Monday, October 24, 2022

Common Ownership and Relative Performance Evaluation

Common Ownership and Relative Performance Evaluation


Miguel Anton

University of Navarra, IESE Business School

Florian Ederer

Yale School of Management; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Mireia Gine

IESE Business School, University of Navarra ; The University of Pennsylvania

Martin C. Schmalz

CEPR; University of Oxford - Finance; CESifo; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: August 15, 2016


We show theoretically and empirically that executives are paid less for their own firm’s performance and more for their rivals’ performance if an industry’s firms are more commonly owned by the same set of investors. Higher common ownership also leads to higher unconditional total pay. We exploit quasi-exogenous variation in common ownership from a mutual fund trading scandal to support a causal interpretation. These findings challenge conventional assumptions in the corporate finance literature about the objective function of the firm.

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