Since the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003, which brought about a fundamental change from a notification system for potentially anti-competitive agreements and an exemption monopoly for the European Commission (‘EC’) to direct applicability of Article 101 (3) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU') and self-assessment of potential infringements by the companies concerned, the EC’s enforcement priority have been, hardcore cartel cases1 and abuse of dominance cases. EC cases on borderline conduct, like co-operations between competitors—where it is without detailed assessment not clear whether an agreement or concerted practice infringes Article 101 (1) TFEU at all, falls under a block exemption regulation (‘BER’) or merits individual exemption under Article 101 (3) TFEU—are largely missing, whereas under the old notification system such precedent existed in the form of negative clearance4 or exemption decisions.