Is the United States Supreme Court a Political Institution?

Public opinion of the United States Supreme Court has declined recently, with some commentators arguing that the Court is a political institution. Below is a brief analysis of why the Court is perceived as political, and how the Court can avoid this perception in the future.

A.    Is the Court a “political” institution?

When one labels the Court as a “political” institution, how is “political” being defined? For this article, “political” is defined as reaching decisions that coincide with a justice’s policy preferences. This does not mean, of course, that a decision coinciding with a justice’s policy views is inherently political, or that the justices are basing their decision on political considerations, as there may be legitimate textual or statutory bases to reach those decisions. Notwithstanding, public perception of whether the Court is acting in a political capacity is often influenced by whether the Court’s vote in particular cases split along ideological lines.

Given this definition, is the Court a political institution? Yes and no. 

To begin with, most of the Court’s cases do not involve divisive social issues. Rather, they involve issues such as choice of law provisions in maritime contracts, trademark issues, the bankruptcy code, the takings clause, and the Federal Arbitration Act. Such cases do not result in decisions that most people would consider politically motivated.  

Furthermore, the Court’s cases are often decided unanimously or by six, seven, or eight-member majorities. From 2008 to 2019, for example, the Court’s unanimous decisions ranged from thirty-six to sixty-six percent of its cases.[1] Conversely, the percentage of 5-4 decisions ranged from five to twenty-nine percent.[2] Rulings with six, seven, and eight-member majorities ranged from twenty to fifty-one percent.[3] Additionally, in 2021, the Court reached unanimous decisions in sixty-seven percent of its cases, and in 2022, the Court was unanimous in forty-eight percent of its cases.[4]

Therefore, in most cases, politics does not likely influence the Court’s decisions. As such, in most cases, are the justices basing their decisions on their political preferences? No.

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However, this does not end the inquiry. In the relatively small number of cases that involve divisive social issues, whether the Court’s decisions were political depends on your perspective.  For example, many conservative legal scholars would consider Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and Obergefell v. Hodges to be political decisions, because in their view they were based on an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that had no basis in the Constitution’s text, and that resulted in outcomes consistent with the liberal majority’s policy views regarding contraception, abortion, and same-sex marriage. Likewise, many liberal legal scholars would consider Bush v. Gore, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, and Students For Fair Admissions v. Harvard to be political decisions because in each case, the Court’s majority was comprised of conservative justices.

The point is that, in a small number of cases, the justices’ opinions consistently reflect their political views, regardless of whether they are conservative or liberal. Thus, to the extent that the Court is perceived as a political institution, both conservative and liberal justices bear some blame. Consider the following:

• Would Justice Elena Kagan, Justice Jackson, or Justice Sotomayor ever vote to restrict access to abortion?
• Would Justice Thomas or Justice Alito ever vote to restrict when the death penalty can be imposed?
• Would Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson ever vote to invalidate an affirmative action policy?
• Would Justice Thomas or Justice Alito ever vote to restrict partisan gerrymandering?
• Would Justice Kagan or Justice Sotomayor ever hold that the Constitution does not protect the right to same-sex marriage?

The answers to these questions should be obvious.

To make matters worse, when the political affiliations of the Court’s members change, the Court’s view of the Constitution – and fundamental rights – often changes. For example, for nearly fifty years, Roe v. Wade, where the Court held that the right to privacy encompasses a woman’s choice to terminate a pregnancy (in most instances), was considered settled law, particularly after the Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey reaffirmed Roe’s central holding. But after Justice Kavanaugh replaced Justice Kennedy, and Justice Barrett replaced Justice Ginsburg, the Court in Dobbs overturned Roe and suddenly discovered that the Constitution did not protect a right to abortion.

Why was Roe overturned? Because the Court now had more conservative than liberal members. One must wonder how the majority could not possibly realize that their decision would be perceived as purely political. The same goes for the justices who voted in Roe to find that the Constitution protects the right to terminate a pregnancy – a right found nowhere in the Constitution.

Cases such as Roe, Obergefell, and Dobbs show why the Court is perceived as a political institution and why its institutional legitimacy is affected negatively. Indeed, when the Court accepts for review cases involving issues such as abortion or the death penalty, most people know exactly how the justices will vote. They know that the justices will reach outcomes that so conveniently comport with their policy preferences. That is the reality, and even if it is not accurate, it is the perception. And perception is reality.

Additionally, conservative and liberal media commentators worsen the situation because they report on only the most controversial cases and, depending on the result that the Court reaches, promote the distorted perception that the Court is primarily a political institution. This is a recipe for undermining the Court’s legitimacy.

Ultimately, in Griswold, Roe, Obergefell, and Dobbs, were most justices basing their decisions on their political preferences? Yes.

B.    Solutions to increase public perception of the Court’s legitimacy.

Regardless of the Court’s many unanimous and super-majority decisions, its decisions in cases such as Roe and Dobbs undermined the Court’s legitimacy. Is there a solution that could help to restore that legitimacy? Below are two suggestions.

    1.    Deny certiorari unless the challenged law likely violates the Constitution’s text.

The Court should not grant certiorari unless a challenged law likely violates the Constitution’s text – not its “penumbras” or whatever unenumerated “right” that the substantive due process might invent. For example, in Citizens United v. FEC, did the First Amendment’s text clearly support the invalidation of a statute that strived to reduce the influence of money on federal elections? In Clinton v. New York, did the Presentment Clause clearly support invalidating the Line-Item Veto Act, which sought to reduce wasteful government spending? In Kennedy v. Louisiana, did the Eighth Amendment clearly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty for individuals who raped children under the age of twelve? In Roe v. Wade, did the Fourteenth Amendment clearly prohibit states from prohibiting abortion?

The answer is no.

So why did the Court decide these issues for an entire nation, often by a 5-4 vote? Your answer is as good as mine. Unless you believe that the Court should be guided by “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”[5]

When the Constitution is ambiguous and subject to alternative interpretations, the Court should not intervene. It should allow the states to resolve these issues democratically or, in the case of federal legislation, defer to the coordinate branches. When nine unelected and life-tenured judges decide an issue for an entire nation, especially by a 5-4 margin where the majority’s decision so conveniently aligns with the justices’ political beliefs, you have a recipe for disaster.

If you believe that this suggestion is unwise, consider Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in National Federation of Independent Investors v. Sebelius and what may have motivated his decision.

    2.    Require a six-vote super-majority to overturn a lower court decision.

When the Court decides cases by a 5-4 vote, and those votes reflect little more than partisan division, that decision is likely to undermine the Court’s legitimacy. Put differently, should the law for an entire country depend on a one-vote majority at the Court, where those votes align with each justice’s policy preferences? No.

Instead, to overturn a lower court decision, the Court should be required to reach a six-vote super majority. Doing so would encourage compromise, consensus, and moderation, and lead to incremental, not drastic changes in the law. And it would prohibit a bare liberal or conservative majority from changing the law for an entire nation, particularly on divisive social issues. Indeed, had a six-vote supermajority been in effect when Dobbs was decided, abortion would still be legal until fifteen weeks of pregnancy. If a six-vote supermajority had been in effect when Citizens United was decided, money would likely not have the corruptive influence in politics that it does today.

Some might argue that this approach would prevent the Court from resolving circuit splits on matters of public importance. So what? There are many circuit splits where the Court denies certiorari, thus leaving them unresolved. We should not pretend that the Court’s responsibility is to resolve every circuit split or injustice that affects the country because the reality is quite the opposite. Furthermore, if there is a circuit split, such that the law is interpreted and applied differently in different states, why is that necessarily undesirable? This is already the norm, not the exception, and the incredibly small number of cases that the Court decides each term has only a marginal impact on that reality. And if you believe that the Court should defer to democratic choice at the state and federal level when the Constitution is ambiguous, a six-vote supermajority requirement would facilitate achieving that objective – as would an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation.

If the Court had less power, and intervened less often, the people, not nine unelected justices, would have “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”[6]

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Attacks on the Court’s legitimacy reflect little more than disagreement with decisions that conservatives or liberals do not like. As Justice Kennedy stated, “[a]n activist court is a court that makes a decision you don't like.”[7] The conservative and liberal media – and politicians – do a terrible disservice when they attack the Court with inflammatory comments that influence the public’s perception of the Court’s legitimacy. Having said that, if the Court wants to shed the perception that it is a political institution, it should stop deciding cases that are so politically divisive. Along with a super-majority requirement, this will help to insulate the Court from attacks on its legitimacy, however unfair such attacks may be.

 

[1] PolitiFact | Despite popular misconception, Supreme Court 9-0 rulings are not that rare

[2] See id.

[3] See id.

[4] Michael D. Berry, The Numbers Reveal a United Supreme Court – And a Few Surprises (Aug. 2, 2023), available at: The Numbers Reveal a United Supreme Court, and a Few Surprises | The Federalist Society (fedsoc.org)

[5] Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).

[6] Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

[7] CBS News, Justice Kennedy: Senators Focus on Short-Term (May 14, 2010), available at: Justice Kennedy: Senators Focus on Short-Term - CBS News