Monday, March 20, 2023
The Sale of Data: Learning Synergies Before M&As
The Sale of Data: Learning Synergies Before M&As
Abstract
Firms may share information to discover potential synergies between their data sets and algorithms, eventually leading to more efficient mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. However, as pointed out by Arrow, information sharing also modifies the competitive balance when companies do not merge, and a firm may be reluctant to share information with potential rivals. Under general conditions, we show that firms benefit from (partially) sharing information. More sharing of information may increase industry expected profits both when there is head-to-head competition and when there is a M&A. Compared to a laissez-faire situation, a regulator in charge of allowing or refusing the M&A may decrease or increase the level of information sharing, as well as consumer surplus. A regulator who can also control the level of information sharing will allow firms to share information.
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2023/03/the-sale-of-data-learning-synergies-before-mas.html
