Friday, September 13, 2024

Merger Analysis with Latent Price

By: Paul Koh
Abstract: Standard empirical tools for merger analysis assume price data, which may not be readily available. This paper characterizes sufficient conditions for identifying the unilateral effects of mergers without price data. I show that revenues, margins, and revenue diversion ratios are sufficient for identifying the gross upward pricing pressure indices, impact on consumer/producer surplus, and compensating marginal cost reductions associated with a merger. I also describe assumptions on demand that facilitate the identification of revenue diversion ratios and merger simulations. I use the proposed framework to evaluate the Staples/Office Depot merger (2016).
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2404.07684&r=ind

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2024/09/merger-analysis-with-latent-price.html

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