Appellate Advocacy Blog

Editor: Tessa L. Dysart
The University of Arizona
James E. Rogers College of Law

Tuesday, June 18, 2024

Neurodiversity and Legal Advocacy: Dyslexia

Brain bias

This is part two of my continuing series of posts about neurodiversity and legal advocacy. In today's post, I'll talk about my own neurodiversity - dyslexia. While each type of neurodiversity presents differently, I hope some of my personal experience and research can help you as either a teacher, partner, or mentor when you encounter dyslexic students or associates. If you are dyslexic yourself, the following may help you process your differences and see how they can be turned into strengths.

Studies estimate that from 10-20% of the population has dyslexia. Dyslexia involves a series of genetic, neurological differences that result in a different way of seeing the world. Given the prevalence of dyslexia, it is likely that you have taught or work with dyslexic thinkers.

1.    Strengths

Although traditionally seen as a disability, Richard Branson considers dyslexia to be his superpower, and several companies now hire dyslexic thinkers purposefully because of their strengths. Indeed, LinkedIn now includes "dyslexic thinking" as a skill. Those strengths include:

    A.     Big Picture Thinking

Most dyslexics see themselves as "big picture thinkers." They see trends and patterns in data more quickly than neurotypicals. This permits them to see how things connect in complex systems, categorize broadly based on similarities, and, conversely, quickly spot things that are out of place. The GCHQ, a British intelligence and security agency, employs over 100 dyslexic thinkers to assist in their analysis for this reason.

    B.     Problem Solving

Dyslexics tend to score very high in reasoning skills. Their big-picture view of the world helps them understand patterns and systems quickly, and they can then simplify those complex systems. They are logical and strategic thinkers. In the legal world, this means dyslexics may be able to see legal solutions based on prior precedent a bit more clearly -- once they understand the purpose and policy behind prior precedent, they can extrapolate it to newer areas quickly.

    C.     Creativity

Picasso, Pollack, Spielberg, Einstein and Roald Dahl were all dyslexic thinkers. That doesn't mean all dyslexics are artists, but most do see the world a bit differently, and process and explore it differently as well.

    D.     Empathy

Whether a function of their "big picture" thinking, their experiences in coping with difficulties in reading and writing, or both, dyslexic thinkers score high in empathy. They typically sense, understand, and respond to other people's feelings more quickly and accurately than neurotypical people.

    E.     Spatial Reasoning

When dyslexic children learn to read, the right hemisphere of their brain lights up on MRIs. Neurotypical children usually do not have the same response. This is hypothesized to be because the dyslexic brain tends to use spatial reasoning for everything, including reading. Rather than just hearing and assigning sounds to letters, the dyslexic child seems to create patterns and "shapes" for each word. This spatial reasoning persists in dyslexic thinking, with dyslexics often scoring highly on spatial reasoning and 3D imagination. This may be why they can be strong theoretical mathematicians, but still make sequential errors (they see the forests but miss the trees).

    F.     Communication

When these strengths are combined, they can make dyslexics excellent communicators. Big-picture thinking, empathy, and creativity mean that dyslexics can be strong narrative story-tellers. And Walter Fisher's narrative paradigm of communications suggests that this makes them more persuasive.

2.     Challenges and coping mechanisms

Of course, being dyslexic isn't always wonderful. Dyslexia was categorized as a disability for a reason - it carries with it significant challenges. People with dyslexia are sometimes described as being neurologically "spiky," with scores both higher and lower than the neurotypical (as that name would suggest). While building on the strengths listed above, the dyslexic thinker needs to recognize those challenges. Fortunately, there are numerous aids in helping them do so.

    A.     Organization.

Big picture thinkers need to learn to break things down into steps. While it is useful to see the forest, the trees still matter in the law. Brian Garner's "madman, architect, carpenter, judge" process is extremely helpful to me. I love the exploration of research (another dyslexic trait) but feel constrained by early organization. Using Garner's process, I naturally compose my big picture argument, use the law I find to create structure, then build and rebuild the argument.

    B.     Spelling and Grammar.

Spelling and grammar are most dyslexic thinkers' kryptonite. Yet most rubrics weigh them heavily, both because they matter and because they are easy to grade. This frankly inequitable bias has to be addressed, because it will impact them professionally. But it can't paralyze the writer.

I once had the privilege of spending an evening talking with Ray Bradbury. His primary writing advice? "Write the damn thing!" Dyslexics need to get a draft on paper without fear of failure. That may mean speech to text software. It may mean cut and pasting blocks of text from cases first, then revising later. But getting something on the page is what matters.

Then revise, revise, revise. Word has learning tools that are thoroughly explored in the website listed below. AI could also be used to help. But the main emphasis for a dyslexic writer should be that good writing is rewriting, even for neurotypical writers, but especially for dyslexic writers. A second set of eyes is also highly recommended. My wife, a history professor, reads almost everything I write. Including these blogs. If you aren't blessed with a wife with good grammar skills and the patience of Job, you probably have a paralegal, legal secretary, or co-worker who does.

    C.     Instructions.

Because dyslexics are big-picture thinkers, and because they often have some decoding lag-time, giving them instructions can be tricky. Rather than just telling students to "write a memo," the dyslexic student may need the necessary steps broken down for them. And they benefit greatly from iterative learning - letting them edit and rewrite assignments is a huge boost both in learning and emotional impact.

    D.    Short-Term and Working Memory.

Several studies have shown that dyslexic thinkers can have difficulty with both short-term and working memory. Working memory is a subset of short-term memory that involves remembering sequential steps, planning, and behavioral related decision making. We forget our keys and people's names and phone numbers with alarming regularity.

One of my coping mechanisms is to write things down immediately. If I am researching and have a thought, I write it down quickly. If I have a text or notification come through, it will probably disappear if I do not. I do the same at oral argument - I furiously write down questions and statements that I need to address and draw arrows and write numbers to organize them. Once I have done that, I am locked in, because I can visualize the new argument.

There are several strategies to look into: color association, chunking, visualization, and mnemonics are all useful. As is technology. Calendaring and note apps are a part of everyday life for me and most dyslexics.

    E.     Managing Emotional Impact.

Being a dyslexic student, or advocate, isn't easy. Issues with memory, organization, and difficulty grasping instructions quickly are all anxiety-inducing. Reading -- a huge part of our day -- is draining because of the additional decoding that must take place. Text-to-speech readers may be helpful. Extra time accommodations aren't necessarily an advantage to such students, so much as a way to help level the field. But making sure their strengths are valued is also key. Hopefully, a strength-based approach to your interactions with these students will help them see the value in their differences.

3.     Conclusion

Dyslexia makes me a better advocate, but only because I've learned to capitalize on its strengths and cope with its weaknesses. Hopefully you can help your students, associates, or yourself do the same by following some of these tips.

 

Further Reading

Made by Dyslexia - Website with tests, instructional videos, and teaching tools

Taylor, H and Vestergaard MD: 'Developmental Dyslexia: Disorder or Specialization in Exploration?' Frontiers in Psychology (June 2022).

 

(Photo attribute: Bill Sanderson, 1997. Credit: Wellcome Collection. CC BY 4.0)

June 18, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Law School, Legal Profession, Legal Writing, Oral Argument, Rhetoric, Science | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, June 16, 2024

A Font by Any Other Name Does Not Read the Same, Redux

On May 19th, my post on this blog covered the different requirements and suggestions that federal circuit courts have for the font used in any brief. A Font by Any Other Name Does Not Read the Same.

Now, the Seventh Circuit has weighed in on the subject in a new opinion written by Judge Easterbrook. The underlying dispute concerned a business lease. However, what made the opinion newsworthy was its discussion of fonts. The plaintiff’s lawyer chose to write his opposition to a motion to dismiss using “Bernhard Modern, a display face suited to movie posters and used in the title sequence of the Twilight Zone TV show,” according to the court. AsymaDesign, LLC v. CBL & Assocs. Mgmt., Inc., No. 23-2495, 2024 WL 2813827, at *2 (7th Cir. June 3, 2024). If you assumed that comment telegraphs the court’s attitude about its use, you stand on solid ground.

The opinion directs practitioners to review the court’s Handbook, available at https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/rules-procedures/Hand-book.pdf, for “important advice about typography” and reminds attorneys that they should give due regard for the “sore eyes of judges who must read copious legal materials.” Id. The Handbook, the court reminds everyone, suggests that lawyers select “type-faces (often called fonts) suited for use in books and other long-form presentations” and choose the “most legible face available to you.” Id. It further states that “[d]isplay faces such as Bodoni or Bernhard Modern wear out judicial eyes after just a few pages,” “make understanding harder,” and is not exactly conducive “to easy reading of long passages.” Id.

It concludes with the fervent “hope that Bernhard Modern has made its last appearance in an appellate brief.” Id.

Two days later, an in-circuit district court cited that passage to register its complaint about a brief that omitted page numbers. Kika C. v. O'Malley, No. 22 C 1502, 2024 WL 2873557, at *3 n.6 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2024).

June 16, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Federal Appeals Courts, Legal Writing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 11, 2024

On Using ChatGPT for Statutory Interpretation

Judge Kevin Newsom of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently wrote a concurring opinion in an insurance case involving an issue of statutory interpretation.[i]  Specifically, the question was whether a landowner’s in-ground trampoline constituted “landscaping” under a policy that provided him coverage for negligence arising from “landscaping” work but provided no definition of “landscaping.”[ii]

After reviewing numerous dictionary definitions of landscaping and finding all of them leaving “a little something to be desired” because none of them fully captured his own understanding of the term, Judge Newsom confessed to having consulted various generative AI tools (out of pure academic curiosity) for a definition.[iii]  While the case was ultimately resolved on a different question, Judge Newsom chose to use his concurring opinion as a platform to discuss the potential use of generative AI for statutory interpretation, specifically when the issue involves discerning the plain and ordinary meaning of a word.[iv]

He concluded that large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, might be useful in the interpretation of legal texts.[v]  He followed his conclusion with a list of benefits and risks of doing so.

Judge Newsom identified the benefits as follows: 

(1) “LLMs train on ordinary-language inputs,” thereby reflecting the “common speech of common people”;[vi]

(2) “LLMs can ‘understand’ context,” which allows them to “discern the difference—and distinguish—between the flying-mammal ‘bat’ . . . and the wooden ‘bat’” used in baseball;[vii]

(3) “LLMs are accessible,” which can both “democratiz[e] the interpretive enterprise” and provide “an inexpensive research tool”;[viii]

(4) “LLM research is relatively transparent” because we know they are trained on “tons and tons of internet data” and because they provide the opportunity for judges to “show their work” by disclosing “both the queries put to the LLMs . . . and the models’ answer”;[ix] and

(5) “LLMs hold advantages over other empirical interpretive methods,” such as conducting broad surveys and corpus linguistics.[x]

Judge Newsom also recognized the following risks: 

(1) “LLMs can ‘hallucinate’”;[xi]

(2) “LLMs don’t capture offline speech, and thus might not fully account for underrepresented populations’ usages”;[xii]

(3) “Lawyers, judges, and would-be litigants might try to manipulate LLMs” by reverse-engineering a preferred answer;[xiii] and

(4) “Reliance on LLMs will lead us into dystopia” where “‘robo judges’ algorithmically resolv[e] human disputes.”[xiv]

Though Judge Newsom found each of the identified risks to be either non-fatal or easily mitigated, I’m not sure he fully appreciated the potential that the LLMs might fail to account for word usage among underrepresented populations.  The inherent bias baked into generative AI is well documented.[xv]  One study in particular “revealed systematic gender and racial biases in [multiple] AI generators against women and African Americans. The study also uncovered more nuanced biases or prejudices in the portrayal of emotions and appearances.”[xvi]

If a benefit of using LLMs to discern ordinary meaning is their ability to “democratiz[e] the interpretive enterprise,” then we should also be giving more consideration to websites such as Urban Dictionary and Wikipedia.

But the primary concern with a judge using any of these sources to discern “ordinary meaning” is that, in doing so, the judge becomes an advocate by both proposing and relying on a new definition not previously advanced or supported by any party.  Admittedly, the same concern is true when judges consult dictionaries for definitions, but I’ve previously identified my concerns with that approach.

Despite the drawbacks of relying on LLMs and other unconventional sources, Judge Newsom makes some very good points about their potential utility. Perhaps the best approach lies somewhere in between complete reliance and absolute prohibition.  Perhaps we should create standardized rules regarding the appropriate usage (by courts and litigants alike) of readily accessible, crowd-sourced information, such as LLMs, Urban Dictionary, and Wikipedia.[xvii]

And we could throw in dictionaries as well for good measure.

 

[i] Snell v. United Spec. Ins. Co., No. 22-12581, slip op. at 1 (11th Cir. May 28, 2024) (Newsom, J., concurring), https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202212581.pdf#page=25 (last accessed June 10, 2024).

[ii] Id. at 1-2.

[iii] Id. at 5-6, 8.

[iv] Id. at 4.

[v] Id. at 10.

[vi] Id. at 11.

[vii] Id. at 14-15.

[viii] Id. at 15.

[ix] Id. at 16, 18, 19.

[x] Id. at 19-20.

[xi] Id. at 21.

[xii] Id. at 22.

[xiii] Id. at 23.

[xiv] Id. at 24-25.

[xv] Nettrice Gaskins, The Boy on the Tricycle: Bias in Generative AI (May 1, 2024), available at: https://nettricegaskins.medium.com/the-boy-on-the-tricycle-bias-in-generative-ai-d0fd050121ec#:~:text=While%20generative%20AI%20has%20numerous,against%20women%20and%20African%20Americans (last accessed June 10, 2024).

[xvi] Id.

[xvii] See Leslie Kaufman, For the Word on the Street, Courts Call Up an Online Witness, New York Times (May 20, 2013), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/business/media/urban-dictionary-finds-a-place-in-the-courtroom.html.

June 11, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Rhetoric, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 10, 2024

Four years of the Journal of Appellate Practice and Process at Arizona

The end of this month marks four years since the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law acquired the Journal of Appellate Practice and Process. As I wrote in the foreword to the first issue that Arizona published, the transfer of the Journal from Arkansas to Arizona occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic and the worldwide shutdown. As the world coped with a new normal, the Journal also faced changes, including online delivery and a new website.

I am happy to report that four years later the Journal continues to thrive. Arizona has successfully published 7 issues, with one more on the way soon. As editor-in-chief, I enjoy working with the other editors, the student assistants, our NITA partners, and, of course, the authors to put together a high-quality issue.

In honor of the fourth anniversary, I wanted to share a list of our ten most downloaded articles. 

Starting with the most downloaded, here is the list:

  1. The Robed Tweeter: Two Judges' Views on Public Engagement by Stephen Louis A. Dillard and Bridget Mary McCormack
  2. Structuring Appellate Briefs by Thomas L. Hudson
  3. Obsessive Over the Possessive at the Supreme Court of the United States: Exploring SCOTUS'/SCOTUS'S Use of Possessive Apostrophes by Timothy R. Johnson and Ryan C. Black
  4. Of Cases and Controversies Once More by Michael S. Greve
  5. Does Quality Matter? The Influence of Party Briefs and Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court by Pamela C. Corley and Adam Feldman
  6. COVID-19 and Supreme Court Oral Argument: The Curious Case of Justice Clarence Thomas by Timothy R. Johnson, Maron W. Sorenson, Maggie Cleary, and Katie Szarkowicz
  7. Judicial Words Matter by Therese M. Stewart
  8. COVID-19, Zoom, and Appellate Oral Argument: Is the Future Virtual by Pierre H. Bergeron
  9. Remote Oral Arguments in the Age of Coronavirus: A Blip on the Screen or a Permanent Fixture by Margaret D. McGaughey
  10. Incentivizing Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claims Raised on Direct Appeal: Why Appellate Courts Should Remand "Colorable" Claims for Evidentiary Hearings by Brent E. Newton

Overall, since launching the new website the articles posted have accumulated over 60,936 views and 48,828 downloads.

I would like to thank all of our authors, editors, and readers for helping make the Journal successful. We are excited to continue our efforts to publish high-quality scholarship on appellate issues.

June 10, 2024 | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, June 8, 2024

Will Former President Donald Trump’s Conviction Be Overturned?

On May 30, 2024, a Manhattan jury convicted former President Donald Trump of falsifying business records with the intent to defraud voters in the 2020 election. The conviction involves, among other things, a non-disclosure agreement that adult film actress Stormy Daniels signed in 2016, which prohibited Daniels from discussing the alleged sexual conduct that, in 2006, occurred with her and Trump.

After the sentencing hearing, which is scheduled for July 11, 2024, Trump’s attorneys will file an appeal seeking to overturn the decision. Below is a brief discussion of the issues that Trump’s attorneys will likely raise on appeal, and a prediction of whether they will be successful.

    1.    The failure to remove Judge Merchan from the case.

Judge Merchan allegedly donated $15 to President Joe Biden’s 2016 election campaign and $10 to an organization called Stop Republicans. A state ethics panel subsequently cautioned Merchan against making such contributions to avoid the appearance of bias. Also, Judge Merchan’s daughter, Loren, works for Authentic Campaigns, a political marketing agency that serves Democratic political candidates, and for a time, Loren was Authentic’s president and Chief Operating Officer. Loren also allegedly displayed an image of President Trump behind bars on her Twitter page, which was later removed. Based on these facts, Trump’s attorneys requested that Judge Merchan be removed from the case. That request was denied.

Perhaps Judge Merchan should have recused himself, but whether he was legally required to do so is a different matter. Judge Merchan donated a small amount to Biden’s campaign eight years ago. Also, Loren’s job at Authentic does not mean that Judge Merchan, because of his daughter’s political activities, will be biased in the trial or have an actual or apparent conflict of interest.

            Prediction: Unsuccessful.

    2.    The failure to change venue.

To many legal scholars and commentators, President Trump faced an uphill battle in this trial because Manhattan is a decidedly liberal city where over eighty-five percent of residents voted for President Biden in 2020, and where a bias toward Trump exists. Indeed, when jury selection began, half of those called for jury duty immediately stated that they could not be impartial in their deliberations. And of the twelve jurors selected, it is highly likely that the majority voted for Biden and harbored negative feelings toward Trump. Given these facts, Trump’s attorneys argued for a venue change, which Judge Merchan denied.

However, the law did not likely require a venue change. To hold that the political orientations of the jurors justify a change in venue in every or most cases would upend the jury system and make criminal trials incredibly inefficient.  Every criminal defendant could argue that the political demographics of a county, city, or state justified a venue change. Moreover, a venue change would not guarantee that existing biases in another venue would be eliminated; also, jurors can certainly assess the facts and evidence objectively despite their political affiliations.  Simply put, it is quite speculative to assume that jurors, who take an oath to be impartial and base their decision on the facts and evidence, would yield to and convict or acquit based upon their political biases. One should have more faith in the citizens of this country.

            Prediction: Unsuccessful.

    3.    Judge Merchan’s decision to allow Stormy Daniels’ testimony.

At the trial, Stormy Daniels testified about a sexual encounter that she had with President Trump in 2006 and, in that testimony, she provided graphic details about the encounter that did not relate to any of the elements of the charges against Trump. Daniels’ testimony also contradicted her prior statements, where she denied that such an encounter ever occurred. Based on the explicit sexual details that Daniels provided in her testimony, the defense will argue that this testimony was unduly prejudicial.

But during the opening statements President Trump’s lawyer, Todd Blanche, told the jury that Trump never had a sexual encounter with Daniels, thus justifying the prosecution’s decision to call Daniels to refute this assertion, which was the alleged motive for the non-disclosure agreement. However, the graphic details to which Daniels testified, such as what President Trump was wearing, how long their sexual encounter lasted, and what sexual position he preferred (Judge Merchan sustained an objection to this part of the testimony), were unnecessary. Surprisingly, the defense did not object to certain portions of this graphic testimony, which prompted Judge Merchan to criticize the defense for not making such objections.

Regardless, as stated above, because Trump specifically denied having a sexual encounter with Daniels, the prosecution was justified in calling Daniels to refute this statement. The question on appeal, therefore, will turn on whether the lurid details that Daniels provided–and which were irrelevant to the prosecution’s case–were sufficiently prejudicial to deprive President Trump of a fair trial.

The answer is, most likely, no. The appellate courts will decide that this was a harmless error.

            Prediction: Unsuccessful.

    4.    Judge Merchan’s evidentiary rulings.

Trump’s attorneys will argue that Judge Merchan’s evidentiary rulings reflected a pro-prosecution bias throughout the trial and compromised President Trump’s right to a fair trial.

Some of the objections that Judge Merchan sustained for the prosecution were questionable. For example, the way Judge Merchan limited Robert Costello’s testimony–not to mention his hostile demeanor toward Costello, calling him contemptuous and threatening to strike his testimony–was concerning. Of course, Costello did himself no favors by acting disrespectfully when Judge Merchan sustained one of the prosecution’s objections. You would think that a lawyer of Costello’s caliber would refrain from such conduct, which severely compromised his credibility.

Additionally, Judge Merchan also restricted the testimony of former Federal Election Commission Chairman Brad Smith, who would have testified that Trump’s payments to Cohen did not constitute a campaign finance violation.  In fact, the restrictions were so significant that the defense decided not to call Smith, Furthermore, Judge Merchan allowed the prosecution to tell the jury that Cohen had pleaded guilty to a campaign finance violation – which was among the charges that Trump faced.[1] When Judge Merchan allowed this, he should have permitted Brad Smith’s testimony to refute the prosecution’s argument. Judge Merchan’s failure to do so is very problematic because it enabled the jury to think, “If Cohen pleaded guilty to a campaign finance violation, then Trump must be guilty too.”

Also, Judge Merchan’s decision regarding the permissible scope of cross-examination if Trump testified was troubling. Specifically, Judge Merchan ruled that the prosecution could ask Trump about the verdict finding him liable for defaming E. Jean Carroll, about the four-hundred-and-fifty-four-million-dollar verdict that Judge Arthur Engeron imposed in President Trump’s civil fraud trial, and about Trump’s numerous violations of Judge Merchan’s gag order. None of these questions related to the charges facing Trump, and allowing the prosecution to ask such questions was more prejudicial than probative. And these rulings played a significant role in Trump’s decision not to testify.

Judge Merchan’s decision regarding the scope of cross-examination may be problematic given the Court of Appeals of New York’s recent decision in People v. Weinstein, where the Court, by a 4-3 decision reversed the conviction against Harvey Weinstein on sexual assault charges. In that case, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly allowed several women to testify that Weinstein had sexually assaulted them, even though Weinstein was not on trial for assaulting those women. As the majority stated, “[u]nder our system of justice, the accused has a right to be held to account only for the crime charged and, thus, allegations of prior bad acts may not be admitted against them for the sole purpose of establishing their propensity for criminality.”[2]

To be clear, this is not to say that Judge Merchan was consciously biased against President Trump. It is to say that some of his evidentiary rulings, including when considering the Court of Appeals’ decision in Weinstein, might constitute reversible error.

            Prediction: Possibly successful.

    5.     Whether Michael Cohen’s testimony should not have been given any weight by the jury, thus justifying a directed verdict for President Trump.

Michael Cohen was not a credible witness.  He lied to Congress.  He pleaded guilty to tax evasion and bank fraud (which were unrelated to Trump), which led to his disbarment and incarceration. He lied to a federal court. He called a deceased federal judge corrupt. He secretly recorded President Trump–his client at the time–during a meeting where they discussed the payment to Daniels. He stole thousands from the Trump Organization. And he lied to or omitted material information about an October phone call with Trump’s bodyguard, Keith Schiller. Also, during his testimony, Cohen blamed his legal troubles on being “knee-deep in the cult” of President Trump, showing that he lacked any sense of personal accountability. Lest there be any doubt about Cohen’s character, watch his belligerent rants online, where he states how much he wants Trump to go to prison while wearing a shirt depicting Trump behind bars.

Cohen had about as much credibility as those claiming that the government faked the moon landing or that Elvis faked his death.

Incredibly, however, the jury believed at least some of Cohen’s testimony because Cohen was the only witness who could testify to, among other things, Trump’s specific intent to defraud voters and promote or prevent the election of any person to public office.[3]  Given that the trial occurred in Manhattan and that at least some jurors despised Trump, this should not be surprising. Moreover, although some commentators made much of the fact that there were two lawyers on the jury, this did not bode well for President Trump. One attorney, who moved to New York from Oregon, has lived in Chelsea for five years, which is notoriously liberal.  The other lawyer worked as a civil litigator at a firm in New York City, and firms in New York City are overwhelmingly liberal.

Regardless, is the jury’s reliance on Cohen’s testimony a basis to reverse the decision? No. Jurors are given wide latitude to credit or discredit the testimony of a witness, and an appellate court will not second-guess the jury’s fact-finding.

            Prediction: Unsuccessful.

    6.    The charge that Trump falsified business records.

Based on the evidence, the jury concluded that President Trump falsified business records. The facts suggested that after Stormy Daniels threatened to go public with her story, Cohen established a corporation, from which he paid $130,000 to Daniels after obtaining a home equity loan. Trump subsequently reimbursed Cohen for the money that he paid to Daniels.

President Trump’s accountant designated these payments as “legal expenses,” using a drop-down menu on a computer to make this designation. Why this designation was improper given that Trump made the reimbursement in connection with a legally enforceable non-disclosure agreement is unclear. And one can certainly question precisely how President Trump “caused” the records to be falsified—if they even constituted falsification. What’s more, the entries into the business records were made after the 2016 election. Thus, how can President Trump be found guilty of falsifying business records to promote or prevent the election of a candidate when the election is already over?

The appellate courts, however, will probably not focus on this issue because it will likely defer to the jury’s fact-finding.   

            Prediction: Unsuccessful.

    7.    Judge Merchan’s jury instructions.

This is where President Trump will succeed on appeal.

Judge Merchan allowed the jury to reach a non-unanimous verdict on the underlying crime(s) that elevated a misdemeanor barred by the statute of limitations into a felony.

To best explain this, consider the following examples: The crime of armed robbery typically requires a person to: (1) take the property of another; (2) without their consent; and (3) with the use of force. To obtain a conviction, all three elements must be satisfied. But the jury need not be unanimous on, for example, how the defendant used force. Some might conclude that the defendant used a gun, while others may conclude that the defendant used a knife. Unanimity on the underlying means is unnecessary if all jurors agree that the defendant used force because the use of force is the element that must be satisfied. Likewise, first-degree murder requires that the defendant: (1) intentionally; (2) kill another person. To convict, the jury must only agree that the defendant acted intentionally to cause the death of another person. It need not agree, however, on whether the defendant killed a person with a gun, a knife, or an ax.

The New York election law is different. It prohibits a candidate from: (1) promoting or preventing the election of a candidate; (2) by unlawful means. Unlike the robbery or murder examples, which specify the conduct needed to satisfy each element (e.g., the use of force), the New York law, in using the vague term “unlawful means,” does not delineate what conduct constitutes “unlawful means.” As such, the “unlawful means” element arguably permits a jury to choose among numerous crimes to convict the defendant without agreeing unanimously that the elements of any single crime were satisfied.

In President Trump’s trial, this is precisely what occurred. The prosecution stated in its closing argument that in deciding whether Trump was guilty of a second underlying crime, the jury could conclude that Trump violated campaign finance law, federal tax law, or engaged in additional falsification of business records. To make matters worse, Judge Merchan instructed the jury that they must only reach unanimity on which underlying crime was committed—not on whether the elements of any underlying crime were satisfied.[4]

In so doing, Judge Merchan permitted the jurors to convict Trump without unanimous agreement that the elements of any single crime were satisfied. Thus, if four jurors agreed that Trump was guilty of a federal campaign finance violation, four agreed that he was guilty of violating federal tax law, and four agreed that he was guilty of falsifying additional business records, Trump could be convicted. In fact, to date, we still do not know what underlying crime(s) the jury found Trump to have committed. This instruction arguably violated the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Ramos v. Louisiana and Richardson v. United States.[5]

That instruction was a reversible error. And it may not be the only one.

By allowing the prosecution to proceed on an indictment that never specified the underlying crime that elevated the misdemeanor (falsification of business records) to a felony, the prosecution deprived President Trump of his Sixth Amendment right to know the nature of the charges that he was facing. That is precisely why, to this day, we have no idea what underlying crime the jurors reached an agreement upon.

That is the point – and the problem.

Additionally, the law upon which Trump was convicted–N.Y. Election Law 17-152–should be deemed unconstitutional because the term “unlawful means" is vague and essentially permits a jury to convict a defendant even if they do not agree on the underlying crime constituting the "unlawful means," and even if they do not agree unanimously that the underlying elements of any single crime have been satisfied.  

            Prediction: Successful.

***

One must wonder why these charges were ever brought. Convicting a former and possibly future president based on conduct occurring eighteen years ago, which involved an alleged “falsification of business records” that occurred eight years ago, is concerning. It suggests that the legal system is being weaponized against a political opponent. After all, if President Biden had engaged in this conduct, do you think that Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg would have brought these charges? Of course not.

That, again, is the point – and the problem.[6]

Trump’s conviction will be overturned.

 

[1] Specifically, during its opening statement, the prosecution told the jury that “Cohen will also testify in this trial that he ultimately pled guilty and went to jail for causing an unlawful corporate contribution in connection with the Karen McDougal payments and for making an excessive campaign contribution in connection with the Stormy Daniels payoff.” 

[2] See Peter Sterne, Why Did New York’s Highest Court Overturn Harvey Weinstein’s Conviction? (April 29, 2024), available at: Why did New York’s highest court overturn Harvey Weinstein’s conviction? - City & State New York (cityandstateny.com)

[3] See N.Y. Election Law 17-152.

[4] Consider by analogy the following law: “It shall be unlawful to physically harm a person through unlawful means.” This would allow a jury to convict a defendant even if four jurors agreed that the harm occurred through kidnapping, four others agreed that the harm occurred through assault, and four others agreed that the harm occurred through battery. In such a circumstance, the jurors would not agree unanimously that the defendant’s conduct satisfied the elements of any single crime. That should prohibit a conviction.

[5] 590 U.S. 83 (2020); 526 U.S. 813 (1999).

[6] Recently, Judge Merchan notified the parties that, on May 29, 2024, a cousin of one of the jurors allegedly posted on a social media website stating as follows: "My cousin is a juror and says Trump is getting convicted! Thank you folks for all your hard work!!!!" See Ella Lee, Trump Hush Money Judge Flags Facebook User Claiming Early Knowledge of the Verdict (May 29, 2024), available at: Trump hush money judge flags Facebook user claiming early knowledge of verdict (thehill.com)

 

June 8, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Law School, Legal Ethics, Legal Profession, State Appeals Courts, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, June 3, 2024

Summer CLE Opportunity with the Legal Writing Institute Bench & Bar

This summer, at its 21st Biennial Conference in July, the Legal Writing Institute will feature a full day of Bench and Bar programming. This programming is aimed at legal professionals and students preparing to enter the legal profession.

The program will offer 5.8 hours of CLE, and student scholarships, to entice practitioners and those about to enter the legal field to join LWI for discussions among practitioners, law professors, and judges exploring hot topics like AI, the effective use of social media, post-pandemic lawyering, remoting lawyering, and mindful tech. You can find the full schedule here.

The Bench & Bar programming is on July 19, 2024, from 9:00 am to 6:30 pm (if you attend the reception at the Madame Walker Theater), at Indiana University's Robert H. McKinney School of Law.  You can register here.

If you are a student and interested in scholarship, please feel free to email me and I will connect you with the right person.

June 3, 2024 | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, June 2, 2024

New Rules on Appealing Factual Findings under the Clear-Evidence Rule

Advocates usually face tough sledding if their appeal merely disputes factual findings. Those appeals confront the “clear-evidence” standard, a demanding test that requires the appellate court to find that the findings are not plausible given the evidentiary record. Appellate courts assume that trial courts have greater expertise in evaluating the facts because experiencing the presentation of the case in the living courtroom allows a judge to assess credibility, among other things, that a cold written record cannot convey.

In Cooper v. Harris (2017), the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Kagan, applied that rubric to uphold a three-judge panel’s decision that invalidated a North Carolina congressional redistricting plan under the “deferential standard of review” that applies to factual findings. The Court held that a “plaintiff may make the required showing [to demonstrate that race was the predominant factor in drawing district lines] through ‘direct evidence’ of legislative intent, ‘circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographics,’ or a mix of both.” The decision distinguished an earlier favorable review of one of the same districts in  Easley v. Cromartie (2001), because the majority read that decision to involve a particularly week evidentiary record of racial considerations that could only be overcome if the plaintiffs had offered an alternative map. That map would have to demonstrate that the legislators’ political goal could have been achieved without regard to race. In Cooper, the Court held sufficient strong evidence, including direct evidence, existed so that an alternate map was unnecessary.

Justice Thomas concurred, writing that the analysis in Cooper “represents a welcome course correction to this Court’s application of the clear-error standard.”

Justice Alito wrote the dissent. He asserted that the majority had treated the earlier precedent “like a disposable household item—say, a paper plate or napkin—to be used once and then tossed in the trash.” He labeled the absence of an alternative map “a critical factor in our analysis” in Cromartie and asserted its absence in the Cooper record required that North Carolina’s new map be upheld.

What a difference a few years and a few justices make! On May 23, the Supreme Court reinstated a South Carolina congressional map that the district court had found to be the product of racial gerrymandering. This time, the writers switched sides. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion, Justice Thomas concurred with the new majority, and Justice Kagan authored the dissent. The majority’s treatment of the clear-evidence standard suggests a new wrinkle for the clear-evidence rule that likely affects a wide swath of cases.

In Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, No. 22-807, the Court held that politics permissibly informed the map-drawing task even if the political motivation correlated with treating race as a predominant factor in the maps. Because the district court did not disentangle race and politics, the Court said, its findings of fact were clearly erroneous. To prevail on the racial-gerrymandering issue, the Court required a plaintiff to rule out the competing explanation of politics. It insisted, as it asserted Cromartie required, that a plaintiff would have to draw a partisan map consistent with the legislature’s intent to favor the dominant political party but with greater racial balance. In other words, the plaintiff had to do a better job of creating the same partisan advantage without evidencing any racial discrimination, a requirement that probably sounds the death knell for racial gerrymandering cases. The Court declared that the district court committed “clear factual error in concluding that race played a predominant role in the legislature’s design,” and the absence of an alternative map warranted an “adverse inference against the Challengers.”

The opinion further called the plaintiffs’ expert reports “deeply flawed” for much the same reason. The “tens of thousands of maps [produced] with differently configured districts” did not include “a single map that achieved the legislature’s partisan goal” of keeping the challenged districts Republican, the majority held.

In the majority’s version of the evidence, no direct evidence suggested the legislature’s map was drawn with a racial “target,” as the district court found. The Court also criticized the district court for “infer[ring]” that, by keeping the racial percentages in the districts the same as previously existed (17 percent), race played a predominant role in the districts’ shape. It noted that no map offered by the plaintiffs “would have satisfied the legislature’s political aim” without increasing the concentration of minority voters, which would have created a Democratic majority. Thus, the majority concluded the 17-percent standard was “simply a side effect of the legislature’s partisan goal” and not constitutionally suspect.

The majority also rejected the dissent’s criticism that clear-error review is essentially perfunctory, declaring that “appellants are entitled to meaningful appellate review” of factual findings.

Justice Thomas concurred but protested the searching factual review that the majority undertook because, in his view, it “exceeds the proper scope of clear-error review” and was unnecessary to resolve the case. It is worth noting that the bulk of the Thomas dissent argues against the Court’s involvement in racial gerrymandering cases altogether. Within that stance, Thomas criticizes a “boundless view of equitable remedies” that he traces to fallout from Brown v. Board of Education and the decision’s “impatience with the pace of discrimination,” seemingly treating that as an original sin, which may have been justified at the time but that has brought about “extravagant uses of judicial power” well beyond the “Framers’ design.”

Justice Kagan’s dissent mounted more withering criticism, starting with the majority’s portrayal of the plaintiffs’ evidence in only the “sketchiest of terms.” She pointed out that evidence established that the software used by the mapmakers was configured to show how any change in the district lines affected the district’s racial composition and achieved “to the decimal point” the exclusion of African-American citizens to accomplish their partisan goals. Perhaps more importantly for appellate advocates, she accused the majority of abandoning the clear-error standard that substantially defers to plausible factual findings, by choosing the evidence that supports its preferred outcome, “ignores or minimizes less convenient proof,” and errs in its reading of expert opinions, while asserting a better understanding of the evidence than did the three-judge district court.

Kagan’s critique also asserts that the majority’s new clear-evidence rule defers, not to the district court, but to the losing defendant because the majority interposed a presumption that legislatures act in good faith. She adds that the alternative-map requirement constitutes a new invention by the majority, in whose absence an adverse inference is drawn “no matter how much proof of a constitutional violation [plaintiffs] otherwise present,” describing this as judicial “micro-management of a plaintiff’s case . . . elsewhere unheard of in constitutional litigation.” She then suggests that the majority opinion is an adoption of Justice Alito’s dissent from Cooper so that the “dissent becomes the law.” Only in that dissent, she points out, did an alternative map requirement receive support before. She also lambasted the majority for reformulating her own majority opinion in Cooper.

The bottom line outside the context of gerrymandering cases is that the majority endorsed a more powerful review of evidence by appellate courts, particularly when legal presumptions exist that support the appellant, creating a level of deference to their evidence over that found by the district court. Any advocate seeking clear-evidence review should now search for favorable presumptions that would support greater appellate scrutiny of the evidence.

June 2, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Federal Appeals Courts, State Appeals Courts, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, May 28, 2024

Neurodiversity and Legal Advocacy: Introduction


Brain bias


Neurodiversity is a relatively new term applied to the range of differences in the human brain regarding social interaction, learning, attention, mood, and other mental functions. Rather than seeing a learning difference (like dyslexia) as a disability, neurodiversity looks at that difference as a point on a continuum of human perception and function. That perspective allows us to see the diagnosis as a difference, not a deficit.

Educators are increasingly aware of certain diagnosed differences because of the accommodations offered to address them. But simply allowing for extra test time or reading software does not address the opportunities that these differences can bring to the table. See Jennifer Kindred Mitchell, Teaching to Neurodiverse Law Students, 29 NO. 2 Persp. Teaching Legal Res. & Writing 49 (2022).

I know. I was diagnosed with dyslexia at a young age. I continue to rely heavily on spelling correction and third-party editing to address my difficulties with spelling and grammar. But I have also come to realize, over the years, that I have attendant strengths that make me a better advocate. My long-term memory, attention to narrative, empathy, and spatial reasoning are different, and often stronger, than those without dyslexia.

Each student is, of course, different. Some present with clear diagnoses. Some have learned to live with, or mask, their neurodiversity without disclosure to their teachers. Awareness of the different presentations of neurodiversity helps educators identify difficulties and strengths and address them head on.

Over the next few weeks, I will address three categories of neurodiversity from a strengths-based approach so we can be better at identifying and helping students and young lawyers with those differences cultivate their strengths and cope with their difficulties. I will start with dyslexia, since that is my experience and an area of some personal study, then address ADHD and autism.

If you have experience with neurodiversity in advocacy, either as a teacher or learner, I would love to hear from you as I prepare those posts. This is a young area and I think we would be well-served by putting our heads together and learning how to better help those who see the world a bit differently.

(Photo attribute: Bill Sanderson, 1997. Credit: Wellcome Collection. CC BY 4.0)

May 28, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Law School, Legal Ethics, Legal Profession, Legal Writing, Moot Court | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, May 26, 2024

Is the United States Supreme Court a Political Institution?

Public opinion of the United States Supreme Court has declined recently, with some commentators arguing that the Court is a political institution. Below is a brief analysis of why the Court is perceived as political, and how the Court can avoid this perception in the future.

A.    Is the Court a “political” institution?

When one labels the Court as a “political” institution, how is “political” being defined? For this article, “political” is defined as reaching decisions that coincide with a justice’s policy preferences. This does not mean, of course, that a decision coinciding with a justice’s policy views is inherently political, or that the justices are basing their decision on political considerations, as there may be legitimate textual or statutory bases to reach those decisions. Notwithstanding, public perception of whether the Court is acting in a political capacity is often influenced by whether the Court’s vote in particular cases split along ideological lines.

Given this definition, is the Court a political institution? Yes and no. 

To begin with, most of the Court’s cases do not involve divisive social issues. Rather, they involve issues such as choice of law provisions in maritime contracts, trademark issues, the bankruptcy code, the takings clause, and the Federal Arbitration Act. Such cases do not result in decisions that most people would consider politically motivated.  

Furthermore, the Court’s cases are often decided unanimously or by six, seven, or eight-member majorities. From 2008 to 2019, for example, the Court’s unanimous decisions ranged from thirty-six to sixty-six percent of its cases.[1] Conversely, the percentage of 5-4 decisions ranged from five to twenty-nine percent.[2] Rulings with six, seven, and eight-member majorities ranged from twenty to fifty-one percent.[3] Additionally, in 2021, the Court reached unanimous decisions in sixty-seven percent of its cases, and in 2022, the Court was unanimous in forty-eight percent of its cases.[4]

Therefore, in most cases, politics does not likely influence the Court’s decisions. As such, in most cases, are the justices basing their decisions on their political preferences? No.

***

However, this does not end the inquiry. In the relatively small number of cases that involve divisive social issues, whether the Court’s decisions were political depends on your perspective.  For example, many conservative legal scholars would consider Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and Obergefell v. Hodges to be political decisions, because in their view they were based on an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that had no basis in the Constitution’s text, and that resulted in outcomes consistent with the liberal majority’s policy views regarding contraception, abortion, and same-sex marriage. Likewise, many liberal legal scholars would consider Bush v. Gore, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, and Students For Fair Admissions v. Harvard to be political decisions because in each case, the Court’s majority was comprised of conservative justices.

The point is that, in a small number of cases, the justices’ opinions consistently reflect their political views, regardless of whether they are conservative or liberal. Thus, to the extent that the Court is perceived as a political institution, both conservative and liberal justices bear some blame. Consider the following:

  • Would Justice Elena Kagan, Justice Jackson, or Justice Sotomayor ever vote to restrict access to abortion?
  • Would Justice Thomas or Justice Alito ever vote to restrict when the death penalty can be imposed?
  • Would Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson ever vote to invalidate an affirmative action policy?
  • Would Justice Thomas or Justice Alito ever vote to restrict partisan gerrymandering?
  • Would Justice Kagan or Justice Sotomayor ever hold that the Constitution does not protect the right to same-sex marriage?

The answers to these questions should be obvious.

To make matters worse, when the political affiliations of the Court’s members change, the Court’s view of the Constitution – and fundamental rights – often changes. For example, for nearly fifty years, Roe v. Wade, where the Court held that the right to privacy encompasses a woman’s choice to terminate a pregnancy (in most instances), was considered settled law, particularly after the Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey reaffirmed Roe’s central holding. But after Justice Kavanaugh replaced Justice Kennedy, and Justice Barrett replaced Justice Ginsburg, the Court in Dobbs overturned Roe and suddenly discovered that the Constitution did not protect a right to abortion.

Why was Roe overturned? Because the Court now had more conservative than liberal members. One must wonder how the majority could not possibly realize that their decision would be perceived as purely political. The same goes for the justices who voted in Roe to find that the Constitution protects the right to terminate a pregnancy – a right found nowhere in the Constitution.

Cases such as Roe, Obergefell, and Dobbs show why the Court is perceived as a political institution and why its institutional legitimacy is affected negatively. Indeed, when the Court accepts for review cases involving issues such as abortion or the death penalty, most people know exactly how the justices will vote. They know that the justices will reach outcomes that so conveniently comport with their policy preferences. That is the reality, and even if it is not accurate, it is the perception. And perception is reality.

Additionally, conservative and liberal media commentators worsen the situation because they report on only the most controversial cases and, depending on the result that the Court reaches, promote the distorted perception that the Court is primarily a political institution. This is a recipe for undermining the Court’s legitimacy.

Ultimately, in Griswold, Roe, Obergefell, and Dobbs, were most justices basing their decisions on their political preferences? Yes.

B.    Solutions to increase public perception of the Court’s legitimacy.

Regardless of the Court’s many unanimous and super-majority decisions, its decisions in cases such as Roe and Dobbs undermined the Court’s legitimacy. Is there a solution that could help to restore that legitimacy? Below are two suggestions.

    1.    Deny certiorari unless the challenged law likely violates the Constitution’s text.

The Court should not grant certiorari unless a challenged law likely violates the Constitution’s text – not its “penumbras” or whatever unenumerated “right” that the substantive due process might invent. For example, in Citizens United v. FEC, did the First Amendment’s text clearly support the invalidation of a statute that strived to reduce the influence of money on federal elections? In Clinton v. New York, did the Presentment Clause clearly support invalidating the Line-Item Veto Act, which sought to reduce wasteful government spending? In Kennedy v. Louisiana, did the Eighth Amendment clearly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty for individuals who raped children under the age of twelve? In Roe v. Wade, did the Fourteenth Amendment clearly prohibit states from prohibiting abortion?

The answer is no.

So why did the Court decide these issues for an entire nation, often by a 5-4 vote? Your answer is as good as mine. Unless you believe that the Court should be guided by “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”[5]

When the Constitution is ambiguous and subject to alternative interpretations, the Court should not intervene. It should allow the states to resolve these issues democratically or, in the case of federal legislation, defer to the coordinate branches. When nine unelected and life-tenured judges decide an issue for an entire nation, especially by a 5-4 margin where the majority’s decision so conveniently aligns with the justices’ political beliefs, you have a recipe for disaster.

If you believe that this suggestion is unwise, consider Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in National Federation of Independent Investors v. Sebelius and what may have motivated his decision.

    2.    Require a six-vote super-majority to overturn a lower court decision.

When the Court decides cases by a 5-4 vote, and those votes reflect little more than partisan division, that decision is likely to undermine the Court’s legitimacy. Put differently, should the law for an entire country depend on a one-vote majority at the Court, where those votes align with each justice’s policy preferences? No.

Instead, to overturn a lower court decision, the Court should be required to reach a six-vote super majority. Doing so would encourage compromise, consensus, and moderation, and lead to incremental, not drastic changes in the law. And it would prohibit a bare liberal or conservative majority from changing the law for an entire nation, particularly on divisive social issues. Indeed, had a six-vote supermajority been in effect when Dobbs was decided, abortion would still be legal until fifteen weeks of pregnancy. If a six-vote supermajority had been in effect when Citizens United was decided, money would likely not have the corruptive influence in politics that it does today.

Some might argue that this approach would prevent the Court from resolving circuit splits on matters of public importance. So what? There are many circuit splits where the Court denies certiorari, thus leaving them unresolved. We should not pretend that the Court’s responsibility is to resolve every circuit split or injustice that affects the country because the reality is quite the opposite. Furthermore, if there is a circuit split, such that the law is interpreted and applied differently in different states, why is that necessarily undesirable? This is already the norm, not the exception, and the incredibly small number of cases that the Court decides each term has only a marginal impact on that reality. And if you believe that the Court should defer to democratic choice at the state and federal level when the Constitution is ambiguous, a six-vote supermajority requirement would facilitate achieving that objective – as would an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation.

If the Court had less power, and intervened less often, the people, not nine unelected justices, would have “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”[6]

***

Attacks on the Court’s legitimacy reflect little more than disagreement with decisions that conservatives or liberals do not like. As Justice Kennedy stated, “[a]n activist court is a court that makes a decision you don't like.”[7] The conservative and liberal media – and politicians – do a terrible disservice when they attack the Court with inflammatory comments that influence the public’s perception of the Court’s legitimacy. Having said that, if the Court wants to shed the perception that it is a political institution, it should stop deciding cases that are so politically divisive. Along with a super-majority requirement, this will help to insulate the Court from attacks on its legitimacy, however unfair such attacks may be.

 

[1] PolitiFact | Despite popular misconception, Supreme Court 9-0 rulings are not that rare

[2] See id.

[3] See id.

[4] Michael D. Berry, The Numbers Reveal a United Supreme Court – And a Few Surprises (Aug. 2, 2023), available at: The Numbers Reveal a United Supreme Court, and a Few Surprises | The Federalist Society (fedsoc.org)

[5] Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).

[6] Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

[7] CBS News, Justice Kennedy: Senators Focus on Short-Term (May 14, 2010), available at: Justice Kennedy: Senators Focus on Short-Term - CBS News

May 26, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Law School, Legal Ethics, Legal Profession, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, May 19, 2024

A Font by Any Other Name Does Not Read the Same

Last week, I argued a case in the Tenth Circuit, my first time in that court. Upon arrival in the courtroom, but before that day’s arguments began, the bailiff provided a quick tutorial about how the 15 minutes of oral argument works. A computer display screen to the left of the podium counted down time from 15:00 against a green background at the beginning of each argument. At three minutes remaining, the background screen would become yellow, alerting counsel to the opportunity to reserve some of the remaining time for rebuttal. The bailiff warned that the court likely would continue asking questions even after the request for rebuttal time. In one of the cases before mine, the questions continued one minute past the 15 minutes, but the court afforded the advocate an extra minute for rebuttal.

In every circuit I have appeared other than the Tenth, and I have argued cases in seven other circuits, an advocate asks for a certain amount of time for rebuttal in advance of the argument, either from an inquiry from the clerk’s office well in advance of the argument, or upon checking in that morning. The most frequent amount of time requested in a 15-minute argument is five minutes.

The differences between circuits on that question and others seem odd and haphazard. I was reminded of those differences when I came across a post that laid out different fonts used by different courts in their opinions. The First and Fourth Circuits issue opinions in Courier. The Second and Seventh Circuits utilize Palatino. The Fifth Circuit favors Century Schoolbook, as does the Supreme Court (although its orders are rendered in the very odd Lucida Sans Typewriter) and the Federal Circuit. The rest, the Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh rely on Times New Roman.

The circuits do not necessarily require counsel to follow suit in their briefs. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) requires courts of appeal to accept briefs in any proportional typeface so long as the text’s typeface has serifs and is at least 14-point in size, but sans-serif type may be used in headings and captions. If a monospaced face is used, it may not contain more than 10 1/2 characters per inch.

Even so, the D.C. Circuit issued a notice in 2021 that encourages the use of typefaces that are easier to read, such as Century or Times New Roman, while discouraging the use of Garamond, which the court deemed less legible because it is smaller. The preference exists in the practice handbook, but not in the local rules, strongly suggesting that it is always a good idea to check those official handbooks as well as the court’s own rules, even though the court will still accept other typefaces.

The Seventh Circuit’s practitioner handbook discusses the readability of serif-type fonts and appears to suggest that Century Schoolbook, Baskerville, Bookman, Caslon, Garamond, Georgia, and Times, as well as variations on those names, are preferred serif-type fonts. The Eighth Circuit, under a tab entitled “Rules and Procedures,” has a section called “Research Aids” that links to the Seventh Circuit’s handbook, so it apparently endorses its sister circuit’s discussion.

And don’t get me started on the requirements for cover pages, where the Second Circuit is a major outlier.

The bottom line is that every circuit has its quirks that a practitioner appearing in them needs to understand. These circuit conflicts will not likely arrive at the Supreme Court to resolve.

May 19, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Federal Appeals Courts, Legal Writing, Oral Argument, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, May 14, 2024

Priming for Persuasion

One of the most powerful tools in an advocate’s toolbox is the psychological concept of priming.  Priming “occurs when an individual’s exposure to a certain stimulus influences their response to a subsequent prompt, without any awareness of the connection.”[i]  In other words, “[p]riming plants a seed in the brain [that] . . . causes us to form an impression that we then use to interpret new information.”[ii]

For example, in one famous research study, participants were exposed to a list of words associated with either adventurousness or recklessness.[iii]  The participants were then provided with a story involving a protagonist whose behavior was ambiguous with respect to those traits.[iv]  When later asked to characterize the protagonist’s behavior, participants were more likely to characterize the behavior consistent with the traits reflected in the words they were exposed to before reading the story.[v]

The concept of priming involves the inner workings of long-term memory.[vi]  Our long-term memory creates units known as “schemas,” which allow us more efficient access to memories by activating them through associated sights, smells, and sounds.[vii] “Priming suggests that certain schemas are activated in unison, which leads to related or connected units of information being activated at the same time.”[viii]

There are many kinds of priming[ix] that are relevant in legal writing, and among them are the following:

  • Semantic priming—the association of words in a logical or linguistic way[x]
  • Repetition priming—the repeated pairing of stimulus and response[xi]
  • Perceptual priming—the perception of similarity between two things that may not, in fact, be similar[xii]

For semantic priming, think about rhetorical devices, such as parallelism, alliteration, anaphora, epistrophe, or metaphor to name a few.[xiii]  A famous example is Martin Luther King Jr.’s statement, “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”

For repetition priming, there’s no better public example than Donald Trump’s approach to Robert Mueller’s investigation into potential ties between Trump’s 2016 campaign and Russia.  Over the course of more than two years, when tweeting about the investigation, Trump used the phrase “witch hunt” more than 160 times.[xiv]  A survey conducted around the same time revealed that, while roughly 60% of adults wanted the investigation, half had “‘just some’ or no confidence that a final report . . . would be ‘fair and even-handed.’”[xv]  Additionally, despite the majority support for investigation, 46% of respondents nevertheless believed it would go “too far,” and support for impeachment fell throughout the same time period.[xvi]

For perceptual priming, consider the recent cases of NetChoice v. Paxton and Moody v. NetChoice, wherein the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of laws in both Texas and Florida designed to regulate how social media companies control content posted on their sites.[xvii]  The states argued that social media platforms are common carriers who may not arbitrarily discriminate against users’ speech,[xviii] while the social media companies argued that social media platforms are “traditional media” requiring “editorial discretion over the expression they disseminate.”[xix]  Though social media is truly neither of those things, the parties sought to have the Court perceive social media to be like the one more favorable to their respective positions.[xx]

Priming is persuasive because the connection is made subconsciously by the reader, and readers tend to trust their own conclusions above others.[xxi]  This is sometimes referred to as “‘the ownness bias’ or the tendency of ‘audience members to consider their own thoughts to be stronger than message arguments.’”[xxii]

Here’s where you can use it in your writing:

  • Issue framing. Consider the abortion context; the issue could be framed as either protecting individual reproductive autonomy or protecting the rights of unborn persons.  By framing the issue favorably to your position at the outset, you are priming your audience to view the case through your chosen lens.
  • Factual opening. Imagine a case involving student speech that led to some kind of disruption at school.  The competing values are a student’s First Amendment right to free speech and the school’s compelling interest in a safe and orderly learning environment.  If you represent the student, you want to open your facts section with a focus on the student and value of the speech the student made, thereby priming your audience to also value both the individual and the speech.  On the other hand, if you represent the school, you want to open with the facts underlying the disruption, priming your reader to see chaos and a justifiable need for school intervention.
  • Argument headings. State your argument headings assertively as the conclusions you want your audience to draw. For example, “Trial counsel’s decision to reject the alibi defense was a matter of reasonable trial strategy”; or “The state presented sufficient evidence of the defendant’s deliberation.” The headings prime your reader to view the analysis and legal authority as consistent with those conclusions.
  • Rule statements. When stating the applicable rules, begin with your position as the default outcome.  For example, when advocating in favor of summary judgment, establish granting the motion as the default position: “Summary judgment shall be granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Or, when advocating against the entry of summary judgment, establish denial as the default position:  “Summary judgment should be denied unless the moving party establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Stating the rule with your preferred outcome as the default primes your audience to see your opponent’s position as the exception and yours as the rule.
  • Quotation introductions. Before offering the reader quoted language from either a legal authority, a written document, or witness testimony, prime the reader by summarizing what you want them to understand from the language.  For example,

At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that she strategically chose not to call the alibi witness because his testimony was inconsistent with the chosen justification defense:  “From the beginning, [the defendant] told me he acted in self-defense, and I think the jury would have been confused if we put his brother on the stand to say he was at a party across town the whole time.”

This kind of priming helps focus the reader’s understanding of potentially ambiguous quoted language favorably to your position and align it with your legal authority.

This list is by no means exhaustive, and priming can be used in each of these areas on both large and small structural scales, from general organization down to sentence structure and word choice.  Priming is an exceptionally powerful persuasive tool.  Both using it and recognizing it can make you a more effective advocate.

 

[i] The Decision Lab, Why do some ideas prompt other ideas later on without our conscious awareness?, available at: https://thedecisionlab.com/biases/priming (last visited May 13, 2024).

[ii] Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the Science of First Impressions to Persuade the Reader, 89 Or. L. Rev. 305, 307 (2010).

[iii] Barbara O'Brien & Daphna Oyserman, It's Not Just What You Think, but Also How You Think About It: The Effect of Situationally Primed Mindsets on Legal Judgments and Decision Making, 92 Marq. L. Rev. 149, 152 (2008).

[iv] Id.

[v] Id.

[vi] The Decision Lab, supra, note i.

[vii] Id.

[viii] Id.

[ix] Id.

[x] Id.

[xi] Id.

[xii] Dave Cornell, 15 Priming Examples (in Psychology) (Jan. 3, 2024), available at: https://helpfulprofessor.com/priming-examples-psychology/ (last visited May 13, 2024).  This site also contains information about additional forms of priming, such as associative priming, cultural priming, affective priming, and more.

[xiii] For definitions of these terms and other common rhetorical devices, see https://www.merriam-webster.com/grammar/rhetorical-devices-list-examples (last visited May 13, 2024).

[xiv] Madison Pauly, Are Trump’s Attacks on Mueller Working? (Jan. 27, 2019), available at https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/01/are-trumps-attacks-on-mueller-working/ (last visited on May 13, 2024).

[xv] Id.

[xvi] Id.

[xvii] Amy Howe, Social Media Content Moderation Laws Come Before the Supreme Court (Feb. 23, 2024), available at:  https://www.scotusblog.com/2024/02/social-media-content-moderation-laws-come-before-supreme-court/ (last visited May 13, 2024).

[xviii] Brief of Petitioners, Moody v. NetChoice, available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22-277/291860/20231130111448519_2023-11-30%20Final%20NetChoice%20merits%20brief.pdf (last visited May 13, 2024).

[xix] Brief of Respondents, Moody v. NetChoice, available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22-277/291860/20231130111448519_2023-11-30%20Final%20NetChoice%20merits%20brief.pdf (last visited May 13, 2024).

[xx] Howe, supra, note xvii.

[xxi] See Michael J. Higdon, Something Judicious This Way Comes . . . the Use of Foreshadowing As A Persuasive Device in Judicial Narrative, 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1213, 1225 (2010) (“studies show that when processing messages readers are more persuaded by conclusions that are implicit rather than explicit, especially when the reader is more involved in the communication”).

[xxii] Id.

May 14, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Legal Writing, Rhetoric | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, May 11, 2024

How To Change Someone's Mind

It is not easy to convince a judge (or any audience) to adopt your point of view, especially when the audience has a firmly entrenched and opposing opinion. Below are a few tips that can maximize the persuasive value of your arguments and enhance your likelihood of success.

1.    Craft a powerful story by showing, not telling.

People are captivated by powerful narratives.

When making an argument, focus on the facts of your case and tell a compelling – and concise – story in which you demonstrate that a result in your favor would be the most fair, just, and equitable outcome. Think of your argument like a fiction book or a movie, in which you do the following:

  • Begin with a powerful opening theme that hooks the audience.
  • Provide the audience with the necessary background facts while omitting irrelevant or extraneous facts.
  • Use the Rule of Three to structure your argument by providing the audience with three reasons justifying your position.
  • Emphasize the most favorable facts that support your argument.
  • Never ignore unfavorable facts; instead, explain why they do not affect the outcome you seek.
  • Use active verbs and vivid descriptions to enable the jury to visualize the story in their minds.
  • Whether in writing or during an oral argument, adopt a composed, mature, and confident demeanor and avoid unnecessary emotion, drama, or over-the-top language.
  • Put yourself in the shoes of your audience and craft your story based on, among other things, the questions and concerns that you expect will arise.

Consider the following examples involving a defamation claim.

Example 1: “In this case, the defendant made defamatory statements about the plaintiff and those statements caused the plaintiff to suffer damages. As we will show, the statements meet the definition of defamation under the relevant legal standards, and no defenses are available that can excuse or otherwise justify the defendant’s statements. We will demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements were defamatory and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages.”

This statement is about as bland as it gets. Furthermore, it does not show the court anything. For example, it does not identify the precise statements that were defamatory, detail to specific reputational harm suffered, or explain why any potential defenses lack merit. It merely tells the court what happened and tells the court what to do. That is not persuasive at all.

Example 2: “The First Amendment is not a license to destroy a person’s reputation. On January 21, 2024, the plaintiff, Sharon Connor, who is the owner of Health Foods Market in the small town of Seashore, New Jersey, awoke at 6:30 a.m. and turned on her computer to respond to emails from several of her employees. One of those emails informed Sharon that, on the website, www.trashmyemployer.com, an employee whom Sharon recently terminated after three consecutive negative performance reviews had posted degrading and demeaning comments about Sharon. They included the following: “Sharon is a Nazi sympathizer;” “Sharon discriminates in the hiring process based on a person’s ethnicity and religious beliefs;” “Sharon artificially inflates prices and mocks the customers for being too stupid to notice;” and “Sharon treats her employees so badly that they are routinely traumatized after leaving work.” In Seashore, New Jersey, a small town where ‘everybody knows your name,’ Sharon was ridiculed, insulted, and ostracized from the community that she had called home for thirty years. She lost friends. Her business has suffered a thirty-five percent decline in profit. And twenty-five percent of her employees have quit. In short, this case implicates precisely what defamation law is designed to protect: a person’s reputation.”

This example is certainly not perfect, but you get the point. It begins with a theme. It tells a story by offering specific and vivid details. Additionally, it shows (not tells) the court why it should rule in the plaintiff’s favor. As such, it is far more persuasive than the first example.

Judges (and most people) do not like to be told what to do or how to think. Rather, they want you to give them the facts in a way that enables them to reach the most fair and just outcome.

2.    Obtain agreement over common values.

When addressing an audience, you are more likely to persuade the audience to rule in your favor if the audience agrees with the common values that undergird your argument. Indeed, when you and your audience, such as a judge or jury, begin a discussion from a point of agreement rather than contention, your likelihood of reaching a positive outcome or, at the very least, a reasonable compromise, increases.

Consider the following hypothetical example of an advocate trying to convince a hostile judge to adopt his or her position that the Constitution does not protect a right to abortion:

Example 1: “Your Honor, the Constitution says absolutely nothing about abortion, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence establishing a right to abortion is deeply flawed. The fact is that abortion involves the killing of human life, and it has nothing to do with a woman’s bodily autonomy. Sanctioning the murder of human life is antithetical to every value upon which this country is founded, and women should know that when they get pregnant, they are responsible for a life other than their own.”

This argument is so awful that it will alienate the judge and ensure that you lose. No one likes to be talked down to in such a condescending manner and told that they are wrong. Advocates who adopt such categorical positions are likely to be viewed as ignorant of the complexities that legal issues invariably present. Moreover, the argument is so politically charged that even the advocate’s most ardent supporters might question the advocate’s competency.

Example 2: “Your Honor, the decision whether to have an abortion is deeply personal and private. And we certainly respect a woman’s right to make that difficult decision in consultation with a woman’s health care provider. Our argument is not about the morality of having an abortion. Rather, it is simply about giving the people of each state the authority to decide whether abortion should be legal in their state. Some states may allow it; some may not. But at the end of the day, this is a decision to be made by the people of each state, not nine unelected judges.”

In this example, which is again not perfect, the advocate recognizes that abortion is a complex issue that is deeply personal and private to the individual. Also, the advocate is not denying the fundamental proposition that a woman should have the right to make this decision. Instead, the advocate is arguing that citizens, not the Court, should have the authority to determine the legality of abortion, which will almost certainly guarantee that abortion will be legal in many, if not most, of the states. Of course, this will still upset many abortion supporters, but at the very least it will demonstrate that you are not fundamentally opposed to abortion itself.

This is not to say, of course, that you will win by taking the latter approach. But you will have a more persuasive impact, maintain your credibility, and possibly get the swing justice(s) to rule in your favor or agree to a compromise.

3.    Show that you have empathy and maturity.

Excellent advocates show empathy for an opposing view, recognize the reasonableness of the opponent’s position, and acknowledge the nuances that most legal issues present. Indeed, people have different views based on their experiences and backgrounds. Displaying empathy for opposing views enhances your credibility, makes you likable, and shows that you possess humility and maturity.

Consider the following examples regarding an argument over whether the death penalty should be authorized for the rape of a child.

Example 1: “Your Honor, killing a defendant for the crime of child rape makes no sense whatsoever. The victim in this case is not dead. The victim will fully recover, and because the victim is only ten, will go on to lead a long and productive life. For these reasons, imposing the death penalty on the defendant, who has never killed anyone, is grossly disproportionate to the crime, and permitting the state to murder a child rapist is worse than the act of child rape itself. Anyone who advocates otherwise shows little regard for the sanctity of human life.”

That argument is so bad that even those who may agree with your position may be turned off by the sheer lack of empathy and insensitivity to the gravity of such a horrific crime. It will also likely offend anyone who supports the argument that you just attacked, particularly the victim’s family. And if you make this argument to a jury, you will alienate the jury and come off as an insensitive jerk.

Example 2: “Your Honor, raping a child is a horrific crime. Few words could capture the trauma and devastation that such a heinous act causes and anyone who commits such a crime should be subject to severe punishment. Our position is not that the defendant should not be punished, but rather that the death penalty, given the Court’s jurisprudence, is not the appropriate punishment. Instead, we respectfully submit that sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment without parole will reflect both the proportionality of the offense committed and impose the punishment deserved.”

This argument is better because it empathizes with the victim, acknowledges the irreparable harm caused, and recognizes that severe punishment is warranted. Furthermore, the alternative punishment proposed is reasonable given the gravity of the offense. Ultimately, having empathy shows that you have maturity, compassion, and humility. So make sure that you are respectful and measured and that you never demean an adversary, the court, or the victim of a crime. Instead, conduct yourself with class, dignity, and civility, and realize that most rational people despise jerks. No one likes narcissists. No one likes people who are condescending or insufferable loudmouths.

4.    Focus on the consequences of adopting a particular position.

Judges and juries are human beings. They are not robots. They want to reach outcomes that they believe are just and fair.

As such, they do not mindlessly apply the law without any regard for the present and future consequences that will result from a decision or a verdict. This is especially true given that, in most cases, precedent does not provide a clear answer to a current legal question, and considering that, in many instances, a law or constitutional provision is ambiguous and capable of different interpretations.  Thus, when trying to persuade a court, do not simply engage in a hyper-technical legal analysis that shows no appreciation for the real-world consequences of a ruling in your favor.

Consider the following examples concerning two advocates who are arguing that law enforcement officers should not, under the Fourth Amendment, be allowed to search a suspect’s cell phone incident to arrest.

Example 1: “Mr. Chief Justice, and Members of the Court, the Court’s search incident to arrest jurisprudence makes clear that the primary purpose of warrantless searches incident to arrest is to preserve evidence and protect officer safety. Although the Court has expanded the search incident to arrest doctrine to include searches of closed containers and passenger compartments, it has never applied the doctrine to cellular telephones. And for good reason. Warrantless searches of cell phones do not implicate evidence preservation or officer safety. Thus, expanding the doctrine to include cell phones would completely unmoor the search incident to arrest doctrine from its original purposes and finds no support in the Court’s precedent.”

This argument is not terrible, but it misses the point. The Supreme Court has the authority to limit or expand precedent whenever a majority votes to do so. The Court also has the authority to overrule, disregard, or distinguish its precedent. Thus, the Court will be less concerned with strictly adhering to its precedent and more with the real-world consequences of its decision on future cases involving warrantless searches incident to arrest.

Example 2: “Mr. Chief Justice, and Members of the Court, the original purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect citizens’ private papers and effects, which at that time were stored in the home, from unreasonable and warrantless searches. Indeed, the privacy protections that lie at the heart of the Fourth Amendment – and this Court’s jurisprudence – are sacrosanct, and this Court has exercised circumspection when permitting warrantless searches into citizens’ private space. That principle is at issue – and under attack – today because, in the Twentieth Century, cell phones house the private papers and effects that, at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s adoption, were traditionally stored in the home. Cell phones store, among other things, personally identifying information, private photographs, financial information, email and text messages, internet browsing and purchasing history, and personal contacts and telephone numbers. To permit law enforcement to search a cell phone without a warrant in the Twentieth Century is equivalent to permitting law enforcement to search homes without a warrant in the Eighteenth Century. It would permit vast and suspicionless intrusions into private spaces and property and allow the types of warrantless fishing expeditions that the Fourth Amendment and this Court’s jurisprudence prohibit. In essence, privacy rights would become a thing of the past, and warrantless searches into the most private aspects of a citizen’s life would be a thing of the future. It would, simply stated, render the Fourth Amendment meaningless.”

This argument, while again not perfect, is more effective because it brings to the Court’s attention the real-world consequences of a decision allowing warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest. And those consequences would be substantial. Privacy rights would be significantly weakened, and law enforcement would be permitted to do exactly what the Fourth Amendment prohibits: warrantless and suspicionless searches of a citizen’s most private information. Faced with such consequences, it should come as no surprise that in Riley v. California, the Court held unanimously that warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest violated the Fourth Amendment.

5.    Listen and do not interrupt.

This requires little explanation.

They often say that those who get their way are the ones who talk the loudest. In other words, intolerable jerks usually get what they want because people will do anything to shut them up. This approach may work in a faculty meeting, but it will not work in a courtroom.

Good advocates know how to talk less and listen more. Being a good listener shows that you have humility. It also enables you to identify the specific concerns that judges have when evaluating the merits of your case and to adjust your argument accordingly. Additionally, it shows that you recognize weaknesses in your argument and are willing to address them thoroughly and explain why they do not affect the outcome you seek.

Consider the following example:

Example: “Your Honor, I respectfully submit that the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution encompasses a right to assisted suicide.”

Judge: “Well counsel, when we speak of the liberty protected by the –”

Counsel: “Your Honor the Supreme Court has been clear that the word liberty encompasses substantive rights, and no right is more central to liberty than having the right to determine the manner and method by which one dies.”

Judge: “I understand that, but what I’m trying to determine is if the liberty protected must be –”

Counsel: “Your Honor, the Supreme Court has already held that the word liberty protects personal privacy, and nothing could be more private than the decision on when to terminate one’s life.”

Judge: “Let me finish. I am concerned about whether the liberty interests protected under the Fourteenth Amendment must be deeply rooted in history and tradition.”

Counsel: “I apologize Your Honor. I misinterpreted your question.”

This attorney is a moron. The attorney looked foolish and unprofessional and was so oblivious that the attorney stated that the question, which the attorney never allowed the judge to ask, was misinterpreted. Doing something like this will destroy your credibility, infuriate the judge, and make it all but certain that you will lose your case.  It will also ensure that, if married, your partner will divorce you.

***

Presenting a persuasive argument requires you to use techniques that connect with your audience on a personal level and that convince the audience that your argument leads to the fairest and most just outcome. Using the techniques above will help you maximize your argument’s persuasive value and your likelihood of success.

May 11, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Law School, Legal Profession, Legal Writing, Moot Court, Oral Argument, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 6, 2024

Belly Buttons and Punctuation

My colleague Diana Simon is my hero--my punctuation and grammar hero. Whenever I have a grammar or punctuation related question, she is the FIRST person that I go to (after Google of course).* In fact just last week I asked her if case law was one word or two. She replied that writing guru Bryan Garner prefers one word, but she and I agreed that we preferred two.

Diana publishes a column on writing and grammar in the Arizona Attorney magazine. Her latest column--Unlike Belly Buttons, Commas and Periods with Quotation Marks Cannot Be Innies or Outies--is a must read. It is a must read not just for its superb humor (a few examples of which I will provide below), but also because it addresses a pervasive problem in writing.  As Diana explains,

the increased placement of period and comma “outies” when quotation marks are used is out of control. Based purely on anecdotal evidence (well, I guess no evidence at all, then), I estimate that the placement of periods and commas outside quotation marks has increased by 165.56 percent.

And while Diana might claim that she has no evidence, she did acknowledge that she has seen an increased improper use of commas, periods, and quotation marks in her student papers. I agree.

So why is this a problem. Well, again Diana explains it well:

When you are a legal writing professor, seeing this trend [improper use of punctuation and quotation marks] can result in, among other things, loss of sleep, loss of hair (from pulling it out), and loss of nails (from biting them).

You might think I am being a tad overdramatic, but I can assure you the improper use of “outies” is a serious offense among legal writing professors. We lead very dull lives, so an issue such as the misplacement of punctuation with quotation marks can cause quite a stir. 

#truth.  I tell my students each semester that they are in America, and as such they MUST put periods and commas inside of quotation marks. If they don't like that rule, they can go become a barrister rather than a lawyer. Diana's article, in fact, tries to recount the history of why our punctuation conventions are historically different in America and why so many people seem to be forgetting those differences in everyday writing. Diana ends the article with the "rules for semicolons, colons, and question marks with quotation marks because there is a whole wide punctuation world that we live in beyond periods and commas, and we don’t want any other punctuation marks to feel left out."    

In short, read this article. Assign it to your students. Hopefully the belly button analogy will stick with them and improve punctuation usage.

*Diana is not, however, my citation hero. But that is a story for a different blog post.

May 6, 2024 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, May 5, 2024

Justices, Not Judges

This past week, I had the privilege of opening the Mid-Year Conference of the California Judges Association with a speech about the rule of law and how we can preserve it. The topic was one the group requested, and it provided me with a welcome opportunity to consider the indefinite meaning of the rule of law without specific laws it seeks to establish as the normative structures of society, its malleability throughout our nation’s history, and the many revolutionary ways it has changed and will likely change in the future.

In this post, however, I do not plan to get into that heavy subject, but instead relate an anecdote about one oral argument at the Supreme Court that exemplifies how the rule of law is really a rule of acceptable norms, not necessarily law itself. I opened my remarks with this story.

When one argues a case at the Supreme Court, upon checking in, you are handed two cards, slightly larger than a business card. One provides a kind of aerial view of the bench, showing the curved bench with boxes depicting the array of the justices, the positions of the marshal and clerk, and the place of counsel at the podium. Each person is depicted as a number, and a legend indicates who each number represents. It provides you with a reminder of where each justice sits.

A second card serves two purposes. One purpose is as an admission ticket that lets court personnel in the courtroom know that you belong at counsel’s table as counsel in a specific case. It also has three instructions. First, it reminds you that you should not speak until acknowledged by the chief justice. Second, it tells you that you should not introduce yourself but begin with the familiar, “May it please the Court, …” And, finally, it says that if you address a member of the Court, it should be as “Chief Justice” or “Justice …,” not judge, with that word italicized on the card.

More than 20 years ago, a novice violated the last of these admonitions, not once, but three times, possibly due to nerves. In response to questions from Justice Kennedy and then Justice Souter, she addressed them as judges. Each time, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist corrected her by saying that’s “Justice ______.” No doubt, the cognoscenti in the courtroom silently clucked at such a faux pas by an advocate. Not long afterwards, however, she compounded these episodes by calling the chief justice “judge.” Rehnquist then said, “Counsel is admonished that this Court is composed of justices, not judges.

Stunned and chastened, the advocate hesitated to say another word, but Justice Stevens interrupted, as he was often prone to do to make counsel more comfortable. He said, “It’s OK, Counsel. The Constitution makes the same mistake.”

Indeed, the Constitution, in Article III, refers to “judges” of the supreme and inferior courts as holding office during good behavior – the only other mention of a member of the Supreme Court is in the impeachment article, where it states that the “Chief Justice” shall preside when the president is subject to an impeachment trial.

Even if the Constitution designates members of the Supreme Court as “judges,” no advocate will ignore the norm that members of that court are called justices, and the card advocates receive continue to tell them not to use the word “judge.” Even though the Constitution is the “supreme law of the land,” it does not supply the rule of law when addressing the Court. Instead, another norm does. That means that while we venerate the rule of law and some of the Court’s end-of-the-term rulings may have many questioning what happened to the rule of law, the admiration and allegiance we hold to the concept reflects only our personal perceptions about the substance of law and how we legitimately determine that substance. Keep that in mind as you review the momentous decisions we expect from the Court this term, and when you ask any appellate court to reach a decision.

May 5, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Oral Argument, Rhetoric, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 30, 2024

Lessons in Resilience from Moot Court

Dumier high tribunal of judges

Last year marked my 25th year of coaching moot court. This year was the first year for our program to win ABA NAAC. I think the two are related, and wanted to share some thoughts on what I've learned over the years.

First, moot court, like many skill exercises, prepares students for work in many ways. They learn principles of rhetoric that are too frequently untaught. They learn the importance of standards of review, limiting principles, and the potential impact of new law to judges. And, of course, they learn to organize and simplify their thoughts on both print and at the podium.

But moot court teaches much more than that. It teaches students time-management skills. They learn to collaborate with others. They learn accountability. And they learn to lose.

That last lesson is, I think, key. Even before COVID, psychologists were noting a serious decline in resilience among incoming college students. Many students had become afraid to take risks, because failure was seen as catastrophic. As a result, they had begun to avoid public speaking or competition, and to instead demand easier grading, do-overs, and other safety measures that ensured they would not make lasting mistakes. Or learn from them.

Then COVID hit. Whatever problems were brewing before that were magnified by the isolation and trauma many young people felt.

Studies in resilience show that it has several predictors. High self-esteem and strong social attachments help. And exposure to stressors, in moderation, can build up a sense of resilience. Some have taken to calling this latter form of resilience "grit."

Moot court teaches grit. It teaches students (the vast majority of them, at least) that they will not always win. That sometimes, this will seem subjective and unfair. And that they need to learn from those failures, grow, and try again. It teaches them that failure is fuel.

Our program's success this year was carried by a lot of that fuel. Nine years ago we made it to ABA NAAC nationals and lost. One of those competitors was so fueled by that loss that she became my co-coach, just to help us get back and try again. Three years ago we made it to ABA NAAC finals. We lost again. Those students have volunteered to guest judge every year since. And this year, my teams lost in finals at our state competition, and lost at NY Bar Nationals. Then a dry cleaner lost one student's suits, and an earthquake hit during the competition itself.

None of that mattered. By then, these students had resilience to spare. They had heard the stories, they had experienced the losses, and they wanted nothing more than to keep going, and daring for greater things. And with that resilience, built over a decade of pain in this competition, we won.

Teddy Roosevelt is often quoted for saying:

“It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again... who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly.”

We need to teach our students to dare greatly. Moot court helps them learn to do just that.

April 30, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Law School, Moot Court, Oral Argument, Rhetoric | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, April 27, 2024

Lessons in Appellate Advocacy from the Supreme Court's Oral Argument in Trump v. United States

The recent oral argument before the United States Supreme Court in Trump v. United States, which concerns presidential immunity, provides several lessons about how to argue a case effectively and persuasively. Although the attorneys for the petitioner and respondent used their persuasive advocacy skills to varying degrees of effectiveness, both did so very competently and demonstrated why they are elite advocates. Below are a few lessons in advocacy that were on display at the oral argument.

1.    Have a strong introduction.

Make a great first impression with a strong introduction.  Begin with a powerful opening theme. Tell the court precisely what remedy you seek. And explain why, in a structured and organized way, the Court should rule in your favor. For example, use the Rule of Three, namely, provide the Court with three reasons that support your argument and the remedy sought.

In Trump, the lawyers for the petitioner and the respondent had effective and persuasive introductions. They opened with a strong theme. They got to the point quickly. They explained in detail and with specificity why the Court should rule in their favor. Doing so enabled both lawyers to, among other things, start strong, gain credibility with the Court, and frame the issues in a light most favorable to their side.

2.    Answer the Court’s questions directly and honestly.

Regardless of how persuasive your introduction is, the justices will express concerns about various legal, factual, or policy issues that impact the strength of your case. Thus, when the justices ask questions, particularly those that express skepticism of your argument, view it as an opportunity to address the justices’ concerns and present persuasively the merits of your position. In so doing, make sure to always answer the questions directly and honestly, as any attempt to evade the questions will harm your credibility. Additionally, if necessary, acknowledge weaknesses in your case (e.g., unfavorable facts or law), and explain why those weaknesses do not affect the outcome you seek. Also, be sure never to react defensively in response to a question; instead, act like you expected the question and use the question to enhance your argument’s persuasiveness.

During the oral argument in Trump, the lawyers for the petitioner and respondent were well-prepared, answered the Court’s questions effectively, and conceded unfavorable facts where appropriate. As a result, they maintained their credibility and enhanced the persuasive value of their arguments.

3.    Speak conversationally and confidently.

During oral argument with an appellate court, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, adopt a conversational tone and confident demeanor. Recognize that the Court is trying its best to reach a fair result that is consistent with the law and the facts. The law and facts, however, often do not dictate a particular outcome, and sometimes judges are left with little more than a desire to reach what they believe will be the best result. Indeed, judges are human, and when they return home after a long day, and their partner asks how their day was, the last thing judges want to say is “Well, I decided several cases that led to horrible outcomes. Other than that, it was a wonderful day.”

As such, your role, while advocating zealously for your client, should be to have a conversation with the Court in which you acknowledge the Court’s concerns and the policy implications of the outcome you seek, and convince a majority of the justices that the result you seek is fair and equitable. Put differently, while you must advocate zealously for your client, you should also display some degree of objectivity that shows an awareness of, among other things, opposing points of view and weaknesses in your case.

During oral argument, both advocates spoke conversationally and confidently and never appeared uncertain, surprised, or equivocal. Projecting confidence is critical to maximizing the persuasiveness of your argument, and speaking conversationally ensures that you can communicate your argument effectively.

4.    Be mindful of your pacing, tone, and non-verbal communication.

It is not just what you say. It is how you say it. Thus, when making an argument, be sure not to speak too quickly. Do not use over-the-top language or attack your adversary. Use strategic pauses to thoughtfully respond to the Court’s questions and transition effectively to different arguments. Never show frustration, surprise, or combativeness in response to a question. Instead, show that you are a composed and thoughtful advocate who listens well, and forms reasoned responses to difficult questions.

Also, be mindful of your non-verbal communication, including your appearance, body language, facial expressions, posture, eye contact, and hand gestures, as non-verbal communication can enhance or detract from the persuasiveness of your argument.

During the oral argument, both advocates avoided speaking too quickly and rushing through their points. They never displayed a combative and adversarial tone. They spoke clearly and articulately, and in a manner that made their arguments straightforward, organized, and easy to understand.

5.    Adjust your argument strategy based on the Court’s questions.

When you begin an oral argument, you know what points you want to emphasize. But the justices may want to discuss other things, and a good advocate recognizes this and adjusts accordingly.

Consider the following example:

Advocate: Your Honor, the warrantless search of the suspect’s house in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the victim’s body was visible to the officer and therefore the search falls within the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.

Justice: But counsel, the officer was unlawfully on private property when she saw the victim’s body, rendering the plain view exception inapplicable. However, it seems that the exigency exception applies because the victim was still breathing, although gravely injured when the officer encountered the victim and entered the home.

Advocate: Your Honor, the plain view exception applies because the officer was on public, not private, property, and as a result, it applies squarely to this case.

Justice: Well let’s assume that I conclude that it was private property. Doesn’t the exigency exception apply?

Advocate: Your Honor, this was public property. The plain view exception is clearly applicable.

***

The advocate’s performance in this colloquy was simply awful.

The justice is unquestionably signaling to the advocate that he or she believed that the exigency, not the plain view, exception to the Fourth Amendment applied to justify the warrantless search. But the advocate, for some reason, did not perceive or simply ignored this and adhered rigidly to his or her argument. That can be a fatal mistake. As stated above, although you may want to emphasize specific points, the justices may not care about those points and instead want to discuss other issues that, in their view, may be dispositive. When that happens, adjust your strategy in the moment and respond to the justices’ concerns. Do not be afraid to abandon your oral argument strategy if, as the argument unfolds, it becomes clear that the case will be decided on facts, law, or policy considerations that you did not anticipate.

During the oral argument, nothing like this occurred because the lawyers for the petitioner and the respondent were far too skilled, intelligent, and experienced to make this mistake.

6.    Be aware of the dynamics in the room and realize that there is only so much you can do.

Judges often have opinions on how to decide a case after reading the parties’ briefs and before the oral argument. Although oral argument can, in some instances, persuade the justices to reconsider their views, oral argument sometimes consists of the justices trying to convince each other to adopt their respective positions, without much regard for what you have to say.

Put simply, sometimes the outcome is preordained. For example, in Trump v. Anderson, it was obvious early in the oral argument that the Court would overturn the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision holding that former President Trump was not eligible to be on Colorado’s primary ballot. If you are faced with this situation, realize that all you can do is make the best possible argument, knowing that losing the case is not a reflection of the quality of your advocacy but rather a reflection of the justices’ predetermined views. In Trump v. Anderson, for example, Jason Murray, the attorney representing the respondents, did an excellent job of making a credible argument despite the obvious fact that the Court would not rule in his favor.

Also, realize that you are not a magician or a miracle worker. Judges can have strongly held views and the results that they reach sometimes have little, if anything, to do with what you said or did not say during an oral argument. If you are arguing that Roe v. Wade was correctly decided and should be reaffirmed, nothing you say is going to convince Justices Thomas or Alito to adopt your position. Likewise, you are not going to convince Justice Sotomayor that affirmative action programs are unconstitutional. You are also not going to convince Justice Alito that the substantive due process doctrine should remain vibrant in the Court’s jurisprudence. Knowing this, focus on the justices that are receptive to your argument, particularly the swing justices, and tailor your argument to their specific concerns. And, if they ask ‘softball’ questions, be sure to seize that opportunity to make your case persuasively because they are using you to convince the swing justices.

Surely, during oral argument, the lawyers for the petitioner and the respondent knew which justices were receptive to their arguments, which were hostile, and which were undecided. And they addressed swing justices’ questions effectively and persuasively.

7.    Be reasonable.

If you want to retain your credibility, make sure that your argument – and the remedy you seek – is reasonable. Advocating for an extreme or unprecedented result that departs significantly from the Court’s jurisprudence, or that leads to a terrible policy outcome, will get you nowhere. For example, during the oral argument in Trump, Justice Sotomayor asked counsel for Trump whether his argument for absolute presidential immunity would allow a president to assassinate a political rival. Trump’s counsel responded by stating that it would depend on the hypothetical and could constitute an “official act,” thus triggering absolute immunity. Most, if not all, judges would reject this argument because it is simply ridiculous to contend that a president could assassinate political rivals with impunity.

Thus, be reasonable when presenting your arguments and requesting specific remedies. Every argument has weaknesses that those with different perspectives will expose. As such, in most cases, avoid absolute or categorical positions that eschew nuance and that prevent the Court from reaching a compromise. Doing so will enhance your credibility and show that you recognize the complexities of the legal issue before the Court.

During the oral argument, the attorney for Trump, although very skilled, arguably advocated for an unreasonable outcome, namely, that the president is always immune from prosecution for official acts done while the president is in office. The problem with this argument, as Justices Sotomayor, Jackson, and Kagan emphasized was that it would allow a president to engage in a wide array of criminal conduct, including the assassination of a political rival, with impunity. That result is simply not reasonable and consistent with the principle that no person is above the law. A better strategy may have been to adopt a more nuanced argument that recognized when, and under what circumstances, presidential immunity should apply, and to give the Court a workable test to distinguish between official and private acts. Adopting an unreasonable position detracted from the persuasiveness of Trump’s argument, and the Court signaled that it would reject this extreme, all-or-nothing approach.

8.    Realize that nothing you do is as important as you think.

Whether you win or lose, the world will keep turning and the sun will rise tomorrow. Sure, there are incredibly impactful cases, such as Brown v. Board of Education, Bush v. Gore, and Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, which significantly affect the rights and liberties of citizens. Your role in influencing that outcome, however, is often far more insubstantial than what you believe, and inversely correlated to the absurd amount of hours you spent litigating the case. Think about it: do you believe that the oral arguments (or briefing, for that matter) in Brown, Bush, or Dobbs caused any of the justices to change their minds? Why do you think that, in some cases, anyone familiar with the Court can predict how the justices will rule before oral argument even occurs? You should know the answer.

Of course, you should still work extremely hard and hold yourself to the highest standards when arguing before a court. Persuasive advocacy skills do matter, particularly in close cases. However, your ability to affect the outcome of a case or the evolution of a court’s jurisprudence is, in some instances, quite minimal, and your inability to reach the outcome you seek is often unrelated to your performance or preparation. So do not put so much pressure on yourself. Have humility and focus on what you can control – and ignore what you cannot. Doing so will help you to cope with the unpredictable and unexpected outcomes that you will experience in the litigation and appellate process. And remember that no matter what happens, life will go on. You should too. And I suspect that the lawyers for the petitioner and the respondent will do precisely that.

***

Ultimately, what matters is not how many cases you win or how much money you make. What matters is the relationships that you form with other people, which are more important than anything that you will do in the law. So don’t sweat the small stuff, because, at the end of the day, it’s all small stuff.

April 27, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Current Affairs, Law School, Legal Profession, Oral Argument, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, April 21, 2024

Absolute Presidential Immunity as an Appellate Strategy

On April 25, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Trump v. United States, the case in which former President Trump’s lawyers will argue, among other things, that a president has absolute immunity from the criminal charges that covers every action of a president. In this instance, they claiming that Trump was advancing electoral integrity when he urged supporters to go to the Capitol on January 6, 2021, which resulted in violence that temporarily halted the tallying electoral votes so that Joseph Biden could take office as the incoming president.

The assertion of absolute immunity may seem incredulous as a strategic choice. Rare is the instance that an appellate advocate should elect to argue the most extreme position possible, particularly when the argument has no textual anchor, no precedential support, and obvious counterarguments. To place a president entirely above the law suggests that the American Revolution, the Constitution, and tradition renders the chief executive a king who wield every possible prerogative and can do no wrong, when we have been taught that the opposite is true.

During argument before the D.C. Circuit, one judge asked whether the president could order Seal Team 6, the elite unit of Navy Seals, to assassinate a political rival. Counsel responded that only impeachment and not criminal prosecution was available under that hypothetical. Judges and the public, expectedly, reacted harshly to that extreme and indefensible position.

The question then, from an advocacy perspective, is why adopt it? Certainly, there are times when a court splits the difference between the positions taken by the two parties, so that the party advocating the most extreme position, as in a negotiation, pulls the center closer to its view. Other times, a position is presented, not to prevail, but to plant a seed that may sprout at a later time. A powerful separate judicial opinion that seeks to justify the position in some instances provides an opportunity to fight another day and to generate more debate and scholarship in favor of the position.

In the Trump case, I doubt that either of these potential outcomes are what his counsel has in mind. Neither is likely to accomplish their client’s current need: the end of the prosecution. Instead, the argument fuels their delay stratagem, which hopes that the trials take place at a time when President Trump can make a triumphant return to the White House and order the Justice Department to drop the prosecutions, or that a defeated candidate who is no longer a threat receives a pardon or other beneficence from the victor to avoid the spectacle of a former president in prison. Still, the argument might produce language, helpful to a defense, about what constitutes the outer boundaries of official action, where the doctrine of qualified immunity provides some guidance.

I expect that this last point is why Trump’s counsel has argued that every act as president is an official act. This argument seeks to goad the Supreme Court into laying down criteria for evaluating when a president is engaged in an official act. Any guidelines are likely to be vague, creating room for exploitation when and if a case goes to trial. While election integrity sounds like official action, the presidency has no specific responsibilities on that issue and exhorting private citizens to march on the Capitol to keep an eye on Congress hardly sounds like official action in support of fair elections.

Still, it is worth noting that the absolute-immunity argument is not counsel’s untethered invention. It borrows from and seeks application of language adopted by the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,[1] which held that former President Nixon was absolutely immune from private civil actions for “official conduct” even at the outer perimeter of presidential authority. In the case, a former air force employee sued the former president on a claim that Nixon had fired him over his whistleblowing testimony before Congress. The Court reasoned that a failure to immunize presidential actions would encourage lawsuits aimed at presidential actions to a degree that would distract a president from the duties of office and chill presidential choices to an extent that would “render an official unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties.”[2] Although the Court took pains to distinguish criminal cases because of their greater public interest and importance, that type of marker can erode over time.

Notably, the Court found no distraction issue in 1997 when it held that then-President Clinton had no immunity from a lawsuit involving sexual allegations that predated his presidency in Clinton v. Jones.[3] Key to the decision was that the allegations concerned private actions unrelated to the exercise of presidential power, thus not creating a concern that it would induce hesitancy about official duties.

While I doubt that the absolute-immunity gambit will work in its purest form, Supreme Court decisions often create new issues that become fodder for future cases or arguments in the same case. In United States v. Nixon,[4] the Court unanimously held that the president could not claim executive privilege to avoid the Watergate special prosecutor’s subpoena for presidential audio tapes. Still, in the course of rejecting the executive-privilege argument, the Court gave executive privilege a firmer foundation than it had ever commanded before. Expect the same for presidential immunity in the opinions that come out of Trump v. United States.

 

[1] 457 U.S. 731 (1982).

[2] Id. at 752 n.32.

[3] 520 U.S. 681 (1997).

[4] 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

April 21, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Federal Appeals Courts, Oral Argument, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, April 20, 2024

An Argument Against Block Quotes

Recently, I saw a long listserv conversation about teaching first-year and LLM students to properly format block quotes. You might remember from your law review days that block quotes are long quotes of “fifty or more words.”  See The Bluebook, Rule 5.1.  Under The Bluebook and other citation manuals, we must set block quotes apart from other text, usually in a single-spaced block of text double-indented from the left and right, with no quotation marks.

Apparently, word processors have made it more difficult to do the left and right indenting needed for block quotes, and the original listserv poster asked for advice on helping students manage block quotes efficiently.  Having noticed the way our Typepad blogging system makes simple indenting more difficult now, and having banned my students from using most block or other long quotes for years, I was intrigued by this thread. 

Some professors on the thread suggested using quotation marks, even in a block quote, to deal with indenting difficulties.  Other professors offered great tips on various word processing program shortcuts and macros to help students properly indent their long quotes.  However, some contributors asked if teaching the format was worth the investment of class time.  The original poster later gave us all a summary of the info gained from the post, and explained that the majority of commenters suggested taking some class time to teach students a tech shortcut. 

To my surprise, I did not see any comments suggesting students simply break apart the quoted material into shorter, more digestible portions for the reader.  Thus, I acknowledge that I might be an outlier here.  Plus, a block quote is much easier to insert into a document–with mere cutting and pasting–than carefully crafted sentences with smaller pieces of the quoted material.  Nonetheless, I ask you to consider clarity and word limits (hopefully in that order), and ban most block quotes from your writing.  

First, think about how often you have actually read the material in a block quote.  Be honest.  If you are like many readers, you tend to skim tightly blocked text, like long brief point headings and block quotes.  See https://proofed.com/writing-tips/5-top-tips-on-how-to-write-for-skim-readers/. Even style manuals allowing the use of block quotes give many tips on how to make sure your reader still gets your point, despite the block quote.  For example, Bryan Garner’s The Redbook Rule 8.10 suggests that we always introduce a block quote with our own assertions, and let the block material simply support our claims.  Just removing the block entirely will increase your chance of the reader truly seeing your ideas.   

Next, think about the lack of clarity from fifty or more words from one source at one time.  Is the material you need from the quote really just on one point?  If so, you likely do not need fifty words or more from the source, added to your own introduction and analysis.  Consider placing the key parts of the quote, likely five to ten words, in your own sentence.  Additionally, if your rationale for using the long block is to cover several points at once, you might be asking too much of your reader.  Your reader will better understand two or three shorter sentences, each with one main point and a relevant short part of the former block quote. 

Finally, look for extra words in the block quote that you don’t need for your point.  Long block quotes are just that; these blocks are long pieces of text that often devour your word count without adding meaningful content.  My students spend a huge amount of time railing against word limits.  Nonetheless, we know word limits are part of any appellate practice.  Thus, I suggest removing long quotes and keeping only what you need.  Sure, you could keep the quote and add ellipses, but too many ellipses are distracting.  See also Jayne T. Woods, The Unnecessary Parenthetical (“Parenthetical”) (April 9, 2024) (explaining research on the way unneeded parentheticals mid-sentence distract readers).  Rather than obscuring your point in a closely-typed long quote with jarring ellipses, use your own words to present the ideas, working in key short quoted phrases.  

Of course, you might have an instance where the clearest and shortest way to convey your point truly is a block quote.  For this reason, I ban most, not all, block quotes.  I urge you to do the same. 

April 20, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Law School, Legal Profession, Legal Writing, Rhetoric | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 15, 2024

Book Review--A Promise Kept

As readers of this blog know, I love a good book.  If the book covers a Supreme Court case it is all the better.  And if it also concerns my maternal ancestors, well I am guaranteed to love it. A Promise Kept: The Muscogee (Creek) Nation and McGirt v. Oklahoma checked all three of those categories (and it had been sitting in my TBR pile for some time). Written by Robert J. Miller, a professor at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University, and Robbie Ethridge, a professor of anthropology at the University of Mississippi, the book is divided into two key parts.

The first part of the book concisely, yet thoroughly, covers the history of the Muscogee Nation, from the Mississippi “chiefdoms” to the towns and provinces that coalesced into the Creek confederacy. Professor Ethridge covers the divisions within the Nation, especially between the Upper and Lower Creeks, and how those divisions impacted the Nation’s removal (both voluntary and involuntary) from our ancestral lands in the South. Finally, the Nation’s history in Oklahoma is addressed, with detailed discussion of the relevant treaties, the allotment period, and ultimately Oklahoma statehood.

I read this part of the book with rapt attention. I was on the plane to Oklahoma City. In a few weeks I would be visiting the Muscogee Nation and the sites where my grandma and her ancestors lived. As I read, I jotted down notes to check when I had Internet service—I wanted to put my own relatives into this story and look at where they predominantly lived in Indian Territory.

The history was extremely easy to read and accessible to non-anthropologists (myself included). I plan on recommending the book to all my relatives.

The second part of the book covers the legal stuff.  It recounts the history of the McGirt case and the relevant precedents that address disestablishment of reservations. It also hypothesizes about issues that Oklahoma will face post-McGirt.  As a lawyer, I enjoyed this part. I especially appreciated the history surrounding the disestablishment cases, and I found the discussion of taxes on the newly re-recognized reservations interesting, especially given my pending trip to Tulsa. I also appreciated how Professor Miller stressed the importance of cooperation between the Nation and Oklahoma.  Shortly after McGirt was decided, I heard Muscogee Principal Chief David Hill speak about the case. From what I can tell, the Tribes in Oklahoma are ready to cooperate, but do want Oklahoma to honor and respect the Supreme Court’s decision and the promises made to the Tribes in Oklahoma. Unfortunately, they haven’t seen the same response from some elected officials in Oklahoma.

I highly recommend this book to all citizens of the Nation and those fascinated with Indian law, history, and sovereignty.

April 15, 2024 in Books, Current Affairs, Tribal Law and Appeals, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, April 14, 2024

Tips for Dealing with a Difficult Adversary

During your legal career, whether in litigation, at trial, or on appeal, you will invariably encounter a “difficult” adversary. For this article, “difficult” does not refer to exceptionally talented adversaries. Rather, it refers to attorneys who, for lack of a better word, are jerks. They are the lawyers who, among other things, file numerous and borderline frivolous motions, call you on a Monday morning or Friday evening screaming at you, and file lengthy and incoherent briefs that leave you wondering how to respond. Dealing with these jerks is taxing and time-consuming. Below are a few suggestions to make your experience as painless as possible.

1.    Remain calm, professional, and patient.

When dealing with difficult adversaries, never let them affect you in a manner that causes you to react emotionally and get into a confrontation with them. Doing so will only exhaust you and will not in any way achieve your objectives in a particular litigation.

Instead, realize the type of person with whom you are dealing. In some (or many) instances, difficult adversaries are covert or malignant narcissists. Importantly, narcissists lack empathy, have a grandiose sense of self, display a sense of entitlement and a need for admiration, and consistently manipulate reality to make themselves the “victim” in every situation. When you react emotionally to these jerks and get involved in their drama, you are providing them with narcissistic supply, or the attention that they crave. Once you do this, the cycle of narcissistic abuse never ends because at the root of their problem is insecurity, which fuels their constant need for validation.

As such, never make the mistake of arguing with these people. In all interactions, remain calm, professional, and patient, and never let your emotions show. Once a narcissistic adversary realizes that they cannot provoke you and thus use you to feed their need for attention and validation, they will mediate their behavior. Furthermore, treating your adversaries with respect, even when they are difficult, reflects maturity and good judgment.

2.    Be kind and try to find common ground.

Good people exhibit kindness, cooperativeness, and humility even when it is difficult. Being combative with your adversary will get you nowhere and make it harder to accomplish your objectives. Thus, regardless of how repulsive your adversary is, you should always remain focused on achieving your objectives in a particular case, not on the adversary.

Remaining kind and respectful in the face of a difficult adversary is likely to disarm the adversary and make cooperation and compromise more likely. As they say, you catch more flies with honey than with vinegar.

3.    When necessary, draw boundaries and command respect.

In some situations, particularly when dealing with insufferable narcissists, kindness and patience may not work because an adversary will continue incessantly with their abusive behavior, such as by filing frivolous motions or constantly calling you to scream and yell about some “injustice” that has made them a victim once again.

If, despite your best efforts, this behavior continues, you should draw a boundary and make it clear to your adversary that you will not tolerate such nonsense. That does not mean getting into a confrontation with your adversary because that will likely exacerbate the problem and their behavior. Rather, firmly make clear that their behavior is unacceptable and take measures to draw necessary boundaries, such as by refusing to take their calls and notifying the court of the adversary’s recalcitrant behavior. Put simply, sometimes you must look the bully in the eye and say enough is enough. Knowing when to accommodate and when to be assertive is critical to ensure that your adversary will respect your boundaries. And be sure to document every interaction with your adversary because they can – and will – distort reality (and even lie) to achieve their goals and paint you in a bad light.

4.    Change your strategy.

In some circumstances, an effective way to deal with an adversary is to change your strategy and take a more calculated approach. Indeed, difficult adversaries are often controlling people who will seek to control their interactions and conversations with you. Do not allow them to do that. For example, reframe a legal or factual issue that the adversary raises with you. Identify areas of common ground with your adversary, which may lead to increased collaboration. Ask the adversary to explain the basis for specific discovery requests, and to identify the factual and legal basis for their arguments. And if the adversary continues to be difficult, such as by filing motions and misrepresenting the facts, do not be afraid to hit back with motions or discovery requests in which you expose their duplicity. As stated above, sometimes you must look a bully in the eye and say enough is enough.

5.    Talk to your adversary on the phone (or in person) rather than via email.

Some individuals, particularly difficult ones, use email to send lengthy messages that contain baseless accusations and invective. Certainly, it is easier to hurl insults at people when you are typing on a keyboard in the privacy of your office. But it is not so easy to do so over the phone or in person. So if the adversary sends you an offensive email, do not respond, especially not immediately, when your emotions may affect your rationality. Instead, think carefully about how you want to respond, and then call your adversary. That will enable you to engage in a dialogue, ask questions, and respond in a mature and conciliatory manner, which can increase the likelihood of collaboration and a favorable outcome.

6.    Remember that it is not about you.

Difficult adversaries can affect you emotionally and psychologically, and cause immeasurable stress, because their strategy is to make you believe that you have perpetuated some wrong or injustice, and in some instances to personally attack you. Remember that difficult people frequently, if not always, need to see themselves as the victim.

Never let these ridiculous tactics affect you. A difficult adversary’s behavior has absolutely nothing to do with you. Rather, it reflects their need for control. It results from their insecurity and emotional immaturity. Do not fall for this ridiculous behavior because if you do, you will play right into their hands.

***

Sadly, most if not all lawyers will encounter jerks during their legal career. Knowing how to deal with these people will reduce the stress that they would otherwise cause you and keep you focused on achieving the best result for your client.

April 14, 2024 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Current Affairs, Law School, Legal Ethics, Legal Profession | Permalink | Comments (0)