Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

The effects of competition policy, regulatory quality and trust on inward FDI in host countries

The effects of competition policy, regulatory quality and trust on inward FDI in host countries

SergioMariotti

RiccardoMarzano

 

Abstract

This article develops a comparative institutionalist framework to investigate how pro-enforcement reforms leading to a change in competition policy regimes attracts FDI in host countries, and how this relationship is moderated by the interplay between key formal and informal institutions. We revisit the FDI theory by integrating insights from economics of competition policy and the most recent debate on how institutions matter to international business. We contend that the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement is a crucial factor in attracting FDI, but only in host countries characterized by institutional configurations where the lack of trust is concomitant with a high-quality regulatory institutional environment. Our analysis on a sample of 63 countries followed in the 1980–2017 period supports our hypotheses. This paper contributes to a deeper understanding on the competition policy–FDI relationship at national level and has implications for policy makers.

Choosing Your Battles: Endogenous Multihoming and Platform Competition

Choosing Your Battles: Endogenous Multihoming and Platform Competition

 

Marco A. Haan

University of Groningen

Gijsbert Zwart

University of Groningen

Nannette Stoffers

University of Groningen

Abstract

We study how digital platforms can choose competitive strategies to influence the number of multihoming consumers. Platforms compete for consumers and advertisers. A platform earns a premium from advertising to singlehomers, as it is a gatekeeper to these consumers. Competitive strategies leading to intense competition on the consumer side reduce profits on that side, but also increase consumer singlehoming and hence market power over advertisers. The size of the singlehoming premium determines where this competitive strategy ‘seesaw’ will end up. We apply this insight to four strategic choices that may increase singlehoming: reducing product differentiation, portfolio diversification through conglomerate mergers, the choice of compatibility and tying.

Patents and Price Fixing by Serial Colluders

Patents and Price Fixing by Serial Colluders

 

William E. Kovacic

George Washington University - Law School; King's College London - The Dickson Poon School of Law

Robert C. Marshall

Pennsylvania State University, College of the Liberal Arts - Department of Economic

Michael J. Meurer

Boston University - School of Law

Abstract

Antitrust law has long been mindful of the danger that firms may misuse their patents to facilitate price fixing. Courts and commentators addressing this danger have assumed that patent-facilitated price fixing occurs in a single market. In this Article, we extend conventional analysis to address firms’ patent misuse to facilitate price fixing across multiple products lines. By doing so, we expose gaps in existing agency enforcement and scholarly proposals for reform. Important legal tests that make sense in the single market setting do not carry over to the context we call serial collusion, where certain offenders engage in repeat collusion across product lines. This Article argues that there is an urgent need to recast these tests to address serial collusion of the sort that prevails in the chemicals, auto parts and electronics industries. To support this argument, we develop empirical evidence consistent with the possibility that serial colluders in the chemical industry acquired and used patents to support their collusion, either directly to coordinate and monitor output and pricing or indirectly to deter new firm entry by erecting patent thickets as a barrier to entry. Throughout this Article, we describe the flaws of current antitrust doctrine when it comes to assessing patents and price fixing, suggest doctrinal improvements, and provide guidance to antitrust enforcers about how to better understand and combat serial collusion facilitated by patents.

Williamson, Pigou and Demsetz on Social Media

Williamson, Pigou and Demsetz on Social Media

Elvira Caterina Parisi

Studio Bucarelli & Associates

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Abstract

Monopolies traditionally increase prices by reducing output, creating a social deadweight loss. Social media networks have found a way to gain market power and lessen competition in the markets in which they dominate. However, their market power manifests itself in ways that are different – indeed, on their face, they mirror-image – those of a traditional monopoly. Their output is virtually unlimited, access is made available to all, and their services are offered at zero-price. Although social media platforms require no monetary payment, users face a “hidden cost” for the services they receive – the time and attention taken by the advertisements. In turn, social media companies sell users’ attention for a profit to advertisement agencies. Recasting some well-known ideas put forth by Williamson (1968), Pigou (1920) and Demsetz (1968), this paper examines the challenges in the regulation of the so-called “attention economy,” and considers how existing antitrust instruments (designed to regulate monopolistic markets, with low output and high prices) can be applied to address the problems posed by e-monopolies and social media networks (with unlimited output and “zero price”).

Fascism and Monopoly

Fascism and Monopoly

 

Daniel A. Crane

University of Michigan Law School

Abstract

The recent revival of political interest in antitrust has resurfaced a longstanding debate about the role of industrial concentration and monopoly in enabling Hitler’s rise to power and the Third Reich’s wars of aggression. Proponents of stronger antitrust enforcement argue that monopolies and cartels brought the Nazis to power and warn that rising concentration in the American economy could similarly threaten democracy. Skeptics demur, observing that German big business largely opposed Hitler during the crucial years of his ascent. Drawing on business histories and archival material from the U.S. Office of Military Government’s Decartelization Unit, this Article assesses the historical record on the role of industrial concentration in facilitating Nazism. It finds compelling evidence that, while German big business principally did not support Hitler before he won the Chancellorship in 1933, the extreme concentration of market power during the Weimar period enabled Hitler to seize and consolidate totalitarian power through a variety of mechanisms. Hence, the German experience with Nazism lends support to the idea that extreme concentration of economic power enables extreme concentration of political power. However, most of the conduct that created the radical economic concentration of the Weimar period would be unlawful under contemporary antitrust principles, which casts doubt on claims that a significant shift in antitrust enforcement is necessary to forestall anti-democratic forces.

Airbnb and Rental Markets: Evidence from Berlin

Airbnb and Rental Markets: Evidence from Berlin

 

Tomaso Duso

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin); TU Berlin- Faculty of Economics and Management - Empirical Industrial Organization

Claus Michelsen

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW)

Max Schäfer

University of Bologna

Kevin Ducbao Tran

University of Bristol, School of Economics

Abstract

We exploit two policy interventions in Berlin, Germany, to causally identify the impact of Airbnb on rental markets. While the first intervention significantly reduced the number of high-availability Airbnb listings bookable for most of the year, the second intervention led to the exit of mostly occasional, low-availability listings. We find that the reduction in Airbnb supply has a much larger impact on rents and long-term rental supply for the first reform. This is consistent with more professional Airbnb hosts substituting back to the long-term rental market. Accordingly, we estimate that one additional nearby high-availability Airbnb listing crowds out 0.6 long-term rentals and, consequently, increases the asked square-meter rent by 1.8 percent on average. This marginal effect tends to be smaller in districts with a higher Airbnb density. However, these district experienced a larger slowdown in rent increases following the reform due to larger reductions in Airbnb supply.

The "Kill Zone": Copying, Acquisition and Start-Ups' Direction of Innovation

The "Kill Zone": Copying, Acquisition and Start-Ups' Direction of Innovation

 

Massimo Motta

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Sandro Shelegia

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Students; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Abstract

The possibility of being acquired by the incumbent tends to push the rival towards developing a substitute rather than a complement. By choosing the former, potential gains from the acquisition are created (in the form of suppression of competition): as long as the rival has some bargaining power in the determination of the takeover price, it will then benefit from entering the "kill zone".

Sector Regulation of Digital Platforms in Europe: Uno, Nessuno e Centomila

Sector Regulation of Digital Platforms in Europe: Uno, Nessuno e Centomila

Marco Botta

 

In 1926, Luigi Pirandello published Uno, Nessuno e Centomila, one of his most well-known novels.¹ The book discusses the identity crisis faced by Vitangelo Moscarda, who wonders whether he has either a single (i.e. uno) or no identity (i.e. nessuno), or whether he has a different identity vis-a-vis every person around him (i.e. centomila—100,000 identities). One century after the publication of Pirandello’s masterpiece, the European Union is also facing a major identity crisis.

2021 Workshop Antitrust Frontiers Global Forum Competition Policy for the Global Economy (with video clips)

2021 Workshop

Antitrust Frontiers Global Forum

Competition Policy for the Global Economy

June 22, 2021

In the coming decade, we will witness a surge of new laws and new enforcement policies seeking to advance competition in the digital era, protect consumers and workers, and spur economic growth. The anticipated reforms will require lawmakers and enforcement agencies to revisit analytical methods, reconsider the relationship between competition laws and regulation, and develop new approaches to global enforcement policies.
Our 2021 Workshop convenes eight influential antitrust thinkers to discuss the legal, economic, and institutional challenges that will shape the development of competition laws in the coming years.

Program

Participants

Program

Download Program (English)

Download Program (Hebrew)

Opening Remarks

Barak Orbach
University of Arizona
Michal Halperin
Director General, Israel Competition Authority

 

Keynote: Managing Digital Competition

Herbert Hovenkamp, James G. Dinan University Professor, Penn Law and the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

Moderator:
Michal Gal, University of Haifa

Hovenkamp: Managing Digital Competition

Download Slides

 

Managing Global Antitrust Enforcement

Eleanor Fox, Professor of Law Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation, New York University School of Law
Frederic Jenny, Chairman OECD Competition Committee; Professor of Economics, ESSEC Business School
William Kovacic, Director, Competition Law Center at George Washington University Law School; Non-Executive Director, United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority

Moderators:
David Gilo, Tel Aviv University
Michal Halperin, Director General, Israel Competition Authority

Fox, Jenny, Kovacic: Cooperation Among Enforcement Agencies

Jenny: Are Contemporary EU and US Debates Over Competition Law Alike?

Fox: How Should Economies Address Global Antitrust Challenges?

Kovacic: What Are the Advantages of International Enforcement Coalitions?

Jenny, Fox, Kovacic: Is Antitrust Moving Toward Codes of Conduct?

 

Could Competition Law Regulate Effectively Digital Platforms?

Aaron Edlin, Professor of Economics and Richard Jennings Professor of Law, UC Berkeley
Nancy Rose, Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics MIT Department of Economics
Fiona Scott Morton, Theodore Nierenberg Professor of Economics, Yale University School of Management
Carl Shapiro, Professor, UC Berkeley Haas School of Business and Department of Economics

Moderators:
Oren Rigbi, Chief Economist, Israel Competition Authority
Barak Orbach, University of Arizona

Edlin (& Discussion): Should Antitrust Ban Unilateral Refusals to Deal?

Shapiro (& Discussion): Should Antitrust Ban “Self-Preferencing”?

Rose (& Discussion): What Are the Virtues of “Structural Separations”

Scott Morton (& Discussion): How Should We Analyze the Notions of “Fairness” and “Contestability” in the EU Digital Markets Act?

Discussion: Should Acquisitions By Big Tech Be Treated As Anticompetitive? (Flipped Burden of Proof)

 

AFGF 2021 Workshop: Unedited Video

The Freedom from Self-Incrimination—A Strasbourg-Proof Approach? Cases C-466/19 P Qualcomm and C-481/19 P DB v Consob

The Freedom from Self-Incrimination—A Strasbourg-Proof Approach? Cases C-466/19 P Qualcomm and C-481/19 P DB v Consob 

Marc Veenbrink

 

Judgment of 28 January 2021, Qualcomm v Commission, C-466/19P, EU:C:2021:76, and Judgment of 2 February 2021, DB v Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob), C-481/19, E EU:C:2021:84

The Court of Justice of the European Union conformed and clarified in Qualcomm, the well-established scope and application of the freedom from self-incrimination; in DB v Consob, it ruled that this principle is applied in conformity with case law of the European Court of Human Rights and made a distinction between undertakings and natural persons.

Hotel Aggregator Vs Russian Antitrust Authorities: Perspectives of Upcoming Litigation

Hotel Aggregator Vs Russian Antitrust Authorities: Perspectives of Upcoming Litigation

Konstantin Voropaev

 

Journal of European Competition Law & Practice

 

 

The legal battles between aggregators such as Booking.com and antitrust authorities of the European Union (EU) commenced some time ago. Now it is the turn of the post-Soviet countries and the preliminary court hearing between Booking.com and the Russian Federal Anti-Monopoly Service (FAS) was held on 24 March 2021 in the Commercial Court of Moscow, the subsequent hearing took place on 19 May 2021. The background to the Russian case appears very similar to the European cases.

Selective Distribution in the Age of E-Commerce: An Overview of EU and National Developments

Selective Distribution in the Age of E-Commerce: An Overview of EU and National Developments

e-Competitions Selective Distribution, Art. N° 99224, 24 March 2021

24 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2021

Anne Witt

EDHEC Business School

Date Written: March 24, 2021

Abstract

In recent years, the growth of e-commerce has significantly reshaped undertakings’ business and distribution strategies. Not only is the use of selective distribution on the rise, but manufacturers are also imposing more and novel types of restraints to control the conditions of retail. They are also increasingly competing with their distributors by selling the contract goods directly through their own online shops, and are using vertical restraints to regulate the emerging competition. The European courts and enforcement agencies are currently contending with how to assess these new restraints (e.g. bans on online selling and restrictions on the use of third-party platforms, search engines and online advertising) under legal principles that were developed in the 1970s for brick and mortar outlets. This contribution reviews key developments and questions currently occupying the European enforcement agencies and courts. It concludes that, while the European competition agencies have actively enforced Article 101 TFEU against selective distribution agreements in recent years, there is still a great deal of legal uncertainty on how to assess restraints that impede the distributors’ ability to sell and market the contract goods online. This has resulted in diverging approaches in different EU Member States. The current review of Regulation 330/2010 and its accompanying guidelines are a welcome and necessary opportunity for the Commission to provide more clarity and spell out more detailed and up-to-date guidance in the interest of a uniform application of EU competition law.

Optional Intermediaries and Pricing Restraints

Optional Intermediaries and Pricing Restraints

 

Chang Liu

Harvard University, Department of Economics, Students

Fengshi Niu

University of California, Berkeley, Department of Economics, Students

Alexander White

Tsinghua University - School of Economics & Management

Abstract

When a platform is an optional intermediary, should it require sellers to charge the same price to the platform’s users as they charge their direct customers? If the platform does this, how will it affect consumers’ and overall welfare? In a model leveraging insight from the study of third-degree price discrimination, we show that, when demand has flexible curvature, an interesting markup-versus-volume tradeoff governs the platform’s choice. Moreover, a drawing-in effect, geared towards low-valuation platform users, makes such a policy surprisingly appealing for consumers.

Call for papers: EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS 17th – 18th January 2022 Faculty of Law Charles University in Prague, Czechia

EU ANTITRUST:

HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS

17th – 18th January 2022

Faculty of Law

  Charles University in Prague, Czechia

Dear colleagues,

We are pleased to inform you that the Faculty of Law of Charles University in Prague is organising the first year of the international conference EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS.

The conference aims to create a space for scientific discussion on legal issues of protection of competition in relation to its undergoing transformation under the pressure of globalisation and the digitisation of economic processes. 

As organisers we are genuinely honoured that the keynote speech at the opening of the conference will be delivered by Mrs. Margrethe Vestager, the Executive Vice-President and the Commissioner for Competition of the European Commission.

 

The focus of the conference will be on:

 

1. Impact of digitisation, globalisation, pandemics and other major trends and developments on EU antitrust, its goals, doctrine, ties to other policies and areas of law, theories of harm, key definitions etc.
2. Adaptation of existing EU antitrust rules, adoption of new tools, standards and methods to cope with current challenges.
3. Efficiency of antitrust enforcement, role and powers of competition authorities and courts at EU and national levels, protection of fundamental rights and principles of law.

We are pleased to inform you that the call for papers has been launched and the registration has been opened. For those interested, please sign up here under the paragraph “Apply”: http://antitrustnext.prf.cuni.cz/ 

The conference proceedings will be published in print and online after the event and submitted to the Conference Proceedings Citation Index accessible at the Web of Science™. Further, all participants with a paper will be offered the opportunity to publish it via Prague Law Working Papers Series disseminated through the Social Science Research Network. The papers selected by the Scientific Committee of the Conference will be offered publication in The Lawyer Quarterly, an open-access international journal listed in SCOPUS and ERIH+ databases.

For more information, please visit our website: http://antitrustnext.prf.cuni.cz/

If you have any questions, please contact us via e-mail: [email protected]

Yours faithfully,

Václav Šmejkal

Department of European Law

Coordinator of Organization and Scientific Committees of the Conference

'I See Something You Don't See'. A Computational Analysis of the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act

'I See Something You Don't See'. A Computational Analysis of the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act

 

Fabiana Di Porto

University of Salento ; Luiss Guido Carli University; Law Faculty, Hebrew University

Tatjana Grote

Algorithmic Disclosure PRIN project, University of Salento

Gabriele Volpi

Algorithmic Disclosure PRIN project, University of Salento

Riccardo invernizzi

Algorithmic Disclosure PRIN project, University of Salento

Abstract

The rise of digital platforms has been accompanied by increasing unease among scholars and policymakers about certain anti-competitive structures and practices. As a result, ensuring fair competition on digital services markets has been high up on the agendas of both US and EU lawmakers.

In its latest proposals, the Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act (DMA and DSA), the European Commission puts forward several new obligations for online intermediaries, especially large online platforms and ‘gatekeepers’. Both are expected to serve as a blueprint for regulation in the US, where lawmakers have also been investigating competition on digital platforms.

This paper investigates whether key concepts of competition law on digital markets are used in the same way by different stakeholders. Leveraging the power of computational text analysis, we find significant differences in the employment of terms like ‘gatekeepers’, ‘self-preferencing’, ‘collusion’ and others in the position papers of the consultation process that informed the drafting of the two latest Commission proposals. Added to that, sentiment analysis shows that in some cases these differences also come with dissimilar attitudes. While this may not be surprising for new concepts such as gatekeepers, the same is not for others, like ‘self-regulatory’, which not only is used differently by stakeholders, but is also viewed more favorably by medium and big companies/organizations than by small ones. We conclude by sketching out how different computational text analysis tools (like e.g. topic modeling, semantic analysis and text similarity), could be combined to provide many helpful insights for both rulemakers and the legal scholarship.

Applying Critical Loss for Market Definition in Merger Analysis: Do Court Decisions Offer Insight?

Applying Critical Loss for Market Definition in Merger Analysis: Do Court Decisions Offer Insight?

 

Malcolm B. Coate

U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

Shawn W. Ulrick

U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

John M. Yun

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Abstract

Critical loss analysis is an empirical tool used to define relevant markets in antitrust law. The existence of two different critical loss methodologies, however, complicates its application. Harris and Simons introduced the first approach, which focused on evaluating the market-level effect of a small, but significant and non-transitory increase in price (“SSNIP”). Later, O’Brien and Wickelgren, along with Katz and Shapiro, introduced a firm-level approach to critical loss to derive a test that applies mathematical models of demand systems, foundationally based on a single-firm SSNIP, to proxy for a market-level price increase. A critical loss controversy evolved as the two tests can, but do not necessarily, generate different relevant markets. This paper examines the choice between the two methodologies—guiding practitioners and courts as to when each approach makes the most sense.

ASCOLA 2021 conference

 

 

                                                     Program of  16^th Annual ASCOLA (Virtual) Conference

1-3 July 2021

 

Important: times indicated are Central European Summer Time (CEST, utc+2, Brussels time). Check your time at time.it

Elaborate program follows immediately after condensed version.

 

Conference website: http://law.haifa.ac.il/index.php/en/ascola

 

 

THURSDAY July 1, 2021

9:00-11:00                  Annex session 1

 

12:00-12:10                Welcome by Michal Gal (ASCOLA President)

12:10-13:55                Main event Panel I

14:05-15:50                Main event Panel II

16:00-16:45                  Keynote Prof. Carl Shapiro (Berkeley) "Antitrust: What went Wrong and How to Fix it"

16:45-16:55                 Virtual toast with all members

16:55-17:30                 Happy hour for spontaneous virtual meetings (if you have the time!)

18:00-20:00                 Annex session 2

 

 

 

 

FRIDAY July 2, 2021

9:00-11:00                  Annex session 3

12:10-13:55                Main event Panel III

14:05-15:50                Main event Panel IV

16:00-16:45                 Economic expert Panel: Innovation Economics

Richard Gilbert (Berkeley), Monika Schnitzer (Ludwig Maximilian University)

Moderator: Tommaso Valletti (Imperial College, London)

18:00-20:30                 Annex session 4 (partly in Portuguese)

Saturday July 3, 2021

9:00-11:20                  Annex session 5

12:00-14:00                Main event Panel V

14:15-16:00                Main event Panel VI

16:00-17:00                 Panel on Career challenges: How to make and maintain an academic career (not just as a woman)

                                    Moderators: Rupprecht Podszun & Kati Cseres

Panelists: Anna Gerbrandy (tbc), Juan David Gutiérrez, Jasminka Pecotić Kaufman, Wendy Ng

17:00-17:15                 Virtual toast with all members

Prize for best paper by a young academic

18:00-19:30                 Annex session 6

Hashtag: #ASCOLA2021

Follow us on Twitter and LinkedIn and visit our website at www.ascola.org!

	Main Program (Annexed Sessions follow separately)
	Thursday, 1st July
12:00 – 12:10	Welcome by ASCOLA President, Michal Gal Zoom: Zurich 1
12:10 – 13:55	Algorithms and Antitrust	Platforms	Collaboration and Cartels
	Session Chair: Giorgio Monti ·         Nicolo Zingales, "Algorithmic nudging as an exclusionary concern" ·         Lena Hornkohl, "Article 102 TFEU as a tool to enforce algorithmic discrimination towards end consumers" ·         Maria T. Patakyova, "How to Enforce a Pricing Algorithm under EU Competition Law? Solutions-Oriented Approach" ·         Eduardo Molan Gaban, Vinícius Klein, "A new language for A.I. and the legal discourse" ·         Fabiana Di Porto, Tatjana Grote, Gabriele Volpi, Riccardo Invernizzi "'I see something you don't see': A Computational Analysis of  the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act" Zoom: Zurich 1	Session Chair: Valeria Falce ·         Rupprecht Podszun, "A Principled Approach to Platform Regulation" ·         Anush Ganesh, "Application of competition law to zero-price online platforms: Convergence of three areas of the law" ·         Konstantina Bania, "Taming the ‘Big Tech’ Beast: Regulating online platforms to protect competition in digital markets" ·         Ki Jong Lee, "Cross-market impact of Platforms' activities: a proposal to introduce the concept of secondary relevant market" ·         Geoffrey Parker, Georgios Petropoulos,  Marshall Van Alstyne, "Platform mergers and antitrust" Zoom: Zurich 2	Session Chair: Josef Drexl ·         Giulia Schneider, "Data Pools for Collaborative Research under Art. 101 TFUE: Lessons from The Proposed Regulations for Data Markets" ·         Alison Jones, Caio Mário da Silva Pereira Neto, "Combatting Corruption and Collusion in Public Procurement: Lessons from Operation Car Wash" ·         Mariateresa Maggiolino, Laura Zoboli, "Blockchain Governance: The Missing Piece in the Competition Puzzle" ·         Luz M. García Martínez, "Transparency through blockchain consortia in digital finance: potential antitrust risks?" ·         Anna Tzanaki, "Varieties and Mechanisms of Common Ownership: A Calibration Exercise for Competition Policy" Zoom: Zurich 3

 

14:05 – 15:50	General Perspectives	Market Power	Developing Economies
	Session Chair:  Dan Rubinfeld ·         John M. Newman, "The Output-Welfare Fallacy" ·         Giorgio Monti, "Balancing in Competition Law" ·         Ramsi Woodcock, "How Antitrust Really Works: A Theory of Input Control and Discriminatory Supply" ·         Harry First, Spencer Weber Waller, "Bespoke Antitrust" ·         Michelle Meagher, "A Systems Approach to Antitrust Reform" Zoom: Zurich 1	Session Chair: Paul Nihoul ·         Salil K. Mehra, "“Chickenization,” Data-Monopsony and Competition Law" ·         Alexandre de Streel, "Digital Attention Intermediaries: A Competition Law Perspective" ·         Noga Blickstein Shchory, Michal Gal, "Market Power Parasites: Abusing the power of digital intermediaries to harm competition" ·         Petar Petrov, "Dominance, Super-Dominance, and Gatekeeper Status: Variable Shades of Market Power in Digital Markets" ·         Anna Gerbrandy, Lisanne Hummel, Laura F. Lalikova, Viktorija Morozovaite, Pauline Phoa, "Power in the digital society: A taxonomy of the composite power of Big Tech companies and a theory of Modern Bigness" Zoom: Zurich 2	Session Chair: Eleanor Fox ·         Dina I. Waked, "Antitrust Statistics: empirical evidence from developing countries 1990-2020" ·         Taimoon Stewart, "Competition Regimes in the Caribbean Community and Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparison" ·         Andrés Felipe Suárez, Juan David Gutiérrez, "Competition policy, regulation and development in Latin America: Does competition advocacy join the dots?" ·         Nora Memeti, "Digital Acquistions and their enforcement in the Arab region" ·         Vellah Kedogo Kigwiru, "Jurisdictional Conflicts and COMESA Competition Commission’s Supranationalism" Zoom: zurich 3
16:00 – 16:45	Keynote Prof. Carl Shapiro (Berkeley) "Antitrust: What went Wrong and How to Fix it" Zoom: Zurich1
16:45-16:55	Virtual toast with all members Zoom: Zurich1
16:55-17:30	Happy hour for spontaneous virtual meetings (if you have the time!) Zoom: Zurich1

 

	Friday, 2nd July
12:10 – 13:55	Competition in Specific Industries	Regulation of Agreements	Abuse
	Session Chair: Wolfgang Kerber ·         Arlen Duke, Rhonda Smith, "Pharmaceuticals and market definition: a cautionary tale" ·         Ariel Katz, Eden Sarid, "Who Killed the Radio Star? How Music Blanket Licensing Distorts the Production of Creative Content in Radio” ·         Todd Davies, Zlatina Georgieva, "Zero Price, Zero Competition: How Marketization Fixes Anticompetitive Tying in Monetized Markets" ·         Xingyu Yan, "Towards a More Competitive Mobile Payment Industry: Standardization and Beyond" ·         Maria Casoria, "The Relationship Between Open Banking and Competition Law: A Novel European Saga"         Zoom: Dusseldorf 1	Session Chair: Ioannis Lianos ·         Carmen Rodilla, Alexandre Ruiz Feases, " "Anticompetitive agreements in labour markets and Article 101 TFEU" ·         Mariateresa Maggiolino, "In the EU Gig Workers Cannot Conclude Collective Agreements. Whose fault is it?" ·         Victoria Daskalova, "Reconciling competition law and the right to collective bargaining for self-employed: a quest for solutions" ·         Alison Jones, Caio Mário da Silva Pereira Neto, "Combating corruption and collusion in UK public procurement: Proposals for post-brexit reform" ·         Marcos Araujo Boyd, "Recent developments on the intra-group exemption under Article 101 TFEU: Ecoservice and AgriMer” Zoom: Dusseldorf 2	Session Chair: Björn Lundqvist ·         Vicente Giovannini, "What Happens with the Abuse of Dominant Position? Advocacy for a New Approach to ‘Abuse’ in Digital Markets" ·         Marios C. Iacovides, Christos Vrettos, "Radical For Whom? Unsustainable Business Practices As Abuses Of Dominance" ·         Daniel Mandrescu, "Abusive pricing practices by online platforms under art.102 TFEU: a framework review for future cases" ·         Vikas Kathuria, Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, "The Case against 'Narrow' Price Parity Clauses" ·         Germán Johannsen, Andrés Gonzalez, "Digital Platforms & Economic Dependence in Chile. Any Room for Competition Theories of Harm without Dominance?" Zoom: Haifa 1

 

14:05– 15:50	Digital Competition	Enforcement Challenges	Competition, Innovation, and IP
	Session Chair: Maurice Stucke ·         Philip Marsden, Rupprecht Podszun, "Enforcement matters! Restoring balance to digital competition with sensible rules and effective enforcement" ·         William Kovacic, David A. Hyman, "Regulating Big Tech: Lessons from the FTC’s Do-Not-Call Rule" ·         Maria José Schmidt-Kessen, "Taming Tech Giants German-Style? Experimentalist Governance and the Regulation of Competition on Digital Markets in the EU" ·         Xingyu Yan, "To Refresh, not Replace Competition: Fine-Tuning the Ex-Ante Approach to Regulating Data Combination Practices" ·         Nora von Ingersleben-Seip, Zlatina Georgieva, "Old Tools for the New Economy? A Plea for an Enhanced Role of Counterfactual Causation in Competition Analysis of Digital Markets in Light of Impending Regulation" Zoom: Dusseldorf1	Session Chair: Heike Schweitzer ·         Jan Broulik, "Roles of Positive Economics in Antitrust Proceedings: Competitive Effects as Adjudicative and Legislative Facts" ·         Florence Thépot, "Interlocking directorates in Europe – an enforcement gap?" ·         Alexey Ivanov, Anna Pozdnyakova, "Cross border cartels: challenges and threats for competition agencies" ·         Jasminka Pecotić Kaufman, "Quest for Purpose of Competition Rules in European Post-Socialist Countries: The Role of Legal Culture" ·         Manuel Abarca, "Competition Law in times of Socialism: The Chilean bank nationalization case (1971-1975)"   Zoom: Dusseldorf 2	Session Chair: Harry First ·         Thomas J. Horton, "Innovation and antitrust: an evolutionary and historical perspective ·         Stephen Dnes, "Browser Tying and Data Privacy Innovation" ·         Marco Botta, "The challenge of sanctioning unfair royalty rate by the SEP holder: ‘when’, ‘how’ and ‘what’" ·         Oscar Borgogno, Giuseppe Colangelo, "SEPs licensing across the supply chain: an antitrust perspective" ·         Soojin Nam, "What do SEPs and Digital Platforms have in common?: Fairness and Meritocratic Values in US Antitrust Laws"               Zoom: Haifa 1
16:00 – 16:45	Economic expert Panel: Innovation Economics Richard Gilbert (Berkeley), Monika Schnitzer (Ludwig Maximilian University) Moderator: Tommaso Valletti (Imperial College, London) Zoom: Dusseldorf1

 

	Saturday, 3rd July
12:00 – 14:00	EU law	Antitrust in Asia	Remedies
	Session Chair: Peter Picht ·         Barry J Rodger, "Beyond ECN+ Directive – Empirical Study Mapping Judicial review of national competition law decisions" ·         Liesbet Van Acker, "The Vacillation of Dual Distribution – An analysis in light of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation review" ·         Alexandre Ruiz Feases, "Sharpening the European Commission’s tools: interim measures" ·         Pietro Manzini, "Disentangling the Digital market Act" ·         Bernadette Zelger, "The Principle of ne bis in idem in EU Competition Law" ·         Małgorzata Kozak, "Running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. Critical analysis of EU harmonisation of the right for compensation for harm caused by competition law infringements." Zoom: Haifa2	Session Chair: Thomas Cheng ·         Wendy Ng, "Data governance in China: Can competition law play a meaningful role?" ·         Shilpi Bhattacharya, Pankhudi Khandelwal, "Judging a Book by its Cover?: Analysing the Indian Approach to Defining Platform Markets" ·         Steven Van Uytsel, "Algorithmic Hub-and-Spoke Cartels: A Japanese Perspective" ·         Masako Wakui, "Zaibatsu Break-Ups: The Legacy of Post-war Economic Reform in Japan and Digital Economies" ·         Koki Arai, "Structuralist and Deconstructive understanding of Japanese Competition Policy toward Digitalization and Innovation"             Zoom: Dusseldorf1	Session Chair: Michal Gal ·         Francisco Marcos, "The uneven and unsure playing field for competition damages' claims in the EU: shortcomings and failures of Directive 2014/104/EU and its implementation" ·         Michal Gal, Nicolas Petit, "Radical Restorative Remedies for Digital Markets" ·         Filippo Lancieri, Caio Mario Pereira Neto, "Designing remedies for digital markets: the interplay between antitrust and regulation" ·         Grigoris Bacharis, "Is ‘‘more’’ better? Broadening the right to sue in competition damages claims in both sides of the Atlantic" ·         Cristina Poncibò, Andrea Piletta Massaro, "The rise of third-party litigation funding in private damage actions for the breach of competition law in Europe" ·         Omar Vasquez Duque, "Forced Choice vs. Inertia? An Exploratory Analysis of Choice Screens Applied in the European Microsoft Antitrust Case"   Zoom: Haifa1

 

14:15 – 16:00	Mergers	Competition and Other Policies	Antitrust Challenges
	Session Chair: Pieter van Cleyenbreugel ·         Elias Deutscher, "CK Telecoms and the new frame of reference for the analysis of unilateral effects in EU merger control - a critical appraisal" ·         Jasper van den Boom, Peerawat Samranchit, "Assessing the long run competitive effects of digital ecosystem mergers" ·         Björn Lundqvist, "Killer Acquisitions and other forms of anticompetitive collaborations" ·         Alexandr Svetlicinii, "State-Controlled Entities in the EU Merger Control: the Case of PKN Orlen and Lotos Group" ·         Frédéric Marty, Thierry Warin, "Visa Acquiring Plaid: A Tartan over a Killer Acquisition? Reflections on the risks of harming competition through the acquisition of startups within digital ecosystems" ·         Theodosia Stavroulaki, "Mergers that harm our health" Zoom: Haifa2	Session Chair: Fabiana Di Porto ·         Klaudia Majcher, Viktoria Robertson, "The Twin Transition to a Digital and Green Economy: Doctrinal Challenges for EU Competition Law" ·         Mary Catherine Lucey, "Gender and the Antitrust Curriculum" ·         Claudio Lombardi, "Competition in Online News, Algorithmic Curation, and Advertising: Between Markets and Democracy" ·         Kalpana Tyagi, "Competition Policy, with a touch of Green: From ‘Competition on the merits’ to ‘Sustainable’ Competition on the Merits"           Zoom: Dusseldorf1	Session Chair: Sofia Pais ·         Inge Graef, "Consumer sovereignty and competition law: from personalization to diversity" ·         Viktorija Morozovaite, "Two sides of the digital advertising coin: putting hypernudging into perspective" ·         Jasper Sluijs, "Recalibrating Compass, or the end of the undertanking as we know it?" ·         Juliane K. Mendelsohn, "The Challenge of Inequality in the Competition Paradigm" ·         Shuya Hayashi, Koki Arai, "Digital Platforms and Consumer Rights: From the Perspective of Competition Law and Trust" ·         M. Borgers, Kati Cseres, Or Brook, "Consumers’ participation in competition law proceedings: an empirical inquiry into the enforcement of competition law in the EU Member States"     Zoom: Haifa1
16:00-17:00	Panel on Career Challenges: How to make and maintain an academic career (not just as a woman) Moderators: Rupprecht Podszun & Kati Cseres Panelists: Anna Gerbrandy (tbc), Juan David Gutiérrez, Jasminka Pecotić Kaufman, Wendy Ng   Zoom: Dusseldorf1
17:00 – 17:15	Virtual toast with all members Prize for best paper by young academic Zoom: Dusseldorf1

Annexed Sessions: Annex Session 1: 9:00-11:00 CEST, 1st July 9:00-10:20 Competition and Data Protection Session chair: Emanuela Arezzo ·         Wolfgang Kerber, Karsten K. Zolna, "The German Facebook Case: The Law and Economics of the Relationship between Competition and Data Protection Law" ·         Simonetta Vezzoso, "Gatekeepers’ Interoperability Mandates: A Contextual Analysis of the Italian Android Auto Decision”" ·         Valeria Falce, Nicola M.F. Faraone, "Digital markets as attention-engagement markets" ·         Klaus Wiedemann, "Consumer Autonomy, Competition Law and Data Protection Law in the Digital Economy: On the Relationship between the German Federal Supreme Court’s Facebook-Decision, the Revised German Competition Act and the Proposal for a Digital Markets Act" ·         Shubhangi Heda, Sakhi Shah, "Exploring the Intersection of Data Protection and Competition Law" 10:20-11:00 Panel on Computational Antitrust. Moderator: Fabiana di Porto; Panellists: Ioannis Lianos, Felix Chang, Thomas Cheng, Julian Nowag Zoom: Zurich4   Annex Session 2: 18:00-20:00 CEST, 1st July 18:00-19:20 Challenging the Basics   Session chair: Jasminka Pecotić Kaufman ·         Magali Eben, "The Antitrust Market does not Exist: Pursuit of Objectivity in a Purposive Process" ·         Oles Andriychuk, "The Concept of Reasonableness in Competition Law: Addressing the Means/Ends Dichotomy" ·         Ignacio García-Perrote Martínez, "Apple Inc. v Pepper et al.: Passing-on at a crossroads?" ·         Antonio Robles Martín-Laborda, "The passing-on defense: Some lessons from the truck's cartel case" 19:20-20:00 Panel on "How a paper is born" Moderator: Magali Eben; Panelists: José Azar, Marios Iacovides, Sara Bensley Zoom: Zurich5                     Annex Session 3: 9:00-11:00 CEST, 2nd July 9:00-10:20 Intersection with other policies Session Chair: Maciej Bernatt ·         Jurgita Malinauskaite, Fatih Buğra Erdem, "Competition Law and Sustainability in the EU: National Competition Authorities’ perspectives" ·         Claudio Lombardi, Tomaso Ferrando, "An Environmentally And Socially Broken Global Food System: What Role For Competition Law?" ·         Kati Cseres, Agustin Reyna, "EU State aid law and consumer protection: an unsettled relationship in times of crisis" ·         Carlos Muñoz Ferrandis, "The Price of Openness: IP and Competition Law considerations for ‘open’ dynamics in AI-related markets." ·         Iga Małobęcka-Szwast, "Enforcing competition, consumer and data protection law in the digital economy – how to find a way forward?" 10:20-11:00 Panel on Tips on how to win grants Moderator: Valeria Falce, Participants: Alexandre de Streel, Michal Gal, Vicente Bagnoli, Marco Botta Zoom:  Dusseldorf 2     Annex Session 4:  18:00-21:00 CEST, 2nd July 18:00-19:20 Antitrust around the world Session Chair: Juliana Domingues ·         Marek Martyniszyn, "Minding its own Markets in a Transnational World? Extraterritoriality in EU Competition Law" ·         Gustavo Ghidini, Maria Bianca Armiento, "“What’s past is prologue”? The European Antitrust in times of emergencies, from Covid-19 back to the aftermath of WWII, and forth to the web titans’ superdominance." ·         Qianlan Wu, Xiaoye Wang, "US-EU-China Bilateral Competition Enforcement Cooperation and Trade Openness" ·         José de Moura Faleiros Júnior, Pietra Daneluzzi Quinelato, "Personalized prices in digital markets in light of Brazilian competition laws" ·         Juliana Oliveira Domingues, Fernanda Lopes Martins, Pietra Daneluzzi Quinelato, "Streaming Disney+ and competition in the fantasy world: the acquisiton 21st Century Fox by Walt Disney in Brazil" 19:20-20:00 panel on Competition and Data Protection in Latin America (in Spanish and Portuguese), Moderators:  Vicente Bagnoli and Juan David Gutiérrez , Panelists: Felipe Irarrázabal, Juan Pablo Herrera, Juliana Domingues. Zoom: Brazil

Annex Session 5:  9:00-11:20 CEST, 3rd July 9:00-10:20 Digital Markets Session chair: Thomas K Cheng ·         Friso Bostoen, "Self-preferencing by online platforms. The unfruitful search for ‘the theory of everything’" ·         Marcin Kamiński, "Self-preferencing: in pursuit of legal clarity and relevant legal tests" ·         Vicente Bagnoli, "Are digital platforms public utilities?" ·         Oles Andriychuk, "The Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act: Towards a New Competition Paradigm" 10:20-11:20 Panel on the book “The Digital Economy and Competition Law in Asia” Moderator: Steven Van Uytsel; Panelists: Peerapat Chokesuwattanaskul, Ningrum Sirait and Nikita Koradia Zoom: Haifa 1     Annex Session 6: 18:00-20:00 CEST, 3rd July 18:00-19:20 Competition Law in Specific Industries Session Chair: David Bosco ·         Bernadette Zelger, "Object Restrictions and Sporting Rules - A Critical Analysis of the Decision in International Skating Union v Commission" ·         Eleni Katopodi, "Blockchain antitrust; regulatory concerns and the ‘Diem’ example" ·         Marco Botta, Niccolò Galli, "It’s Unfair! Non-Price Exploitation in ICT Patents Licenses" ·         Niccolò Galli, "Back to Basics: Defining Markets for ICT Patents and Calculating Market Shares Thereupon" ·         Margherita Colangelo, "Fighting high drug prices: excessive pricing and price gouging in EU, UK and US pharmaceutical markets" 19:20-20:00 Panel on Recent Books on Global and Comparative Antitrust Moderator: David Bosco; Participants: David Gerber and Barry Hawk Zoom: Aix

 

The Proposed Digital Markets Act (DMA): A Legal and Policy Review

The Proposed Digital Markets Act (DMA): A Legal and Policy Review

Nicolas Petit

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW)

Abstract

In December 2020, the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”) was proposed. It was prepared by the European Commission (“EC”) following several years of work. The DMA attempts to improve “fairness” and contestability” in the digital sector. The DMA acknowledges that some companies designated as “gatekeepers” maintain power over “core platform services” by virtue of incumbency advantages or bad business behavior. The DMA additionally worries about an extension of gatekeepers control over “ancillary services”, and of incipient gatekeeping positions resulting from tipping effects. The DMA states that it is built on “strong evidence” of high concentration, trading partner dependence, and unfair conduct. The DMA foresees that targeted regulation of gatekeepers’ behavior will promote the emergence of alternative platforms, improve innovation levels, and drive prices down in the digital sector. The DMA covers eight types of core platform services: online intermediation services (including software application stores), online search engines, social networking, video sharing platform services, number independent interpersonal electronic communications services, operating systems, cloud services, and advertising services. This paper gives an overview of the DMA. It does so by describing the DMA’s general characteristics (I), the “gatekeeping” market situations it targets (II), the legal treatment of gatekeeping (III), the multi-level governance system (IV), and the choice of economic policy it articulates (V). The paper concludes by highlighting areas for further consideration by lawmakers (VI). The ambition of the paper is essentially descriptive.

The Presumption of Harm in EU Private Enforcement of Competition Law – Effectiveness vs Overcompensation

The Presumption of Harm in EU Private Enforcement of Competition Law – Effectiveness vs Overcompensation

 

Lena Hornkohl

Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law

Abstract

The main issue that is still disrupting private enforcement of competition law is the calculation of damages. The 2014 Damages Directive contains some alleviations. Particularly Article 17(2) Damages Directive foresees a rebuttable presumption that cartels cause harm. Despite the clear statement in Recital 47 Damages Directive that this presumption should not cover the concrete amount of harm and studies that vary significantly regarding the typical overcharge, some Member States have created presumptions related to the amount of harm. Other Member States want to expand the presumption to non-cartel violations. This article takes a comparative analysis of the different Member States approaches and attempts to test the Damages Directive and EU competition law boundaries more generally. The article takes a sceptical perspective on some of the Member States’ approaches and proposes other solutions to ease the predicaments of damage quantifications: (i) a focus on illicit gains, (ii) amending the calculation guidelines and create a EU-wide competition damages database, (iii) create further procedural measures, such as collective redress instruments, special legal venues for private enforcement of competition law and expert judges, and (iv) foster further party-led solutions.

Potential Competition

Potential Competition

OECD Competition Papers

Chris Pike

Fideres Partners LLP; University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy

Takuya Ohno

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) - Competition Division

Date Written: May 1, 2021

Abstract

This paper discusses the concept of potential competition as an important pro-competitive factor. While potential competition is inevitably subject to significant uncertainty, where it does exist, the paper suggests treating potential competition with a parity of esteem with respect to actual competition. The paper considers the benefits of extending the timeframe used to evaluate potential competition and reviews the tools that are available to assess it. It suggests such tools may be helpfully placed within a specific framework to enable assessment under the different and greater uncertainty that exists over potential competitive constraints. These tools include many that are already widely used, such as the additional weight placed on credible contemporaneous internal documents, progress against regulatory checkpoints, understanding of business models and of competition to innovate. Similarly, on the counterfactual it suggests following existing best practices such as pro-actively exploring alternative counterfactuals. Other suggestions involve the use of what in some jurisdictions might be newer tools – valuation analysis, forward-looking consumer surveys, spillover analysis of non-overlapping products in adjacent markets, and the development of specialist progress-to-market expertise. The paper also highlights existing trends by competition agencies to advocate for a change in existing decision-making frameworks to effectively protect against the loss of potential competition. In this respect, the paper suggests that there might be a case for using different thresholds for potential competition from those that are used when the concern is over the possible loss of an actual constraint.