Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Friday, May 7, 2021

Interlocking Directorates in Europe – An Enforcement Gap?

Interlocking Directorates in Europe – An Enforcement Gap?

Corradi and Nowag (eds.), The Intersections between Competition Law and Corporate Law and Finance (Cambridge University Press, 2021)

Florence Thépot

University of Glasgow


This chapter highlights the potential anti-competitive risks raised by interlocking directorates between competitors. The anti-competitive effects stem both from the increased ability to collude enabled by interlocks, as well as the reduced incentive to compete fiercely on markets characterised with numerous social and corporate links. In addition, this chapter touches upon the questions of conflict of interest and problems of directors’ independence that are inherent when a board member sits on the boards of two competing companies. The main claim of this chapter is that there may be an enforcement gap around anti-competitive effects of interlocking directorates in Europe.

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