Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Thursday, July 23, 2020

Overlapping Ownership, Endogenous Quality,and Welfare

Overlapping Ownership, Endogenous Quality,and Welfare

By:

Duarte Brito (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia and CEFAGE); Ricardo Ribeiro (Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Católica Porto Business School and CEGE); Helder Vasconcelos (Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia and CEF.UP)

Abstract:

This paper investigates how overlapping ownership affects quality levels, consumer surplus, firms' profits and welfare when the industry is a vertically differentiated duopoly and quality choice is endogenous. This issue is particularly relevant since recent empirical evidence suggests that overlapping ownership constitutes an important feature of a multitude of vertically differentiated industries. We show that overlapping ownership while detrimental for welfare, may increase or decrease the quality gap, consumer surplus and firms' profits. In particular, when the overlapping ownership structure is such that the high quality firm places a positive weight on the low quality firm's profits, the incentives of the high quality firm to compete aggressively reduce. This may increase the equilibrium quality of the low quality firm, which in turn may lead to higher consumer surplus, despite higher prices.

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cap:wpaper:052019&r=com

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2020/07/overlapping-ownership-endogenous-qualityand-welfare.html

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