent research suggests that the correlation between implicit bias and biased behavior is dubious:
Researchers from the University of Wisconsin at Madison, Harvard, and the University of Virginia examined 499 studies over 20 years involving 80,859 participants that used the IAT and other, similar measures. They discovered two things: One is that the correlation between implicit bias and discriminatory behavior appears weaker than previously thought. They also conclude that there is very little evidence that changes in implicit bias have anything to do with changes in a person’s behavior.
These findings, the researchers state, “produce a challenge for this area of research.”
Additionally, the IAT, which is a popular assessment of implicit bias, has faced significant criticism concerning its methodology and practical value. For example, the IAT sets arbitrary cutoff scores to determine whether an individual’s responses reveal implicit biases, yet fails to provide any assessments of the differences, if any, between the many individuals who score above or below those cutoffs. Also, scores on the IAT are arguably context-dependent and thus produce different results for individuals who take the test multiple times. Consequently, although results on the IAT are “not as malleable as mood,” they are “not as reliable as a personality trait.” Likewise, it is difficult to assess whether the IAT is measuring unconscious attitudes of mere associations that result from environmental influences.
In fact, researchers have conceded that the IAT is flawed, stating that, although the IAT “can predict things in the aggregate … it cannot predict behavior at the level of an individual.” In fact, one of the IAT’s creators acknowledged that the IAT is only effective “for predicting individual behavior in the aggregate, and the correlations are small.” Perhaps most surprisingly, one researcher explained that “what we don’t know is whether the IAT and measures like the IAT can predict behavior over and above corresponding questionnaires of what we could call explicit measures or explicit attitudes.” As a social psychologist explains:
Almost everything about implicit bias is controversial in scientific circles. It is not clear, for instance, what most implicit bias methods actually measure; their ability to predict discrimination is modest at best; their reliability is low; early claims about their power and immutability have proven unjustified.
Of course, this does not mean that implicit bias bears no relationship to biased behavior. It simply means that more research is necessary to determine whether, and to what extent, implicit bias predicts biased behavior. After all, given that eradicating all forms of discrimination is a moral imperative, researchers and policymakers should ensure that society is using the most effective measures to do so. This includes assessing whether implicit bias is a credible predictor of biased behavior.
 Bartlett, T. (2017). Can We Really Measure Implicit Bias? Maybe Not. Retrieved from: https://www.chronicle.com/article/Can-We-Really-Measure-Implicit/238807 (emphasis added).
 Azar, B. (2008). IAT: Fad or Fabulous? American Psychological Association. Retrieved from: https://www.apa.org/monitor/2008/07-08/psychometric.
 German Lopez, For Years, This Popular Test Measured Anyone’s Racial Bias. But It Might Not Work After All. (March 7, 2017), available at: https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/3/7/14637626/implicit-association-test-racism; see also Heather MacDonald, The False Science of Implicit Bias, (Oct. 9, 2017), available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-false-science-of-implicit-bias-1507590908.
 Id. (emphasis added).
 Lee Jussim, Mandatory Implicit Bias Training Is a Bad Idea (Dec. 2, 2017), available at: https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/rabble-rouser/201712/mandatory-implicit-bias-training-is-bad-idea.
Tuesday, December 3, 2019
On the Appellate Advocacy Blog, we typically focus on advocacy in appeals. This is the typical understanding of what an appellate attorney does - handle appeals. But in reality, an appellate attorney wears many different hats depending on the context of the representation.
It is important, from both an ethical and practical standpoint, to define the scope of each representation. Ethically, Rule 1.2(c) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct allows an attorney to “limit the scope of representation if … reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.” The attorney must also communicate to the client “[t]he scope of the representation and the … fee and expenses ….” (Rule 1.5(b)).
Practically, an appellate attorney needs to define the scope of the representation so they can adequately meet their client's needs. Each case has different requirements, and if those requirements are not defined and communicated clearly, necessary work can either fall through the cracks or be unnecessarily duplicated.
In my practice, I try to have this scope discussion as early as possible, usually during conflicts checks. For new clients, I often start with setting out the different models under which I typically work as an appellate specialist. These are:
- “Embedded” Appellate Specialist. The appellate specialist works with the trial team from the beginning of the case. This includes drafting pleadings, pretrial motions, limines and charges, handling motion hearings, directed verdicts, charge conferences, and then any resulting appeal. In short, this model has the appellate specialist overseeing the legal aspects of a case from beginning to end. This model permits the trial team to focus on factual development and trial strategy, and the appellate specialist to focus on legal argument and error preservation. The model is typically used in complex matters, cases with large potential exposure, and cases that the parties intend to appeal no matter the result. Primary responsibility for the case usually shifts from trial counsel to appellate counsel after trial, although trial counsel may, in some cases, remain in a "first chair" position throughout.
- “Consulting” Appellate Specialist. The appellate specialist steps in primarily to observe and assist in a secondary capacity. Sometimes insurance underwriters or corporate clients will become concerned when a case seems to be “going south,” or when a case involving a significant potential verdict approaches trial. In those cases the appellate specialist is usually contacted shortly before trial, and serves as an additional briefing and research consultant for the trial team, while observing and sending daily reports to the client. This helps prepare the attorney for any necessary post-judgment work, because they become familiar with the case through the daily observations and reporting, and helps make sure any issues identified as potential appellate points are preserved for future appellate review. In other cases, the specialist may not be contacted until after the appeal or post-judgment motions are filed, and serves primarily to test, refine, and tighten arguments raised by trial counsel through the drafting process and in mooting the arguments prior to any hearings or oral argument.
- “Traditional” Appellate Specialist. The appellate specialist is brought in to handle the appeal post-trial. This traditional model has the appellate specialist review the same record that the appellate court will review, and present a new, objective view of the merits of the case and the likelihood of success of any appellate point. The specialist takes the record as they find it, and then helps with postjudgment motions and essentially takes over the case on appeal.
By presenting these models, I can then discuss with the client whether they need to use my services in line with one of those models or as something of a mix. That discussion then defines what work needs to be done, how that work should be prioritized, and who will bear responsibility for that work. I can then either include that specific scope in the letter of representation, or state a more general scope with some comfort in the knowledge that we have a set understanding of what that means.
In some cases, it may be necessary to go further and specifically state what role you will not be filling in a case. In cases involving insurance coverage, for instance, it is a good practice to specifically state that you are not coverage counsel, and that you are not choosing points on appeal based on their ultimate effect on coverage in the case, unless you are specifically instructed to do so by the client. In cases where there is already suspicion or acrimony between the client and trial counsel, a disclaimer that you are not going to advise on any malpractice theories may also be wise in order to preserve your focus on the appellate issues in the case.
However you ultimately define the scope of your engagement, the discussion with your client to set that scope will help more clearly define the client's needs and expectations in both of your minds. Only through that type of discussion can you be sure that those needs are met. Both you and the client will benefit.
(Photo attribute: Bill Sanderson, 1997. Credit: Wellcome Collection. CC BY 4.0)