Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Friday, July 24, 2020

Free Entry under Common Ownership

Free Entry under Common Ownership

By:

Sato, Susumu; Matsumura, Toshihiro

Abstract:

This study investigates the equilibrium and welfare properties of free entry under common ownership. We formulate a model in which incumbents under common ownership choose whether to enter a new market. We find that an increase in common ownership reduces entries, which may or may not improve welfare. Welfare has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the degree of common ownership. However, if firms do not have common ownership before the entry, after entry common ownership harms welfare.

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:97525&r=com

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2020/07/free-entry-under-common-ownership.html

| Permalink

Comments

Post a comment