Appellate Advocacy Blog

Editor: Tessa L. Dysart
The University of Arizona
James E. Rogers College of Law

Saturday, October 16, 2021

Why We Should Use Proper Apostrophes, Even on Facebook

Like many, I use “Weird Al” Yankovic’s “Word Crimes” in my legal writing classes.   See    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Gv0H-vPoDc.  In the past few years, I have added a note about not calling each other “morons” when I play the video.  Nonetheless, the song and lyrics still have great examples about why we need Oxford commas, correct apostrophes, and other basic punctuation, all to a catchy tune.  Often, I pair this discussion with an analysis of the 2018 Maine dairy delivery drivers’ dispute about a missing comma and overtime pay.  See https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/15/health/oxford-comma-maine-court-case-trnd/index.html.  I’ve blogged about the Maine case before, as it leads to great teaching discussions.  See also Kelly Gurnett, A Win for the Oxford Comma: This Lawsuit Shows Why It’s So Important (updated Nov. 2, 2020), https://thewritelife.com/is-the-oxford-comma-necessary/ (“For anyone who’s ever wondered what all the fuss is about over Oxford commas, the circuit judge’s [dairy drivers’ pay] opinion says it all: ‘For want of a comma, we have this case.’”).

This month, the District Court of New South Wales in Australia gave us another ruling on punctuation, this time involving defamation and a Facebook post.  See https://www.theguardian.com/law/2021/oct/10/missing-apostrophe-in-facebook-post-lands-nsw-real-estate-agent-in-legal-hot-water.  As New York Times writer Livia Albeck-Ripka explained in her article on the case, “a missing apostrophe in a Facebook post could cost a real estate agent in Australia tens of thousands of dollars after a court ruled a defamation case against him could proceed.”  https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/11/world/australia/facebook-post-missing-apostrophe-defamation.html#:~:text=Missing%20Apostrophe%20in%20Facebook%20Post%20Lands%20a%20Man%20in%20Defamation,mark%20may%20cost%20him%20thousands.

In his Facebook post, real estate agent Anthony Zadravic appeared to accuse Stuart Gan, his former employer at a real estate agency, of not paying into the Australian government retirement fund for all of the agency’s employees, and not just for one employee.   Zadravic’s Facebook post stated:

Oh Stuart Gan!! Selling multi million $ homes in Pearl Beach but can’t pay his employees superannuation [for the Australian retirement system].  Shame on you Stuart!!! 2 yrs and still waiting!!!

Id.  Gan filed a defamation claim against Zadravic, alleging the Facebook post improperly stated Gan had not paid his contributions for any of his employees, since Zadravic did not use an apostrophe in “employees.”

Although Zadravic explained he meant the singular “employee’s” contributions for his own account, the court refused to dismiss Gan’s case.  The court ruled the plural “employees” without an apostrophe could “be read to suggest a ‘systematic pattern of conduct’ by Mr. Gan’s agency rather than an accusation involving one employee.”  Id.  Thus, the judge allowed the defamation case to move forward.

While there are lower standards for defamation in Australia than in the United States, for example, the punctuation point is well-taken.  Just as we teach our students to be cautious in their work texts and avoid imprecise language, emojis, and the like, we should also caution them be careful not only in content, but also in language on social media. 

My teen/twenty-something sons will roll their eyes (via emojis, no doubt) at my suggestion we use proper grammar on social media.  However, when our students and newer associates are posting about professional matters, they should err on the side of caution.  Many employers, in fact, have strict guidelines on social media posts, and using proper punctuation helps ensure compliance.  

Thus, whether we use the dairy drivers, “Weird Al’s” YouTube videos, or now the Facebook apostrophe case, we have several fun sources to encourage discussion and create teaching moments on commas, apostrophes, and more.  

October 16, 2021 in Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Legal Writing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, October 2, 2021

A Six-Vote Supermajority Requirement is the Solution to De-Politicizing the United States Supreme Court

The United States Supreme Court is struggling to maintain its institutional legitimacy. A recent poll showed that only 40% of Americans approved of the Court.[1] Three factors arguably explain the reasons underlying the public’s negative perception of the Court.

1.    Chief Justice John Roberts

Chief Justice John Roberts is a brilliant and accomplished jurist, and by all accounts a good person. But Roberts has contributed substantially to the Court’s compromised legitimacy. This might appear surprising at first glance, considering that Roberts cares deeply about preserving the Court’s legitimacy and is dedicated to ensuring that the Court is not viewed as a political institution.

Sadly, that very concern is precisely what has politicized the Court. The reason is that, in many cases, Roberts decides cases not based on a reasonable interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision, but on what he believes will preserve the Court’s legitimacy, which essentially means that Roberts decides cases based on how he subjectively believes the public will react.

The problem with that approach should be obvious. It completely divorces the justices from the law, and from their obligation to reach outcomes based on a reasonable interpretation of constitutional and statutory text. In so doing, it enables nine unelected, life-tenured justices to reach outcomes based on their subjective views regarding what outcomes will be viewed as politically “legitimate.” The result is that the Court’s decisions are ipso facto political.

Roberts has been a disappointment on the Court. His approach betrays the rule of law and the judicial role. Put differently, when the justices base decisions on the desire to appear apolitical, they inherently politicize the Court. And Chief Justice Roberts is the Court’s most political actor.   

2.    The Shadow Docket

The Court’s shadow docket, in which it decides cases and important legal issues without oral argument. For example, in Whole Women’s Health, et al. v. Jackson, the petitioners applied for an order enjoining enforcement of a law in Texas that banned all abortions after six weeks, and that gave private citizens, not the government, the power to enforce the law. The Court denied the application, holding that it did not satisfy the standards required for granting a preliminary injunction. Although this interpretation was not incorrect, it showed that the Court couldn’t see the forest from the trees.

Any person with a pulse would recognize that, whatever one’s views on abortion, the law obviously violated the Court’s poorly-reasoned decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, both of which manipulated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to hold that a woman has the right to terminate a pregnancy before viability (i.e., approximately twenty-four weeks). Thus, because Texas’s law was so ridiculous, the Court should have voted unanimously to invalidate the law. Had the Court done so, it would have sent the message that the justices are not motivated by their policy preferences.  Instead, five members of the Court held that the Petitioner failed to satisfy the standards required for granting injunctive relief and allowed the law to go into effect. It should come as no surprise that the usual suspects – those who are almost certainly pro-life – signed onto this decision (Alito, Barrett, Kavanaugh, Thomas, Gorsuch).

So, when the justices express surprise and indignation that the Court is viewed as a political institution and claim that decisions are not based on the policy predilections, it is hard not to laugh.

3.    The Justices’ Political Views

If you believe that the justices don’t base their decisions on personal policy predilections, then you probably believe that the United States faked the moon landing or that most law schools are deeply committed to ideological diversity.

Think about it: could you imagine Justice Sotomayor ever invalidating an affirmative action program? Could you ever imagine Justice Thomas or Justice Alito relying on stare decisis to uphold Roe and Planned Parenthood? Could you ever imagine Justice Kagan supporting restrictions on same-sex marriage? No.

And don’t be fooled when the justices claim that their decisions reflect differences in interpretive philosophies. Uh-huh. It’s interesting – and amazingly convenient – that the justices’ interpretive philosophies so often comport with their policy preferences. That isn’t an accident.

This fact does not make the justices bad people. It just means that they are human. It means that their personal views impact their decisions, which is precisely why it is so critical for the Court to base their decisions on a reasonable interpretation of constitutional or statutory text. It is why the Court should refuse to hear most cases where the Constitution is silent or ambiguous, and instead defer to the democratic and political process. Doing so minimizes the risk that personal preferences will triumph over the law, and decreases the likelihood that constitutional meaning will depend on whether the Court’s majority is comprised of liberals or conservatives.  

Otherwise, justices will feel free to roam unconstrained in the Constitution’s penumbras,  seeking to discover new rights that reflect the “heady days of the here and now.”[2] That approach, which the Court has embraced at times, explains in substantial part why the public doesn’t view the Court favorably.

The Solution

Chief Justice Roberts is not the solution. Expanding the Court, for obvious reasons, is not the solution. The solution is to require a six-vote supermajority to affirm or reverse a lower court decision.

This solution would have several benefits that would preserve the Court’s legitimacy, protect the separation of powers, and promote democratic choice regarding issues upon which the Constitution is silent. Specifically, 5-4 decisions have been and continue to be the source of substantial disagreement and division. The Court’s decisions in National Federation of Independent v. Sebelius, Obergefell v. Hodges, Shelby County v. Holder, and Bush v. Gore are perfect examples. A six-vote majority would reduce the frequency with which the Court issues divisive, controversial – and politicized – decisions.

Furthermore, requiring a six-vote majority would almost certainly lead to incremental, rather than drastic, changes in the law and minimize the risk that the Court’s decisions will be perceived as political and illegitimate. To achieve a six-vote majority, the justices would be forced to compromise and reach a middle ground concerning decisions that affect, among other things, civil rights and liberties. As such, the influence of ideology or policy preferences in the decision-making process would likely be minimized.

Finally, a six-vote majority might incentivize litigants to stop seeking social change through the courts and instead concentrate their efforts on effecting change through the legislature. Doing so would limit the Court’s power in a principled way. The Court would still decide cases that involved violations of specific constitutional or statutory guarantees, but a six-vote majority requirement would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Court to create rights based on implausible interpretations of the Constitution and thus engender public backlash. 

Without principled reforms, the public perception of the Court will likely remain negative, and with several controversial issues on its current docket, the Court’s legitimacy is likely to go anywhere but up.

 

[1] See Jeffrey M. Jones, Approval of Supreme Court Down to 40%, A New Low (Sep. 23, 2021), available at: Approval of U.S. Supreme Court Down to 40%, a New Low (gallup.com)

[2] Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

October 2, 2021 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Court Reform, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Current Affairs, Federal Appeals Courts, Legal Profession, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, September 13, 2021

Keeping the Peace

A few weeks ago I blogged about the latest issue of The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process, which looks at what lawyers and judges can do to help ease our country’s deep divisions along racial, ethnic, religious, political, and socio-economic lines. Today I want to focus on one article in that issue--Lawyers as Peacemakers by Lance B. Wickman.

Lance Wickman has a fascinating background. Since 1995, he has served as the General Counsel for The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. He has also served in LDS church leadership. Prior to becoming general counsel, he worked for the firm of Latham & Watkins in California as a litigation partner. He also served in the Vietnam war. Much of his career has been centered around conflicts, either through war, litigation, or "political and cultural conflicts." Despite this experience, his article explains his belief that "the heart of what lawyers and judges do--or should be doing--is peacemaking."

Mr. Wickman starts his article by exploring the existing divisions in our country, highlighting some disturbing statistics on the increasing lack of faith in the rule of law. He then gives a defense of the concept of "the rule of law," explaining that it needs "constant tending and defense" and that it promotes fair, neutral, and peaceful resolution of disputes.

After highlighting the importance of the rule of law, Mr. Wickman delves into the role that lawyers and judges can play in defending the rule of law and acting as peacemakers. I don't want to give away the full article, so I will just touch on two of his examples. First, he talks about how lawyers are resourceful. As he writes, "In battles over cultural or moral is-sues, lawyers can help chart approaches that seek fair-ness for all Americans, rather than winner-take-all out-comes that breed resentment and perpetual conflict." As an example, he cites the compromise in Utah over religious freedom and LGBTQ rights that led to the passage of Utah Senate Bill 296. The bill involved collaboration between Equality Utah and the LDS church and "prevented discrimination in employment and housing while preserving religious freedom."

He also writes that lawyers are "resolute."  As he explains, lawyers must "defend the rule of law in the teeth of determined opposition, even when doing so seems to threaten our narrow interests."  For this point he cites the example of John Adams defending the British soldiers charged with murder during the Boston Massacre. Although Adams's action caused him to lose clients, even in his later years, Adams cited his representation as "'one of the most gallant, generous, manly and disinterested actions of my whole life, and one of the best pieces of service I ever rendered my country.'" 

Mr. Wickman ends his article with an excerpt from President Lincoln's first inaugural address. If any person knew how to bring people together, it was Lincoln. I recently finished A Team of Rivals by Doris Kearns Goodwin, which highlights Lincoln's effort to bring several rivals for the presidency together in his cabinet. For those interested in the role lawyers can make as peacemakers, I commend both Mr. Wickman's article and Ms. Goodwin's book.

September 13, 2021 in Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, September 5, 2021

The Abortion Mess Continues

In the words of the late Justice Antonin Scalia, “[l[ike some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried,” Roe v. Wade (and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey) stalks the Fourteenth Amendment’s jurisprudence yet again, reflecting the constitutional mess that these decisions created.[1]

Specifically, in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the Court will decide whether a Mississippi law, which bans abortions after the fifteenth week of pregnancy, violates the right, created in Roe and reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood, to obtain abortions before viability (which occurs at approximately twenty-four weeks of pregnancy).[2] By way of background, in Roe, the Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to support a fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy in certain circumstances.[3] In so holding, the Court adopted a trimester framework that balanced a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy with a state’s right to regulate the abortion procedure. In the first trimester, women had an unfettered right to terminate a pregnancy.[4] In the second trimester, states could regulate abortion to protect a women’s health.[5] After the second trimester – when the fetus became viable – states could prohibit abortions except when necessary to protect the life or health of the mother.[6]

Scholars and judges of all political persuasions criticized the Court’s decision in Roe, arguing that the right to abortion could not be found anywhere in the Constitution’s text and certainly was not inferable from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which protects procedural, not substantive rights.[7] These scholars were correct: the abortion right in Roe was predicated in substantial part on and an outgrowth of the Court’s decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, where the Court held that the Constitution contains invisible “penumbras,” that are “formed by emanations from those guarantees [in the text] that give them life and substance.”[8] In other words, the Court could create whatever rights it wanted, regardless of whether the text supported creating those rights.

Two decades later, in Planned Parenthood, the Court made the problem worse. In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld the central holding in Roe (the right to obtain abortions before viability) but rejected Roe’s trimester framework. In its place, the Court adopted the “undue burden,” test, which stated that before viability, states may not enact laws that impose a substantial burden on a woman’s right to access abortion services.[9] It is obvious why Planned Parenthood introduced instability and unpredictability into abortion jurisprudence. After all, what constitutes an “undue burden” on the right to obtain a pre-viability abortion? No one knew the answer. Perhaps it was located in Griswold’s penumbras, which only the Court could access and define.

Not surprisingly, in response to what many rightfully perceived as judicial overreach in Roe and constitutional ambiguity in Planned Parenthood, some states embarked on a decades-long and seemingly never-ending mission to eviscerate, if not effectively overturn, Roe through legislation that imposes various restrictions upon when and under what circumstances women can obtain abortions. For example, in Planned Parenthood, a Pennsylvania law required minors to obtain parental consent, and adult women to inform their spouses, before obtaining an abortion. The Court upheld the former provision and invalidated the latter.[10] In Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstadt and June Medical Services v. Russo, Texas and Louisiana, respectively, enacted laws requiring physicians to obtain hospital admitting privileges before providing abortion services.[11] In two 5-4 decisions, the Court invalidated both laws.[12] These cases are just a sample of the many instances in which states attempted to limit, directly or indirectly, access to abortion.[13]  

And in every case,  the Court declined the opportunity to clarify definitively the nature and scope of the abortion right, such as by unequivocally upholding or overruling Roe, or adopting categorical rules concerning when and under what circumstances women could access abortions. Instead, the Court applied the malleable “undue burden” test, which resulted in a case-by-case jurisprudence that led to uncertainty and often kept the abortion right hanging by a thread, dependent more on the current justices’ ideological predilections than on principled constitutional law. Simply put, the Court’s approach ensured that the abortion right would remain in constitutional purgatory, mired in uncertainty, and continuously under attack by states that viewed abortion as constitutionally unsupportable and morally indefensible.

Unfortunately, the saga continues.

In the latest installment of How to Overturn Roe While Acting Like You Are Not, the State of Mississippi has enacted a law that bans abortions after fifteen weeks – and thus bans a portion of previability abortions. Only this time, the plot doesn’t just involve Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, where the Court will decide whether Mississippi's law passes constitutional muster.  Rather, Texas has decided to make yet another appearance into the abortion sage by passing an unusually bizarre law that: (1) bans all abortions after six weeks; and (2) gives citizens, not the state, enforcement power by authorizing private causes of action against those who provide or assist in providing abortion services after six weeks.[14] This law is certainly unconstitutional; many women do not even know that they are pregnant at six weeks, thus rendering the six-week limit a substantial and unconstitutional burden on abortion access. Not surprisingly, in Whole Women’s Health v. Jackson, the Petitioner sought an order from the Court preliminarily enjoining the law's enforcement.[15]

You’d think that, based on Roe and Planned Parenthood, the Court would have granted the injunction.

Think again.

Last week, in a 5-4 decision, the Court declined to issue an injunction. [16] To be fair, the majority did not rule on the merits of Texas’s law. Rather, the Court held that the Petitioner did not meet the standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction because, among other things, there was no evidence that any private citizen intended to enforce the law, or that the Court had the authority to issue an injunction against state judges who were asked to decide the law's constitutionality.[17] The Court was careful to emphasize, however, that its decision was not “based on any conclusion about the constitutionality of Texas’s law.”[18]

Yeah, right.

The majority doesn’t live in a fantasy world. It knew that its decision would allow a law to go into effect that unquestionably violated Roe and Planned Parenthood, and effectively outlawed abortion for most women in Texas. As Justice Sotomayor explained in her dissent:

The Court’s order is stunning. Presented with an application to enjoin a flagrantly unconstitutional law engineered to prohibit women from exercising their constitutional rights and evade judicial scrutiny, a majority of Justices have opted to bury their heads in the sand. Last night, the Court silently acquiesced in a State’s enactment of a law that flouts nearly 50 years of federal precedents.[19]

Furthermore, as Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, the Court could have enjoined the law on the ground that a state “cannot delegate . . . a veto power [over the right to obtain an abortion] which the state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy.”[20] Ultimately, the Court’s refusal to issue the injunction in Whole Women’s Health v. Jackson suggests that five justices may be prepared to overturn Roe or, at the very least, severely restrict abortion rights.

For that and other reasons, Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization is perhaps the most important abortion case in years. Whatever the justices decide, they should ensure that the opinion ends the constitutional mess that is abortion jurisprudence, in which the abortion right has been plagued by uncertainty and the Court’s decisions characterized by anything by clarity.  The Court can do so by issuing a clear and categorical decision about whether abortion is a fundamental right and, if the answer is yes, clarifies definitively the scope of this right. The Court has several options, including:

  1. Overturn Roe and return the abortion issue to the states.
  2. Overturn Planned Parenthood but not Roe and return to the trimester framework.
  3. Overturn Planned Parenthood and Roe, but hold that the Equal Protection Clause supports the right to abortion.
  4. Uphold Planned Parenthood and Roe based on stare decisis.

The absolute worst result would be if the Court issued yet another fractured, 5-4 decision that invalidated or upheld the Mississippi law, but otherwise provided no clarity regarding the scope of the abortion right and the states’ power to restrict its exercise. The worst result would be if Chief Justice Roberts engaged in legal shenanigans yet again in a misguided to preserve the Court’s institutional legitimacy. The worst result would be if the Court issued a plurality opinion with multiple concurrences and dissents that made readers think that the Court just can’t – and perhaps never will – reach any agreement on how to address the constitutional mess that Roe created, and that Planned Parenthood exacerbated. Whatever happens, the abortion saga should be a lesson in what happens when courts ignore the Constitution and create rights out of thin air.

The time has come to bring the abortion soap opera to a conclusion and end the decades-old constitutional charade that Griswold, Roe, and Planned Parenthood created.  In other words, either kill the monster or allow it to forever terrorize constitutional law and lurk in the hidden penumbras, waiting to trap and possess unsuspecting justices in those penumbras.  

The Court’s abortion jurisprudence, however, suggests that the ending in the latest installment of How to Overturn Roe While Acting Like You Are Not will leave the audience wanting, just as in those 80s’ horror movies that ended with the killer seemingly dead, only to open an eye or move a body part before the screen fades out, signaling to the audience that yet another sequel is on the horizon. 

Stay tuned.

 

[1] Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)

[2] No. 19-392, available at: Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization - SCOTUSblog.

[3] 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

[4] See id.

[5] See id.

[6] See id.

[7] See, e.g., Meredith Heagney, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Offers Critique of Roe v. Wade During Law School Visit (May 15, 2013), available at: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Offers Critique of Roe v. Wade During Law School Visit | University of Chicago Law School (uchicago.edu).

[8] 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (brackets added).

[9] 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

[10] See id.

[11] 579 U.S. 582 (2016); 591 U.S.     , 2020 WL 3492640.

[12] See id.

[13] See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).

[14] See Whole Women’s Health v. Jackson, 594 U.S.      (2021), available at: 21A24 Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson (09/01/2021) (supremecourt.gov).

[15] See id.

[16] See id.

[17] See id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

[20] Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 69 (1976)) (brackets in original).

September 5, 2021 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Legal Profession, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, August 21, 2021

Social Media, State Action, and the First Amendment

In a climate of extreme partisanship and polarization, platforms such as Facebook and Twitter – with the express authorization of Congress under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act – exercise unprecedented power to censor the content and viewpoints that individuals express on these platforms, particularly concerning political speech. And social media platforms have done precisely that, censoring views that they subjectively deem objectionable or inappropriate – with no repercussions whatsoever. In so doing, social media platforms thwart the robust exchange of opinions and thus undermine the marketplace of ideas that is so essential to a properly functioning democracy and a diverse society.

If the federal government engaged in such conduct, it would unquestionably violate the First Amendment. Social media platforms, however, are private companies, not government (state) actors, thus rendering the First Amendment inapplicable and enabling social media to engage in content and viewpoint-based discrimination with impunity.  

That has to change – now.

For the reasons set forth below, the United States Supreme Court should hold that social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are state actors and, as such, prohibited from engaging in conduct that would violate individuals’ free speech rights.

1. Through Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, Congress gave (and delegated to) social media the power to engage in                            content-based discrimination.

A private company can be deemed a state actor when there is a close relationship between the private party's actions and the government's objectives, or when the private party performs a traditional government function. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, for example, Congress empowered private companies to conduct drug tests of their employees.[1] The Labor Association objected, arguing that the drug tests violated the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.[2] The Supreme Court held that, although the railroad was a private company, the tests, which the government explicitly authorized, rendered the railroad  a state actor for this purpose.[3] Additionally, in Marsh v. Alabama, the Court held that when a private company exercises powers that are traditionally reserved to the states, it is engaging in a public function and thus must respect constitutional safeguards.[4]

Based on Skinner, social media can arguably be deemed a state actor. Through Section 230, Congress explicitly authorized social media platforms to do precisely what the First Amendment prohibits: censor information based on content or viewpoint.  As one commentator explains:

Section 230 … grants a … “good Samaritan” immunity to online platforms as well. In this second immunity, Section 230 authorizes internet platforms to block content deemed “lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” Section 230 explicitly exempts websites from most civil and state criminal liability for any action they take in a “good faith effort” to exclude such “offensive” material.[5]

As Professor Dawn Nunziato states, “Congress encouraged private Internet actors to do what it could not do itself—restrict harmful, offensive, and otherwise undesirable speech, the expression of which would nonetheless be protected by the First Amendment.”[6]  

Simply put, Section 230 “effectively immunizes and induces private conduct that would be unconstitutional if governmental actors did it themselves.”[7] And that is the problem. Congress should not be permitted to evade First Amendment protections simply by giving social media platforms – the modern-day marketplace of ideas – the power to do that which it could never do.

2.    Social media is the new public forum and the modern-day marketplace of ideas.

Most citizens do not express their political views on Main Street, in public parks, or in the public square. Rather, they express their views online, such as on their Facebook and Twitter pages. Indeed, the views that millions of social media users express often relate directly to political and public policy issues, such as judicial nominees, abortion, climate change, campaign finance reform, and infrastructure. To be sure, a person need spend only a few minutes on Facebook or Twitter – or read Alexandria Ocasio Cortez’s Twitter feed (among others in both parties) – to realize that these platforms are the primary vehicle by which users express a diverse array of political views and engage in often heated debates on public policy issues.

Put simply, the marketplace of ideas – the forum in which diverse ideas on matters of public concern, however unpopular or distasteful, are welcome – is now located on social media platforms.

By censoring information that it subjectively and arbitrarily deems “objectionable,” social media is compromising the marketplace of ideas by doing precisely what the First Amendment prohibits – engaging in content and viewpoint discrimination. If legislators are to remain committed to respecting all points of view, rejecting discrimination and arbitrariness, and recognizing that unpopular ideas are essential to public discourse, they should conclude that social media platforms, particularly due to the power Section 230 grants, are state actors.

3.    A robust public discourse – including welcoming offensive and unpopular ideas – is essential to democracy, liberty, and diversity.

Politics and public discourse have become so divisive and polarized that diverse and unpopular viewpoints – regardless of political affiliation – are often met with scorn and ridicule.  By censoring diverse views that challenge widely accepted and prevailing views, social media exacerbates this problem.

It encourages groupthink.

It discourages critical analysis of public policy issues.

Don’t be fooled by the claim that social media platforms are simply preventing the dissemination of “misinformation.” That determination is subjective and arbitrary. It is also anathema to the principle that liberty, democracy, and diversity depend on tolerating speech that we hate and views that we abhor.  Ultimately, welcoming all viewpoints and eschewing discrimination vindicates every individual’s interest in having a voice in democracy. As Erwin Chemerinsky stated:

Freedom of speech is defended both instrumentally—it helps people make better decisions—and intrinsically—individuals benefit from being able to express their views. The consensus is that the activity of expression is vital and must be protected. Any infringement of freedom of speech, be it by public or private entities, sacrifices these values. In other words, the consensus is not just that the government should not punish expression; rather, it is that speech is valuable and, therefore, any unjustified violation is impermissible. If employers can fire employees and landlords can evict tenants because of their speech, then speech will be chilled and expression lost. Instrumentally, the “marketplace of ideas” is constricted while, intrinsically, individuals are denied the ability to express themselves. Therefore, courts should uphold the social consensus by stopping all impermissible infringements of speech, not just those resulting from state action.[8]

Upholding the social consensus – and the First Amendment’s original purpose – supports a finding that social media platforms, due both to Section 230 and their status as the new public forum, are state actors. 

***

The solution to this problem is simple: social media should retain immunity for the comments posted by its users. However, social media should only be prohibited from censoring speech that the Court has held receives no First Amendment protection. This includes, for example, obscenity and speech that incites violence.

Otherwise, the marketplace of ideas should remain a place where diverse and unpopular ideas are welcomed.  

 

[1] 489 U.S. 602 (1990)

[2] See id.

[3] See id.

[4] See id.

[5] Jed Rubenfeld, Are Facebook and Google State Actors? (Nov. 4, 2019), available at: Are Facebook and Google State Actors? - Lawfare (lawfareblog.com) (emphasis in original).

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] David L. Hudson, Jr., In the Age of Social Media, Expand the Reach of the First Amendment, available at:    In the Age of Social Media, Expand the Reach of the First Amendment (americanbar.org) (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky) (emphasis added).

August 21, 2021 in Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Legal Ethics, Legal Profession | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, August 19, 2021

The Next Supreme Court Justice: A Case for Greater Diversity

For the Supreme Court, the question of the summer has been whether Justice Stephen Breyer will retire or remain on the Court. Aware that both racial and gender diversity have been historically lacking on the Court, President Biden has promised to nominate an African-American woman if Justice Breyer leaves. Although racial and gender diversity are the most important and most visible considerations in having a diverse Court, President Biden should consider other matters of diversity as well in selecting a nominee.

Racial diversity is a top priority. Only two African-Americans have sat on the Supreme Court, and neither has been a woman. One Hispanic, Justice Sonya Sotomayor, has been a member of the Court. But no Asians or Native Americans have served on the Court.

Gender diversity also is an essential consideration. When asked how many women on the Court would be enough, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg famously answered "nine." Although the Court has as many women now as it ever has had at one time, only five women have been justices in the history of the Court. 

The more diverse the Court is the more it will reflect the diversity of the nation. This will benefit the Court by adding different perspectives and by increasing the bar's and the general public's faith in the Court. But the president should not stop at just racial and gender diversity. In addition to race and gender, he should consider other attributes of a prospective justice: experience, geography, education, and religion.

Experience. Recent appointments to the Supreme Court have overwhelmingly come from federal appellate courts (the only current justice not to have been a federal appellate judge is Justice Elena Kagan, who was the Solicitor General before her appointment). The last state court judge appointed to the Court was Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (also the first woman on the Court), who had been on the Arizona Court of Appeals (and also in the state legislature). While it has been said that a federal judge is someone who knows a Senator and a state judge is someone who knows a Governor, there obviously are differences between the two. That being said, many cases come to the Supreme Court directly from the highest court of a state. Having a justice who has worked in a state court system would be a plus.

And who says that Supreme Court justices need to already be judges anyway? It has been quite a while since the appointment of a practicing attorney or academic without judicial experience.

Although Justice Sotomayor was a federal prosecutor, there also generally has been a lack of justices with criminal law experience. How about the appointment of a Public Defender to bring a different perspective?

Geography. It was essential in the early years of the Court that there be geographical diversity because the justices were required to ride the circuits. In recent memory, though, the Court has been the domain primarily of justices who either were from the Northeast or worked there a considerable portion of their careers. When Justice Ginsburg and Justice Antonin Scalia were on the Court, there were four justices from New York City (at least each was from a different borough).

There are two Southerners by birth currently on the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas (Georgia) and Justice Amy Coney Barrett (Louisiana). This is the most representation the South has had on the Court in recent memory. And the appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Court added a justice originally from a mountain state (Colorado), giving the Court that added perspective.

Although it no longer is necessary to have justices from different regions in order to ride the circuits, the Court best reflects the nation when it reflects the nation's geographic diversity. Further, some matters that come before the Court are unique to certain areas of the country. A justice from one of these areas would be able to contribute knowledge and perspective that other justices may lack.

Education. When Justice Barrett joined the Court, the dominance of Ivy League law schools in producing Supreme Court justices was diminished ever so slightly. Justice Barrett graduated from the University of Notre Dame law school, leaving an even split of law school alma maters among the other justices between Harvard University and Yale University. But it has been many years since any member of the Court has been a graduate of a public university's law school. There certainly must be excellent jurists from top public law schools like the University of California, the University of Michigan, and the University of Virginia who could be nominated. While diversity in law schools attended may not make much difference in perspective, it could help in dispelling the notion that the Court is elitist or somehow out of touch with those who are not.

Religion. Prior to Justice Gorsuch joining the Court, it was composed of six Catholic justices and three Jewish justices. Justice Gorsuch became the first Protestant on the Court since Justice John Paul Stevens. The Court has never had a Muslim justice or any justice who did not identify as Christian or Jewish, nor at least recently has it had a justice that did not identify with some religion. While religious affiliation does not necessarily produce monolithic perspective among justices (see, for instance, Justice Thomas and Justice Sotomayor, both Catholic), diversity in this area would increase confidence in the Court's decisions related to religious matters.

  ***

In the end, perfect diversity is neither required nor achievable. After all, the Court is not a representative body. Even so, the standing of the Court in the eyes of a more and more diverse citizenry would increase if it better reflected this increasing diversity. And the Court itself would benefit from greater diversity of experience, geography, education, and religion as it deals with the difficult and complex issues that come before it.

Although Justice Breyer may not retire this year, a new justice will be nominated sooner or later. When that happens, the President should consider a variety of diversity matters in addition to race and gender.

August 19, 2021 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Current Affairs, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, August 15, 2021

Requesting Reconsideration of Precedent

In rapid succession, the Supreme Court recently received three briefs asking it to overturn different precedents. The one that got widespread national attention was Mississippi’s brief in the high-profile case being heard next term, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,[1] which asks the Court to overturn Roe v. Wade.[2] Then, on the heels of that brief, a petition for certiorari asked the Court to overrule Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.[3] Soon afterwards, Oklahoma filed a petition seeking reconsideration of the Court’s one-year-old, 5-4 ruling in McGirt v. Oklahoma.[4]

The unusual spate of requested nullifications of existing precedent plainly reflects a calculation that the Supreme Court’s new majority is less tied to stare decisis than their predecessors. Still, each brief makes an effort to provide grounds why stare decisis should not insulate the targeted decisions from reassessment. A review of the arguments against simply following precedent provides lessons for appellate counsel confronting an unavoidable but adverse controlling decision.

To be sure, the doctrine of stare decisis remains a “foundation stone of the rule of law” and the “preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”[5] The Court has deemed that following precedent “is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.”[6] Still, stare decisis is not an “inexorable command” or “‘mechanical formula.’”[7] In constitutional cases, stare decisis has less gravitational pull because “correction through legislative action is practically impossible.”[8]

 Dobbs presents the politically voluble issue of abortion, which has percolated for years, dominated national politics at times, and influenced Supreme Court appointments and confirmations. The potential impact of the issue in the political arena is inseparable from the legal arguments made, simply because the conversations in both playing fields have merged. That happenstance probably allows counsel to undertake a more opinionated and overtly political argument than might be prudent in other cases, particularly when some of the justices have expressed similarly strong opinions on the relevant jurisprudence.

In that vein, Mississippi’s brief asserts that both Roe and the subsequent decision in Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey,[9] “are egregiously wrong” and lack any “basis in text, structure, history, or tradition, leading to a hopelessly unworkable” legal framework. The brief’s unworkability argument is not a traditional one, though. In most instances, unworkability focuses on why an adopted test or stance fails to resolve recurring problems or issues. It asserts that the lower courts do not apply it consistently so that application of the precedent produces inconsistent results.

Mississippi’s brief frames its unworkability argument in terms of the frustration that States experience when they seek to end or heavily regulate abortion, blaming the application of heightened scrutiny when, it claims, rational-basis analysis should apply. The argument reminds a reader of the “heckler’s veto” in First Amendment law, because it relies on the sustained objections of opponents as a basis for claiming that the Court should recede from precedent. In this instance, it asserts that Roe and Casey have not contributed to a settled state of the law because they tend to block laws that Mississippi favors. In this brief, unworkability appears only as an obligatory nod. Mississippi’s argument really depends on justices’ agreeing that abortion should not receive constitutional protection so that laws restricting it are reviewed by the most deferential form of scrutiny.

Egbert v. Boule[10] seeks the abandonment of an equally longstanding precedent, Bivens, but one that has had a lower public profile. Still, it boasts a vocal set of opponents in government and academia. Bivens and its progeny implied a direct cause of action under the Constitution for federal officer violations of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, as well as due process.  Yet, more recently, the Court has taken a narrowing view of Bivens and even suggested that the current Court would not have reached the same decision as the Bivens Court about implying a cause of action.[11]

The petition’s unworkability argument emphasizes the Ninth Circuit’s more expansive view of Bivens in the case submitted for review to show that Bivens is irreconcilable with more recent precedent and therefore provides an uncertain basis for implying a constitutional cause of action that the lower courts cannot uniformly apply. Coming in the context of a lawsuit against a Border Patrol agent stationed near the Canadian border for First and Fourth Amendment violations, the petition claims “that judicially crafted Bivens actions could skew agents’ decision-making about whether and how to investigate suspicious activities in carrying out their important national-security mission.” Playing to the jurisprudential predilections of a majority of the Court, the petition asks that it “bring this important area into line with the Court’s modern jurisprudence respecting the separation of powers and recognizing Congress’ primacy in creating causes of action.”

Oklahoma’s petition in Oklahoma v. Bosse[12] attempts a rare, though not unheard of feat: the overruling of a fresh precedent. Only last year, in McGirt, the Supreme Court held a large swath of Oklahoma remained part of the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation and subject to federal, not state, criminal law jurisdiction under an 1885 statute. What makes the Bosse petition credible was the immediate impact that McGirt had on future criminal prosecutions in Oklahoma, even if the effect on past prosecutions was expected.

The Bosse petition asserts that McGirt was wrong and has already had disastrous consequences, sending thousands of crime victims on a mercurial adventure to “seek justice from federal and tribal prosecutors whose offices are not equipped to handle those demands.” At the same time, it tells the justices that public safety is endangered as “crimes are going uninvestigated and unprosecuted,” confirming the worst fears of the McGirt dissenters.

The overruling of a recent Supreme Court decision, as Oklahoma seeks in Bosse, is not unprecedented. One prominent example occurred in the Flag Salute Cases. In 1940, the Supreme Court decided Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, holding that a school district did not violate the rights of several schoolchildren who were expelled because they had religious objections to participating in the school’s morning flag-salute ceremony. Those objections led to accusations that Jehovah’s Witnesses, the religion of the expelled schoolchildren, were unpatriotic, releasing a wave of terrorism against its followers. The intolerance generated by the decision caused three members of the Gobitis majority to re-think their position. When joined by new appointee, the formerly 8-1 decision turned around to uphold a right to object to pledging allegiance as a right of conscience in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette.[13]  Remarkably, the new decision also ended the terroristic attacks on the Witnesses. Still, Bosse may have a higher climb than Barnette had to swing a member of the majority to the other side.

Each of these briefs demonstrate three things when asking a Court to overrule prior precedent. First, know your audience. If a court has expressed misgivings about a precedent, that become fodder for your request to abandon stare decisis. Second, explain why the precedent fails to achieve the stability that stare decisis is supposed to bring about. Third, make the consequences of staying with precedent seem as dire and bleak as possible. There is no guarantee that checking these boxes will bring about your desired result, but their absence almost guarantees failure. Advocates, no doubt, will watch developments in these cases closely to see if they succeed.    

 

[1] No. 19-1392, Br. for Petitioners (S.Ct. Jul. 22, 2021).

[2] 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

[3] 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

[4] 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).

[5] Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).

[6] Id. (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).

[7] Id. at 828 (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).

[8] Id. (quoting Burnet, 285 U.S. at 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).

[9] 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

[10] 21-147, Pet. for Certiorari (S.Ct. Jul. 30, 2021).

[11] Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856 (2017).

[12] No. 21-186, Pet. for Certiorari (S.Ct. Aug. 6, 2021).

[13] 319 US 624 (1943).

August 15, 2021 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, July 24, 2021

How to Effectively Line and Copy Edit Your Brief

The writing process consists of three phases: (1) the first draft; (2) the rewriting stage; and (3) the line and copy edit. This article focuses on line and copy editing, which involves reviewing your writing for, among other things, conciseness, clarity, word choice, repetition, and persuasive value. Below are tips to ensure that you can line and copy edit effectively for briefs and other legal documents.

1.    Make your sentences concise

Long and wordy sentences are the enemies of effective and persuasive writing. Focus on getting to the point in as few words as possible. Use simple words. Be clear and straightforward. Consider this example:

The issue in this case is whether the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms. We contend that it does.

This sentence is far too wordy. Instead of the above statement, simply say:

The Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms.

Likewise, consider this example:

The issue to be decided by the court is whether the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which unquestionably and unmistakably protects substantive liberty interests pursuant to the substantive due process doctrine, encompasses within its reach the fundamental and thus basic right to terminate a pregnancy. The answer is certainly yes.

Wow. What an awful, fifty-two word sentence. Instead of this nonsense, simply say:

The Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty guarantee supports a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy.

That sentence is thirteen words, and it says the same thing.

Remember that judges can easily recognize bad writing, and the failure to communicate concisely is a classic sign of bad writing.  

2.    Focus on coherence and flow

Make sure that your paragraphs are coherent and flow effectively. In so doing, remember that paragraphs should never occupy an entire page. They should begin with a concise sentence and focus on a single point, such as an element of a cause of action. Consider, for example, a negligence lawsuit, which requires a plaintiff to show that a defendant: (1) owed a duty; (2) breached that duty; (3) directly and proximately caused injury; and (4) caused legally compensable damages.  With this in mind, consider the following statement:

The defendant was negligent in treating the plaintiff’s back injury. The defendant, as a doctor and certified surgeon specializing in back injuries, owed a duty to the plaintiff to exercise a degree of care that was consistent with doctors of similar quality and experience. But the defendant breached this duty when he failed to operate on the correct area of the plaintiff’s spine. And this breach was contrary to and inconsistent with the conduct of similarly situated professionals in the medical industry. Moreover, the defendant’s conduct was the direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. First, but for the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff would never have suffered any injuries whatsoever. Second, the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Most importantly, the plaintiff suffered legally compensable injuries that should result in a verdict in plaintiff’s favor.

This paragraph is utter nonsense.  It includes all four elements of negligence in a single paragraph without even attempting to explain in sufficient depth why the plaintiff’s case satisfies these elements. The better approach is to discuss each element in four separate and concise paragraphs.  

3.    Keep the reader’s attention

When does writing fail to keep the reader’s attention? When you write long sentences. When you write long paragraphs. When you use fancy or esoteric words. When you repeat yourself. When you tell, but don’t show. When your writing is simply boring. Consider the following example:

The defendant assaulted and severely injured the plaintiff in a most invidious and insidious manner. To be clear, the defendant assaulted the plaintiff in a most egregious manner because the plaintiff trusted the defendant and because the defendant represented to the plaintiff that he was a trusted friend and because the defendant told the plaintiff that he would always be a loyal and trusted friend, which is a representation upon which the plaintiff relief and did so to his detriment, as the complaint alleges. Also, the duplicitous behavior of the defendant showed that his purported loyalty was evanescent in nature and execrable in design.

This paragraph is worse than the Friday the 13th movies.  Instead of this ridiculous statement, begin with a powerful opening sentence. Use short sentences. Include specific and vivid details that tell a compelling story and that engage the reader logically and emotionally.

4.    Eliminate filler words

Sentences should include only necessary and purposeful words.  As such, eliminate words like “just,” “very,” and “really.” Consider the following example:

My settlement offer should really be considered by your client.

versus

Your client should consider my settlement offer.

The second example eliminates the filler words. It gets to the point quickly and directly.

5.    Don’t repeat words

If you repeat words, it suggests that you didn’t take the time to edit your brief and it makes your writing seem contrived. Consider the following example:

The defendant’s conduct exacerbated the plaintiff’s injuries. These injuries were severe and, due to being exacerbated by the defendant’s conduct, continue to affect the plaintiff’s health. Indeed, the defendant’s conduct, which as stated above, exacerbated the plaintiff’s injuries, is negligent as a matter of law.

Unfortunately, instead of focusing on the substance of your argument, the reader is likely to wonder why you used the word “exacerbate” three times. To avoid this problem, get a thesaurus.

6.    Don’t suggest unintended meanings or biases

Your word choice is the vehicle by which you convey meaning. Thus, be careful not to use words that may imply that you harbor prejudices or biases.  Consider the following example:

The defendant was mentally retarded and should be held incompetent to stand trial.

Yeah, that’s not good. Instead, say:

The defendant was intellectually disabled and should be held incompetent to stand trial.

Remember to always write with sensitivity and objectivity. If your writing reveals underlying prejudices or biases, you – and your argument – will lack credibility.

7.    Avoid words that convey uncertainty or equivocation

Your writing should be powerful and unequivocal because it shows that you believe in your argument. For example, don’t say this:

The court’s decision seems to be based on reasoning that is inconsistent with precedent.

Whatever. Imagine if a man proposed marriage to a woman, and the woman said in response, “I think so,” or “This seems like what I want.” They probably wouldn’t be tying the knot anytime soon – or ever. Instead, say:

The court’s decision is based on reasoning that is inconsistent with precedent.

The latter sentence is direct and declarative, and thus more persuasive.

8.    Eliminate cliches

When you include cliches in your writing, it suggests that you are unoriginal and that you didn’t spend much time revising and perfecting your work product. For example, don’t say this:

My client, a professional boxer, wasn’t going to quit the fight until, as they say, “the fat lady sings.”

That sentence is terrible. Instead, say:

My client is a professional boxer who refused to quit and fought with his heart for every round of the fight.

This statement might make the reader envision the Rocky movies. It might also demonstrate that you are thinking for yourself and not relying on stale and tired phrases to support your argument. When you do that, your sentences will be original, relatable, and memorable.

9.    Know what your words mean

Don’t use words that you misunderstand or don’t understand. Consider this example:

The law’s affects will suppress citizens’ First Amendment rights.

Don’t make such a foolish mistake. Instead, say:

The law’s effects will suppress citizens’ First Amendment rights.

And be sure not to reveal that you simply don’t understand the meaning of a word. Consider this example:

The invidious weather caused the plane crash.

versus

The inclement weather caused the plane crash.

The first sentence would make the reader question the writer’s credibility – for good reason.

10.    Lose the adverbs

Great attorneys know how to use the facts and the law to craft a compelling story that shows, not tells, a court why it should rule in their favor. To that end, they minimize, if not eliminate, adverbs. Indeed, adverbs describe what happened, but they don’t capture the moment. Consider the following examples:

The party was extremely loud.

versus

The party was deafening.

***

The defendant was extraordinarily tired.

versus

The defendant was exhausted.

The difference should be obvious: “deafening” is more powerful than “extremely loud,” and “exhausted” is more powerful than “extraordinarily tired.”

11.    Lose the adjectives

Like adverbs, adjectives describe what happened, but they don’t capture the moment. Consider the following example:

The plaintiff’s journey to seek justice for her deceased daughter in this court has been really long and arduous.

Who cares? Law school exams are long and arduous. The bar exam is long and arduous. Relationships are long and arduous. And one’s belief in what is “long and arduous” is subjective. Put simply, nothing in the above statement connects with the reader in a relatable and compelling manner. Consider this example:

The plaintiff has waited patiently for three years, seven months, and twenty-eight days to obtain justice for her deceased daughter.

The second example is more powerful because it includes specific details. In so doing, it more effectively places the reader in the plaintiff’s shoes and enables the reader to relate to the plaintiff’s struggle.

12.    Think differently about active versus passive voice

The conventional wisdom is that writers should use the active voice and avoid the passive voice. That’s not always true. You should use the passive voice, for example, when de-emphasizing unfavorable facts.

Consider a case in which your client made allegedly defamatory statements about a public official, but contended that he or she believed those statements were true. Which of the following statements would you prefer?

The defendant admittedly made potentially defamatory statements about the plaintiff, but he contends that they are true.

versus

The alleged defamatory statements, which were made by the defendant, are true.

The second example is better because it de-emphasizes the unfavorable fact, namely, that the defendant made the statements, and it maintains the focus on the argument that the statements were true.

12.    Good judgment leads to good writing

Legal writing is not a mechanical task in which you robotically apply a set of techniques to create a persuasive argument. Rather, you have to exercise good judgment – and common sense – when drafting briefs or other legal documents. This includes, but is not limited to, choosing specific words that enhance your brief’s persuasive value, varying the length of your sentences, choosing a compelling theme, deciding which facts to emphasize, and determining how to address effectively unfavorable facts and law. Thus, never approach legal writing as a mechanical or formulaic endeavor; understand that the quality of your judgment and common sense will impact substantially your brief’s quality and persuasiveness.

***

Ultimately, how you say something is equally, if not more, important than what you say. For law students, the message should be clear: the quality of your writing and communication skills largely determines whether you will be successful in the legal profession.

July 24, 2021 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Current Affairs, Law School, Legal Profession, Legal Writing, Rhetoric | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, July 17, 2021

Power Poses and Oral Argument:  Or, Do What Your Mother Said and Stand up Straight

In a recent meeting about teaching Legal Writing, an experienced appellate advocate mentioned practicing “power poses” as part of her prep for an oral argument at the Ninth Circuit.  While her comment was a nice way to add humor and humanity to the conversation, the idea of using power poses to add confidence before oral argument stuck with me long after the meeting concluded. 

I decided to check out the TED Talk on power poses the advocate mentioned in our meeting:  Social Psychologist and Harvard Business Law Professor Amy Cuddy’s TEDGlobal 2012 Your Body Language May Shape Who You Are. https://www.ted.com/talks/amy_cuddy_your_body_language_may_shape_who_you_are. The TED Talk website has a disclaimer at the beginning of Prof. Cuddy’s talk, explaining, “Some of the findings presented in this talk have been referenced in an ongoing debate among social scientists about robustness and reproducibility.”  Id.  Keeping in mind the debate about the science behind some of Prof. Cuddy’s premises, I decided to focus more on her overall points about body language. 

Prof. Cuddy’s general theme is that "power posing" by standing or sitting in a posture of confidence--even when we do not feel confident--can boost subjective feelings of confidence and thereby possibly impact success.  Id.  She initially focused on non-verbal communications, especially posture, among her MBA students.  Cuddy noticed her students who made themselves smaller, with hunched shoulders and crossed arms and legs, tended to earn lower grades than the students whose posture took more space.  Looking at controlled human subject students and primates with her collaborator, Prof. Dana Carney of Berkeley, Cuddy also saw a connection between testosterone and cortisone levels and use of power poses like the “Wonder Woman” and “Victory” stances with arms outstretched.  Thus, Prof. Cuddy hypothesized people who sit hunched over before a job interview, or in our case an oral argument, will have less confidence than those who stand for a few minutes privately in a power pose before an important talk.  See id.  Prof. Cuddy stressed she does not believe the power poses are for use “with other people” or to have any impact on substance, but instead can help us feel more comfortable with ourselves and thus preform better.  Id.

Commentator Kate Torgovnick May summarized Prof. Cuddy’s point as:  “[B]efore heading into a job interview, giving a big speech or attempting an athletic feat . . .  everyone should spend two minutes power posing [by] adopting the stances associated with confidence, power and achievement — chest lifted, head held high, arms either up or propped on the hips.”  Kate Torgovnick May, Some Examples of How Power Posing Can Actually Boost your Confidence (Oct. 1, 2012) https://blog.ted.com/10-examples-of-how-power-posing-can-work-to-boost-your-confidence/.  Torgovnick May provides several testimonials from people who successfully used “Wonder Woman” or other power poses before important classes, interviews, and  presentations.  See, e.g., id. (“It’s nice to see that there’s scientific support for Oscar Hammerstein’s King and I lyrics: ‘Whenever I feel afraid, I hold my head erect and whistle a happy tune, so no one will suspect I’m afraid …The result of this deception is very strange to tell, for when I fool the people I fear, I fool myself as well.’”)   

In bringing these ideas back to my own life, and to our Appellate Advocacy blog, the mom in me could not help but remember my own lawyer mother teaching my sister and me to walk with books on our heads.  My mom--like so many other parents—wanted her girls to stand up straight and have confidence.  I regularly chide my very tall sons for hunching over, admonishing them to “put back” their shoulders and “stand up straight.”  While the scientific community debates the precise reliability of Prof. Cuddy’s work, I know standing with confidence can indeed help me feel and look more confident in court and in the classroom. 

Therefore, I recommend you check out Prof. Cuddy’s TED Talk, as well as the debate on her research.  And the next time you are especially nervous about an oral argument or presentation, spend two minutes in a power pose.  Hopefully, you can smile thinking about the parent, auntie, teacher, or other adult who told you to “stand up straight” years ago.   And perhaps this technique will give you increased confidence too.

July 17, 2021 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Legal Profession, Moot Court, Oral Argument | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, June 20, 2021

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia: Chief Justice Roberts Issues Another Disappointing Decision

In Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, the United States Supreme Court confronted the question of whether the City of Philadelphia could deny a contract to a Catholic foster care agency (Catholic Social Services) because the agency refused to provide service to same-sex couples.[1] The city argued that the agency's policy violated the city’s anti-discrimination law, which prohibits discrimination based on, among other things sexual orientation.[2]

By way of background, in Employment Division v. Smith, the Court held that neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religion do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.[3] Writing on behalf of the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia relied in part on Reynolds v. United States to hold that the Free Exercise Clause does not permit religious organizations to receive exemptions from generally applicable laws.[4] Justice Scalia reasoned that to allow such exemptions “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."[5] Justice Scalia held that religious exemptions could be granted only when an alleged violation of religious liberty was coupled with a violation of another constitutional right.[6] For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held that the parents of an Amish child were exempt from a generally applicable law requiring all children to attend public school until the age of sixteen because the law infringed on both the parents’ religious liberty and the fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children.[7]

The Court’s decision in Smith has proved quite controversial, as some argue that it is inconsistent with the original purpose of the Free Exercise Clause.[8] And Smith has been implicated in recent disputes involving the balance between accommodating individuals’ religious beliefs and protecting citizens against discrimination.  For example, in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a cakeshop owner refused to design a custom wedding cake for a same-sex couple, arguing that doing so would violate his religious beliefs.[9] The State of Colorado argued that the cakeshop owner's refusal violated its generally applicable anti-discrimination law, which prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation.[10]  The facts in Masterpiece Cakeshop arguably presented the Court with the issue of whether Smith should be overruled.

But the Court avoided the question.

Instead, it ruled on very narrow grounds, holding that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had demonstrated hostility toward the cakeshop owner’s religion when addressing his claim.[11] As a result, Masterpiece Cakeshop resolved nothing. The decision provided no clarity or guidance to courts and citizens regarding the Free Exercise Clause. It was a missed opportunity.

Not surprisingly, three years later in Fulton, the same issue arose again when Philadelphia denied a contract to Catholic Social Services because it refused to offer services to same-sex couples. As in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court was faced with the question of whether Smith should be overruled.

Yet again, the Court avoided the question.

Instead, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court issued a very narrow decision in favor of Catholic Social Services, holding that Philadelphia’s anti-discrimination law was not generally applicable because the city retained the discretion to grant exemptions to the law.[12] This led to a narrow, unanimous ruling for Catholic Social Services. But again, the decision failed to resolve the underlying question of whether Smith should be overruled and avoided addressing how to balance an individual’s right to religious liberty against another individual’s right to be free from unlawful discrimination. The result is that one of the most sacrosanct constitutional rights – the free exercise of religion – is now marred in constitutional purgatory, with no clarification or guidance about the scope of this right and the limits on state power. 

Fulton was legal gymnastics at its finest. And politics at its worst.

Sadly, the decision in Fulton is yet another example of Chief Justice Roberts's disappointing jurisprudence.

To be clear, by all accounts Chief Justice Roberts is a brilliant and ethical jurist – and a great person. Roberts is deeply committed to preserving the Court’s institutional legitimacy and to avoiding the perception that politics and ideology motivate the Court’s decisions. To that end, Roberts strives to achieve consensus on the Court and avoid controversial 5-4 decisions. To reach consensus, Roberts seeks to decide each case on the narrowest ground possible, which often has the effect, as in Masterpiece Cakeshop and Fulton¸ of rarely addressing the fundamental constitutional issues that undergird many cases and, concomitantly, failing to clarify the law.

The ugly truth about this approach is that it causes precisely what Chief Justice Roberts hopes to avoid: it politicizes the Court, undermines its institutional legitimacy, and destabilizes the rule of law.  And it causes Roberts to become precisely what he disavows: a political actor.

As stated above, it is politics at its worst.

Unfortunately, even a cursory examination of Roberts’s jurisprudence in recent years reveals that his decisions often result from political calculations rather than principled constitutional considerations.

Indeed, Roberts’s decision in Fulton was eerily reminiscent of his decision in National Federation of Independent Investors v. Sebelius, where the primary issue confronting the Court was whether the Affordable Care Act violated the Commerce Clause.[13] Roberts agreed that the Act violated the Commerce Clause, yet after initially voting to invalidate the Act, Roberts reversed course and concluded that the Act was a proper exercise of Congress’s taxing power.[14] It was apparent that Roberts was trying to find a way – any way – to avoid issuing a decision that might compromise the Court’s legitimacy, lead to a divisive decision, and be perceived as political.

Yet, Roberts created precisely that result. The Court’s legitimacy was damaged because the decision was so obviously based on political calculations, not constitutional principles.

This is not the first time that Roberts has engaged in legal gymnastics that elevate politics over the rule of law and provide no clarity, guidance, stability, or predictability on important legal issues affecting civil rights and liberties. For example, in June Medical Services v. Russo, Roberts concurred in a decision that invalidated a Louisiana law requiring abortion providers to have hospital admitting privileges.[15] Roberts argued that, based on the Court’s decision in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstadt, where it invalidated a nearly identical law in Texas (although Roberts dissented), principles of stare decisis required him to invalidate the Louisiana law.

But Roberts’s jurisprudence shows that he has an on-again, off-again relationship with stare decisis.  In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, which addressed a union’s ability to collect fees from non-union members, Roberts joined the majority in overruling Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which had been valid law for over forty years.[16] And in Citizens United v. FEC, Roberts joined a 5-4 majority that invalidated a federal law restricting independent expenditures from corporations; in so holding, the Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which held that restrictions on corporate speech did not violate the First Amendment.[17] Thus, Roberts’s reliance on stare decisis in June Medical Services was about as disingenuous and manipulative as it gets. Simply put, when a concern for institutional legitimacy triumphs over the rule of law, the result is an unprincipled jurisprudence that at its core is political.

If Chief Justice Roberts values the Court’s institutional legitimacy, he should prioritize the rule of law and base his decisions on reasonable interpretations of the Constitution. He should stop avoiding the real issues that are presented in each case. He should make decisions based on what he believes, not on how others may react to a particular decision. In doing so, Roberts would demonstrate that he is faithful to the Constitution and the rule of law, and that his decisions are based on principle, not politics.

To date, sadly, Chief Justice Roberts has become the Court’s most political actor. And the Court is unquestionably a political institution.

 

[1]  No. 19-123, available at: 19-123 Fulton v. Philadelphia (06/17/2021) (supremecourt.gov)

[2] See id.

[3] 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

[4] See id.

[5] Id.

[6] See id.

[7] 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

[8] See Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioners, available at: 20200602142513866_19-123 CCJ tsac.pdf (supremecourt.gov)

[9] 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)

[10] See id.

[11] See id.

[12] No. 19-123, available at: 19-123 Fulton v. Philadelphia (06/17/2021) (supremecourt.gov)

[13] 567 U.S. 519 (2012).

[14] See id.

[15] 2020 WL 3492640 (2020)

[16]  138 S. Ct. 2448.

[17]  558 U.S. 310 (2010).

June 20, 2021 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Legal Profession, Religion, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, June 5, 2021

How to Win an Argument

Winning an argument depends in substantial part on effectively using strategies to maximize your argument’s persuasive and logical force, expose weaknesses in your adversary’s argument, and convince the audience to adopt your position. Below are tips that will enhance your chances of winning an argument in many contexts, such as in court, at a debate, or in a negotiation.

1.    Require that your adversary define relevant terms with specificity.

You should always require your adversary to define important terms that are essential to proving or disproving an argument. And you should never engage in or respond to arguments that consist of overly general propositions. For example, imagine the following discussion between two scholars who differ about the extent to which systemic racism and white privilege exists in the United States:

Scholar: Both history and current laws demonstrate that the United States is systemically racist, and that white privilege is pervasive throughout this country. Ultimately, until our society is more diverse and inclusive, we will continue to oppress marginalized populations.

Wow. There is a lot to unpack in that statement. 

Importantly, the scholar’s adversary should neither react nor respond to the substance of that statement. Instead, the scholar’s adversary should state as follows:

I certainly agree that racism, inequality, and oppression are antithetical to basic human values. But how do you define and quantify systemic, or institutional, racism? Which specific institutions do you allege are racist? And how do you define and quantify white privilege?

This strategy forces your opponent to be specific and places on your opponent the burden to provide a definition upon which most reasonable people can agree. In so doing, the opponent will likely reveal underlying assumptions or biases in an argument and thus allow you to expose the flaws in whatever definition the adversary provides. At the very least, you will prevent your opponent from relying on unproven generalities and enable yourself to avoid a futile discourse involving statements that may lack an empirical foundation.  

2.    Expose logical fallacies in your opponent’s argument, especially appeals to authority and emotion.

Logical fallacies undermine many arguments. Two of the most common are the appeals to authority and emotion.

First, many advocates strive to enhance the validity and persuasiveness of an argument by relying upon well-respected sources or unnamed “experts.” Consider the following example:

Any athlete should have the right to kneel for the national anthem and thus exercise their right to free speech. As nearly every justice on the United States Supreme Court has stated, freedom of speech is critical to protecting liberty and democratic values.

This statement represents an appeal to authority. Specifically, the fact that nearly every justice on the Supreme Court may have expressed these sentiments utterly fails to support the argument that any athlete should have the right to kneel for the national anthem. In essence, the person making this statement is saying, “If the justices on the Supreme Court agree with me, the argument must be valid.” Wrong. An argument is valid only if it is based on facts and evidence.  

Second, many advocates appeal to the audience’s emotion when striving to maximize an argument’s persuasive value. Consider the following example:

We must resist attempts to abolish the death penalty. A few years ago, my teenage son was brutally murdered by a man who had previously murdered four teenagers. The only way justice will be served is if we hold this man accountable for the atrocities he committed.

This is a tremendously sad story. But it is not a logically valid argument. Whether the death penalty should be abolished depends on facts and data regarding, among other things, whether the death penalty is applied fairly and equitably, and whether it deters crime. The above statement addresses none of these points.

3.    Begin your argument with a foundational and well-accepted principle.

To maximize the likelihood that the audience will adopt your position, begin your argument with foundational principles that engender widespread agreement. For example, assume that you are debating whether Georgia’s recently-enacted voter identification law will suppress voter turnout, particularly among minority communities. Consider the following two statements:

Georgia’s voter identification law does not and will not impact voter turnout. And the law isn’t targeted at minority communities. It applies to everyone and enhances election integrity.

Versus

Racism and discrimination are intolerable, and equality is a basic principle of democracy and essential to liberty. To that end, we must embrace the core principle that every person, regardless of, among other things, race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation, has an equal right to vote and must have equal access to the ballot box. Georgia’s law does not violate this important principle.

Which statement is better? The answer should be obvious – as should the reasons why.

4.    Know the statistics. Again, know the statistics.

To win an argument, you must know the relevant statistics and empirical studies that impact the argument’s validity. If you don’t, or if you rely only on statistics and studies that are favorable to you, your argument’s persuasive force vanishes along with your credibility. For example, some scholars have posited, in law review articles and other publications, that implicit bias is a major contributor to ongoing discrimination, marginalization, and oppression in society. In support of this argument, they cite studies allegedly illustrating implicit bias’s pernicious effects.

There is only one problem. Several recent studies have debunked or, at the very least, cast serious doubt upon the relationship between implicit bias and biased behavior. Sadly, very few advocates of implicit bias training have addressed this damaging evidence. This failure renders their arguments unpersuasive and calls into question their objectivity as scholars.

To avoid this mistake, be sure to prepare extensively before any argument by knowing the relevant facts and data, both favorable and unfavorable, that impact your argument. Don’t be afraid to concede bad facts. Instead, explain why they do not affect the outcome you seek and highlight how the statistics favor the position for which you advocate.

After all, facts and statistics are the foundations of powerful arguments.

5.    Transition from abstract to concrete arguments.

When making an argument, avoid extensive reliance on abstract principles. Instead, provide concrete evidence and examples that support your argument, and offer a solution or rule that demonstrates your position's practicality and workability. Consider the following example:

The Fourth Amendment should not be construed to allow law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless cell phone searches. Privacy is a bedrock principle in the Constitution and citizens have a right to be free from unreasonable, government-sanctioned intrusions on privacy. Furthermore, law enforcement must not be given the power to encroach upon basic civil liberties and thus place the freedoms of all citizens at risk.

Yeah, whatever. That statement is far too abstract. Consider this example:

Warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest violate the Fourth Amendment. Unlike searches of closed containers or passenger compartments, a cell phone houses a vast amount of the very papers and effects, such as personal photographs, bank statements and other documents, text and email addresses, and online search history, that the Founders would have afforded the highest Fourth Amendment protection. As such, warrantless searches in this context are unreasonable per se. The Court should thus adopt a rule stating that law enforcement officers must have probable cause and warrant before searching a cell phone incident to arrest.

This statement is far more persuasive because it makes specific points, and proposes a workable and practical rule.

6.    Use ‘hidden’ premises in your argument.

Including ‘hidden’ premises in your argument helps to reframe the issue(s) effectively in your favor and increases the likelihood that the audience will agree with your stated premises and conclusion. Additionally, it often presents as accepted or proven precisely the issue(s) that the argument or debate involves. Consider the following example:

The death penalty should be abolished immediately for three reasons. First, the death penalty disproportionately impacts African-American defendants. Second, it is almost certain that innocent people have been executed. Third, the death penalty serves none of the purposes of criminal punishment. Thus, because I am against racial discrimination and inequality, because I do not believe in intentionally murdering innocent civilians, and because I do not support criminal justice policies that have no societal value, the death penalty should be abolished.

This statement is effective because of the ‘hidden’ premises, even though some scholars would disagree with one or more of these assertions. But that is not the point. The point is that all reasonable people are against racial discrimination and inequality. No one believes in “intentionally murdering innocent civilians.” And few would support any policy that has no societal value. By including in your argument widely accepted principles, you increase the likelihood that the audience will accept your argument and adopt your position.

7.    Never allow your adversary to characterize you or your argument inaccurately.

Make your adversary work diligently to establish any point that impacts negatively your argument. Put simply, always challenge inferences or assumptions that your adversary makes to undermine your position. Consider the following example:

Professor Smith recently drafted an article claiming that the late Justice Antonin Scalia was an “intellectual giant on the Supreme Court and the author of many extraordinary opinions that respected the Constitution’s text and structure.” Professor Smith’s endorsement of conservative values and a conservative judicial philosophy means that he will support judges who turn a blind eye to progressive values and marginalized populations.

Be sure to call out such nonsense. What Professor Smith said does not even remotely support the proposition that he endorses conservative values and will support judges who “turn a blind eye” to progressive values (whatever that means).  Never allow your adversary to get away with such a misrepresentation and never concede more than is necessary to maintain your argument’s credibility.  

8.    Listen more and talk less.

It’s the quality, not the quantity, that matters. In an argument, never talk too much and dominate the discussion. When you do so, it suggests that you are insecure about the merits of your argument, that you believe your adversary has made compelling points that require an immediate response (which gives your adversary credibility), and that you are so rigidly attached to your argument that alternative perspectives are neither necessary nor welcomed. Unfortunately, that approach undermines your credibility.

Remember, less is more.  You should listen calmly and carefully to your adversary’s argument. You should recognize good points that your adversary makes and strive to find areas of agreement. And when you do speak, be sure to make a concise, high-quality, and compelling statement. What does that mean? Get to the point immediately. Start with a powerful theme. Use the Rule of Three. Lead with your strongest points. Use statistics to support your assertions. End powerfully and confidently.

Then, shut up.

The best advocates pick their battles effectively.

9.    Never show emotion.

Getting emotional is one of the worst things that you can do in an argument. When you show emotion, such as by being angry, irritated, or offended, it typically means that your adversary is winning the argument and that you are not confident in your position. Consider the following two statements from the captain of an airline to passengers who just flew through severe turbulence in bad weather:

Hi everyone, please do not worry. I know that things were really rough for several minutes, but I will never allow this plane to crash! Let me repeat – I will not let this plane crash, no matter what! I am a veteran of the Air Force and I’m going to fight this weather to the death!

If I were a passenger on this plane, I would immediately believe that the plane was going to crash nose-first into a ditch. Now consider this statement:

Hi folks, sorry about the rough air we just encountered. The plane is fine, of course, and the turbulence we just encountered is pretty common in this part of the country. We’re going to change our altitude as soon as possible to make your flight as comfortable as possible and we don’t expect much rough air for the rest of the flight.

If I were a passenger on this plane, I would feel assured and safe. The difference wasn’t simply the words. It was the measured manner with which the latter statement was delivered.

Simply put, in an argument, be confident. Be calm. Never act surprised by a point your adversary makes or a question that your adversary asks. This doesn’t mean that you shouldn’t show passion and conviction. You should certainly be your authentic self. But you must avoid the negative reactions and emotional outbursts that invariably raise questions about your credibility and the merits of your argument.

10.    Don’t be an a******.

People like others who are nice. They like others who are respectful, friendly, and civil. They like others who are mature. They like others who are honest and genuine. And when people like you, they will be more likely to listen to you and find you credible. Most importantly, when people like you, they are more inclined to adopt your position. After all, people associate with those that they like and respect.

Conversely, people hate jerks. And they know them when they see them. Jerks attack people rather than ideas. Jerks insult others. Jerks always think that they are right and that else is always wrong. Jerks interrupt people when they are speaking. Jerks misrepresent others’ positions. The list goes on and on.

You get the point. Don’t be an a******.

Remember, when you make an argument, people are not just listening to what you say. They are evaluating you.

June 5, 2021 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Law School, Legal Profession, Legal Writing, Moot Court, Oral Argument, Rhetoric | Permalink | Comments (0)

Judicial Opinions & Pop Culture (or, are the Star Wars sequels "mediocre and schlocky")

Earlier this week I received an email from a student with this Ninth Circuit opinion attached. The subject of the email was "Judge Lee and Star Wars," and the student told me to look on page 26 at footnote 5. I was a bit puzzled at first, since the case was about class action settlements. But, when I got to page 26 it was all clear. Here is what Judge Lee wrote,

Under the settlement, ConAgra agreed to refrain from marketing Wesson Oil as “100% Natural.” That sounds great, except that ConAgra already abandoned that strategy in 2017 — two years before the parties hammered out their agreement — for reasons it claims were unrelated to this or any other litigation. Even worse, ConAgra’s promise not to 
use the phrase “100% Natural” on Wesson Oil appears meaningless because ConAgra no longer owns Wesson Oil. In reality, this promise is about as meaningful and enduring
as a proposal in the Final Rose ceremony on the Bachelor. Simply put, Richardson — the new owner of Wesson Oil — can resume using the “100% Natural” label at any time it
wishes, thereby depriving the class of any value theoretically afforded by the injunction. ConAgra thus essentially agreed not to do something over which it lacks the power to do. That is like George Lucas promising no more mediocre and schlocky Star Wars sequels shortly after selling the franchise to Disney. Such a promise would be illusory.5

Footnote 5. As evident by Disney’s production of The Last Jedi and The Rise of Skywalker.

I laughed out loud when I read the paragraph and footnote, but I also was not surprised, since I have known Judge Lee for many years, and he is definitely a fan of Star Wars (and apparently the Bachelor?). Judge Lee's Star Wars analogy has also made the news, especially in the movie and comic spheres, with one headline reading:

U.S. Ninth Circuit Court Declares THE LAST JEDI "Mediocre And Schlocky" In Recent Ruling

Although that headline might stretch the analogy a bit, it did get me thinking--should judges throw pop culture references into their judicial opinions? In my mind, the answer is certainly yes.

Before I defend pop culture references in judicial opinions, let me start with what I assume to be the critique--that it trivializes important disputes. The response is--like any other use of humor--there is certainly a time and a place for pop culture references. There are some cases where pop culture references could seem insensitive or overly trivial, but in other cases, they humanize the judiciary and raise awareness about our court system, which is why I think that they are great!

According to a 2020 survey, only 51% of Americans can name all three branches of government, with 23% unable to name any branch of government. Compare this to the 49% of adults who have seen The Empire Strikes Back. I couldn't find statistics for the number of people who can name the three movies in the original trilogy, but I think that you get my point.  Star Wars is a big business and very well known. If a pop culture reference to Star Wars gets people to think, albeit even briefly, about our federal court system, that reference is a plus in my book.

How common are pop culture references in judicial opinions?  I ran a few searches on Westlaw Edge to see what I could find.  Searching "Star Wars" in all cases brought up 403 hits. In glancing at the top 50 results, most of them have to do with copyright infringement--they aren't using pop culture to make an analogy.  Justice Kagan did make a Star Wars reference in her dissent in  Lockhart v. U.S., stating "Imagine a friend told you that she hoped to meet 'an actor, director, or producer involved with the new Star Wars movie.' You would know immediately that she wanted to meet an actor from the Star Wars cast—not an actor in, for example, the latest Zoolander. . . . Everyone understands that the modifying phrase—'involved with the new Star Wars movie,' . . . —applies to each term in the preceding list, not just the last." 577 US. 347, 362 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

A search for "Harry Potter" in all cases brought up 284 hits. I looked at the last 84 results, and I found some gems:

  • "Between Marshall's status as the only other person at the defense table and the fact that, by this time, Jenkins had twice previously been shown Marshall's face, Jenkins's in-court identification of Marshall was about as unexpected as the mention of Voldemort in a Harry Potter novel." Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1293 (11th Cir. 2016)
  • "According to plaintiff, goodwill is a fleeting concept, here one instant and gone the next, depending upon a firm's current profit status—much like a Harry Potter wizard who disapparates in bad times and reappears in good." Deseret Mgmt. Corp. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 438, 451 (2013)
  • "In a word, today's decision will not require even depositary banks to hire armies of employees to examine each check like something out of Harry Potter's Gringotts Wizarding Bank. It will require only a minimal level of reasonable care." HH Computer Sys., Inc. v. Pac. City Bank, 231 Cal. App. 4th 221, 240, 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 689, 703 (2014)
  • "The effect is that the debtor's homestead is subject to the loss of its exemption because the snapshot taken upon filing catches the potential for movement not unlike a photograph from a Harry Potter novel captures the movement of the subjects in the photograph." In re Montemayor, 547 B.R. 684, 701 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2016)

So appellate judges--throw in those pop culture references!  Maybe, just maybe, it will increase awareness and interest in the judiciary.

June 5, 2021 in Current Affairs, Federal Appeals Courts, Film, Humor, Legal Writing, State Appeals Courts, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, May 23, 2021

The Supreme Court, Abortion, and the Future of Roe v. Wade

Last week, the United States Supreme Court agreed to review the constitutionality of a Mississippi law that prohibits most abortions after fifteen weeks.[1] This case, Jackson Women's Health Organization v. Dobbs, represents yet another episode in the seemingly never-ending abortion saga. Simply put, a state enacts legislation striving to restrict the right to abortion and the Court renders a divisive decision, often by a 5-4 vote along ideological lines, that fails to resolve and clarify permanently the scope of the abortion right. The Court’s incremental, case-by-case jurisprudence has invited confusion and unpredictability into abortion jurisprudence and incentivized states to continue testing the viability of Roe v. Wade, which held that the judicially-created right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed a right to abortion.[2]

So, here we go again.

Another divisive abortion decision is likely and whatever the Court decides, its decision will likely be viewed as political and compromise the Court’s institutional legitimacy.

This constitutional mess can be traced to Roe v. Wade and Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the Court manipulated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to create unenumerated rights that no reasonable reading of the text could support.[3] In Griswold, the Court held that the Due Process Clause, along with other provisions in the Bill of Rights, contained invisible “penumbras … formed by emanations from those guarantees that give them life and substance.”[4] Within these judicially-invented “penumbras,” the Court gave itself the power to discover unenumerated “rights” out of thin air, including the right to privacy, that could not possibly be found in or inferred from the text.  Relying in substantial part on Griswold, the Court in Roe held that the right to privacy encompassed the right to terminate a pregnancy.[5]

Regardless of one’s policy views on abortion, liberal and constitutional scholars largely agree that Roe was constitutionally indefensible. Harvard Law School Professor Laurence Tribe, for example, stated that “behind its own verbal smokescreen, the substantive judgment on which it [Roe] rests is nowhere to be found.”[6] The late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg described Roe as “heavy-handed judicial activism,” and Edward Lazarus, a former clerk to Justice Harry Blackmun (who drafted the majority opinion), stated that “as a matter of constitutional interpretation ... if you administer truth serum … [most scholars] will tell you it is constitutionally indefensible.”[7] These scholars are correct – Roe was one of the worst decisions of the twentieth century.

Importantly, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court had the opportunity to overturn Roe and return the abortion question to the states. Instead, the Court made the problem worse.[8] In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld the “central holding” of Roe but overturned Roe’s trimester approach, which provided that, absent a compelling interest, states could not restrict a woman’s right to access abortion services during the first two trimesters, or pre-viability phase, which lasts approximately twenty-four weeks.[9] In the third trimester, the states had the authority to prohibit abortion except where necessary to protect the life or health of the mother.[10] In Planned Parenthood, however, the Court rejected the trimester approach; instead, the Court held that abortion restrictions during the pre-viability phase that imposed a “substantial burden” on the right to access abortion services were unconstitutional.[11]

Planned Parenthood was equally, if not more, constitutionally indefensible than Roe and it thrust the right to abortion into legal purgatory. After all, what precisely constitutes a “substantial burden” on the right to access abortion? And what criteria should be used to determine whether a burden is substantial? The Court had no answer.

But the states opposing abortion did.  Recognizing the ambiguity that Planned Parenthood created, these states have repeatedly enacted legislation that seeks to restrict abortion rights and thus rendered the scope of abortion rights unclear and uncertain. To make matters worse, the Court has evaluated these laws on a case-by-case basis and, in divisive and muddled opinions, failed to resolve the abortion question. Recently, for example, in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstadt and June Medical Services v. Russo, the Court invalidated – for good reason – laws requiring abortion providers to obtain hospital admitting privileges.[12]

The problem is that the Court, in these and other abortion decisions, has failed to definitively clarify the nature and scope of the abortion right, thus perpetuating a never-ending saga in which some states continue, in various ways, to eviscerate the abortion right. Instead of deciding each case narrowly – and based on an arguably subjective application of the undue burden standard – the Court should have either: (1) overturned Roe and returned the abortion issue to the states; or (2) held that women have an unfettered right to abortion before viability. Whatever one’s views on abortion, this would have resolved the constitutional question and precluded the seemingly never-ending litigation that Roe and its progeny have engendered. In short, Roe was a terrible decision and Planned Parenthood only compounded the constitutional damage that Roe inflicted. By way of analogy, when a person lies, the best course of action is to admit and own up to the lie rather than try to cover it up with additional lies. The Court’s abortion jurisprudence reflects the latter.

As such, the Court once again finds itself in a constitutional quagmire, the result of which will surely divide the country and risk compromising the Court’s institutional legitimacy. But the Court has no one but itself to blame. It created – and exacerbated – the constitutional fictions known as “penumbras” and substantive due process.  

Of course, one’s views on whether women should have a right to abortion are irrelevant. Most polls suggest that a majority of citizens support at least a limited right to abortion. And the reasons are understandable. But the abortion issue should have always been resolved by state legislatures, not nine unelected and life-tenured judges. The Court should have never involved itself in the abortion debate.

Ultimately, what should the Court do in Jackson Women's Health Organization? It should end this constitutional charade. In so doing, the Court should hold that, although Roe was constitutionally indefensible, it should not be overruled. For nearly fifty years, women have relied on Roe to make decisions, in conjunction with their health care providers, regarding whether to terminate a pregnancy. Put simply, Roe is entrenched in the public consciousness and stare decisis counsels in favor of reluctantly upholding Roe despite its obvious flaws. Furthermore, the Court should return to the trimester framework and hold that states may not restrict abortion access prior to viability.

That will end the inquiry and the uncertainty.

But don’t count on it. The most likely result will be a decision, engineered by Chief Justice John Roberts – who has become the Court’s most political actor – that confuses, rather than clarifies, abortion jurisprudence. That is the sad reality of the U.S. Supreme Court. Despite Chief Justice Roberts’s assertions to the contrary, the Court is unquestionably political.

Most importantly, in the future, the Court should hold that the penumbras upon which Griswold and Roe are predicated no longer exist. Had the Court adhered to an originalist framework, we would never be in this mess.

Hopefully, the Court will learn its lesson. There is ample reason, however, to be skeptical.

 

[1] Jackson Women's Health Organization v. Dobbs, No. 19-1392 (October Term, 2021).

[2] 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

[3] Id; 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

[4] Id. at 484.

[5] 410 U.S. 113.

[6] Timothy P. Carney, The Pervading Dishonesty of Roe v. Wade (Jan. 23, 2012), available at: The pervading dishonesty of Roe v. Wade | Washington Examiner

[7] Id.

[8] 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12]  136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); 2020 WL 3492640.

May 23, 2021 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Federal Appeals Courts, Legal Profession, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, May 16, 2021

Derek Chauvin's Conviction Should Be Overturned

On April 20, 2021, after a brief deliberation, a jury convicted former police officer Derek Chauvin for second-degree unintentional murder (i.e., felony murder), second-degree manslaughter, and third-degree murder in connection with George Floyd’s death.

Chauvin’s attorney, Eric Nelson, who has already moved for a new trial before Judge Peter Cahill, will certainly appeal Chauvin’s conviction. Although the likelihood of succeeding on appeal is relatively small, several issues in Chauvin’s case render the guilty verdict vulnerable to reversal.

1.    The jury deprived Chauvin of a fair trial

Chauvin’s defense team will likely argue that the conduct and composition of the jury deprived Chauvin of a fair trial. First, the defense will assert that the jury violated Chauvin’s Fifth Amendment rights. The Fifth Amendment provides, among other things, protection against self-incrimination. At a criminal trial, a defendant may invoke the right against self-incrimination and thus refuse to testify. Importantly, jurors may not infer guilt from a defendant’s silence; doing so is grounds for overturning a guilty verdict.

During the trial, Chauvin invoked his Fifth Amendment right and thus did not testify. Unfortunately, there is some evidence that at least one of the jurors construed that silence against Chauvin. Specifically, shortly after the verdict, Brandon Mitchell (Juror No. 52), spoke to the media and, after being asked whether Chauvin’s silence impacted the jury, stated as follows:

Yeah, definitely it [Chauvin's silence] did when we were in the deliberation room; you know, a few people wondered like they wanted to actually hear from [him]. They were curious on you know, just what his thoughts might have been throughout.  You know it probably was to his detriment that he didn’t take the stand ’cause people were curious on what his thoughts were throughout the entire incident.”[1]

At the very least, Mitchell's statement may cause Judge Cahill to question the jurors regarding the effect, if any, that Chauvin’s silence had on their deliberations.

Second, the defense will argue that the jury was impermissibly biased against Chauvin. Once again, Brandon Mitchell’s conduct provides a basis upon which to support this assertion. After the trial, a photograph emerged of Mitchell wearing a t-shirt that stated, “Get your knee off our necks,” which Mitchell allegedly wore at a Washington, D.C. rally commemorating Martin Luther King’s “I have a dream” speech.[2]

The photograph’s impact on appeal will depend primarily on whether Mitchell was truthful when answering the jury questionnaire during voir dire. Specifically, Mitchell was asked the following questions:

“Did you, or someone close to you, participate in any of the demonstrations or marches against police brutality that took place in Minneapolis after George Floyd’s death?” one question read, according to the newspaper.

 “Other than what you have already described above, have you, or anyone close to you, participated in protests about police use of force or police brutality?”[3]

Mitchell answered “no” to both questions.

At the very least, the photograph of Mitchell wearing a shirt stating, “Get your knee off our necks,” coupled with his “no” answer to the second question, supports a further inquiry by Judge Cahill into Mitchell's potential bias.

2.    Failure to sequester the jury

Chauvin’s defense team will certainly argue that the jury should have been sequestered from the beginning of the trial, not merely during deliberations. There may be some merit to this argument, given: (1) the pervasive media coverage in the months following Floyd’s death and particularly during the trial; (2) the statement by Maxine Waters, in which she stated that protesters should “get more confrontational” if a guilty verdict was not reached.[4] Indeed, Judge Cahill stated that Waters’ statement may lead to a reversal on appeal. Furthermore, Alan Dershowitz stated:

Well, first, what was done to George Floyd by officer Chauvin was inexcusable, morally, but the verdict is very questionable because of the outside influences of people like Al Sharpton and people like Maxine Waters,” … Their threats and intimidation and hanging the Sword of Damocles over the jury and basically saying, 'If you don’t convict on the murder charge and all the charges, the cities will burn, the country will be destroyed,' seeped into the jury room because the judge made a terrible mistake by not sequestering the jury. 

And a statement by alternate juror Lisa Christensen, although not necessarily relevant to the appeal, suggests that the pressure to reach a guilty verdict may have impacted the jury. When questioned about the possible social unrest that may result from the verdict, Christensen stated as follows:

There was a question on the questionnaire about it and I put I did not know. The reason, at that time, was I did not know what the outcome was going to be, so I felt like either way you are going to disappoint one group or the other. I did not want to go through rioting and destruction again and I was concerned about people coming to my house if they were not happy with the verdict.[5]

Coupled with Brandon Mitchell’s statement (and the photo), Christensen’s statement arguably supports the argument that the jury should have been sequestered.

3.    Failure to Change Venue

Chauvin’s defense will argue that Judge Cahill erred by failing to grant a change of venue. To begin with, the incessant media coverage in Minneapolis and elsewhere following Floyd’s tragic death, coupled with the widespread protests in Minneapolis, which universally condemned Chauvin’s actions (some of which turned violent), may support the argument that Judge Cahill should have granted the defense’s motion to change venue. However, the prosecution will argue that the media coverage and protests occurred throughout Minnesota and the United States, thus rendering it unlikely, if not impossible, that Chauvin would have received a fairer trial anywhere in Minnesota. The prosecution will probably succeed on this aspect of the venue issue.

That, however, does not end the inquiry. Shortly before jury selection, Minneapolis announced that it reached a settlement of twenty-seven million dollars with Floyd’s family in connection with the family’s civil suit. The timing of this settlement is certainly suspect and a legitimate question exists concerning whether the settlement affected the jurors' impartiality.  

4.    Insufficiency of evidence on one or more of the charges

The defense will likely argue that the evidence did not support a conviction for second-degree unintentional murder (felony murder) or third-degree murder. The third-degree murder conviction is problematic because Minnesota’s statute requires that an individual engage in conduct that is a threat to “others.” It is difficult to conceive of how Chauvin’s actions threatened anyone by Floyd, thus warranting a reversal of the conviction on this charge. As a practical matter, however, this will have no impact on the sentencing because the conviction for second-degree unintentional murder, which results in the most severe sentence, will likely be upheld, and because the sentences for each conviction will be imposed concurrently, not consecutively.

***

Ultimately, the vast majority of commentators and citizens viewed Chauvin’s actions as egregious and criminal. Moreover, the likelihood of overturning a conviction on appeal is small.

But in this case, the chances of success are higher. Based on Brandon Mitchell’s statements (and the photograph), the failure to sequester the jury despite the incessant and negative media coverage, and the twenty-seven million dollar settlement on the eve of jury selection, Chauvin’s defense team will have a strong argument to overturn the conviction.

And for the reasons stated, the conviction should be overturned.

Process matters – regardless of Chauvin’s egregious and deplorable conduct.

 

[1] Scott Cosenza, Did Floyd Jurors Violate Chauvin’s Fifth Amendment Rights? (April 29, 2021), available at: Did Floyd Jurors Violate Chauvin's 5th Amend Rights? - Liberty Nation

[2] See Paulina Villegas, Photo of Chauvin Juror Wearing BLM T-Shirt at March Raises Questions of Impartiality, Experts Say (May 3, 2021), available at: Brandon Mitchell, juror in Derek Chauvin’s murder trial, faces allegations of prejudice after photo surfaces - The Washington Post

[3] Jonathan Turley, Juror No. 52: Does Chauvin Have a New Challenge Over Juror Brandon Mitchell? (May 4, 2021), available at: Juror 52: Does Chauvin Have A New Challenge Over Juror Brandon Mitchell? – JONATHAN TURLEY

[4] See Chandelis Duster, Waters Calls for Protestors to ‘Get More Confrontational’ If No Guilty Verdict Is Reached in Chauvin Trial (April 19, 2021), available at: Maxine Waters calls for protesters to 'get more confrontational' if no guilty verdict is reached in Derek Chauvin trial - CNNPolitics

[5] Jordan Davidson, Stunning Chauvin Juror Confession: I Was Worried About ‘Rioting and Destruction’ and ‘People Coming to My House’ to Protest Verdict (April 23, 2001), available at: Stunning Chauvin Juror Confession: I Was Worried About ‘Rioting And Destruction’ (thefederalist.com)

May 16, 2021 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Current Affairs, Law School, Legal Profession | Permalink | Comments (5)

Saturday, May 15, 2021

Using Inclusive Language As Allyship

While avoiding grading recently, I found an interesting analysis of inclusive language as a lawyer’s professional responsibility, and as a form of allyship.  Jayne Reardon, a former Illinois State Bar disciplinary counsel, posted a thoughtful piece on inclusion and allies on the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Professionalism’s 2Civility website.  See Jayne Reardon, Inclusive Language Is Allyship (Apr. 22, 2021).  

Reardon aptly concludes:  “Given that ‘effective communicator’ is part of a lawyer’s job description, we should be sensitive to how listeners may interpret our language.”  Id.  As lawyers, “our stock in trade is language. We can choose language that makes our points persuasively or language that is distracting and possibly offensive. Distracting or offensive language, of course, doesn’t serve our clients, our profession, or our image in the eyes of the public.”  Id.

As appellate lawyers, we are in an especially good position to combine our duty to communicate clearly with the goal of using language non-offensively.  In so doing, we can also use our privilege to serve as allies for underrepresented groups. 

How do we combine communication with allyship?  Hopefully, in many ways, including using our writing skills and engaging in conversations on bias and inclusion.

Reardon suggests we start by avoiding metaphors and by thinking carefully about the way phrases like “Chinese wall” and “the blind leading the blind” can be offensive and painful.  Id.  Ellie Krug, founder and president of Human Inspiration Works, LLC, finds “the language of ‘us vs. them’ particularly pernicious to our democratic values and “exhorts lawyers to embrace the diversity, equity, and inclusion practices that the business community adopted long ago.”  Reardon, Inclusive Language Is Allyship.  

We can also connect our language to allyship with a full understanding of what being an ally can entail.  As Nicole Asong Nfonoyim-Hara, the Director of the Diversity Programs at Mayo Clinic, defines, “allyship” is "when a person of privilege works in solidarity and partnership with a marginalized group of people to help take down the systems that challenge that group's basic rights, equal access, and ability to thrive in our society."  Samantha-Rae Dickenson, What Is Allyship?  (Nat’l Inst. of Health Jan. 28, 2021).  “Allyship” can also focus on “help[ing] humans who often lack a voice to speak on their own behalf or who aren’t always in the room when demeaning or marginalizing comments/behaviors occur, or marginalizing policies or plans are made.”  Ellie Krug, Allyship for Lawyers in an Awakened America (Apr. 21, 2021).

As Reardon notes, “[w]hen we disregard how others may interpret our language or are unthoughtful with our words, we risk offending members of our professional community, like the judge, judge’s staff, opposing counsel, or others who may hear the oral argument or read the brief. In choosing more inclusive language, we choose allyship.” 

I am working to choose allyship in my writing and teaching, and I appreciate the resources and conversations about being an ally from 2Civility and others.  If you are interested in seeing more of the 2Civility website and programs, you can subscribe herefor the Commission’s weekly newsletter.

May 15, 2021 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Legal Ethics, Legal Profession, Legal Writing, Rhetoric | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, April 27, 2021

Reducing Exigencies and Rebuilding Trust

Exigent circumstances have appeared on the Supreme Court’s mind (and docket) frequently in recent months. After hearing arguments on the hot pursuit species of exigent circumstances in February’s Lange v. California (a case I blogged about here), the Court heard arguments concerning the so-called community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement in March’s Caniglia v. Strom. Caniglia gave the Justices plenty to chew on, including whether there is really a separate community caretaking exception or if warrantless entry into a home to check on a resident 's wellbeing is simply another species of exigent circumstances.

That question came into clear focus during Justice Breyer’s questioning of the petitioner’s attorney. Breyer struggled to define the bounds of a distinct community caretaking exception. Nonetheless, he believed some such exception must exist so that officers can respond to protect citizens’ wellbeing even if there is no emergency that requires action immediately.[1] Breyer worried that tying officers hands so they could only warrantlessly react to immediate threats would stop them from responding in slower-burning, yet equally dangerous, circumstances—such as an unattended baby crying in a home for hours.[2]

But limiting officer discretion to act warrantless to only scenarios where a response is required in seconds, rather than minutes, is appropriate in the modern world for two reasons. First, given the speed with which warrants can be obtained today, only traditional species of exigent circumstances—like rendering emergency aid, chasing a fleeing felon, or preventing the imminent destruction of evidence[3]—seem truly necessary.  As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, modern electronic warrant procedures allow officers to obtain a warrant in just a few minutes.[4] That is little help when officers must act in a matter of seconds. But the ready availability of warrants undermines arguments for many other categorical exceptions to the warrant requirement, perhaps including community caretaking, when time is less of a limiting factor.

Second, Breyer wrongly implies that officers will fear responding warrantlessly to a slow-burning, community-caretaking style “emergency.” Officers genuinely interested in protecting the community should not be afraid for two reasons. First, even if the officers’ instincts prove incorrect and no community safety threat was present inside the home, there is little chance they will face civil liability. The homeowner is unlikely to file a § 1983 suit given the minimal, if not nominal, damages involved. Even if the homeowner sues, current qualified immunity doctrine provides officers broad protection so long as their actions were not contrary to existing precedent. Second, the officer should hardly be concerned if evidence of a crime that they happen to find inside the home is excluded from a later trial. Such evidence would be an unexpected windfall for an officer genuinely interested in protecting the community from a slow-burning harm. Losing windfall evidence should not concern such well-meaning officers.

If the Court limits exigent circumstances doctrine to genuine emergencies, while at the same time curbing other categorical exceptions to the warrant requirement that seem antiquated in light of the rapid availability of warrants today, it will begin lowering the temperature in many officer-citizen interactions. Both officers and citizens can easily understand and justify a narrow exigent circumstances exception. Everyone sees the benefits of allowing officers to respond to genuine, immediate threats. And if officers have little discretion to act warrantlessly beyond those emergencies, citizens may be less wary of any interaction with officers. Counterintuitively, limiting any community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement may actually help officers care for the communities they police.

 

[1] Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-16, Caniglia v. Strom, March 24, 2021, No. 20-157.

[2] Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-16, Caniglia v. Strom, March 24, 2021, No. 20-157.

[3] Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (outlining these traditional species of exigent circumstances).

[4] “[P]olice can often request warrants rather quickly these days. At least 30 States provide for electronic warrant applications. In many States, a police officer can call a judge, convey the necessary information, and be authorized to affix the judge's signature to a warrant. Utah has an e-warrant procedure where a police officer enters information into a system, the system notifies a prosecutor, and upon approval the officer forwards the information to a magistrate, who can electronically return a warrant to the officer. Judges have been known to issue warrants in as little as five minutes. And in one county in Kansas, police officers can e-mail warrant requests to judges' iPads; judges have signed such warrants and e-mailed them back to officers in less than 15 minutes.” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 172–73 (2013) (citations and quotations omitted).

April 27, 2021 in Appellate Advocacy, Current Affairs, Oral Argument, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, April 24, 2021

Life Imprisonment Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders: An Analysis of Jones v. Mississippi

In Jones v. Mississippi, the United States Supreme Court ruled by a 6-3 margin that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a fifteen-year-old juvenile who was convicted of murder did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.[1] The Court’s decision will likely engender criticism because it is arguably inconsistent with the Court’s precedents.

By way of background, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that it was unconstitutional to impose capital punishment for crimes that an individual committed while under the age of eighteen.[2] In so holding, the Court emphasized that juveniles’ brains are not fully developed and, as such, juveniles lack the maturity of adults and often engage in impulsive conduct that reflects a failure to appreciate the consequences of particular actions. For these reasons, juveniles are less culpable than adults and therefore not among the narrow category of offenders for whom the death penalty is warranted. Additionally, in Miller v. Alabama, the Court relied in substantial part on the differences between juveniles and adults to hold that laws authorizing mandatory sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders convicted of murder violated the Eighth Amendment.[3] The Court emphasized that a juvenile’s crime often reflects “unfortunate but transient immaturity,” and that a sentence of life without parole should be reserved for a narrow category of juvenile offenders “whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption” or “permanent incorrigibility.”[4] Accordingly, imprisonment for life “is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest children.”[5] And in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court held that the rule announced in Miller applied retroactively to juveniles previously sentenced to life without parole, thus requiring re-sentencing for these offenders.[6] Finally, in Graham v. Florida, the Court held that sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment without parole for non-homicide offenses violated the Eighth Amendment.[7]

The Court’s decisions in Miller and Montgomery arguably require that, before a juvenile can be sentenced to life without parole, a court must determine whether a juvenile’s crime reflects “unfortunate yet transient immaturity,” therefore precluding a sentence of life without parole, or “irreparable corruption” (permanent incorrigibility), thus justifying the imposition of such a sentence.[8]

In Jones, the Court’s decision, although not technically inconsistent with Miller and Montgomery, certainly appears at odds with the spirit and purpose underlying these decisions.[9] Writing for the majority, Justice Brett Kavanaugh noted that Miller only prohibited the imposition of mandatory sentences of life without parole for individuals who were minors when the crime was committed. In Jones, however, the trial court had the discretion to impose a lesser sentence on the defendant – who was fifteen at the time of the crime – and thus did not violate Miller by exercising that discretion to impose a sentence of life without parole. Furthermore, because Graham v. Florida only prevented the imposition of life without parole for non-homicide offenses, it violated neither Miller nor Graham to impose a discretionary sentence of life without parole for a homicide offense.[10] Furthermore, Justice Kavanaugh stated that, when exercising such discretion, a trial court is not required to determine whether a juvenile’s crime reflected “transient immaturity” or “irreparable corruption,” the very distinction upon which Miller relied to identify the narrow category of juvenile offenders for whom life imprisonment without parole could be justified.[11] Rather, it suffices that a court has the discretion to consider youth as a mitigating factor – even in the absence of a record showing that the court considered this issue to a meaningful degree.[12]

The Court’s decision in Jones appears inconsistent with Miller and Montgomery and casts doubt upon their continued viability. First, if a sentence of life without parole should be, as the Court stated in Miller, reserved for a narrow category of juveniles who demonstrate irreparable corruption (or permanent incorrigibility), it seems logical and constitutionally necessary for courts to determine at sentencing that a juvenile falls within this narrow category. Holding that a sentence of life without parole is permissible simply because the lower court had the discretion to impose a lesser sentence – even if the court did not meaningfully exercise this discretion as Miller and Montgomery contemplate – eviscerates the precedential value of these decisions.

Second, as the Court in Roper, Miller, and Montgomery recognized, juveniles lack fully developed brains and the capacity to act with the same degree of maturity as adults. For that reason, only juveniles whose conduct reflects “irreparable corruption” may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Unfortunately, by refusing to require a finding that a juvenile falls into this narrow category, the Court’s holding in Jones eviscerates the distinction between juveniles whose actions reflect “transient immaturity” and those whose actions reflect “irreparable corruption.” And Jones arguably undermines, at least to a degree, the distinction previously recognized by the Court between juvenile and adult culpability. After all, in Roper and Miller, the Court relied on the differences between juveniles and adults regarding brain development, maturity, and rational decision-making to hold that juveniles are less culpable for even the most serious crimes. After Jones, the Court appears willing to relegate decisions regarding culpability to courts who have the “discretion” to impose lesser sentences while imposing no requirements on how courts exercise this discretion.  

Put simply, Jones cannot be reconciled with the Court’s prior jurisprudence, suggesting yet again that stare decisis is a doctrine of convenience rather than conviction. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts, despite pledging fidelity to stare decisis in June Medical Services v. Gee, where he voted to invalidate a Louisiana law requiring abortion providers to have hospital admitting privileges, joined the majority in Jones and appears to have an on-again, off-again relationship with stare decisis.[13] And given that Roberts seems to care more about public perceptions of the Court rather than constitutional law, his decision to inconsistently apply the doctrine is surprising because it undermines the very institutional legitimacy he strives to preserve.

Third, the Court failed to address the concern that permitting a judge to consider youth as a mitigating factor violates precedent holding that the Sixth Amendment requires juries, not judges, to make such factual findings, particularly where they may result in an increased sentence.

Ultimately, the Court’s decision in Jones confuses, rather than clarifies, the law regarding whether, and under what circumstances, juveniles can be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. And by countenancing such sentences simply because a court has the discretion to impose a lower sentence – without any requirement that a court determine that a juvenile’s actions reflect irreparable corruption – the Court turned a blind eye to the risk that sentencing in this area will become arbitrary and unfair.

The decision was a mistake.

 

[1] 593 U.S.              (2021), available at: 18-1259 Jones v. Mississippi (04/22/2021) (supremecourt.gov)

[2] 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

[3] 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

[4] Miller, 567 U. S., at 479; Montgomery, 577 U. S., at 209.

[5] Montgomery, 577 U. S., at 195.

[6] 577 U.S.             , 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).

[7] 560 U. S. 48 (2010)

[8] Miller, 567 U. S., at 479; Montgomery, 577 U. S., at 209.

[9] 593 U.S.              (2021), available at: 18-1259 Jones v. Mississippi (04/22/2021) (supremecourt.gov)

[10] See id.

[11] See id.

[12] See id.

[13] 591 U.S.            (2020), 2020 WL 3492640.

April 24, 2021 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Legal Profession, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, April 18, 2021

An Analysis of the Charges Against Derek Chauvin

George Floyd’s death, which was captured on video, is difficult to watch and, quite frankly, disturbing. In that video, former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin kneeled on Floyd’s neck for over nine minutes, including several minutes after which Floyd had lost consciousness.  Floyd’s death sparked protests (and, in some areas, riots) throughout the country for many months and, over the last three weeks, Chauvin has stood trial for Floyd’s murder in Minneapolis. Both the prosecution and defense are expected to deliver closing arguments tomorrow and the jury may begin deliberating as soon as Tuesday.

When deliberations begin, the jury will consider the following three charges against Chauvin: (1) second-degree unintentional murder (felony murder); (2) second-degree manslaughter; and (3) third-degree murder.  Second-degree unintentional murder, which carries a prison sentence of up to forty years, applies to a defendant who “causes the death of a human being, without intent to effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second-degree with force or violence or a drive-by shooting.”[1] Under Minnesota law, the underlying felony must pose a “special danger to human life,” thus requiring at least some risk of death. Second-degree manslaughter applies where an individual’s death results from “the person’s culpable negligence whereby the person creates an unreasonable risk, and consciously takes chances of causing death or great bodily harm to another.”[2] Third-degree murder applies to individuals who “without intent to effect the death of any person, cause the death of another by perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human life.”[3]

Determining which, if any, charge will result in a conviction is difficult to predict. During the trial, the prosecution, led by Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison, presented thirty-eight witnesses. This included testimony from Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria Arradondo, who stated that Chauvin’s decision to kneel on Floyd’s neck was not an approved police technique and that Chauvin should have ceased kneeling on Floyd’s neck when he longer presented a threat to the officers (the evidence shows that Chauvin continued restraining Floyd for approximately three minutes after Floyd was unconscious). Additionally, the prosecution presented numerous medical experts who testified that hypoxia, which is a low level of oxygen that leads to asphyxia, caused Floyd’s death, and that the asphyxia resulted from Chauvin kneeling on Floyd’s neck for over nine minutes.

The defense, led by attorney Eric Nelson, argued that Floyd’s death was caused by a combination of factors unrelated to Chauvin’s actions, such as drug use and heart disease. For example, the toxicology report revealed that Floyd had ingested a potentially lethal amount of Fentanyl, and that Floyd had methamphetamine and THC in his system. Additionally, Floyd had atherosclerosis and hypertensive heart disease. The defense’s expert, Dr. David Fowler, concluded that these conditions, coupled with the drugs Floyd ingested and his inhalation of carbon monoxide from the squad car, collectively caused his death.  The defense also presented a use-of-force witness who testified that, under the circumstances, Chauvin did not use excessive force.

It is difficult to predict whether the jury will convict Chauvin and, if so, what charge will most likely result in a conviction. The prosecution’s witnesses, particularly Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria Arradondo and Dr. Martin Tobin, were quite compelling. Defense attorney Eric Nelson, however, effectively cross-examined several witnesses and focused extensively on drugs and heart disease as the causes of death.

Arguably, the causation issue will most likely consume much of the jury’s deliberations and will require a determination of whether Chauvin’s actions – or drugs and heart disease – caused Floyd’s death.  Indeed, given the amount of Fentanyl in Floyd’s system and his underlying cardiovascular conditions, it may be difficult for jurors to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Chauvin caused Floyd’s death. Importantly, however, the prosecution need only show that Chauvin’s actions were a contributing cause of Floyd’s death, which renders a conviction more likely.

Ultimately, considering the arguments, testimony, and evidence, it seems that, if the jury does convict Chauvin, it will likely be for second-degree manslaughter. A conviction on the third-degree murder charge is implausible because Chauvin’s actions, although reprehensible, did not threaten to harm multiple persons or “others” as the statute requires. Also, a conviction on the second-degree unintentional murder charge seems less likely (although possible) because the felony murder statute has rarely, if ever, been applied to law enforcement officers in the context of restraining a suspect. This is particularly true concerning a suspect who is resisting arrest because, at least for a portion of the time, the restraint used is arguably justified. In addition, given that Chauvin was unaware of the level of Fentanyl in Floyd’s system or of his preexisting heart conditions, it may be difficult to demonstrate that Chauvin intended to inflict bodily harm on Floyd or that he knew his actions were likely to result in such harm. However, a conviction on second-degree manslaughter is arguably justified because Chauvin was culpably negligent by kneeling on Floyd’s neck for minutes after Floyd was unconscious and thus no longer presented a threat to the officers. Indeed, Chauvin’s failure to stop kneeling on Floyd’s neck despite his lack of consciousness cannot be justified.

If the jury returns an acquittal, it will almost certainly result from a belief that, although Chauvin’s actions were appalling and entirely unnecessary, they did not cause Floyd’s death. This is certainly a possibility and will depend on the jury’s assessment of the experts’ credibility and of the relevant medical reports.

Also, if the jury returns a guilty verdict, defense attorney Eric Nelson (or whomever Chauvin retains) will almost certainly appeal. Specifically, Nelson will likely argue, among other things, that Judge Peter Cahill’s refusal to change the venue for the trial deprived Chauvin of the right to a fair trial. And if the jury returns a guilty verdict on the third-degree murder charge, it may be overturned on appeal because Chauvin’s actions, however deplorable, did not threaten harm to multiple people.

Regardless, George Floyd’s death was a tragedy. The video of his death is appalling. Whatever the jury’s verdict, this incident will hopefully lead to reforms in how police are trained in the use of force and de-escalation techniques, such that an incident like this never occurs again.

 

[1] Minn. Stat. 609.19(1).

[2] Minn. Stat. 609.205(1).

[3] Minn. Stat. 609.195.

April 18, 2021 in Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Law School, Legal Profession | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 12, 2021

Yes, Persuasive Writing Skills Can Help You in Real Life

I "won" a major appeal this week.  It wasn't in the courtroom, and it wasn't exactly a victory.  Rather, after about two months of back and forth, my employer directed my health insurance company to cover two months of my daughter's specialized amino-acid formula. This "victory" came after I wrote, to paraphrase the representative for the insurance company, a "really good appeal." I laughed when he said this and replied, "Well, my job is to teach law students to write persuasive appeals."  But, in reality, as I sat down late one night to write the appeal, I did think about principles I taught my students.  I wanted to share that here, but first a little backstory.

Both of my kids have needed to be on amino-acid based infant formula for a milk/soy protein intolerance. The formula is very expensive--a small can costs over $40 and lasts us less than 3 days (assuming no waste).  The formula is also hard to find--it isn't available in most stores, although some Walgreens carry it.  We have had it delivered through a medical supply company. My husband and I are both state employees, and we have the choice of two companies for health insurance. For several years we were on one company, and they covered the formula for both kids with no problem. This year we had to switch companies due to a major restructuring of the state plans.  Our kids see several specialists, and the new insurance company covered them better. 

Of course, I didn't even think about the formula in making the switch. Well, the new company decided to not cover it. Among its many arguments were: (1) the formula is a plan exclusion and (2) it is standard infant formula and over the counter. We appealed the denial, and after claiming for about a week that they didn't receive the appeal and then initially refusing to expediate the appeal (I mean, it isn't like its her FOOD or anything), they finally denied the appeal.  I got the appeal letter right around 5pm on Wednesday night, and I was livid when I read it. The letter said that I could appeal the appeal, and provided a fax number for me to send it to.  I wanted to sit down immediately and type a multi-page diatribe against the company, but cooler heads prevailed (or rather, I needed to get the kids to bed before I had time to type).

When I finally had time to type, I kept three key principles that I teach my students in mind: (1) Lead from strength, (2) Be clear and organized, (3) Use strong persuasion not abusive language.

(1) Lead from strength--My best argument on appeal was that the insurance company in its denial letter misstated my daughter's diagnosis.  The letter didn't list her milk protein intolerance, which was odd, since that is the diagnosis that requires her to have her formula.  So, my first point in the appeal pointed to that misdiagnosis. I provided copies of her medical records stating her correct diagnosis, and I carefully listed her diagnoses in the letter, pointing out the incorrect language that the insurance company used.  Similarly, in writing an appeal, start with your strongest argument, unless there is a threshold issue that you need to address like standing or jurisdiction. You want to put your best argument first, since that is your best opportunity to draw your reader (the judge!) in.  Likewise, be sure to set out your affirmative argument first. Don't come out as too reactionary to either the adverse decision below or your opponent's brief. Of course you need to rebut some arguments, but set out your affirmative case first--showing how the law is in your place.

(2) Be clear and organized--I divided my appeal into three main arguments--the misdiagnosis, the mischaracterization of the formula as standard infant formula, and the failure to explain the plan exclusions.  I set out these three points in my introductory paragraph and then used headings to set apart each argument. It was easy for the reader to follow.  Likewise, clarity and organization are critical in an appellate brief.  If there is one thing that judges almost universally agree upon it is that briefs are too long. Clarity and organization can keep the length of your brief on track, for example by avoiding unnecessary repetition. It can also help a judge follow your argument.  I always tell my students that your point headings should serve as an outline for your brief.

(3) Use strong persuasion not abusive language--I will be honest. I struggled with this point. I used stronger language than I would recommend in a brief, but I also toned down some of my writing as I went along as I thought about this principle. My most strident language was calling their characterization of the formula as "over-the-counter" as "simply false."  By the time I had written the appeal, I had also written several emails to the appeals unit, and some of those were a little harsh. I was frustrated at the amount of time I was spending on the matter and the specious arguments being raised by the insurance company. I also was annoyed because I felt that the company was just trying to delay until my daughter turned one and she could try a milk substitute. Finally, I was frustrated for all the parents of kids who have had to deal with this issue and who might not be lawyers or feel comfortable with the appeals process. These parents might also truly not be able to afford $500-$1000 a month on formula (on top of all the specialist doctor visits). My frustration definitely leaked into my written letters and emails. BUT, in general, you should not take cheap (or expensive) shots at the judge below or opposing counsel in your appellate briefs.  Be persuasive, but don't call names. Sure, you can show how the judge made a legal error or how opposing counsel's case is inapposite, but you don't need to call them liars, lazy, manipulative, or state that they "ignored the law."  Furthermore, rather than saying the law "clearly" supports you, focus on showing how the law clearly supports you.  Strong persuasion is always better than strong words.

I hope that these little tips help you in whatever type of appeal that you are writing.

April 12, 2021 in Appellate Advocacy, Current Affairs, Food and Drink | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, April 11, 2021

Is Georgia’s New Voter Identification Law “Jim Crow on Steroids?”

Recently, Georgia Governor Brian Kemp signed legislation that substantially revised Georgia’s election laws. As discussed in more detail below, the law, among other things, requires voters to present a valid state identification when voting in person (similar requirements apply to mail-in ballots), limits the number and location of drop boxes for mail-in ballots, reduces the time for requesting such ballots, and expands early voting in most of Georgia’s counties.[1]

Almost immediately, critics claimed that Georgia’s law was racist.[2] Such critics claimed, for example, that the law will suppress voter turnout and limit access to voting through provisions that will disproportionately impact people of color and various marginalized communities. The result, critics argued, would benefit the Republican party and diminish the voices of Georgia’s increasingly diverse electorate.

Additionally, Major League Baseball joined the chorus of critics in condemning the law as racist and decided to move its annual All-Star Game from Atlanta, even though doing so will likely have a deleterious impact on Atlanta’s minority-owned businesses. Likewise, Delta Airlines, United Airlines, and Coca-Cola criticized the law, with Delta Airlines CEO Ed Bastian stating that the law is “unacceptable and does not match Delta’s values.”[3]

And President Joe Biden stated that Georgia’s voter identification law was “Jim Crow on steroids.”[4]

But is the law racist? Is the law really “Jim Crow on steroids?” A brief analysis of the relevant provisions of Georgia’s law suggests that the answer is a resounding no.

First, the law requires individuals to present a valid state-issued ID when voting in person. For individuals voting by mail, the law requires individuals to submit a valid driver’s license or state identification number, or provide the last four digits of their social security number.[5] Importantly, the Georgia Department of Driver’s Services and county registrar’s offices issue state ID cards at no cost to voters.[6] Given that a valid ID is required, for example, to pick up tickets at an Atlanta Braves game or to board a Delta Airlines flight, it seems rather sensible to require one before voting.

Second, the law expands early voting in most Georgia counties. Specifically, counties must designate at least two Saturdays in which to conduct early voting; counties also have the authority to offer early voting on Sundays.[7] Indeed, because this portion of the bill increases early voting – as Georgia’s previous law only required one Saturday of early voting – it appears that this provision is the antithesis of racist.

Third, Georgia’s law requires one drop box per county (and only one drop box per 100,000 voters). In so doing, the law reduces the number of drop boxes, and limits the locations where, and times in which, they can be accessed.[8] The rationale for this reduction is likely because the coronavirus pandemic, particularly due to current vaccination efforts, is nearing an end and thus does not justify the number of drop boxes made available for the 2020 election.

Fourth, the law bans giving food or water to voters who are waiting in line at the polls, ostensibly to prevent groups from campaigning to voters before they enter the ballot box.[9] However, the law permits poll workers to create self-service areas where voters can hydrate.[10] And, of course, voters are not prohibited from making the sensible decision to purchase water and food before arriving at their designated precinct. Although this provision seems rather unnecessary, there is simply no basis to conclude that it is racist.

Fifth, voters are required to request absentee ballots and must do so within approximately two-and-a-half months (seventy-eight days) of an election.[11] Again, the racist aspect of this provision is not immediately apparent.

Sixth, and in what is perhaps the most problematic (although not racist) provision in the law, the secretary of state will no longer chair the state election board. Instead, the General Assembly will elect the chair and board members, which gives Republicans in the state an unnecessary degree of power in controlling how elections are conducted and how the results are processed.[12]

The law also includes provisions striving to report election results more quickly by allowing counties to begin processing absentee ballots fifteen days before election day, and establishes a hotline that voters can call to report voter intimidation or illegal activity. [13]

Consequently, given that a state-issued ID in Georgia is free, that early voting is expanded, and that little, if any, evidence suggests that any of these provisions will suppress voter turnout,[14] can Georgia’s new law properly be characterized as “Jim Crow on steroids?” Of course not. The assertion is ridiculous on its face – just about as ridiculous as harming minority-owned businesses by removing the All-Star Game from Atlanta.[15]

Importantly, empirical evidence does suggest that voter ID laws are not effective in preventing voter fraud and that instances of voter fraud are relatively rare. However, voter ID laws can increase the perception that elections are being conducted honestly and with integrity, which will enhance public confidence in our electoral and democratic process. Perhaps that is why most states have enacted such laws. To be sure, voter ID laws in states that are the darkest shade of blue, such as New Jersey, New York, and Delaware – President Biden’s home state – are similar to, if not more restrictive than, Georgia’s new law.  In short, Georgia’s law isn’t racist. It’s not “Jim Crow on steroids.”

Ultimately, racism is despicable. Racists should be universally condemned. And efforts to increase access to the polls for marginalized groups, and conduct free and fair elections, is a legal and moral imperative. But neither of these objectives is accomplished when leaders make irresponsible and factually inaccurate statements regarding voter ID laws, and causally make allegations of racism. Doing so only serves to further divide an already divided society and promote misinformation campaigns that are anathema to a healthy democracy.

 

[1] See, e.g., Adam Brewster, What Georgia’s New Voting Law Really Does – 9 Facts (April 7, 2021), available at: What Georgia's new voting law really does — 9 facts - CBS News

[2] See, e.g., Ben Nadler and Jeff Amy, Georgia’s New GOP Election Law Draws Criticism, Lawsuits (March 29, 2021), available at: Georgia's new GOP election law draws criticism, lawsuits (apnews.com)

[3] See, e.g., Natasha Dailey, Coca Cola, Delta, United, and 7 Other Companies Blast Georgia’s New Voting Law In a Wave of Corporate Backlash (April 5, 2021), available at: Coca-Cola, Delta, Others Speak Out Against Georgia Voting Law (businessinsider.com)

[4] Gabe Kaminsky, Biden’s ‘Jim Crow’ Label for Georgia’s Election Laws is Insane – Here’s Why (April 9, 2021), available at: Biden's 'Jim Crow' Label For Georgia Election Laws Is Insane. Here's Why (thefederalist.com)

[5] See Brewster, supra note 1, available at: What Georgia's new voting law really does — 9 facts - CBS News

[6] See id.

[7] See id.

[8] See id.

[9] See id.

[10] See id.

[11] See id.

[12] See id.

[13] See id.

[14] See e.g., German Lopes, A New Study Finds Voter ID Laws Don’t’ Reduce Voter Fraud – Or Voter Turnout (Feb. 21, 2019), available at: Study: voter ID laws don’t reduce voter fraud — or voter turnout - Vox

[15] See, e.g., Katie Daviscourt, MLB’s Decision to Pull All Star Game from Atlanta ‘Crushing’ for Small Businesses (April 7, 2021), available at: MLB's decision to pull All Star Game from Atlanta 'crushing' for small businesses | The Post Millennial

April 11, 2021 in Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Legal Ethics, Legal Profession | Permalink | Comments (1)