Appellate Advocacy Blog

Editor: Tessa L. Dysart
The University of Arizona
James E. Rogers College of Law

Saturday, March 21, 2020

One Successful Process for Zoom Moot Court Competitions

I hope everyone is staying safe as we navigate our new COVID-19 reality.  In response to the virus, some law schools are canceling oral arguments and moot courts, while others are considering moving arguments online. 

At Pepperdine Caruso School of Law, we just successfully held the preliminary rounds of our annual first-year moot court competition via Zoom.  We are one the first schools to take such a large tournament--with multiple levels of rounds and cash prizes--online.  As I helped move us to an online format in one crazy week, so many people inside and outside of Pepperdine gave me incredible support.  In an effort to pay that support forward, I am sharing our process here.  I hope our lessons can help other schools and moot court competitions make this transition.  Our experience was very positive.  The students are grateful we gave them a formal oral argument opportunity, and many sent thank you emails and even fun Zoom screen shots to us. 

In practice, many of us have appeared via video or phone for short hearings, and even for appellate oral arguments.  See https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000995 (video and audio recordings of the Ninth Circuit argument in Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019), where Judge Wardlaw appeared via Zoom).  Currently, courts all over the country are holding their oral arguments online.  See, e.g., https://www.courts.ca.gov/2dca.htm (California Court of Appeal website noting: “Counsel will appear remotely via video conference, by telephone conference, or by other electronic means as available and arranged by the Clerk's Office”).

We knew we wanted to give our students the traditional moot court experience in these new circumstances, and we chose to conduct arguments using Zoom.  We made one major change from the past, as we decided to let students opt out of the arguments to help students who had to leave our dorms quickly or who were otherwise struggling.  Happily, about half of our first-year students still chose to participate. 

We usually have two teams of two advocates each, or four students, argue in each room of our preliminary argument rounds.  With about 90 students arguing this year, we placed 4 students and 2 judges in each of our 23 Zoom "courtrooms." 

To run courtrooms at more or less the same time, we needed 23 Zoom host judges who could create Zoom meetings open to anyone with the links.  These judges also kept time, though we had the students run timers on their phones too.  We suggested on-screen timers shared to the whole courtroom, but the students were concerned the timers would take too much screen space, even with Zoom’s side-by-side view.

Once we identified trusted members of our community to be the Zoom host judges, we created and shared a step-by-step guide for making an open Zoom link.  We asked hosts to name their meetings "Courtroom One 4:15," and so on.  We then collected the hosts' Zoom links and added them to our Google Sheet listing all the students, courtrooms, and argument times.  We shared the sheet with the courtroom assignments and links to all of our first-year competitors.   

We had great support from our faculty, who joined some Moot Court Team members and Law Review students, as well as a few alums, to be our roughly 40 judges.  Some judges helped with multiple rounds, and many judges told us this was almost as fun as in-person arguments.

We ran three preliminary rounds, to spread out the ability for our Moot Court Board and me to “Zoom in” to meetings and help as needed.  We used ten courtrooms each during two evening rounds, and we needed to pop in to only two courtrooms to help.  The next morning, our three courtrooms ran without a hitch.  Having trusted judges as hosts really helped, and we recommend this approach.

We made our score sheet into a Google Form for the judges.  It was fun to watch the scores roll in after the rounds.  Moreover, our competition co-chairs had a spreadsheet right away with the score sheet data.  These chairs could quickly identify our top four teams for the semi-final round, unlike when they type in scores from paper forms.

We will have four teams in our semi-final round Monday night, and then the top two will go to our final round Wednesday night.  We will share the Zoom link for our final round courtroom with our whole school, and we will have sitting judges serving on our final round bench.  We made the judges a separate deliberation room Zoom meeting, to be doubly sure their voting discussion will be confidential. 

In our law school virtual classrooms today, we can still give our students a traditional first-year highlight by moving oral arguments online.  Many of our courts are doing the same thing, and after holding these successful digital arguments at Pepperdine, I can promise you will be glad you saved moot court by moving online too. 

March 21, 2020 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Current Affairs, Law School, Legal Profession, Moot Court, Oral Argument, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 16, 2020

Quarantine, Coronavirus, and the Constitution

Attack-on-the-quarantine-establishment-staten-island-ny-on-september-1-1858

Eugene Volokh over at the Volokh Conspiracy recently posted a blog sharing the expertise of law professor and M.P.H. Ed Richards on the issue of the constitution and coronavirus quarantine measures. Professor Richards notes that drastic public health measures were the rule of the day during our republic's early years, and that there is a strong originalist argument in favor of public health concerns trumping certain individual constitutional concerns.

As Richards noted:

Colonial boards of health may have been the first administrative agencies in the US. They exercised Draconian powers that were rooted in English law. The English statutory and common law recognized the right of the state to quarantine and limit the movement of plague carriers. Blackstone observed that disobeying quarantine orders merited severe punishments, including death. The argument of counsel in Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 340-41 (1849) described measures to control a yellow fever outbreak in Philadelphia:

 

For ten years prior, the yellow-fever had raged almost annually in the city, and annual laws were passed to resist it. The wit of man was exhausted, but in vain. Never did the pestilence rage more violently than in the summer of 1798. The State was in despair. The rising hopes of the metropolis began to fade. The opinion was gaining ground, that the cause of this annual disease was indigenous, and that all precautions against its importation were useless. But the leading spirits of that day were unwilling to give up the city without a final desperate effort. The havoc in the summer of 1798 is represented as terrific. The whole country was roused. A cordon sanitaire was thrown around the city. Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania proclaimed a non- intercourse between New York and Philadelphia.

 

These powers are classic police powers, exercised by the states. While they were not at direct issue in Smith, the power to quarantine ships was upheld against commerce clause and foreign affairs challenges in Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health (1886). The power to establish cordons sanitaire was upheld in Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Board of Health of State of Louisiana (1902). The right of the state to require vaccination was upheld in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905).

As Richards goes on to comment, while the breadth of power the government can exercise is broad, it must be exercised with wisdom. The yellow-fever quarantine, for instance, we now know to be counterproductive: the disease is spread by mosquitoes, and quarantine only kept people in harm's way.

Most governmental limitations on gatherings and the imposition of involuntary quarantine have been, and likely will continue to be, local. The federal government's power to quarantine comes primarily from the Commerce Clause, as well as a statute passed pursuant to the power granted by that clause, 42 U.S.C. § 264. This statute is restricted to the quarantine of people at a certain stage of infection who either cross state lines, or are likely to come into contact with those who will cross state lines.

Local and state governments, however, have no such restrictions on their police power over local conditions regarding health and safety. For a listing of each state's statutory power to quarantine, see this website. As you can see, each state takes a different approach and violations carry different penalties, all of which may be tested under both state and federal constitutional challenges.

Due process challenges may be raised, as they have in the past, in response to the deprivation of liberty interests. Exactly what standard would be applied to these challenges is an interesting question. In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), the Supreme Court dealt with an analogous issue - the involuntary confinement of persons with mental illness to state asylums. Noting that "[t]his Court repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection," the court went on to discuss what standard was necessary in such cases. Id. at 425.

In order to protect competing interests of the State and its wards, the Supreme Court concluded that something more than "preponderance of the evidence" was necessary, but that the "reasonable doubt" standard used in criminal cases was too high. The Court thus held that a "clear and convincing standard" was the constitutional floor for commitment cases. See Id. at 430-33.

It is not entirely clear that the Addington standard would apply to infectious disease quarantine. There would be an argument for a lower standard, given the urgent and emergent nature of the current situation as compared to the usually measured and individual determination of mental illness. But Addington does give those who are curious some reading into the balancing interests at issue in crafting that standard.

Under Addington and other authorities, what must be proven by this "clear and convincing evidence" is not just that the person to be confined was mentally ill, but also that they presented a threat to themselves and others. It is likely that similar proof would be required for quarantine - that the person has been exposed to the virus, and that they present a risk to themselves or others if not confined. See Michael R. Ulrich, et al., Quarantine and the Federal Role in Epidemics, 71 SMU L. Rev. 391 (2018).

This analysis not purely academic. Some of those under voluntary quarantine have already broken their confinement and been placed into involuntary quarantine. More will likely have to be place there. And if conditions continue to deteriorate, the full extent of the federal governments power under 42 U.S.C. § 264 may be tested.

Hopefully, the "curve will flatten" soon thanks to voluntary compliance. If not, local and federal governments have powerful tools available to intercede, limited only by constitutional principles with application that is currently ill-defined.

(image attribution: Attack on the Quarantine establishment [Staten Island, N.Y.] on September 1, 1858, appearing in Harper's Weekly, Sept. 11, 1858).

March 16, 2020 in Current Affairs, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, March 8, 2020

Oral Argument Recap: June Medical Services, LLC v. Russo

On March 4, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in June Medical Services, LLC v. Russo, an important case concerning the states’ ability to regulate abortion providers and access to abortion services. Specifically, the Court will decide the constitutionality of a law in Louisiana that requires abortion providers to obtain hospital admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of where the providers perform abortions.

By way of brief background, in Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to privacy, which the Court recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut (and other cases), encompassed a right to abortion.[1] In so holding, the Court established a trimester framework. Under this framework, laws restricting access to abortions during the first trimester were presumptively unconstitutional. During the second trimester, states could only regulate abortion to protect a woman’s health and, in the third trimester, states were generally permitted to prohibit abortions, except to save or preserve the life of the mother. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court upheld Roe but rejected the trimester framework. In so doing, the Court adopted an “undue burden” test. Under this standard, the constitutionality of laws regulating abortion depends on whether such laws unduly burden a woman’s right to access abortion services. After Planned Parenthood, several states enacted legislation to regulate and, arguably, restrict abortion access, and the Court, applying the undue burden standard, addressed the validity of these laws on a case-by-case basis. As a result, the nature and scope of the right to abortion remains unresolved.

The Court’s decision in June Medical Services will be among the most significant in the Court’s abortion jurisprudence. To begin with, the Court’s decision will clarify the precedential value of Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstadt, where the Court invalidated – by a 5-4 margin – a nearly identical law in Texas.[2] In Hellerstadt, the Court held that the law in question conferred no material benefit on women and would likely lead to the closure of several abortion clinics, thus constituting an undue burden on the right to obtain abortion services. Additionally, the Court’s decision will likely impact the states’ ability to restrict abortion access in future cases and may clarify the scope of the right to abortion. Third, although not likely, the Court may adopt a new or, at least, modified standard by which to assess the constitutionality of laws regulating abortion, particularly because the “undue burden” standard has arguably been difficult to interpret and apply with any degree of consistency or predictability.

At oral argument, the justices appeared divided.[3]

Justice Samuel Alito raised the issue of third-party standing and questioned whether physicians who provided abortions could challenge the law on behalf of women. Specifically, Justice Alito appeared concerned that the physicians’ interests (i.e., avoiding unnecessary or burdensome regulations) conflicted with the interests of women seeking abortion services (i.e., safety and continuity of care). The majority of justices, however, did not appear to find this argument persuasive.

Chief Justice Roberts focused primarily on whether the benefits (and burdens) of laws requiring admitting privileges for abortion providers may differ on a state-by-state basis. Justice Brett Kavanaugh also questioned whether these laws would be considered constitutional if abortion providers could easily obtain admitting privileges at a nearby hospital. Roberts’s and Kavanaugh’s questions suggested that the Court may be considering whether these laws are facially constitutional or whether their constitutionality depends on the facts of each case.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, along with Justices Sonya Sotomayor, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan, appeared skeptical of the law. For example, Justice Ginsburg questioned the utility of requiring that abortion providers obtain admitting privileges within thirty miles of where abortion serves are provided. As Justice Ginsburg stated, since the relatively small number of women who experience complications from medical or surgical abortions go to a hospital nearest to their residence, which almost always outside of the thirty-mile radius, the admitting privileges requirement arguably served no legitimate purpose.

Justice Sotomayor questioned whether, given the various requirements for obtaining admitting privileges at Louisiana’s hospitals, abortion providers could realistically obtain such privileges. For example, one factor is whether the physician has admitted a sufficient number of patients to the hospital to which the physician is applying. Given the fact that women rarely experience complications from abortions and thus are not admitted to a nearby hospital, abortion providers would not, in most instances, meet this requirement. This and other questions suggested that the law in Louisiana, like the law in Texas, reflected an attempt to restrict or even prohibit abortions, rather than to safeguard women’s health. The attorneys for Louisiana disagreed, arguing that most of the physicians who challenged the law had not made reasonable attempts to obtain admitting privileges and thus could not reasonably claim that they were unable to obtain such privileges.

Justice Breyer also questioned whether the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision to overturn a portion of the district court’s factual findings satisfied the “clearly erroneous standard.”

And Justice Kagan appeared skeptical of the argument that the law served a “credentialing purpose,” particularly because hospitals could deny admitting privileges to a physician based on factors having no relationship to the quality of that physician.

Ultimately, Justice Breyer expressed a concern that has arguably plagued the Court’s abortion jurisprudence: the difficulty in adopting a reliable, predictable, and workable rule.

I understand there are good arguments on both sides. Indeed, in the country people have very strong feelings and a lot of people morally think it’s wrong and a lot of people morally think the opposite is wrong. And in Casey, and the later cases, I think personally the Court is struggling with the problem of what kind of rule of law do you have in a country that contains both sorts of people.[4]

Based on the oral argument, the Court’s decision in June Medical Services is difficult to predict. The difficulty of applying the nebulous “undue burden” standard, the politically divisive nature of this issue, principles of stare decisis, and concerns for the Court’s institutional legitimacy may certainly influence one or more of the justices.

Notwithstanding, based on oral argument, it seems that the Court may decide June Medical Services by a 5-4 vote, and if the Court invalidates the law, the most likely scenario would involve Chief Justice Roberts joining Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, Sotomayor, and Breyer in the majority. However, it is uncertain how Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh will vote, or how the majority decision will be written. It appears unlikely that the Court will simply overturn Whole Women’s Health; rather, if the Court upholds the law, it will likely do so by distinguishing Whole Women’s Health on the facts. The problem is that, if the Court chooses this option, it will fail to effectively guide lower courts and lawmakers, thus inviting additional litigation in the future. As such, the Court may hold that laws requiring abortion providers to obtain admitting privileges are facially unconstitutional because, regardless of the state in which such laws are enacted, they confer no benefit to women.

[1] 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

[2] 579 U.S.             ; 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).

[3] See June Medical Services, LLC v. Russo, Transcript of Oral Argument (March 4, 2020), available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-1323_d18e.pdf.

[4] Id. at 61:24 to 62:9.

March 8, 2020 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Federal Appeals Courts, Legal Profession, Oral Argument, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, March 1, 2020

The Friendship Between Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg – A Lesson in Professionalism, Civility, and Respect for Diverse Viewpoints

Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsberg were, as Justice Ginsburg stated, “best buddies.”[1]

Some might find their friendship surprising. After all, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg embraced very different views regarding constitutional theory and interpretation. Justice Scalia was an originalist and thus believed that the Constitution’s words were fixed and should be interpreted based on what the drafters intended those words to mean.[2] Justice Ginsburg is arguably a “living constitutionalist" and believes that the Constitution’s meaning may change over time to comport with contemporary understandings and present-day realities.[3]

Not surprisingly, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg disagreed – often strenuously – in many significant and controversial decisions, such as in Lawrence v. Texas, where the Court invalidated a statute banning same-sex sodomy, Atkins v. Virginia, where the Court held that the execution of intellectually disabled defendants violated the Eighth Amendment, National Federation of Independent Investors v. Sebelius, where the Court upheld the Affordable Care Act, Obergefell v. Hodges, where the Court invalidated same-sex marriage bans, and Bush v. Gore, where the Court overturned the Florida Supreme Court’s decision ordering a statewide recount of votes cast in the Presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore.[4]

Despite these disagreements – and despite fundamentally different approaches to constitutional interpretation – Justices Scalia and Ginsburg were, as Justice Ginsburg stated, “best buddies.”[5] As Justice Ginsburg explained:

Toward the end of the opera Scalia/Ginsburg, tenor Scalia and soprano Ginsburg sing a duet: “We are different, we are one,” different in our interpretation of written texts, one in our reverence for the Constitution and the institution we serve. From our years together at the D.C. Circuit, we were best buddies. We disagreed now and then, but when I wrote for the Court and received a Scalia dissent, the opinion ultimately released was notably better than my initial circulation. Justice Scalia nailed all the weak spots — the “applesauce” and “argle bargle”—and gave me just what I needed to strengthen the majority opinion. He was a jurist of captivating brilliance and wit, with a rare talent to make even the most sober judge laugh. The press referred to his “energetic fervor,” “astringent intellect,” “peppery prose,” “acumen,” and “affability,” all apt descriptions. He was eminently quotable, his pungent opinions so clearly stated that his words never slipped from the reader’s grasp. Justice Scalia once described as the peak of his days on the bench an evening at the Opera Ball when he joined two Washington National Opera tenors at the piano for a medley of songs. He called it the famous Three Tenors performance. He was, indeed, a magnificent performer. It was my great good fortune to have known him as a working colleague and treasured friend.[6]

Justice Scalia was similarly complimentary of Justice Ginsburg, describing her as an “intelligent woman and a nice woman and a considerate woman — all the qualities that you like in a person.”[7] Indeed, when asked about their friendship, Justice Scalia replied: “what’s not to like?”[8]

In fact, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg “frequently dine[d] and vacation[ed] together,” and “[e]very Dec. 31, they [rang] in the new year together.”[9] As one commentator described:

They and their families spent New Year's Eve together every year. They rode together on an elephant in India (Scalia joked that Ginsburg betrayed her feminism by sitting behind him), and Scalia watched Ginsburg go parasailing in the south of France (“She's so light, you would think she would never come down. I would not do that”).[10]

Ultimately, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg demonstrate that it’s ok to disagree – even strenuously – on various issues and still be friends. After all, people come from different backgrounds and experiences. They see the world differently and have different perspectives. This doesn’t mean that one person’s viewpoint is more ‘right’ than another’s. It simply means, as Justices Scalia and Ginsburg sang in a duet, “[w]e are different, [but] we are one.”[11]

Lawyers and law students should remember the example set by Justices Scalia and Ginsberg. Put simply, “[t]hey weren't friends despite their divergent interpretations of the Constitution … [t]hey were friends, in part, because of it.”[12]

[1] Pete Williams and Elisha Fieldstadt, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Justice Antonin Scalia: We Were Best Buddies’ (Feb. 2016), available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-justice-antonin-scalia-we-were-best-n518671 (emphasis added).

[2] See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1243 (2019); see also Justices Ginsburg and Scalia, A Perfect Match Except for Their Views on the Law (Feb. 2015), available at: https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/02/13/386085342/justice-ginsberg-admits-to-being-tipsy-during-state-of-the-union-nap

[3] See id.

[4] 539 U.S. 558 (2003); 536 U.S. 304 (2002); 567 U.S. 519 (2012); 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

[5] Williams supra note 1, available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-justice-antonin-scalia-we-were-best-n518671 (emphasis added).

 [6] Id. (emphasis added).

[7] Joan Biskupic, Scalia, Ginsburg Strike a Balance (Dec. 2007) available at: https://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=4053142&page=1

[8] Ariane de Vogue, Scalia-Ginsburg Friendship Bridged Opposing Ideologies (Feb. 2016), available at: https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/14/politics/antonin-scalia-ruth-bader-ginsburg-friends/index.html

[9] David G. Savage, From the Archives: BFFs Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia agree to disagree (June 2015), available at: https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-na-court-odd-couple-20150622-story.html (brackets added).

[10] Dara Lind, Read Justice Ginsburg’s Moving Tribute to her “Best Buddy” Justice Scalia (Feb. 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/2/14/10990156/scalia-ginsburg-friends.

[11] Williams and Fieldstadt, supra note 1, available at:  https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-justice-antonin-scalia-we-were-best-n518671 (brackets added).

[12] Sasha Zients, Justice Scalia's Son: Washington Can Learn From Dad's 'Rich Friendship' with RBG (Aug. 2018), available at: https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/23/politics/scalia-son-rbg-podcast-cnntv/index.html (emphasis added).

March 1, 2020 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Law School, Legal Ethics, Legal Profession, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, February 16, 2020

Resolving the Tension Between Religious Liberty and Equality

In Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the Court confronted the issue of whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits a business owner to refuse service to individuals – in violation of a state anti-discrimination statute – if providing such service would violate the business owner’s religious beliefs.[1] By way of background, the Petitioner, a small business owner in Colorado, refused to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple because doing so would have violated the business owner’s religious beliefs.[2] The Respondent, Colorado Civil Rights Commission, later held that the business owner’s refusal to serve the same-sex couple violated Colorado’s anti-discrimination law. In so holding, the Commission rejected the Petitioner’s religious liberty claim.

Unquestionably, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. implicated the tension between liberty (i.e., permitting individuals to freely exercise their religious beliefs) and equality (i.e., the statutory and, in some situations, constitutional right to freedom from discrimination), and underscored the difficulty in balancing these competing interests. Indeed, how should this tension be resolved and what standard or criteria should be adopted to guide lower courts in future cases?

In its decision, the Court did not answer these questions. Instead, the Court issued a narrow decision in which it held that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s decision was procedurally unfair because the Commission displayed impermissible hostility toward religion during the hearing.[3] Thus, the underlying legal issue remains unresolved, although it will likely only be a matter of time before the Court again confronts this question.

The purpose of the Free Exercise Clause, and the Court’s jurisprudence, has established several principles that may help to address the question presented in Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. and guide lower courts in future cases.[4] To begin with, a core purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to ensure that individuals can freely exercise their religious beliefs without undue interference, and absent coercion or fear of reprisal. Indeed, the right to religious freedom is essential to safeguarding individual liberty. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor stated in City of Boerne v. Flores, “[g]iven centrality of freedom of speech and religion to the American concept of personal liberty, it is altogether reasonable to conclude that both should be treated with the highest degree of respect.”[5]

Importantly, however, the right to religious freedom is not absolute. In limited circumstances, laws infringing on religious liberty will be upheld if they further compelling government interests, are narrowly tailored, and constitute the least restrictive means of achieving the stated interests.[6] The Court’s jurisprudence has established several principles that clarify the extent to which the government may restrict religious liberty.

First, the Court distinguishes between religious beliefs and practices, the latter of which is subject to restriction. As the Court held in Reynolds v. United States, “[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”[7]

Second, any law that coerces individuals into acting contrary to their beliefs violates the Free Exercise Clause. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, the Court emphasized that states “may make it more difficult to practice certain religions,” provide that state laws “have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs do.”[8]

Third, states may not enact laws that target specific religions or religious practices. For example, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court invalidated a law banning the ritual sacrifice of animals because the record indicated that the law was aimed at suppressing core aspects of a worship service conducted by the Santeria religion.[9] As Justice Anthony Kennedy explained, states “may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices.”[10]

Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, in Employment Division v. Smith, the Court held that generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause if they only incidentally burden religious practices.[11] Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia stated that “[i]t is a permissible reading of the text … to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion … is not the object … but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”[12] The Court’s holding in Smith overruled its prior decision in Sherbert v. Verner, where the Court held that individuals may seek exemptions from laws that infringe on their religious freedom.[13]

In response to Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which states that any law resulting in a “substantial burden” on religious practices violates the Free Exercise Clause unless it furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means to achieve that interest.[14] However, in City of Boerne, the Court held that the Act does not apply to the states.[15] Thus, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Act was not relevant to the Court’s decision.

Ultimately, it is difficult to predict how the Court will rule when, in all likelihood, it is confronted with this or a very similar issue in the future. In Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd., Justice Kennedy suggested that “while … religious and philosophical objections are protected … such objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law.”[16] However, Justice Kennedy retired from the Court in 2018 and it is by no means certain that his replacement, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, or the majority of justices, would agree with this proposition.

If the Court does decide this issue in the future, Smith will be highly relevant. Specifically, the justices will likely address whether Smith should be overruled or modified. If the justices decline to overrule Smith, they will probably consider whether the law at issue only incidentally burdens religious liberty or is sufficiently burdensome that it violates the Free Exercise Clause. Additionally, the Court will likely examine whether the law coerces individuals into violating their religious beliefs or impermissibly targets specific religious practices.

As stated above, it is difficult to predict how the Court will rule. Whatever the result, the Court will hopefully adopt a workable standard that clarifies the appropriate balance between liberty and equality, and that effectively guides lower courts, thus avoiding confusion regarding how these interests are balanced in future cases. However, given the fact-specific nature of cases in this area, the Court’s desire to maintain institutional legitimacy, and its understandable reticence to issue broad and sweeping decisions, the Court will most likely issue a narrow ruling that leaves to the lower courts the task of clarifying and developing the law in future cases.

[1] 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017).

[2] See id.

[3] See id. (Specifically, the Court highlighted the following language as evidence of the Commission’s hostility toward religion: “Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the Holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt others”). 

[4] U.S. Const., Amend. I (providing in relevant part that “Congress shall make no law … prohibiting the free exercise [of] religion”).

[5] 521 U.S. 507, 564-65 (1997).

[6] See id. at 555 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he right to free exercise was viewed as generally superior to ordinary legislation, to be overridden only when necessary to secure important government purposes”).

[7] 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).

[8] 485 U.S. 439 (1988).

[9] 508 U.S. 520 (1993).

[10] Id. at 547.

[11] 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

[12] Id. at 878.

[13] 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

[14] 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)(2012).

[15] 521 U.S. 507.

[16] 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017).

February 16, 2020 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Federal Appeals Courts, Legal Profession, Religion, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, January 19, 2020

Ramos v. Louisiana: Do the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments Require Unanimous Jury Verdicts?

In Ramos v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court will decide whether the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous jury verdicts. Specifically, in Ramos, by a vote of 10-2, a jury in state court convicted the defendant of murder. Currently, in criminal cases, only Oregon and Louisiana permit criminal convictions where the jury is non-unanimous. In both jurisdictions, a vote of 10-2 is sufficient to convict a defendant.[1]

The answer to the question presented in Ramos depends in substantial part on the text and purpose of the Sixth Amendment, relevant legal doctrine, and the Court’s precedent.

By way of background, the Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a … public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”[2] Additionally, under the incorporation doctrine, the Court has held that the Sixth Amendment’s right to a trial by an impartial jury, like most provisions in the Bill of Rights, applies to the states.[3]

Over the last several decades, the Court has clarified the nature and scope of the Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement. In Williams v. Florida, for example, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment permits six-member juries in criminal cases.[4] Subsequently, in Ballew v. Georgia, the Court held that juries cannot consist of less than six jurors.[5] Perhaps most importantly, in Apodaca v. Oregon, the Court held that, while the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous jury verdicts in federal cases, it does not require unanimous jury verdicts in state cases.[6] The Court’s decision in Apodaca is arguably anomalous because, when a provision in the Bill of Rights is incorporated against the states, the general rule is that the standards established at the federal level (e.g., unanimous jury verdicts) also apply to the states. In Ramos, the Court will confront this issue – and the continuing validity of Apodaca – when deciding whether jury verdicts at the state level must be unanimous.

Several considerations will be relevant to the Court’s decisions. Advocates of a unanimous jury requirement will likely argue that the Founders expected – and the English common law demonstrated – that the Sixth Amendment’s right to impartial jury encompassed a unanimity requirement. Additionally, relying on the historical record, advocates may assert that racial animus motivated Louisiana’s and Oregon’s adoption of a non-unanimous jury requirement.[7]

Conversely, opponents of a unanimous jury requirement may argue that the Sixth Amendment’s text is silent regarding the issue of unanimous jury verdicts, thus leaving this determination to the states. Furthermore, principles of stare decisis support upholding Apodaca and thus giving states the authority to determine whether to adopt a unanimity requirement for jury verdicts.

The Court’s decision is difficult to predict. On one hand, the Court may be sensitive to the argument that non-unanimous jury verdicts silence the voices of dissenting jurors and result in fundamentally unfair convictions, particularly against traditionally marginalized groups. Also, the Court may determine that a unanimity requirement is essential to ensuring the right to a fair trial. Indeed, empirical evidence has demonstrated that such a requirement “strengthens deliberations, ensures more accurate outcomes, fosters greater consideration of minority viewpoints, and boosts confidence in verdicts and the justice system.”[8]

On the other hand, the Court may be reluctant, under the doctrine of stare decisis, to overturn Apodaca, particularly because at least two states have relied on Apodaca to adopt laws permitting non-unanimous jury verdicts. Moreover, the Court may be concerned regarding the implications of adopting a categorical rule requiring unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases (at least for felonies). For example, what if a state decides to increase the number of jurors from twelve to eighteen? Would a vote of 17-1 in favor of a conviction violate the Sixth Amendment? What if a state law provided that a non-unanimous jury verdict of 11-1 was sufficient to convict a defendant? The Court will likely have to address these and other questions when deciding this case.

Ultimately, Ramos will likely be decided by a 5-4 or 6-3 margin and based on oral argument, it appears that the Court is leaning toward interpreting the Sixth Amendment to require unanimous jury verdicts.

 

[1] Robert Black, Ramos v. Louisiana: Does the 14th Amendment Require Unanimous Jury Verdicts? (Oct. 9, 2019) available at: https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/ramos-v-louisiana-does-the-14th-amendment-require-unanimous-jury-verdicts.

[2] U.S. Const., Amend. VI.

[3] See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).

[4] 399 U.S. 78 (1970).

[5] 435 U.S. 223 (1978).

[6] 406 U.S. 404 (1972).

[7] Black, supra note 1, available at: https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/ramos-v-louisiana-does-the-14th-amendment-require-unanimous-jury-verdicts

[8] Constitutional Accountability Center, Ramos v. Louisiana, available at: https://www.theusconstitution.org/litigation/ramos-v-louisiana/.

January 19, 2020 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Legal Profession, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, December 7, 2019

Implicit Bias: Does It Have Any Relationship to Biased Behavior?

In recent years, social scientists have demonstrated that all individuals likely harbor implicit, or unconscious, biases. Additionally, based on empirical research, some scholars contend that laws or policies that disparately impact marginalized groups result, at least in part, from implicit biases. Other studies suggest that certain behaviors, such as statements reflecting subtle prejudice against marginalized groups (e.g., microaggressions) result from implicit biases. As a result, many organizations in the public and private sector have instituted training programs that focus on implicit bias, its allegedly deleterious effects, and the methods by which to alleviate such bias in, for example, the hiring and promotion of employees or admission of applicants to universities throughout the United States. And researchers at Harvard University have developed the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which purportedly measures the degree to which an individual harbors implicit biases in a variety of contexts, including those affecting traditionally marginalized groups.

Certainly, striving to eradicate biases that produce discriminatory or disparate impacts on individuals or groups is a moral and legal imperative; discrimination in any form is intolerable and contravenes the guarantee that citizens of all backgrounds enjoy liberty, equality, and due process of law.

But does implicit bias actually – and directly – correlate with biased behavior?

Recent research in the social sciences suggests that the answer to this question remains elusive and that the effect of implicit bias on biased behavior may not be as significant as previously believed.

To begin with, there is a general consensus among scholars that implicit bias exists. Put simply, all individuals, regardless of background, arguably harbor implicit biases or prejudices. Importantly, however, the distinction between implicit and explicit bias is difficult to ascertain and operationalize. In other words, how can researchers claim with any degree of confidence that discriminatory behaviors or policies that, for example, disparately impact marginalized groups are the product of implicit rather than explicit bias? Currently, there exists no reliable and objective criteria to make this distinction.

Furthermore, if, as some researchers contend, implicit bias resides outside of consciousness, it would seem difficult, if not impossible, to remedy the effects of such bias. After all, if we cannot be aware of these biases, how can we regulate their manifestation in particular contexts? Also, how can researchers reliably claim that implicit bias predicts biased behavior if not a single person, including researchers, can be aware of its presence and influence? This is not to say, of course, that individuals are unable to develop an increased awareness of the explicit biases that they harbor and take steps to minimize the effect of such biases on their behaviors. It is to say, though, that the relationship between implicit bias and biased behavior remains uncertain, and that there is no method by which to quantify the effect of implicit bias on biased behavior given the presence of other relevant factors (e.g., explicit bias).

Moreover, recent research suggests that the correlation between implicit bias and biased behavior is dubious:

Researchers from the University of Wisconsin at Madison, Harvard, and the University of Virginia examined 499 studies over 20 years involving 80,859 participants that used the IAT and other, similar measures. They discovered two things: One is that the correlation between implicit bias and discriminatory behavior appears weaker than previously thought. They also conclude that there is very little evidence that changes in implicit bias have anything to do with changes in a person’s behavior.[1]

These findings, the researchers state, “produce a challenge for this area of research.”[2]

Additionally, the IAT, which is a popular assessment of implicit bias, has faced significant criticism concerning its methodology and practical value. For example, the IAT sets arbitrary cutoff scores to determine whether an individual’s responses reveal implicit biases, yet fails to provide any assessments of the differences, if any, between the many individuals who score above or below those cutoffs.[3] Also, scores on the IAT are arguably context-dependent and thus produce different results for individuals who take the test multiple times.[4] Consequently, although results on the IAT are “not as malleable as mood,” they are “not as reliable as a personality trait.”[5] Likewise, it is difficult to assess whether the IAT is measuring unconscious attitudes of mere associations that result from environmental influences.[6]

In fact, researchers have conceded that the IAT is flawed, stating that, although the IAT “can predict things in the aggregate … it cannot predict behavior at the level of an individual.”[7] In fact, one of the IAT’s creators acknowledged that the IAT is only effective “for predicting individual behavior in the aggregate, and the correlations are small.”[8] Perhaps most surprisingly, one researcher explained that “what we don’t know is whether the IAT and measures like the IAT can predict behavior over and above corresponding questionnaires of what we could call explicit measures or explicit attitudes.”[9] As a social psychologist explains:

Almost everything about implicit bias is controversial in scientific circles. It is not clear, for instance, what most implicit bias methods actually measure; their ability to predict discrimination is modest at best; their reliability is low; early claims about their power and immutability have proven unjustified.[10]

Of course, this does not mean that implicit bias bears no relationship to biased behavior. It simply means that more research is necessary to determine whether, and to what extent, implicit bias predicts biased behavior. After all, given that eradicating all forms of discrimination is a moral imperative, researchers and policymakers should ensure that society is using the most effective measures to do so. This includes assessing whether implicit bias is a credible predictor of biased behavior.

[1] Bartlett, T. (2017). Can We Really Measure Implicit Bias? Maybe Not. Retrieved from: https://www.chronicle.com/article/Can-We-Really-Measure-Implicit/238807 (emphasis added).

[2] Id.

[3] Azar, B. (2008). IAT: Fad or Fabulous? American Psychological Association. Retrieved from: https://www.apa.org/monitor/2008/07-08/psychometric.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] German Lopez, For Years, This Popular Test Measured Anyone’s Racial Bias. But It Might Not Work After All. (March 7, 2017), available at: https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/3/7/14637626/implicit-association-test-racism; see also Heather MacDonald, The False Science of Implicit Bias, (Oct. 9, 2017), available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-false-science-of-implicit-bias-1507590908.

[8] Id.

[9] Id. (emphasis added).

[10] Lee Jussim, Mandatory Implicit Bias Training Is a Bad Idea (Dec. 2, 2017), available at: https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/rabble-rouser/201712/mandatory-implicit-bias-training-is-bad-idea.

December 7, 2019 in Current Affairs, Law School, Legal Ethics, Legal Profession, Science | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, November 8, 2019

The Weekly Roundup

 

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Each week, the Appellate Advocacy Blog Weekly Roundup presents a few tidbits of news and Twitter posts from the past week concerning appellate advocacy. As always, if you see something during the week that you think we should be sure to include, feel free to send a quick note to either (1) Dan Real at DReal@Creighton.edu or on Twitter @Daniel_L_Real or (2) Catharine Du Bois at DuBoisLegalWriting@gmail.com or on Twitter @CLDLegalWriting

 

US Supreme Court Opinions and News:

  • Next Tuesday, November 12, the court will hear arguments on the validity of President Trump’s decision to terminate the DACA program. More on the case here and a summary of the arguments by Amy Howe (SCOTUS Blog) here.
  • The court has released the January calendar, which begins on January 13, 2020.
  • A new book about a Supreme Court Justice has been released; this one about Justice Clarence Thomas. Author Corey Robin answers questions here about “The Enigma of Clarence Thomas” (Metropolitan Books, 2019).

Federal Appellate Court Opinions and News:

  • The Second Circuit ruled that Donald Trump's accounting firm must turn over the returns to Manhattan District Attorney. The three-judge panel rejected Trump’s argument that he is immune as president from criminal investigation while in the White House. Coverage by NPR and Washington Post.
  • An Alabama US District Court has blocked Alabama’s abortion law. The law was a near-total abortion ban that would have taken affect next month. The order calls the law clearly unconstitutional. AP News report.

Final Tidbit

The Massachusetts Appeals Court rules that, although improper, appealing to a jury’s “reptile” brain is not enough for a mistrial.  Law360 article here.

November 8, 2019 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Federal Appeals Courts, Legal Profession, Legal Writing, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, October 19, 2019

Blackbeard, Allen v. Cooper, and Research via Public Depositories

    This term, SCOTUS will hear a sovereign immunity case involving Blackbeard’s sunken pirate ship.  In Allen v. Cooper, 18-877, the Court will address whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity in the 1990 Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA) by providing remedies for copyright holders when states infringe their federal copyrights. 

    Why does this matter to appellate advocacy, aside from the obvious fun of saying “Aaarrr!” when discussing an Eleventh Amendment case?  The case could impact the scope of free access researchers and appellate practitioners have to online materials.  In fact, while the case raises deep concerns for intellectual property creators, it also shows the increasing push by States to make images and documents available to the public at libraries and universities, and to preserve historic materials digitally.

    In 1718, Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s Revenge ran aground a mile off the coast of what is now called Beaufort, North Carolina.  Legend says her captain and crew immediately transferred all treasure to smaller ships, and the Revenge remained underwater for over 200 years.  According to the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2018), in 1996, a private research and salvage firm operating under a permit issued by North Carolina discovered the wreck of the Revenge.  The researcher hired Petitioner, Frederick Allen, to document the shipwreck.  Id.  Allen obtained the rights to create video footage and photographs of the Revenge with another permit issued by North Carolina, and Allen registered his work over the next 13 years with the U.S. Copyright Office.  Id. at 342, 344.

    At some point, North Carolina posted pieces of Allen’s copyrighted works on State websites and in a State publication.  The State and Allen settled copyright claims from these postings, and the State agreed not to use Allen’s commercial copyrighted material in the future.  Id. at 344-45.  Nonetheless, the State soon published more of Allen’s Revenge video and images online, and then the North Carolina Legislature passed “Blackbeard’s Law,” which converts many of Allen’s images to the public record.  See id. at 342; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121–25(b) (2015) (providing that photographs and video recordings of shipwrecks in the custody of North Carolina are public records); Amy Howe, Justices grant three new cases, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 3, 2019, 12:16 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/justices-grant-three-new-cases/.

    Allen sued North Carolina for copyright infringement and for a declaration that Blackbeard’s Law is unconstitutional.  The state moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity, and Allen argued the CRCA abrogated North Carolina’s immunity.  The district court ruled for Allen, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding Congress acted improperly in enacting the CRCA.  Allen, 895 F.3d at 342-43, 350-53.  The Supreme Court granted cert, and will hear the case on November 5.  https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/allen-v-cooper/.

    Over twenty amici have filed briefs.  Amici in support of Allen make excellent arguments in favor of strengthening IP protection and maintaining the remedies provided in the CRCA.  For example, Oracle, the Software & Information Industry Association, and a group of prominent law scholars have each filed briefs contending Congress properly protected IP rights and innovation in the CRCA.  Oracle ACB, 2019 WL 3828598; SIIA ACB, 2019 WL 3814393, and Scholars ACB, 2019 WL 3828597.  These briefs stress the need to protect inventors and innovators from state action and potential wholesale public adoption of their copyrighted property.

    On the other hand, amici in favor of North Carolina argue copyright holders have remedies aside from the CRCA.  The also claim abrogating immunity will limit the public’s access to documents at public university and government research libraries.  The American Library Association and others stress that public archivists need protection for their large-scale, costly digitization projects to create open access and to save documents of historical significance.  ALA ACB, 2019 WL 4858292.  Similarly, a group of public universities note they are acting in the public interest to promote “education, research and community engagement” when digitizing documents and already carefully respect copyrights.  Public Universities ACB, 2019 WL 4748384.

    Whatever the outcome of these arguments, our appellate community should keep an eye on this case.  Not only does it offer pirate fun, but it presents serious issues of property rights and public access to research materials.

October 19, 2019 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, United States Supreme Court, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 7, 2019

Grammar, Memes, and the Law

I love a good meme.  Make it a good grammar, writing, or editing meme and I am in law professor meme heaven.

Not long ago one of my Facebook friends started sharing the funniest grammar memes (or maybe she had been sharing them all along, but Mark Zuckerberg finally thought I should start seeing them).  Regardless, I was hooked and followed the clicks through to the main Facebook page of Analytical Grammar.  The company also has a website.

What I have loved about the Analytical Grammar memes is that they explain often misused words.  For example, check out this meme (which I share with permission!):

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I shared this meme on my Facebook page and several of my friends found in informative.  I also like that if you click to Analytical Grammar's Facebook page, there is a short text description of the meme and the proper word usage.  

I could share a lot more of the Analytical Grammar memes--they are delightful--but I want to get to the rest of the story.  When I clicked over to the Analytical Grammar Facebook page, I was struck by the cover photo.  It contains a few images and the following text: "This page is run by an Air Force reservist and small business owner, and the business is being SUED for sharing a viral meme. For the full story, documentation, and other info, go to this link: www.gofundme.com/analyticalgrammar." Naturally, I went to the GoFundMe page for more information.

Apparently, Analytical Grammar shared a viral picture of a visual pun. The pun went viral from its site too.  That was in December 2017.  Almost two full years later Analytical Grammar was sued in federal court by the man who said he created the meme.

According to the complaint (in a nutshell), the plaintiff took the photograph and copyrighted it.  He claims that Analytical Grammar ran the photo without permission or a license.  He also seems to claim that Analytical Grammar removed "copyright management information."  He asks the court for actual damages, profits Analytical Grammar received from the infringement, attorneys fees, and punitive damages.  Wow!

Analytical Grammar's answer and counterclaims is pretty awesome.  In a delightful play on words (since the original photo was of several levels), it states;

Bradley’s lawsuit is wrong on so many levels. He levels claims against Analytical for sharing his joke. He does his level best to take Analytical down a level. But his claims are not on the level. Analytical raises these counterclaims to level the field.

It recounts the history of the photo, which wasn't even copyrighted until 2018, (even I was able to look that up on Copyright.gov) after the photo had risen to Internet fame, much to the plaintiff's delight.

Analytical Grammar raises several counterclaims too: (1) invalidity of copyright, (2) declaratory judgment of non-infringement of copyright, and (3) declaratory judgment of non-removal of copyright management information.

I was struck by this case. I often share memes on Facebook.  I see others share memes on Facebook.  I "like" shared memes on Facebook.  Not once did I ever think about copyright when doing any of those things.  I imagine that I am not alone in that regard.  I will certainly be watching this case as it moves through the federal district court in North Carolina.  Good luck Analytical Grammar!

October 7, 2019 in Current Affairs, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, September 24, 2019

Leaks and the Supreme Court

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Earlier this month, CNN reported that Judge Roberts had supported the administration's ability to add a citizenship question to the census before he had decided to oppose it. According to "sources familiar with the private Supreme Court deliberations," Roberts had, to use a political term, flip-flopped. This seemed to be supported by the opinion, which began by noting the broad power of the relevant agency to include questions about citizenship, but eventually concluded that it still had to provide an honest rationale for any decision to do so, and that the record indicated that the explanation provided was pretextual.

This was not the first time Roberts had been allegedly outed for changing his mind during the deliberative process. In 2012, when Roberts joined the majority to support the Affordable Care Act, the press again used insider information to show his change of mind. In that case, CBS cited to "two sources with specific knowledge of the deliberations," who detailed Roberts' journey from one side to another.

There is a very short list of who these sources might be. It is also fairly apparent that the damage to the Court is mounting, as these leaks fit into the narrative that politics plays more of a role than precedent.

Of course, judges do, and should, change their minds during the deliberative process. Simple issues are rarely appealed, and even more rarely reach this level. The complex issues involved require time to determine, and we should hope that judges maintain an open mind during this time, permitting change. And the modern "rule" of judicial silence in response to these leaks means that judges are unable to defend those deliberations.

These leaks are nothing new. As Jonathan Peters wrote for Slate after the 2012 leaks, there is a long history of leaks from the high court. This history seems to indicate that the damage done by the leaks, which are usually politically motivated, is mounting.

In the 1800's, the New York Tribune seemingly sat in chambers with the Court. Days before the Court handed down its decision in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company, the Tribune reported the outcome. It then provided detailed accounts of the deliberations in the Dred Scott case. Historians have speculated that the leak came from Justice McLean, who authored a dissent in those cases.

In the 1960's, a law clerk leaked information to the New York Times about Justice Fortas and his close connection to the administration. According to the U.S. Senate website, as a sitting justice, Fortas regularly attended White House staff meetings, briefed the president on secret Court deliberations, and, on behalf of the president, pressured senators who opposed the war in Vietnam. When these details were revealed during his confirmation hearings to be appointed Chief Justice, along with details of a private stipend he received to teach, rather than being confirmed as Chief, he eventually stepped down from the bench.

The leaks escalated after this point. In the 1970's Justice Douglas wrote a memo to his colleagues in the Roe v. Wade case, and it reached the hands of the Washington Post. Time then published a story about Roe v. Wade before the decision was announced by the Court, detailing the votes. Believing that a law clerk was again to blame, Justice Burger created the "20-second rule," meaning any clerk caught talking to a reporter had no more than 20 seconds left as a clerk before being fired.

Of course, the 20-second rule only applies to current clerks. Thus, in 2004, a group of former clerks leaked the details of the deliberations in Bush v. Gore to Vanity Fair.

Some of the leaks have been remarkably detailed. In 1986, ABC reported not only the outcome but the actual vote break-down before the decision was handed down regarding the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings balanced budget act. It also disclosed the date the decision would be handed down, a forecast that was off a few days reportedly only because Justice Burger delayed the release so that the reporter would be wrong about something.

This brief history gives some clue as to who the most likely sources might be. But whether it is a judge or a clerk (and it seems unlikely that it could be anyone else), they are damaging the Court at a time when it is already under serious attack.

As Justice Frankfurter noted, the secrecy of the Court's work is "essential to the effective functioning of the Court." Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311, 313 (1955). Justice Burger considered the enforcement of this secrecy to be an essential "inherent power" of the Court. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723 n.3 (1971) (Burger, dissenting). Rehnquist stated in a lecture on the topic that without secrecy, the open, at times short-tempered discussions at conference would end, to the detriment of the Court and the public it serves.  

Judges need to feel free to change their minds and be open with each other as they deliberate and discuss difficult issues. If leaks and reports continue to cast any change of heart during the deliberative process as being political motivated, it seems likely that the result might be a chilling of both communication and flexibility in thought. Either one would be dangerous.

(image source: Library of Congress, World War II poster from the U.S. Navy)

 

 

September 24, 2019 in Appellate Justice, Current Affairs, Legal Ethics, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, August 12, 2019

When Having A Heart for Justice is Not Enough--Part 2

In March, Professor Teri McMurtry-Chubb blogged about her forthcoming article The Practical Implications of Unexamined Assumptions: Disrupting Flawed Legal Arguments to Advance the Cause of Justice, which will be published in the Washburn Law Journal.  The article can now be accessed here on SSRN.

As Prof. McMurtry-Chubb explained in her post, her article explores "how bias shapes lawyer analytical and reasoning processes," and it is the product of "a 6-year empirical research study [that she] conducted involving student motion and appellate briefs generated from case files involving social justice issues."  In her article, Prof. McMurtry-Chubb goes into more detail on the different problems that she used in the study--ranging from legacy admits to law school to Indian Child Welfare Act cases.  Her article, her study, and the results are simply fascinating and raise important questions for law schools.  As she explains in the article,

This research project has the potential to change how we view the preparation of law students for law practice. As such, it has significant implications for how we approach diversity, equity, and inclusion in legal education and the law. Legal education touts diversity—equity and inclusion less so—as aspirational goals, but has largely focused efforts to achieve the same in admissions and faculty hiring.

. . . .

. . . The study in this Article suggests that the presence of non-White racial and ethnic bodies in law school classrooms do not, and cannot, in and of themselves, promote
better learning outcomes, prepare all students for a globally diverse workforce and society, and help them to shape professional identities beyond the touch of white supremacy, patriarchy, and capitalism.

In sum, rarely have law schools mapped and studied their curricula to assess how it perpetuates inequities and reinforces hierarchies. This and more are required to address the law and lawyers’ inability to fully serve racially and ethnically diverse client groups. As this study teaches us, legal educators and employers cannot take for granted that students leave law school with the skills to advocate effectively for historically marginalized, underrepresented groups, even as they matriculate successfully through law school. A heart for justice is not sufficient to do justice. Rather, law schools must actively develop interventions in their core curricula that directly and explicitly engage students around issues of power and privilege. Until then, students will not act with agency to transform law practice and its societal impact in ways that challenge their unexamined assumptions and allow them to make arguments in the service of justice. 

Thank you Prof. McMurtry-Chubb for your important contribution to how we approach legal education.  I am certainly going to be mindful of these issues as I teach this semester.

August 12, 2019 in Current Affairs, Law School, Legal Writing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 23, 2019

Social Media Ethical Concerns for Appellate Lawyers

This is a guest post by John Browning.  John is a partner in a Dallas law firm, where he handles civil litigation and appeals in state and federal courts. He is the author of multiple books and many articles on social media and the law.

In our increasingly wired world in which over 82% of adult Americans maintain at least one social networking profile—and in which Facebook boasts over 2.2 billion users and Twitter processes a billion tweets every 48 hours—the potential for using social media in ways that violate attorneys’ ethical restrictions looms large. Lawyers across all practice areas have tweeted, Instagrammed, posted, and Snapchatted their way into disciplinary proceedings, judicially-imposed sanctions, and other forms of ethical hot water. But in the comparatively staid, even monastic confines of the appellate world, can appellate lawyers fall prey to the siren song of social media?

The answer is a resounding, if somewhat surprising, “yes.” Appellate lawyers, clerks and other court staffers, and even judges have seen their online activities result in public embarrassment, job loss, and disciplinary action. And while reviewing the record in an underlying case and engaging in legal research may not be typical paths to social media misuse, breaching confidentiality by discussing certain aspects of a case on social media platforms is a very real danger.

Let’s begin with a cautionary tale. Sarah Peterson Herr was a newly-minted graduate of Washburn University School of Law in Kansas in 2010 when she started her first job at the Kansas Court of Appeals as a judicial assistant to Judge Christel Marquardt. About a year later, she was promoted to research attorney, the position she held on November 15, 2012. When she reported for work that day, Herr noticed that there was an unusual amount of security. She soon learned the reason why: that day, the Kansas Supreme Court would host an attorney disciplinary proceeding against former Kansas Attorney General Phill Kline. While serving as attorney general, Kline attracted controversy over the use of his office to investigate and prosecute abortion providers such as Planned Parenthood.

Herr decided to view the oral arguments using the computer in her office, where she also proceeded to “live Tweet” the proceedings, sending out a series of tweets that included the following:

  • “You can watch that naughty naughty boy, Mr. Kilein [sic], live! live.kscourts.org/live.php”
  • “Why is Phil Klein [sic] smiling? There is nothing to smile about douchebag.”
  • “ARE YOU FREAKING KIDDING ME. WHERE ARE THE VICTIMS? ALL THE PEOPLE WITH THE RECORDS WHO WERE STOLEN.”
  • “You don’t think a sealed document is meant to be confidential. BURN.”
  • “I predict that he will be disbarred for a period not less than 7 years.”
  • “I might be a little feisty today.”

With that last note, about whether or not she might be too “feisty,” Herr may have made her most salient observation. While she did not associate her tweets with her job, at least some of Herr’s Twitter followers were aware of her position with the Court of Appeals, and now everyone also knew her opinion of Phill Kline—including her accusation that Kline’s “witch hunt” helped lead to a doctor’s murder. A journalist with the Associated Press learned of Herr’s tweets and contacted the Kansas Judicial Center’s public information officer the next day for comment, and shortly thereafter Herr was placed on leave and, falling on her sword and issuing an apology:

I didn’t stop to think that in addition to communicating with a few of my friends on Twitter I was also communicating with the public at large, which was not appropriate for someone who works for the court system . . . I apologize that because the comments were made on Twitter—and thus public—that they were perceived as a reflection on the Kansas courts.

The following Monday, Herr was terminated. Within days, she was referred to the Kansas bar’s disciplinary body by the clerk of the appellate courts, and in January 2014, Herr was found to have violated Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(c) (about engaging in deceit or misrepresentation) and 8.4(e) (about implying on ability to influence a government agency). She received an informal admonition and became a cautionary tale for the Digital Age.

Even appellate judges can misstep or overshare on social media platforms. In November 2017, Ohio Supreme Court Justice Bill O’Neill was also a Democratic candidate for governor of Ohio. On the national landscape, U.S. Senator Al Franken of Minnesota was embroiled in a highly publicized scandal involving his alleged sexual misconduct with radio host Leeann Tweeden during a 2006 USO tour. Inexplicably, Justice O’Neill felt compelled to weigh in on what he described as the “national feeding frenzy about sexual indiscretions” with a “too much information” Facebook post about his own sexual history. Saying it was “time to speak up on behalf of all heterosexual males” and expressing that he would “save my opponents some research time,” Justice O’Neill posted the following:

In the last fifty years I was sexually intimate with approximately 50 very attractive females. It ranged from a gorgeous personal secretary to Senator Bob Taft (senior) who was my first true love and we made passionate love in the hayloft at her parents barn in Gallipolis and ended with a drop dead gorgeous red head who was a senior advisor to Peter Lewis at Progressive Insurance in Cleveland.

O’Neill’s Facebook post led to an immediate backlash, including from his own party. O’Neill had already been widely criticized for his refusal to resign from the Supreme Court while openly proclaiming his candidacy for governor. Ohio Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor stated “No words can convey my shock. This gross disrespect for women shakes the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.” Justice O’Neill deleted his post but posted new comments on Facebook, at first lambasting his critics. O’Neill eventually posted an apology, but the damage was already done.

Appellate lawyers and judges should not only be aware of the ethical risks presented by their own misuse of social media, they also have to be mindful of what their lawyer and non-lawyer staff might be posting. Appellate courts, including the Supreme Court of Texas, have begun implementing social media policies for that reason. Courts’ internal handling of matters before them are confidential, and courts must balance the First Amendment freedoms of current and prospective court employees with the courts’ legitimate interest in protecting the integrity and efficiency of their work. The online activities of court employees can implicate or even threaten multiple ethical obligations, including the duty to maintain confidentiality, the duty to avoid conduct that would jeopardize the integrity and independence of the judiciary, and the duty to avoid any conduct that would cause a reasonable person to question the impartiality of the court.

One current lawsuit illustrates the dangers of court staffers’ social media activity when they communicate in such as way as to make their affiliation with an appellate court known. In May 2018, Olga Zuniga—a former secretary to Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Kevin Yeary—filed a federal lawsuit complaining that she had been fired from her job because of Facebook posts in which she criticized President Trump and other Republican politicians while praising Democratic politicians. According to the lawsuit, Zuniga had worked as a career legal secretary in state government, including at the Texas Attorney General’s Office, and had been an executive assistant at the Court of Criminal Appeals since 2003. In November 2016, Zuniga alleges Judge Yeary “counseled” her about her Facebook posts critical of Republican figures. Zuniga maintains that Judge Yeary’s periodic reviews of her Facebook activity continued throughout 2017, with Judge Yeary expressing “disapproval” of her politically-charged posts. Ultimately, according to Zuniga’s lawsuit, after again disapproving of posts Zuniga made in September 2017 critical of stances taken by both Governor Greg Abbott and Lt. Governor Dan Patrick on immigration-related issues, Judge Yeary terminated her on October 11, 2017.

Judge Yeary and the Court of Criminal Appeals responded with two motions to dismiss, filed on July 30, 2018 and March 28, 2019 respectively. In both motions, among other arguments, the defense pointed out numerous examples of Zuniga’s Facebook posts associating herself with the Court, its activities, and its personnel, as well as posts containing lewd content, to demonstrate her use of Facebook while at work on her official state computer. The motions also argued that dismissal was warranted based on the fact that, as someone employed in a judge’s chambers, Ms. Zuniga was an employee with access to confidential information, and one whose job functions required trust and loyalty. Moreover, Ms. Zuniga’s online comments suggesting that partisan elected judges could not be trusted if they belonged to a certain political party undermined the Court’s interest in maintaining authority and credibility. In addition, the motions to dismiss also argued that, as Zuniga herself had admitted, there were other factors leading to her termination, such as attendance problems, inaccurate leave reporting, the failure to complete assignments, and other job performance issues unrelated to any dispute over plaintiff’s political views. The court has not yet ruled on either of these dismissal motions.

In today’s digital environment, social media allows commentators incredible reach with the blinding speed of a search engine. Consequently, appellate attorneys—like their counterparts in other practice areas—need to be mindful of that when they express opinions online or on social media platforms, even when they think they are acting in a purely personal capacity. Lawyers face heightened public and ethical scrutiny when they make statements on social media, so if you wouldn’t put it in a letter or pleading, you probably shouldn’t post it on Facebook or tweet about it.

July 23, 2019 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 22, 2019

In Memoriam- Justice John Paul Stevens

Today, Justice John Paul Stevens lays in repose at the Supreme Court. Later, he will be buried at Arlington National Cemetery. Justice Stevens died last Tuesday at ninety-nine years old, after retiring from the Supreme Court in 2010 at ninety. When he retired, he was the third longest serving Justice in Supreme Court history.

President Ford, a Republican, nominated Justice Stevens, who became a leader of the liberal voices on the Supreme Court. According to Jan Crawford Greenburg in her 2007 book, Supreme Conflict: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Control of the United States, Justice Stevens “was a Maverick who didn’t ascribe to a particular theory. He was fiercely independent in his writings and actions. When the justices donned their robes before taking the bench, Stevens was the only one who refused assistance from the aides in the robing room. He always insisted on putting on his own robe. He took his own path in his opinions, too.”

Live coverage at the Supreme Court today on C-SPAN:
https://www.c-span.org/video/?462838-1/justice-john-paul-stevens-lies-repose-supreme-court

A biography of Justice Stevens at Oyez.org:
https://www.oyez.org/justices/john_paul_stevens

Paul Clement’s Tribute on SCOTUSblog:
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/07/justice-stevens-at-oral-argument-often-fatal-always-kind/

July 22, 2019 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 5, 2019

Appellate Advocacy Blog Weekly Roundup Friday, July 5

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Each week, the Appellate Advocacy Blog Weekly Roundup presents a few tidbits of news and Twitter posts from the past week concerning appellate advocacy. As always, if you see something during the week that you think we should be sure to include, feel free to send Dan Real a quick email atDReal@Creighton.edu or a message on Twitter (@Daniel_L_Real).  You can also send emails to Danny Leavitt at Danny@tsalerno-law.com or a message on twitter @Danny_C_Leavitt

 

Supreme Court Opinions and News:

@Steven Mazie had an article in the Economist this week reviewing the past term of the Court, its movement to the right, and the emerging political alignment of Justices Kavanaugh and Gorsuch.

The New Yorker had an article this week addressing how the Court’s recent decision in Gundy v. United States  likely foreshadows a shift in the Court’s position with regard to allowing Congress to broadly delegate authority to agencies.  Gundy involved a challenge to Congress’ delegation to the Attorney General the decision of whether mandatory registration requirements under the Sex Offender Registration Act apply to individuals who were convicted prior to the Act’s passage.  Gundy is such a defendant, did not register, and was charged and convicted as a result.  He challenged Congress’ delegation as impermissible.  As the article notes, the Court has long allowed Congress broad authority to make such delegations.  In Gundy’s case, the Court was divided with the four more liberal Justices voting to continue allowing delegation, three more conservative Justices voting to deviate from prior law, and Justice Alito siding with the more liberal Justices but explicitly indicating that if a majority of the Court was inclined to change the law, he’d be on board.  The decision in Gundy strongly suggests that the next case to raise the issue to the Court will likely be decided differently because Justice Kavanaugh had not yet been confirmed when it was argued and did not participate.  The article notes that changing this practice of delegation may result in wide sweeping changes to federal government, as a substantial amount of federal law currently depends heavily on such delegations to agencies.

FiveThirtyEight.com had an article this week reviewing the voting habits of the members of the Court (especially the conservative members) since the retirement of “swing vote” Justice Kennedy.  The article suggested that the Court could be viewed now as having three swing Justices, depending on the issues presented – Justice Gorsuch joined the more liberal members of the Court in more closely divided cases than any of the other more conservative Justices, while Justice Roberts provided the decisive vote on the recent census case.  Additionally, the early voting trends suggest that Justice Kavanaugh is likely the current “middle” of the Court, pushing it more conservative even while he seems to be more ideologically moderate than Justice Gorsuch.

The ABA Journal took a look this week at Justice Thomas' 30 year career on the Court, emphasizing his enigmatic persona -- "supporters and detractors are still debating who he really is."  He's now the longest-serving member of the Court and the senior associate Justice.  On the bench, he's known for rarely speaking; off the bench, he's known for being quite jovial and chatty. 

 

Federal Appellate Court Opinions and News:

In the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Amazon was held strictly liable for injuries caused by defective products sold by other vendors on its website.  The case was Oberdorf v. Amazon.com.  More from the CA3blog.

 

State Appellate Court Opinions and News:

The Iowa Court of Appeals this week reversed a jury's decision that had awarded an Iowa couple $3.25 million after they claimed their adoption attorney failed to file paperwork on time and lead to them losing the child they planned to adopt.  The couple cared for the boy for a few months, but were then required to return him to his biological parents after the couple's attorney did not have the biological parents sign termination of parental rights documents.  The child died from severe head injuries a month later, and the biological father was convicted of second-degree murder.  In reversing the malpractice damage award, the appellate court concluded that the couple had failed to show that the attorney engaged in illegitimate conduct especially likely to produce serious emotional harm and had not show that he had a duty to exercise care to avoid causing emotional harm.  More here.

 

Practice Tips and Pointers:

#AppellateTwitter discussion this week on Twitter addressed lawyers and social media – many good thoughts throughout the Twitter thread started by @RachelGurvich  right here.

July 5, 2019 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Federal Appeals Courts, State Appeals Courts, United States Supreme Court, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, April 30, 2019

The Ongoing Experiment of State Judicial Selection

Nast Aug 7 1875

In my last article I commented briefly on the political history of the selection and number of justices on the Supreme Court of the United States. As I was writing that piece, a committee was taking testimony in the Texas legislature on a bill attempting to change the Texas judicial selection process. While federal judicial selection is largely a set process, the method of selection of state judges is an experiment in democracy that continues to change today.

Prior to the mid-1800s, most states selected their judges in a way that mirrored the federal system – gubernatorial appointment with legislative confirmation - with a minority of states using direct legislative selection. The Jacksonian era saw a renewed concern with accountability and public participation, and this led to rapid change. In 1832, Mississippi became the first state to switch to a popular election for judges. After a few years of observation, New York and several other states followed suit. By 1861, 24 of the 34 states used the new election system.

There have been several experiments since. Nonpartisan elections were used by 12 states in 1927. Since 1940, over thirty states have adopted some form a system of appointments (either solely gubernatorial or gubernatorial selection from a merits-based nomination system, which is called the “Missouri plan”) with nonpartisan retention elections. Today, only ten states use some kind of partisan election process to select their high court justices, and only five states rely solely on partisan elections.

My home state of Texas is one of them. In the most recent election cycle, for reasons that political wonks can (and do) argue about endlessly, this resulted in a seismic shift on the bench. 35% of all intermediate appellate justices were replaced. One-fourth of all trial judges, at all levels, were also replaced. Four of the largest state appeals courts flipped along partisan lines. By one count, over 700 years of judicial experience were removed from the bench.

The response has been a re-evaluation of the method the State uses for judicial selection. Official committees have been formed to re-evaluate judicial selection and qualification, and there has been vigorous debate over the pros and cons of each system.

The hearing on HB 4504, proposing a new judicial appointment and retention vote system (similar to the "Missouri plan"), covered the gambit of options and perils. Chief Justice Nathan Hecht framed the discussion in terms of the inherent conflict between impartiality and accountability. To be truly impartial, judges must be free of outside influence. At the same time, there must be some accountability for their stewardship of power. But if a judge rules contrary to popular opinion in order to remain impartial, yet is subject to removal through election by that same population, this balance is imperiled.

Calling partisan election an “utter failure,” Hecht opined that partisan election often means there is no true accountability for judges, since the focus is on partisan affiliation rather than performance. He also warned against the risk to impartiality in such a system:

If you want judges who rule in favor of the Republicans or Democrats, in favor of the left or the right, in favor of the establishment or the outsiders, in favor of the rich or the poor, then we should keep partisan judicial elections. But be clear - today, tomorrow, or the day after, the powerful will win that struggle.

Former Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson, the first African American member of the Supreme Court of Texas, while supporting the system, acknowledged that any system needs to increase diversity on the bench, and briefly discussed the impact of implicit biases based on different life experience. Former Chief Justice Tom Philips also supported the bill, asserting that for the vast majority of judges, the partisan label is meaningless, because they seek to serve the people and follow the law. Partisan labels, however, serve to undermine faith in their decision-making. Other practitioners spoke out against partisan elections because the cost in terms of the loss of judicial experience is too high when those elections result in sweeps, and because the system prevents some well-qualified candidates from ever running.

Speaking against the bill, Judge Eric Moyé, a longtime Dallas District Court judge, started with a reference to the importance of local government and local citizen control. Noting that judges are the most direct contact most citizens have with government, Moyé expressed his concern than any appointment process would bypass citizen control. Gloria Leal from the Mexican American Bar Association also testified against the bill, noting that 39% of the Texas population was Hispanic, a proportion that was not reflected on the bench (by my quick calculation of data from the Texas Office of Court Administration published on September 1, 2018, about 17% of the bench is Hispanic), and that popular election was the best way to reach a bench composition that matched the population.

In short, the testimony largely fell along the lines of the tension recognized by Justice Hecht – impartiality versus accountability. This balance was one of the many areas that Hamilton and Jefferson (as well as Madison) disagreed upon, with Hamilton arguing for a truly independent judiciary in Federalist 78, while Jefferson was primarily concerned that the judiciary remain accountable to the people through elections. Over the years, the various states have experimented with numerous ways to maintain that balance.

As an appellate practitioner who appears in different jurisdictions, I can say that by-and-large, these various systems get it right. The professionalism and integrity of our judges is, in fact, remarkable, given the various selection processes and pressures to which they find themselves subjected. This continued discussion, though, is important to ensuring that this remains the case. Only so long as the judiciary remains both impartial and accountable, through whatever procedures and safeguards we can refine, can we ensure a healthy system with judges who are qualified and willing to serve.

(Image credit: Thomas Nast’s cartoon “Princip-als, Not Men – A Lawyer Pleading for his “Client,” Harper’s Weekly, August 7, 1875, showing Nast’s fear that wealth was influencing the bench in its decisions regarding Tammany Hall. The sign on the bar is a quote from King Lear: “Plate sin with gold, and the strong lance of justice hurtless breaks. Arm it in rags, a pigmy’s straw doth pierce it.”).

April 30, 2019 in Appellate Court Reform, Appellate Justice, Current Affairs, Legal Ethics, Legal Profession, State Appeals Courts | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, April 20, 2019

Saying Less: the revised Supreme Court Rules and cutting words

On July 1, 2019, the Supreme Court of the United States will impose a new, shorter word limit for principal briefs.  The change affects Supreme Court Rule 33.1(g), decreasing the word limit for principal merits briefs from 15,000 to 13,000.  The change brings the Court in line with the federal Courts of Appeal.  Since December 1, 2016, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure have allotted only 13,000 words for opening and response briefs. 

The Court rejected one of the more controversial proposed rules.  That proposal would have limited reply briefs to 4,500 words.  Even so, the Court did shorten the time for filing a reply brief.  Previously, merits replies were due (1) 30 days after the respondent filed its merits response or (2) no later than 2 p.m. on the date seven days before the case was scheduled for argument, whichever was earlier.  The amended rule keeps the 30-day window but pushes the seven-days-before-argument deadline to 10.

 So why did the Court adopt these changes?  I don't claim to know the answer, but I expect that it has something to do with the fact that most briefs are simply too long.  Anecdotally, I once heard an appellate judge comment that every appeal really has one issue, maybe two.  It's clear that some lawyers—yours truly included—forget that sometimes. 

So how can you come in under these shorter word limits?  That's simple—better writing.  Here are some things to do, and to avoid, to bring your brief under the word limit.

  • Do use fewer words, not more: Legal writers often are guilty of using phrases like "pursuant to," "prior to," or "on or about."  Don't.  Instead of these wordy phrases, try "under," "before," and "on."  This seems like a no-brainer, but I've encountered many lawyers that refuse to give these anachronisms up.  As an aside, I've also encountered several that use "pursuant to" incorrectly.  Things don't happen "pursuant to" anyone's recollection.  If you can't replace the phrase "pursuant to" with the word "under," you should re-write.
  • Do run a search for the word "of." I never noticed it, but many phrases with the word "of" can be rewritten to eliminate one, often two words.  Consider the common phrases "the issue of" or "the question of."  You're likely able to pull those out without doing violence to your brief.  Also, if you're using an "of" phrase, there's also a chance you could use a possessive.
  • Do run a search for "ly." You're hopefully not going to find very many adverbs.  But if you do, take them out unless they're necessary.  Consider spending some time with a thesaurus; if you're using a lot of adverbs, perhaps you'd be better served by using stronger verbs.
  • Do not use the words "plaintiff," "appellant," or other, similar procedural phrases to describe any party. Briefing an appeal is about telling a story.  It's your job to tell the court the whole story of the case in the limited (13,000!) words that you have.  Even though replacing your client's four-word name would save space, resist the urge.  I promise, what you're gaining in space, you're giving up in clarity.
  • Do not use precise dates, unless you absolutely need it. The Court doesn't need to know that something happened on April 21, 2019, unless multiple events happened in April 2019.  If you've got to describe a temporal relationship, try words like "later" or "before."  Otherwise, just save the words and use the month or month and year. 

These aren't all the ways to save space.  But writing shorter, more coherent briefs is a mindset.  You have to start somewhere.

April 20, 2019 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Current Affairs, Federal Appeals Courts, Legal Writing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, April 16, 2019

The U.S. Supreme Court and Its Political History.

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Over the last several weeks there have been numerous articles about the "unprecedented" politicization of the United States Supreme Court. I have also seen several opinion pieces about growing frustration with the political leanings of the judiciary, and proposals to increase the number of seats on the high court to bypass a feared conservative bloc.

I am fortunate enough to be married to a lovely lady who is, among many other things, a college history professor. While we don't talk shop too often, I am familiar enough with our history to know that none of these complaints are new. Indeed, they say that those who do not know history are doomed to repeat it. So let's learn a bit of history, then, and gain a bit of insight from the past.

First, dissatisfaction with the judiciary is baked into the system. Alexis de Toqueville noted that “[t]here is almost no political question in the United States that is not resolved sooner or later into a judicial question.” Yet Tocqueville considered this a good thing: lawyers by their education and nature were naturally skeptical of change and conservative in nature, and thus provided our best brake against the “revolutionary spirit and unreflective passions of democracy.” Congress and the Executive provide the passion and funding and guidance that moves the State, and the judiciary makes sure that all this passion and money doesn't ruin anything of Constitutional importance.

This inherent conflict between the Supreme Court and the other branches of government has often resulted in moves to make the Supreme Court "more like us." The Constitution does not define the number of seats on the Supreme Court. Thus, the Supreme Court started with just six seats in 1789. It did not take long for this to invite political intervention. In 1801, President Adams and his outgoing Federalist congress passed a bill to restrict the court to five seats, attempting to limit the incoming President Jefferson from meddling with things. Jefferson and his new congress changed the seats back to six by repealing the act.

This tinkering continued. At first, there was the excuse that new circuits meant there was a need for new seats. So, in 1807, when a seventh circuit was added, Jefferson and his congress added a seventh seat to the Court as well. Andrew Jackson followed suit in 1837, adding two more seats to match. When a tenth circuit was added during the Civil War, a tenth seat was added.

After the Civil War, the seats were reduced, at first back to seven, and then to nine, by President Grant and his congress. This number has remained the norm until this day.

That doesn't mean things have gone smoothly. In fact, things were worse in the 1930's than they are now, and we almost wound up with 15 judges a result.

In the 1930's, FDR and his congress passed a number of new laws that were a part of what became known as the New Deal. The Supreme Court was the only thing stopping this change. Time and again, the Court balked at the fairly radical changes that were being implemented. Soon, ideological divisions were noted and mocked. There were four conservatives -- Justices Pierce Butler, James Clark McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter -- that the pro-New Deal press began calling "the Four Horsemen." They were opposed by the "Three Musketeers," who favored the changes: Justices Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, and Harlan Stone. In the middle were two moderates, Justices Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Owen J. Roberts, with Roberts usually siding with the "Four Horsemen" to overturn New Deal legislation.

The "Four Horsemen" were publicly reviled. Burned in effigy in city squares, they nevertheless stuck to their opposition, often meeting together to formulate opinions and questions at oral argument. In the 1935 term alone, this voting bloc overturned the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, the Federal Farm Bankruptcy Act, the Railroad Act, the Coal Mining Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act, and a New York minimum wage law.

In 1936, FDR won reelection by a landslide and believed that this mandate gave him a chance to defeat the Four Horsemen. He announced legislation that would add (through a thinly-veiled mandatory retirement plan that required retirement at 70 or appointment of an additional judge if retirement was refused) as many as six new justices to the court, turning the conservative voting bloc into a minority. In one stroke, the president proposed to regain "control" of the court.

There was immediate backlash. The public and press were split, but most (along with many in Congress) considered the move to be an improper, and undemocratic, power grab.

Most historians seem to think that the proposal never would have passed. But events on the high court soon made the effort moot. Shortly after its announcement, in a move that the press called "the switch in time that saved the nine," Roberts sided with the Three Musketeers in a minimum wage case, and what support there was for the court-packing bill subsided. Within a year, Van Devanter and Sutherland retired and were replaced by Justices Hugo Black and Stanley Reed, both FDR appointees who proved to be strongly in support of his New Deal.

Modern opinion writers would do well to remember our past. What we are seeing is not a new politicization, but the continuation of a trend that is inherent in our system of checks and balances, and a history of attempted political tinkering that repeats itself with some frequency. There may very well be better ways of constructing the Court, and revisiting the court's role and composition periodically is a healthy thing. But overstating the current state of events, underestimating public esteem for the high court and its fragile but important position, and refusing to acknowledge history, does not help that cause.

(image source: February 1937 cartoon in opposition of FDR's court-packing plan, publication unknown)

April 16, 2019 in Appellate Court Reform, Appellate Justice, Current Affairs, Federal Appeals Courts, Legal Ethics, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 25, 2019

When Having A Heart for Justice is Not Enough

The following is a guest post by Prof. Teri McMurtry-ChubbProfessor of Law at Mercer University School of Law.

On Friday, February 17, 1978 the Chelsea Chapter of the N.Y. Committee to Overturn the Bakke Decision (NYCOBD) met to strategize how best to influence the Supreme Court decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. The purpose of the meeting was to strategize under the banner of the National Committee to Overturn the Bakke Decision (NCOBD) as it planned a unified “March on Washington” in protest. In keeping with the call to arms espoused by its sister chapters throughout the United States, Chelsea NYCOBD boldly stated in its meeting flier:

Fight Racist Attacks on Affirmative Action Programs!

In the spring, the U.S. Supreme Court will render a decision on the Bakke case – one of the most important cases in the last 25 years on the question of racial equality. The Bakke decision, which is based on the absurd and racist idea of “reverse discrimination,” is a serious attack on the rights of minorities to jobs and education. If the Bakke decision is not overturned by the court, affirmative action programs for minorities and women will be threatened with elimination. Join the growing anti-Bakke movement in our demands to: implement, maintain, and expand special admissions and other essential affirmative action programs for minorities and women at all levels of higher education and employment. Fight Racism. Overturn the Bakke Decision! 

NCOBD flier

Although the NCOBD was not successful in overturning the decision, its act of grassroots organizing and educating the public is a primer on the importance of education to informed direct action. 41 years later, our contested, national conversation about affirmative action has continued with the Harvard Affirmative Action Case and the College Cheating Scandal. The scandal has caused us to (again) pause and ponder what is an elite education, who “earns” admission to America’s most prestigious educational institutions, and who deserves access to the America Dream. However, what about the lawyers who litigate these cases? Have you ever considered the views they hold about affirmative action in admissions and how their beliefs shape their discussions about the litigants and the arguments in their briefs that will ultimately become part of the jurisprudential landscape of affirmative action law?

This question, the question of how bias shapes lawyer analytical and reasoning processes, is the subject of a 6-year empirical research study I conducted involving student motion and appellate briefs generated from case files involving social justice issues. The study examines 576 brief submissions from 192 students on topics ranging from hostile work environment claims based on colorism, religion, and national origin to LGBTQIA students’ right to freedom of expressive association in creating the policies for their student organizations.  I wanted to know if law student biases concerning race, gender, class, and sexuality colored their analytical and reasoning processes as they drafted the argument sections of their briefs, and if so to what extent. The focus of one of the case files (the universe in which students litigate) was an African American man ranked in the 75th percentile of all law school applicants who was denied admission to law school, even when White legacy students were admitted despite being consistently ranked in the lower 25th percentile of all applicants. The claimant sued the University on grounds that the law school’s legacy admissions policy was an unconstitutional affirmative action program - he argued that a White student “took his seat” in the 1L class. The Bakke case and its progeny were the controlling authority.

Student attitudes about colorblindness led approximately 85% of them to make legal arguments flawed by bias in the first drafts of their briefs. For example, students representing the claimant analyzed his racial classification, “African American,” when the race of the legacy admits, “White,” was the racial classification at issue in the lawsuit. Student arguments advanced the notion of color-blindness or the phenomenon of “not seeing color.” Moreover, students representing the University argued for diversity as a compelling state interest even though the legacy admissions policy favored White applicants over applicants of color - a losing proposition for the University. Simply, they could only see race or ethnicity as anything other than White. These arguments based on biased assumptions led students to make arguments that were incorrect and inconsistent with the major tenets of the Bakke decision, and ultimately contrary to their client’s interests.

The good news is that with critical pedagogical interventions, teaching methods aimed at problematizing students’ biased assumptions, students course corrected their attitudes from color-blind to color-conscious. Approximately 82% of all student final appellate brief submissions, the final assignment submitted by students in the study, evidenced a critical engagement with issues of race and class in higher education admissions policies. Students made arguments that recognized “White” as a racial category of analysis in affirmative action jurisprudence, “legacy” as a function of class hierarchy, and the connection between the two. Most importantly, students continued to engage with each other and their peers around these issues after their time in the study ended.

Law firms, public interest and government agencies should note that unless their attorneys have been taught to recognize and disrupt their biases with respect to race, class, gender, and sexuality, it is probable that they will replicate these biases as they interpret the law and develop the analytical frameworks in their briefs. A heart for justice does not necessarily mean that lawyers will do justice. Rather, it is imperative that legal educators and the bar actively implement interventions to make attorneys aware of how their arguments replicate structural and societal inequities. We can do no less if our expectation is that attorneys serve their clients with excellence and an eye toward equity. You can read a detailed analysis of the study in my article The Practical Implications of Unexamined Assumptions: Disrupting Flawed Legal Arguments to Advance the Cause of Justice, 58 Washburn Law Journal  ____ (forthcoming 2019).

March 25, 2019 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Legal Writing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, March 5, 2019

When the law loses its way

1024px-Trial_of_a_sow_and_pigs_at_Lavegny

There are times when we, as advocates, must argue for a change in the law. Going into the case, we know that the law, as it exists, is against our clients. Our job in those cases is to be candid and admit this, and then argue that this law must be changed. To do so, we need to examine the history and reasoning behind the law, look for allies who might have questioned it in the past, and not feel tied to earlier justifications that may have lost their appeal over time. Our job is made easier when that work reveals that the law has become unmoored from the reasons that justified its genesis.

Civil forfeiture – the idea that the state can take any item arguably involved in the commission of a crime, regardless of the fault of the owner – is one such area of the law. The Supreme Court recently ruled that state civil forfeiture awards are subject to constitutional challenge under the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment. Timbs v. Indiana, No. 17-1091, 2019 WL 691578 (Feb. 20, 2019). But there is a bigger problem with civil forfeiture: it has lost its connection to historical justifications.

Justice Thomas raised this concern when he issued a statement on denial of certiorari in Leonard v. State of Texas, 137 S.Ct. 847 (2017) (mem.). After briefly analyzing the origins of the law, he concluded that “[w]hether this Court’s treatment of the broad modern forfeiture practice can be justified by the narrow historical one is certainly worthy of consideration in greater detail.”

A brief look at the historical foundations of modern civil forfeiture statutes reveals how badly they totter when asked to support the modern practice. For instance, the Bible is often cited as a source for the law, where, in Exodus 21:28, it is said that “if an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten, but the owner of the ox shall not be liable.” However, even a cursory look at this passage reveals no mandate that the state gets to eat the ox. Rather, this verse stands for the principle that if an animal causes unexpected injury, only it should bear the cost and no one should profit from the resulting death. This is also in accord with the Talmudic interpretation.

Sometimes, ancient Greek law is quoted, where inanimate things that cause death were cast out beyond the borders. Other times, ancient practices with impressive sounding names like “deodand,” “wergild,” and “bane” are cited. But in each case where early examples are found, the ancient practice is distinguishable. It was only in the English common law that something similar to our current American systems was found, and then only because the state replaced the church as the beneficiary of the proceeds of sale of an item (or ship) that caused injury, largely because it could. When we adopted that common law, this practice found its way into our legal system. The fact that Great Britain later discarded the practice when it adopted wrongful death actions providing for recovery directly to the victim’s family (at the urging of railroad companies alarmed at the potential for loss) apparently went unnoticed.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, noted that, in 1881, this was already a very common and recognizable phenomena in the development of the law:

The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula. In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been found for it, and enters on a new career. The old form receives a new content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has received.

After analyzing this growth and the history of civil forfeiture, in particular, he had this to say:

The foregoing history, apart from the purposes for which it has been given, well illustrates the paradox of form and substance in the development of law. In form its growth is logical. The official theory is that each new decision follows syllogistically from existing precedents. But just as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the existence of some earlier creature to which a collar-bone was useful, precedents survive in the law long after the use they once served is at an end and the reason for them has been forgotten. The result of following them must often be failure and confusion from the merely logical point of view.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, chapter 1 (1881).

And yet, almost 100 years later, the Supreme Court cited the passage in Exodus, the law of deodand, and Holmes’ discussion of other historical antecedents in concluding that a civil forfeiture statute that permitted the forfeiture of a yacht without first proving the guilt of the owner was constitutional, largely because it was ancient. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680–686 (1974). No mention was made of Holmes’ conclusion that this historical analysis gave no real support for modern civil forfeiture.

Not surprisingly, a long catalogue of abuses followed.

In Tenaha, Texas, while Jennifer Boatright and her children rode through town on their way to buy a used car, she has stopped by the police for driving too long in the passing lane. When the police found the cash she was carrying to buy the new car, they took it. At the station, Boatright was given the option of forfeiting the cash and being released without charge, or going to jail for suspected money laundering and child endangerment, while her children were taken by CPS. She chose to keep her children.

In Emporia, Virginia, when Victor Ramos Guzman was stopped for speeding, the officers searched his vehicle and found $28,000 in cash. The driver was a Pentecostal Church secretary from El Salvador, who explained (and later proved) that he was taking the money -  donated by parishioners - to buy a parcel of land. Although no contraband was discovered, the money was seized.

In Philadelphia, a couple's home was seized after their son was arrested for making a $40 drug deal inside.

More recently, Tyson Timbs was arrested in Indiana for selling less than $400 worth of heroin. Although the maximum fine for his offense was $10,000, the police opted to seize his $42,000 Land Rover, bought with insurance proceeds from his father's death. This was the case that eventually rose to the Supreme Court.

These and other cases are often referred to as examples of “policing for profit.” The catalog of abuses is impressive, and the effect is disproportionately felt by the poor, who often cannot afford to challenge the seizures. These statutes are far removed from the original idea that no one should profit when an animal or inanimate object causes a death. And yet there are still efforts to justify these actions by referencing their ancient antecedents.

Civil forfeiture statutes are an important tool for law enforcement departments faced with sophisticated drug operations transporting drugs and laundered cash across the country. Reform efforts requiring guilt on the part of the owner and limitations on police department spending have helped rein them in. But they must also be tempered by constitutional concerns, no matter what ancient civilizations may have to say (or not say) on the subject.

Holmes’ reasoned that “[t]he history of what the law has been is necessary to the knowledge of what the law is.” This history is also important to understanding what the law should be. The historical supports given for civil forfeiture statutes do not bear the weight of many modern civil forfeiture schemes. It should not have taken us this long to figure that out, given an honest review of their history.

(Image credits: "Trial of a sow and pigs at Lavegny" from Chambers Book of Days (1864). According to the book, “Among trials of individual animals for special acts of turpitude, one of the most amusing was that of a sow and her six young ones, at Lavegny, in 1457, on a charge of their having murdered and partly eaten a child. … The sow was found guilty and condemned to death; but the pigs were acquitted on account of their youth, the bad example of their mother, and the absence of direct proof as to their having been concerned in the eating of the child.”)

March 5, 2019 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Federal Appeals Courts, Legal Writing, Rhetoric, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)