Friday, May 15, 2020

Vertical Relations and Dynamic Exclusion of Product Improvement

David Gilo, Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law, and Yaron Yehezkel, Coller School of Management , Tel-Aviv University identify Vertical Relations and Dynamic Exclusion of Product Improvement.

ABSTRACT: We consider infinitely repeated vertical relations when a retailer can sell an established product and a new product that is initially inferior but can improve over time. We find that the retailer has an incentive to sell the new product more than what maximizes industry profits. The manufacturer of the established product excludes the new product by setting a below-cost wholesale price, combined with a fixed fee, in all periods, and accommodates the new product more than under vertical integration. If exclusive dealing is allowed, the manufacturer imposes it and replicates the vertically integrated outcome. Such exclusive dealing can either increase or decrease social welfare.

May 15, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, May 14, 2020

Dynamically Efficient Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents

Bertram Neurohr addresses Dynamically Efficient Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents.

ABSTRACT: Some economists have argued that a reasonable royalty for a standard-essential patent should be based on the patent’s ex ante incremental value. Others have argued that a patent’s ex ante incremental value is insufficient, that a reasonable royalty is more akin to the prize in a winner-takes-all tournament, and that it should reflect the R&D costs associated with both the winning technology and unsuccessful alternative technologies. The results presented in this paper are favourable to the latter view, but with the additional qualification that a reasonable royalty ought to cover the costs of only those R&D efforts—successful or not—that are efficiency enhancing from an ex ante perspective. The notion of ex ante incremental value is core to identifying these efforts and hence to determining what the dynamically efficient outcome is. A reasonable royalty is one that induces this dynamically efficient outcome (i.e. a dynamically efficient level of R&D), balancing the costs incurred by innovators with the benefits that go to implementers and/or consumers. As such, a reasonable royalty is significantly higher than a technology’s ex ante incremental value. High ‘winner’ margins are offset by losses incurred by ‘losers’, leaving a significant proportion of the total net value generated by R&D to implementers and consumers.

May 14, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

A Moment of Truth for the EU: A Proposal for a State Aid Solidarity Fund

Alfonso Lamadrid de Pablo and José Luis Buendía offers A Moment of Truth for the EU: A Proposal for a State Aid Solidarity Fund.

ABSTRACT: The Covid-19 outbreak is putting societies, institutions, companies, families, and individuals to the test. Like all major crises, it is exposing our strengths and weaknesses, our contradictions and limitations. A common threat of unprecedented scale has revealed, once again, that our societies are capable of the very best and the very worst. Over the past few days, we have witnessed inspiring examples of empathy and solidarity, but also prejudice, frustration, and tension. We have the chance to show that we are up to the task. How we collectively choose to react to this crisis will define our future.

Like all major crises, the Covid-19 outbreak is also straining the European Union, bringing once again unresolved tensions between Member States to the surface and awakening dangerous currents of misunderstanding among citizens. Critics of EU integration have jumped on the occasion, failing to realise that the problem calls for more, not less EU. At the current stage of European integration, absent a fiscal union and with limited EU competences on public health, decisions remain mainly in the hands of national governments controlled by national parliaments. Disagreements among EU Member States within the European Council are sometimes desirable, and sometimes not so much, but they are perhaps inevitable. It is not only a matter of attitude and prejudice, but also of institutional and political constraints. While we wait for consensus among national governments on a comprehensive political response, other constructive and complementary solutions must be explored.

The European Commission can be the driving force in the pursuit of EU solidarity. Unlike national governments, the Commission is entrusted with safeguarding the general interests of the Union as a whole. President von der Leyen has committed to exploring any options available within the limits of the treaties. The Commission has both the responsibility and the power to take decisive action, and to shape the reactions of Member States to the crisis in line with the general interest. The Commission cannot require Member States to ignore or work around existing constraints, but it can impose proportionate ones.

Indeed, while the Commission’s powers may be limited in certain areas, they are strong and decisive in others. Notably, the Commission enjoys the exclusive competence to control, under State aid rules, the measures adopted by Member States to support economic operators. Over the past few days, the Commission has made an effort to exercise these powers swiftly and responsibly, adopting a Temporary Framework and authorising a considerable number of national measures to support the economy in the context of the pandemic. As we write, the Commission has announced an imminent amendment to the Temporary Framework aimed at enlarging the categories of permitted aid.

The unquestionable necessity of allowing the speedy authorisation of Covid-19-related national measures should, however, not blind us to their inevitable negative side-effects. The ‘full flexibility’ recognised by the Temporary Framework applies in theory to all Member States. In practice, however, it mostly benefits deeper-pocketed Member States with the means and the budget to spend the greatest resources.

Note that the Member States that benefit disproportionately from this policy are also the champions of austerity Member States that, rightly or wrongly, oppose other solidarity instruments like corona bonds. Under the current Temporary Framework, all Member States enjoy the same freedom to unleash their economic arsenal, but some may end up using bazookas, while others are stuck using slingshots.

Massive capital injections by only certain Member States might lead to massive distortions of competition. Companies and sectors from wealthy Member States may enjoy much more support to weather the crisis than their competitors established elsewhere in the EU, regardless of where the ongoing crisis happens to hit harder. Under the current circumstances, this could trigger the market exit of companies that would have normally survived, and vice versa. Competitive asymmetries deriving from State aid would, moreover, be exacerbated should national governments fail to reach an agreement on mutualising budget risks.

This scenario is not inevitable. It is within the power of the European Commission to ensure that State aid is awarded in a way that minimises any distortions of competition and, by the same token, fosters EU solidarity. The Commission itself recognises in the Temporary Framework that a coordinated effort will make the measures adopted more effective and may even foster a quicker recovery. The Framework also emphasises that this is not the time for a harmful subsidies race.

Our proposal is that the Commission amend the Temporary Framework in order to make the compatibility of State aid conditional on the provision of compensation for the competitive distortions that they necessarily create. This compensation would take the form of a contribution to the support of companies established in other Member States. The contribution could be equivalent to a percentage (for example, 15 per cent) of the public resources involved in the measures at issue. Each Member State would be able to propose specific ways to channel these contributions in a way that minimises competitive distortions. The Commission would assess their sufficiency prior to authorising the aid, and it would also ensure that most of the compensation is received by those who need it the most.

In order to speed up the approval process, the Commission could also predetermine ex ante that contributions to a ‘European Solidarity Fund’ would be presumed an acceptable compensation in this regard. The Fund could be initially established by some Member States as a vehicle allowing financial solidarity among them, but would be open all Member States. The Fund itself should also be notified under State aid rules and could obtain Commission approval as an ‘Important Project of Common European Interest’ (IPCEI).

We see no EU law impediment in implementing this proposal. Making the compatibility of State aid measures subject to compensatory conditions would not in itself entail any deviation from the Commission’s standard assessment. The rules adopted by the Commission to manage the support to financial institutions in the context of the past crisis were accompanied by strict conditions aimed at minimising distortions of trade and competition. To be sure, while requiring direct compensation from the State that granted the aid would constitute a novelty, this innovation would be justified. Indeed, the current circumstances do not permit the use of traditional safeguards, based on limiting the amounts of aid granted.

Several measures have already been authorised, but it is not too late to take action. Public support measures are here to stay and are likely to materialise in unprecedented volumes of aid. Failure to prevent further asymmetries would only make matters worse. Under this proposal, Member States would retain the ability to support their national economies, subject only to the condition that they contribute, proportionately to their means and to their measures, to minimising distortions to the internal market. This way, State aid policy could better contribute to the solution, rather than the problem.

Important details should be ironed out following an urgent consultation with Member States. Some version of this formula would not only be sensible and feasible, but also indispensable. It would mitigate serious distortions and contribute to levelling the playing field. In the absence of a political agreement between Member States, it would create a proportionate legal obligation to prevent harm to companies established in other EU countries, easing ‘rich’ Member States’ task of justifying their solidarity efforts to their citizens and parliaments. It would show precisely what the European Union is for and would restore citizens’ trust in the ideals of European integration. Let us not forget that, as empathically stated in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), one of the main tasks of the EU is to promote ‘economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.’

This proposal is not a silver bullet, but it is an important step towards solidarity based on legal mechanisms. As proclaimed in the Schuman declaration, the EU ‘will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.’ The European Commission has now the opportunity, the unique ability, and the historical responsibility to fulfil its mission.

May 14, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Branding Vertically Differentiated Product Lines: Branded House vs. House of Brands

Thomas Jungbauer, Johnson School, Cornell University and Sherif Nasser, Cornell University identify Branding Vertically Differentiated Product Lines: Branded House vs. House of Brands.

ABSTRACT: The decision whether a multi-product firm offers its goods under a joint or separate brands is essential for its success. When selling vertically differentiated products, it needs to consider the interplay of branding spillovers, pricing and cannibalization. We study the problem of a firm selling vertically differentiated products deciding whether to sell its products under a joint or separate brands. The analysis accounts for the positive and negative spillover effects between jointly branded products previously established in the literature. Our findings suggest that joint branding is optimal when spillover effects are either high or low but not when they are intermediate. When spillover effects are low, firms jointly brand to save the cost of building a second brand. In contrast, when spillover effects are high, the firm chooses joints branding because it is inherently more profitable even if building additional brands is free. When spillover effects are intermediate, however, firms opt for separate branding despite the additional cost of building more brands. We also extend the analysis to investigate the effect of low-end strategic competition and find that this kind of competition pushes the multi-product line firm towards joint branding. Finally, our modeling approach explains why some firm use hybrid (endorsed) branding to dampen the spillover effects compared to pure joint branding.

May 14, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Supply Chain Strategies of the Apparel Industry in Research: A Literature Review

Sabrina Backs, Bielefeld University, Hermann Jahnke, Lars Lüpke, Bielefeld University, Mareike Stuecken, Bielefeld University - Department of Business Administration and Economics, and Christian Stummer, Bielefeld University offer Supply Chain Strategies of the Apparel Industry in Research: A Literature Review.

ABSTRACT: In recent decades, the apparel industry has received substantial attention from both practitioners and from researchers. This interest has been fueled by the desire to shrink product lifecycles as well as by the increasing competition in the apparel industry due to globalization and digitization. What is the convenient supply chain strategy? How can it be managed and what types of investigation do a company have to find the “right” direction? In this working paper, we present a short summary of the historical background of the apparel industry and in particular a comprehensive literature review. In this context, we have grouped the existing literature regarding supply chain strategies of the apparel industry in qualitative empirical, quantitative empirical and model theoretical research to lay a basis for further research tasks.

May 14, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 12, 2020

Illegal Cartel

Douglas Silveira, Federal University of Juiz de Fora; University of Alberta; Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Emilson Delfino Silva, University of Alberta - Department of Marketing, Business Economics & Law, and Silvinha Vasconcelos, Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora - Department of Economics discuss the Illegal Cartel.

ABSTRACT: This paper offers a theoretical model for the analysis of illegal cartels. Given the nature of the cartel, retaliation is also illegal. To assess the stability of collusion as a criminal organization, we propose a one-shot game based on Bertrand competition with product differentiation. We confirm our conjectures on both the cartel's internal and external stability through numerical solutions. Depending on market parameters, the cartel remains stable with up to six homogeneous firms. By introducing cost asymmetry that number is significantly higher, and the collusion proves to be increasing in the share of high-cost firms in the market.

May 12, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Case for 'Unfair Methods of Competition' Rulemaking

Rohit Chopra, Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission and Lina Khan, Columbia University - Law School make The Case for 'Unfair Methods of Competition' Rulemaking.

ABSTRACT: A key feature of antitrust today is that the law is developed entirely through adjudication. Evidence suggests that this exclusive reliance on adjudication has failed to deliver a predictable, efficient, or participatory antitrust regime. Antitrust litigation and enforcement are protracted and expensive, requiring extensive discovery and costly expert analysis. In theory, this approach facilitates nuanced and factspecific analysis of liability and well-tailored remedies. But in practice, the exclusive reliance on case-by-case adjudication has yielded a system of enforcement that generates ambiguity, drains resources, privileges incumbents, and deprives individuals and firms of any real opportunity to participate in the process of creating substantive antitrust rules. It is difficult to quantify this harm.

This Essay argues that rulemaking under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act should supplement antitrust adjudication, and that this institutional shift would lower enforcement costs, reduce ambiguity, and facilitate greater democratic participation. We build on existing scholarship to debunk the view that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) does not have competition rulemaking authority pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act conferring Chevron deference, and trace legislative history to underscore how Congress designed the FTC to play a unique institutional role.

We close by outlining an initial set of factors that should weigh in favor of rulemaking: when there is significant learning from past enforcement and when private litigation would be unlikely. Finally, we pose questions in the context of the FTC’s recent hearings to prompt further discussion on where this unused tool would be most useful.

May 12, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Mergers and Acquisitions during the Crisis: Should the Antitrust Traffic Light Be Red, Yellow, or Green? - May 14, 2020 12pm ET

May 12, 2020
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CPI & PYMNTS are partnering to offer an exclusive series of live debates where key economists, lawyers, investors, and executives meet to discuss some of the most pressing issues affecting our economies.

Join us next Thursday, May 14th, 12pm ET for our first live discussion on “Mergers and Acquisitions during the Crisis: Should the Antitrust Traffic Light Be Red, Yellow, or Green?”

 
 
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Three Key Questions Will Be Tackled:
1 Should merger policy change during the pandemic and if so how?
2 Is now the time to tighten or loosen the antitrust grip on Big Tech?
3 How could these decisions affect innovation, entrepreneurs, and startups?

Spanning these questions is the unfolding crisis affecting company M&A decisions as buyers or sellers.

 
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May 12, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

FTC Hot Topics with Commissioner Christine Wilson: Regulatory Reform, Privacy, Antitrust, & Beyond [Virtual Fireside Chat] May 18, 2020 at 12:00 PM ET

FTC Hot Topics with Commissioner Christine Wilson: Regulatory Reform, Privacy, Antitrust, & Beyond [Virtual Fireside Chat]

May 18, 2020 at 12:00 PM ET

Please register to attend this Zoom Webinar.

Please join us at noon on March 18 for a fireside chat discussion on the Federal Trade Commission’s regulatory reform efforts, federal privacy legislation, and the future of antitrust law.

Christine Wilson

Commissioner

Federal Trade Commission


Svetlana Gans

Vice President & Associate General Counsel

NCTA

May 12, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Developing International Perspectives on Digital Competition Policy

Sean F. Ennis, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia; Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia and Amelia Fletcher Centre for Competition Policy and Norwich Business School, UEA analyze Developing International Perspectives on Digital Competition Policy.

Abstract: In 2019, there was a notable ramping up in the international focus around competition issues in digital platform markets, with the publication of expert policy reports in several jurisdictions. There are many similarities across these various reports, including a general recognition that digital platforms have become increasingly important, that they have delivered enormous benefits for consumers, but also that they raise significant competition concerns. Digital platform markets have a tendency towards concentration and towards the creation of ecosystems within which market power may be extended across markets. This paper compares and contrasts the policy recommendations made in three of the major expert reports, those from the EC, UK and US. These offer similar diagnoses of the underlying economic drivers of competition concerns in digital platform markets. They consider government actions to address these concerns have so far been insufficient. However, the reports exhibit notable differences in respect to their specific policy recommendations. For example, the UK and US experts both favour the introduction of ex ante regulation, albeit taking on somewhat different functions. The EC experts focus more on setting out recommendations for antitrust, albeit recognising that a regulatory regime may be needed in the longer run. Meanwhile, the US and EC experts are inclined to relax or reverse burdens of proof for both mergers and abuse of dominance, albeit in specified circumstances only, whereas the UK experts do not recommend this. This paper focuses on such similarities and differences of view across the three reports under the categories of mergers, dominance, data, regulation, and international.

May 12, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

GCR 40 Under 40 is Out

According to GCR:

 

GCR 40 UNDER 40 2020

GCR has published its list of the world’s top young antitrust lawyers and economists.

This year’s survey features 37 private practitioners from 33 different law firms and economics consultancies, as well as two enforcers and one academic.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the US is the most represented jurisdiction, with eight lawyers and economists featured. The UK and Brussels follow close behind with seven apiece.

You can see the entire list here.

May 12, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Data Portability: Initial Reflections on an Ex Ante Approach

Simonetta Vezzoso, University of Trento identifies Data Portability: Initial Reflections on an Ex Ante Approach.

ABSTRACT: In this time of radical transformations and profound uncertainty, an important reflection is underway on how to adequately adjust the competition policy’s toolbox. As the traditional ways to manage market power and to promote competition seem increasingly inadequate in the digital economy, new conceptual frameworks have been suggested. Promising in this respect is the idea of an ex ante pro-competition approach aiming to impose proportionate constraints on the behaviour of particularly powerful, systemic operators. This brief contribution offers some initial reflections on the hereby envisaged ex ante intervention promoting data portability, focusing in particular on the different issues that this tool could potentially tackle.

May 12, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 11, 2020

Artificial Intelligence: Can Seemingly Collusive Outcomes Be Avoided?

Ibrahim Abada, ENGIE and Xavier Lambin, Grenoble Ecole de Management, Univ Grenoble Alpes ComUE discuss Artificial Intelligence: Can Seemingly Collusive Outcomes Be Avoided?

ABSTRACT: Strategic decisions are increasingly delegated to algorithms. We analyze a setting where a limited number of agents use simple and independent machine learning algorithms to buy and sell electricity on behalf of a large number of consumers. No specific instruction is given to them, only that their objective it to maximize profits based solely on information of past market prices and payoffs. With a realistic application to the operation of batteries, we observe that the algorithms quickly learn to exert market power at seemingly collusive levels, despite the absence of any formal communication between them. This finding is a generalization of Waltman and Kaymak (2008) and Calvano et al. (2019) to the much more complex problem of dynamic optimization. We add another player (possibly a regulator), whose objective is to maximize social surplus or minimize supra-competitive profits. With adequate intervention during the learning process, this player succeeds in disciplining the market toward socially desirable outcomes.

May 11, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

25 Years of European Merger Control

Pauline Affeldt, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin); Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin), Tomaso Duso, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin); TU Berlin- Faculty of Economics and Management - Empirical Industrial Organization, and Florian Szücs, Vienna University of Economics and Business survey 25 Years of European Merger Control. Worth reading!

ABSTRACT: We study the evolution of EC merger decisions over the first 25 years of common European merger policy. Using a novel dataset at the level of the relevant antitrust markets and containing all merger cases scrutinized by the Commission over the 1990-2014 period, we evaluate how consistently arguments related to structural market parameters – dominance, concentration, barriers to entry, and foreclosure – were applied over time and across different dimensions such as the geographic market definition and the complexity of the merger. Simple, linear probability models as usually applied in the literature overestimate on average the effects of the structural indicators. Using non-parametric machine learning techniques, we find that dominance is positively correlated with competitive concerns, especially in concentrated markets and in complex mergers. Yet, its importance has decreased over time and significantly following the 2004 merger policy reform. The Commission's competitive concerns are also correlated with concentration and the more so, the higher the entry barriers and the risks of foreclosure. These patterns are not changing over time. The role of the structural indicators in explaining competitive concerns does not change depending on the geographic market definition.

May 11, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Roots of Agricultural Innovation: Patent Evidence of Knowledge Spillovers

Matthew S. Clancy, Paul Heisey, Yongjie Ji, GianCarlo Moschini describe The Roots of Agricultural Innovation: Patent Evidence of Knowledge Spillovers.

ABSTRACT: This chapter investigates the extent to which agricultural innovations draw on ideas originating outside of agriculture. We identify a large set of US patents for agricultural technologies granted between 1976 and 2018. To measure knowledge spillovers to these patents, we rely on three proxies: patent citations to other patents, patent citations to the scientific literature, and a novel text analysis to identify and track new ideas in the patent text. We find that more than half of knowledge flows originate outside of agriculture. The majority of these knowledge inflows, however, still originate in domains that are close to agriculture.

May 11, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Market Structure and Product Assortment: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Liquor Licensure

Gastón Illanes, Sarah Moshary examine Market Structure and Product Assortment: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Liquor Licensure.

ABSTRACT: We examine how market structure, measured as the number of firms, affects prices, quantities, product assortment, and consumer surplus. Our analysis exploits Washington’s deregulation of spirit sales, which generated exogenous variation in market structure across the state. Consistent with the uniform pricing literature, we find no effect of increased competition on prices. Rather, we document an expansion of product assortment, which in turn increases purchasing. Using a discrete-choice demand model, we estimate that wider assortments increase consumer surplus by $3.20/month when moving from monopoly to duopoly. However, the likelihood that a household engages in heavy drinking, as defined by the CDC, increases by 5.6 percentage points, raising concerns about social welfare.

May 11, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, May 8, 2020

Countervailing Market Power and Hospital Competition

Eric Barrette, Gautam Gowrisankaran, Robert Town have an interesting paper on Countervailing Market Power and Hospital Competition. Worth reading!

ABSTRACT: While economic theories indicate that monopsony power by downstream firms can potentially counteract market power upstream, antitrust policy is opaque about whether to incorporate countervailing market power in merger analyses. We use detailed national claims data from the healthcare sector to evaluate whether insurer monopsony power does indeed limit hospitals' exercise of market power. We estimate willingness-to-pay models to evaluate hospital market power across analysis areas. We find that countervailing market power is important: a typical hospital merger would raise hospital prices 4.3% at the 25th percentile of insurer concentration but only 0.97% at the 75th percentile of insurer concentration.

May 8, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Innovation Considerations in Horizontal Merger Control

Ioannis Kokkoris and Tommaso Valletti discuss Innovation Considerations in Horizontal Merger Control.

ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on the assessment of mergers and in particular on unilateral effects analysis where innovation plays an important role. The paper discusses the economic theories behind innovation, how we move from the traditional product-by-product market definition to pipeline competition and innovation competition and the concept of innovation space. The paper provides a structural analysis of unilateral effects in such markets analyzing how competition authorities should assess a transaction where the main theory of harm is based on innovation considerations.

May 8, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Licensing Standard Essential Patents: Preparing for 5G Mobile Communications

Dan Spulber, Northwestern addresses Licensing Standard Essential Patents: Preparing for 5G Mobile Communications.

ABSTRACT: The 5G mobile telecommunications standard is focusing increased attention on licensing of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). SEP holders and technology implementers commit to negotiate license agreements on terms that are Fair, Reasonable, and Non-discriminatory (FRAND). Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) establish coordinated FRAND commitments by consensus decision making. SEP holders and implementers create negotiated FRAND commitments through patent license agreements. Courts specify adjudicated FRAND commitments in SEP license disputes. The article argues that SSO coordination, market negotiation, and adjudication precisely define FRAND commitments. The courts have successfully applied common law principles and comparable license agreements to interpret FRAND commitments. The article argues that administrative or judicial regulation would reduce standardization, impede innovation, and constrain market negotiation of patent license agreements. The article introduces the concept of the “patent run-around” to describe potential effects of “licensing to all” regulations. The article cautions that because of some landmark court decisions, there is a risk that the provisions of patent license agreements could be determined more by judicial regulation than by negotiation in competitive markets. Problematic developments include the imposition of arbitrary aggregate rate caps and basing royalties on the estimated incremental value of standardized technology. The article recommends that courts avoid formulating one-size-fits-all FRAND commitments in 5G mobile telecommunications and other innovative industries. Licensing SEPs does not justify increased antitrust enforcement or administrative regulation.

May 8, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, May 7, 2020

Climate change, sustainability, and competition law

Simon Holmes identifies Climate change, sustainability, and competition law.

ABSTRACT: Climate Change is an existential threat. Competition law must be part of the solution and not part of the problem. This article draws on the constitutional provisions of the EU treaties and remarks by leaders such as Commissioner Vestager to show how competition law need not stand in the way of urgent action and co-operation by the private sector to fight climate change. It also shows how sustainability is relevant to both the analysis of mergers and dominance cases. It is a call to update our thinking, our guidelines and, if necessary, our law. Based on EU law it contains ideas that could inspire changes in other jurisdictions.

May 7, 2020 | Permalink | Comments (0)