Thursday, March 12, 2020
Seth B. Sacher, Federal Trade Commission and John Simpson, Federal Trade Commission are Estimating Incremental Margins for Diversion Analysis.
ABSTRACT: Over the past twenty years, antitrust agencies increasingly have used diversion and pricing pressure analyses to help identify which mergers to investigate and then to help identify which mergers to challenge. A key input in these analyses is an estimate of the profits that firms earn on incremental sales. In this paper, we consider how best to estimate incremental margins for diversion and pricing pressure analyses given that for a number of reasons measures drawn from aggregate accounting data sometimes poorly measure the relevant incremental margin. We conclude such estimates often can be improved by making greater use of general knowledge about how the relevant market works, using detailed data to create incremental profit measures tied to a particular change in output, and presenting sensitivity analyses based on a range of plausible incremental margin estimates.
Winand Emons, University of Bern - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and Severin Lehnhard, University of Bern are Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions.
ABSTRACT: To encourage private actions for damages in antitrust cases some jurisdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from the fine. We analyze the effectiveness of this policy. Such a rebate does not encourage settlement negotiations that would otherwise not occur. If, however, the parties settle without the rebate, the introduction of the reduction increases the settlement amount, yet at the price of reduced deterrence for those wrongdoers who are actually fined. Under a leniency program the rebate has no effect on the leniency applicant: she doesn't pay a fine that can be reduced. The overall effect of a fine reduction on deterrence is, therefore, negative.
Now a free online conference - REGISTER NOW Digital Platforms: Innovation, Antitrust, Privacy & the Internet of Things UIC John Marshall Law School Center for Intellectual Property, Information & Privacy Law Friday, March 13, 2020 from 8:45 AM to 4:30 PM
Friday, March 13, 2020 from 8:45 AM to 4:30 PM (CDT)
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Digital Platforms: Innovation, Antitrust, Privacy & the Internet of Things
* CONFERENCE TO BE HELD ONLINE VIA WEBEX. LOG-IN INFORMATION WILL BE SENT VIA EMAIL ON THURSDAY*
Friday, March 13, 2020 | 8:45 a.m.—4:30 p.m.
No Live Event on Campus
CLE Credit: Due to change in format no CLE credit will be avilable for this event.
Thanks to our sponsors' generosity, we are pleased to extend complimentary registration to all.
Online platforms have become a focal point for many in the United States as well as in key jurisdictions around the world. Governments and legal advisors are struggling to understand the issues and implications these platforms raise, particularly in the areas of intellectual property, privacy, and antitrust law and practice. This Conference brings together top experts in government, industry, practice, and academia to share their cutting-edge insights on these issues as well as where things are headed. It will feature highly interactive sessions and opportunities to speak directly to these experts to have questions answered. It is the only event of its kind in the Midwest and one that is not to be missed.
(as of March 9)
March 13, 2020
UIC John Marshall Law School
Daryl Lim, Professor of Law & Director, Center for IP, Information and Privacy Law, UIC John Marshall Law School
Keynote: Christine S. Wilson, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission
“Global Innovation, Local Regulation: Navigating Competition Rules in the Digital Economy.”
Discussant: Andre Fiebig, Partner, Quarles & Brady LLP
Session 1: Intellectual Property Issues
Topics include artificial intelligence, refusals to license (general rule and exceptions, the Internet of Things), breach of “good faith” FRAND commitments, whether and how national courts should address “global” licensing disputes.
Moderator: Themi Anagnos, Head of IP for the Americas, Continental Automotive
- Kenneth R. Adamo, Owner, Law Offices of Kenneth R. Adamo
- Kirti Gupta, Vice President, Technology and Economic Strategy, Qualcomm Incorporated
- Hon. James Holderman (Ret.), Mediator and Arbitrator, JAMS
- Adam Kelly, Partner, Loeb & Loeb
- Russell E. Levine, P.C., Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP
- Erin Lothson, Senior Counsel, Uber Freight
11:30 a.m.—12:55 p.m.
Session 2: Privacy Issues
Topics include compliance with the rapidly evolving privacy and security regulatory landscape; the risks and benefits posed by the power of digital platforms in the modern economy; privacy and security considerations in biometrics, artificial intelligence, facial recognition, behavioral advertising, and “big-data”
Moderator: Robert H. Newman, Co-Chair, Privacy, Security & Data Innovations, Loeb& Loeb
- Cara Dearman, Data Privacy Officer, RSM US LLP
- Daniel Farris, Partner, K&L Gates LLP
- Cameron Krieger, Senior Counsel, Digital Governance, Privacy & Security, Mars Incorporated
- Divya Mathur, Vice President and Consultant, Analysis Group
- Randy Robinson, Assistant Professor, UIC John Marshall Law School
- Liad Wagman, Senior Economics and Technology Advisor, Federal Trade Commission, Office of Policy Planning
1:40 —2:25 p.m.
Keynote: D. Daniel Sokol, Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law
“Digital Competition, Regulation, and Business Risk Across the Supply Chain”
Discussant: David Schwartz, Professor of Law & Associate Dean of Research and Intellectual Life, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law
Session 3: Antitrust Issues
Topics include platform regulation developments in the U.S. and overseas, concerns indirectly related to competition law or that don’t fit easily within traditional modes of antitrust analysis, disagreement whether online markets competition are only a click away and that there are no enduring monopolies about which we should be concerned.
Moderator: Matthew Sag, Georgia Reithal Professor of Law & Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, Loyola University School of Law
- Jeffrey Cross, Partner, Freeborn & Peters LLP
- Anne Gron, Managing Director, AlixPartners
- Michele Lee, Senior Director and Associate General Counsel, Head of Global Litigation, Regulatory, & Competition, Twitter
- Dan Spulber, Elinor Hobbs Professor of International Business, Professor of Strategy; Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law (Courtesy), Kellogg School of Management; Pritzker School of Law, Northwestern University
- Aaron Yeater, Managing Principal, Analysis Group, Inc.
Keynote: James M. Foote, President and Chief Executive Officer, CSX Corporation
“Digital Competition, Regulation, and Business Risk Across the Supply Chain”
Closing Remarks & Reception
Consent For Video Recording:
This event may be recorded and may be later made publically available via the Internet. Participation in the event constitutes consent to be recorded, including without limitation by audio, video, and still images. Participants understand that such recordings may be distributed by means of a variety of media, formats, and contexts, and that this may occur during the event and thereafter. Participants waive all claims for any compensation and for any damages or other remedies in connection with such recordings and the use thereof.
Please contact [email protected] with any questions.
Have questions about Digital Platforms: Innovation, Antitrust, Privacy & the Internet of Things? Contact UIC John Marshall Law School Center for Intellectual Property, Information & Privacy Law
Shengyu Li, University of New South Wales - School of Economics and Rong Luo University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business - Department of Economics identify Non-Exclusive Dealing with Retailer Differentiation and Market Penetration.
ABSTRACT: Retailer differentiation widely exists in most industries, and this gives manufacturers an incentive to contract with different retailers to penetrate the market. This paper analyzes the impact of this market penetration effect on vertical contract exclusivity in an oligopolistic model with differentiated retailers. In this model, manufacturers endogenously choose contract types and negotiate with retailers on wholesale prices. We show that, when the penetration effect is strong, non-exclusive contracts imply higher profits for the manufacturers and retailers. A numerical example of the model with logit demand shows that choosing a non-exclusive contract is a dominant strategy, and a prisoners' dilemma occurs when the products have high quality or low costs.
Wednesday, March 11, 2020
Heiko Gerlach, University of Queensland has written about Price Discrimination in Cartels.
ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes price discrimination of an upstream cartel in the presence of a dominant firm at the retail level. Charging different wholesale prices creates a bond between the upstream cartel and the favored downstream firm. This bond reduces or eliminates this firm's incentives to accept deviation offers from upstream cartel members. When a cartel price discriminates in favor of the dominant downstream firm, it is able to implement prices above cost for any strictly positive value of the discount factor. This conclusion is robust with respect to the type of downstream competition, the form of contracts and the observability of offers. I also discuss the effect of vertical mergers on cartel sustainability in this setting.
Collusive Investments in Technological Compatibility: Lessons from U.S. Railroads in the Late 19th Century
Daniel Gross, HBS investigates Collusive Investments in Technological Compatibility: Lessons from U.S. Railroads in the Late 19th Century. Worth reading!
ABSTRACT: Collusion is widely condemned for its negative eﬀects on consumer welfare and market eﬃciency. In this paper, I show that collusion may also in some cases facilitate the creation of unexpected new sources of value. I bring this possibility into focus through the lens of a historical episode from the 19th century, when colluding railroads in the U.S. South converted 13,000 miles of railroad track to standard gauge over the course of two days in 1886, integrating the South into the national transportation network. Route-level freight traﬃc data reveal that the gauge change caused a large shift in market share from steamships to railroads, but did not aﬀect total shipments or prices on these routes. Guided by these results, I develop a model of compatibility choice in a collusive market and argue that collusion may have enabled the gauge change to take place as it did, while also tempering the eﬀects on prices and total shipments
ABSTRACT: Amid a global uptick in public interest in competition policy, questions have emerged about the fitness of tools available to international competition authorities, particularly in relation to the digital economy. Treatment of mergers has come under increased scrutiny, and while the competitive analysis of mergers is a rich vein of debate, equally important is the question of which mergers competition authorities decide to analyse at all. We provide a brief overview of the Canadian approach to pre-merger notification, the emerging challenges associated with but not limited to the digital economy, and the Canadian response thus far.
An Evidence-Based Analysis of Relevant Market: The Case of Ridesharing in Delhi-National Capital Region (India)
CUTS has prepared a report on An Evidence-Based Analysis of Relevant Market: The Case of Ridesharing in Delhi-National Capital Region (India).
Tuesday, March 10, 2020
Michal Gal, Haifa makes THE CASE FOR LIMITING PRIVATE EXCESSIVE PRICING LITIGATION.
ABSTRACT: In the European Union, private litigation of competition law violations is in its nascence. As this article shows, excessive pricing raises strong concerns for such litigation, for three reasons: (1) the inherent difficulty of defining what constitutes an unfair price; (2) additional challenges inherent to private excessive pricing litigation, such as the need to pinpoint when exactly a price becomes unfair; and (3) the institutional features of general courts in EU member states, which are ill-suited to the required tasks. We elaborate on these concerns, pointing to four specific challenges inherent to private litigation and to three instances where a lack of sufficient economic understanding could entrap general courts (a cost trap, a fairness trap, and a monopolistic competition trap). Together, these factors create a risk of error costs much higher than any experienced so far, which could potentially reduce welfare. The article suggests some measures that can be taken to ensure that welfare is served.
Ryan M. Rodenberg, FSU describes Antitrust Standing after Apple v. Pepper: Application to the Sports Betting Data Market.
ABSTRACT: In Apple v. Pepper, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed a largely permissive view about whether certain potential plaintiffs have legal standing to pursue antitrust lawsuits in federal court. The Apple v. Pepper ruling provided important clarity about the scope of the so-called indirect purchaser rule set forth forty-plus years earlier in Illinois Brick. This paper first summarizes the key takeaways from the Apple v. Pepper decision released on May 13, 2019, positioning the ruling vis-à-vis other standing-related cases that have sometimes closed the courtroom doors to plaintiffs alleging anticompetitive conduct under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. This paper then applies the lessons from Apple v. Pepper to sports betting data, an emerging tech-focused market. This paper concludes by outlining how—and why—this market will likely be subject to antitrust scrutiny soon.
Sole Control: The Belgian Competition Authority Clears a Vertical Merger in the Audiovisual Sector, Subject to Conditions
Simon Vande Walle, University of Tokyo - Graduate Schools for Law and Politics describes Sole Control: The Belgian Competition Authority Clears a Vertical Merger in the Audiovisual Sector, Subject to Conditions.
ABSTRACT: This case note analyses and comments on the Belgian Competition Authority's approval of Telenet's acquisition of sole control over De Vijver Media. The decision, rendered in May 2019, allowed Telenet to acquire sole control over De Vijver Media but imposed several remedies on Telenet. The acquisition combined a cable operator and a TV broadcaster and was therefore a vertical merger. It is part of a broader wave of vertical integration between content providers and TV distributors, often said to be a response to the threat of vertically integrated entities like Netflix and Amazon.
The decision offers an interesting example of how the vertical effects of media mergers are assessed. It also analyses the role that data, platforms and algorithms play in the distribution of TV content and articulates several theories of harm on that basis.
Sergey G. Kokovin, Novosibirsk State University - Department of Economics, Shamil Sharapudinov, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Alexander Tarasov, National Research University Higher School of Economics, and Philip Ushchev, HSE Moscow offer A Theory of Monopolistic Competition with Horizontally Heterogeneous Consumers.
ABSTRACT: Our novel approach to modeling monopolistic competition with heterogeneous consumers involves a space of characteristics of a differentiated good (consumersâ€™ ideal points), alike Hotelling (1929). Firms have heterogeneous costs Ã la Melitz (2003). In addition to price setting, each firm also chooses its optimal location/niche in this space. We formulate conditions for positive sorting: more efficient firms serve larger market segments and face tougher competition in the equilibrium. Our framework entails rich equilibrium patterns displaying non-monotonic markups, high in the most and least populated niches, and the unequal gains from trade across different consumers.
Monday, March 9, 2020
Matthew Panhans, Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economics and Reinhard Schumacher, Universität Potsdam offer Perspectives on Antitrust of the American Institutionalist Economists.
ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the views on monopoly, competition, and antitrust of the American Institutionalist economists during the first half of the 20th century. In doing so, we explore a perspective on antitrust issues that contrasts with what would later become the mainstream approach to antitrust analysis. American Institutionalists contributed some distinct approaches and perspectives on the question of competition policy, and our survey of Institutionalist writings identifies four major contributions. First, they had broad goals for competition policy that extended beyond low consumer prices, including economic stability, fair distribution to factors of production, diffusion of the gains of progress, and preservation of the competitive process. Second, they rejected the perfectly competitive market as the conceptual benchmark and ideal. Third, their methodology focused on describing institutional details, so as to bring theory into closer contact with life and reality. Finally, they viewed a scientific approach to policy as involving experimentation to see what worked, and consequently were often open-minded about which policies would best achieve given policy objectives.
First Assistant Attorney General – Antitrust Unit
- Consumer Protection
- Position Number:
- LAA 09100
- Salary Range:
- $9,815.00 - $12,000.00 Monthly
- Apply By:
- Friday, March 27, 2020, 11:59 pm
- Work Unit:
- Job Location:
- 1300 Broadway, Denver, CO 80203
- Release Date:
- Friday, March 6, 2020
- Employment Type:
- Position Type:
Find a rewarding career making a difference: Join the Office of the Attorney General!
The Colorado Department of Law, Consumer Protection Section is recruiting for the First Assistant Attorney General to lead the Antitrust Unit and drive the development and implementation of the Office’s antitrust enforcement strategy. This is a rare opportunity for an attorney seeking high-level government experience enforcing the antitrust laws. The Office of the Attorney General offers the opportunity to be involved in challenging, interesting, and meaningful work in a collaborative environment supported by leadership committed to effective and innovative law enforcement.
The Office of the Attorney General/Department of Law is committed to serving as the “People’s Lawyer.” The Attorney General, Phil Weiser, was elected by the people of Colorado and is the State’s chief lawyer and law enforcement official. Our purpose is:
“Together, we serve Colorado and its people, advancing the rule of law, protecting our democracy and promoting justice for all.”
Our core values drive our actions and demonstrate that we are:
Principled – maintain highest ethical standards, rigorous legal analysis, careful evaluation of facts
Public Servants – ensure our work is not about us, it’s about the people of Colorado
Innovative – identify the best approach, make deliberate decisions, always look to improve
Better Together – support each other, partner with others
The Attorney General has primary authority for enforcement of consumer protection and antitrust laws, prosecution of criminal appeals and some complex white-collar crimes, the Statewide Grand Jury, training and certification of peace officers, and most natural resource and environmental matters. The Attorney General serves as counsel to all state officials, departments, boards and commissions. Visit our website to learn more: https://coag.gov/.
In addition to the challenging and impactful work being done at the Office of the Attorney General, there are many other benefits to joining our team:
- Medical and dental health plans
- Employer-paid life insurance
- Paid vacation and sick leave earned each month
- 10 paid holidays per year
- Public Service Loan Forgiveness – A borrower may qualify for forgiveness while employed full-time in a public service occupation and meet other certain criteria
- Free access to an on-site fitness center
- Strong, flexible retirement benefits including 401K and 457 plans
- Excellent work-life programs, such as flexible work schedules, professional development opportunities, and an employee discount program
To learn more about our benefits visit: https://www.colorado.gov/dhr/benefits.
Information About the Job:
The Consumer Protection Section of the Colorado Attorney General’s Office has an opening for a First Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Unit. This First Assistant Attorney General leads the Unit and supervises a staff of 9 employees, including assistant attorneys general, legal assistants, and temporary attorneys. The work of this unit focuses principally on competition issues, but also covers other consumer protection matters, and involves enforcement of state and federal antitrust laws, the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, and the No Call List Act.
The Colorado Attorney General is committed to effective and innovative enforcement of the antitrust laws. The First Assistant Attorney General works with the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General to develop and implement the Office’s antitrust enforcement strategy. The Unit conducts investigations under the antitrust and consumer protection statutes, reviews proposed mergers and acquisitions, and brings enforcement actions in state and federal district courts, both on its own and with other state and federal law enforcement agencies. The First Assistant Attorney General is expected to handle a caseload and to supervise other staff conducting investigations and/or enforcement actions. The First Assistant Attorney General is also responsible for employee performance management activities and assisting the Deputy Attorney General for Consumer Protection with personnel, budget, and various administrative duties affecting the work of the Unit and the Department of Law.
Job Qualifications: Must be licensed to practice law in Colorado or clearly eligible to waive into the Colorado Bar, and be in good standing. Requires at least eight years of experience as a practicing attorney with significant litigation skills and experience working with state or federal antitrust laws. The preferred candidate will have experience in complex cases, experience with consumer protection laws, and prior management or supervisory experience leading a diverse workforce. Prior public sector experience is also desirable. Candidates must have outstanding writing and analytical skills, the ability to work collaboratively with a variety of personalities, a commitment to excellence, a strong professional background, and a desire to serve the public interest.
The Office of the Attorney General/Department of Law is an equal opportunity employer and understands that a diverse work force adds quality and perspective to the services we provide to the public. We encourage candidates with diverse qualities, backgrounds, and abilities to apply.
All final candidates for employment must successfully pass a thorough background investigation.
How to apply: Please submit a resume, writing sample and a minimum of three professional references via e-mail to:
Cynthia Garcia, Program Assistant
Consumer Protection Section
Email: [email protected]
Byeongyong Paul Choi, Howard University - School of Business - Department of Finance, International Business, and Insurance discusses Advertising, Market Concentration, and Firm Performance on the Distribution System.
ABSTRACT: This paper examines the impact of advertising on the firm performance as measured two profit variables and market structure as measured by market concentrations and the relationship is analyzed by two different distribution systems: independent agency writers vs. direct writers. The empirical testing results show that a positive and non-significant relationship between concentration and advertising for both distribution systems, while a negative and significant relation between market share and advertising is found. These results are consistent with the two distribution systems. This paper, however, finds differences between the two distribution systems in the profit model. A negative and significant relationship is found between advertising and profits for independent agency writers, while there exists no significant relationship for direct writers. So, in this highly competitive market, advertising does not boost profit for independent agency writers.
Barak Orbach has written on D&O Liability for Antitrust Violations. Worth reading!
ABSTRACT: This Article provides a guide for liability of directors and officers (“D&O”) for antitrust violations. Where violations of law appear profitable, a misalignment of compensation schemes and formal compliance policies may preserve incentives to engage in misconduct. In such situations, the likelihood and prevalence of misconduct heavily depends on the effectiveness of the company’s oversight system. Antitrust violations intend to increase profit, are hard to detect, and are hard to prove. The perceived profitability of antitrust violations sometimes motivates D&O to participate in, encourage, or ignore such violations.
I review the liability standards that may apply to D&O for antitrust violations, as well as trends in relevant doctrines and enforcement policies. I explain the reasons for the growing risk of personal liability and argue that this risk likely to continue rising in the foreseeable future. Specifically, today, D&O may be held liable for failures to make good faith efforts to develop and maintain organizational culture of compliance with antitrust law. I outline the factors that D&O and their counsels who seek to mitigate risk exposure should consider.
Anja Rösner, University of Duesseldorf, Justus Haucap, Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Department of Economics; German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Ulrich Heimeshoff, University of Duesseldorf analyze The Impact of Consumer Protection in the Digital Age: Evidence from the European Union.
ABSTRACT: We investigate the effect of an EU-wide consumer protection regulation on consumer trust as well as consumer behavior. The Unfair Commercial Practice Directive (UCPD) was implemented by EU member states between 2007 and 2010. We utilize data from the Special and Flash Eurobarometer for the years between 2006 and 2014 and expertsâ€™ evaluation on consumer protection levels before the introduction of the regulation. This rich data set allows us to apply a difference-in-difference estimator with multiple time periods. We find a significant relationship between the introduction of the UCPD and consumer trust and cross-border purchases for countries with a low consumer protection level before the introduction of the UCPD. The relationship increases over time and stays then relatively constant.
Sunday, March 8, 2020
Steve Salop, Georgetown offers The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines: A Suggested Revision.
ABSTRACT: The FTC and DOJ requested comments on their draft Vertical Merger Guidelines in January 2020. This article is a complete alternative set of suggested Vertical Merger Guidelines that reflects and supplements the approach explained in the comments submitted by the author along with Jonathan. Baker, Nancy Rose and Fiona Scott Morton, as well as their other comments, and might be read in conjunction with those comments. This suggested revision of the Agencies’ draft expands the list of potential competition harms and provides illustrative examples. It expands and unifies the discussion and treatment of potential competitive benefits. It deletes the quasi-safe harbor and suggests the circumstances under which competitive harms raise lessened concerns on the one hand and heightened concerns on the other.
Friday, March 6, 2020
On the Road of Establishing Criteria for Assessing the Anti-competitive use of Trade Remedies in Egypt
Mohamed ElFar, Queen Mary - University of London and Mahmoud Momtaz, Hamburg University; World Bank - Middle East & North Africa Region provide thoughts On the Road of Establishing Criteria for Assessing the Anti-competitive use of Trade Remedies in Egypt.
ABSTRACT: This article is intended to explore cases where there have been both trade remedies and competition investigations, with a special focus on the sugar cases. It explores whether abusing trade remedies can amount to an infringement of the Egyptian Competition Law, and suggests criteria to guide the Egyptian Competition Authority on how to deal with those cases.
Doug Melamed, Stanford Law has a great article on Antitrust Law and Its Critics. Worth downloading!
ABSTRACT: Antitrust law is the subject of substantial current controversy, criticism, and proposed reform. The current unease seems to reflect the confluence of four factors: rising populism, on both the left and the right, that decries free markets, globalism, and increasing inequality within the developed countries; the rise of big tech, which seems to expand without limit through scale and scope economies and network effects; a growing body of economic studies that suggest that market concentration and market power have increased in recent years; and increasing concern of libertarians about private, as well as government, power coupled with evidence of increased industry concentration.
On the surface, there appears to be a conversation about the future of antitrust law between three groups; conservatives who argue that antitrust law is basically fine as it is, progressives who argue that antitrust enforcement has been too lax and that antitrust law should be adjusted but within the prevailing consumer welfare paradigm; and populist critics who have more far-reaching reform proposals. In fact, however, there are really two very separate conversations. One, between conservatives and progressives, concerns how antitrust law might best promote economic welfare. The other, pushed largely by the populists, concerns how to replace what is now known as antitrust law with alternatives that will serve other objectives, in addition to economic welfare, such as promoting an equitable distribution of wealth and of economic and political power. The two conversations seldom intersect in any meaningful way.
This paper analyzes the current controversies. It explains what the consumer welfare standard means, why proposals for abandoning or replacing it are unsound, and how the two conversations have not intersected. It ends by describing ways in which the various critics and defenders of antitrust law might fruitfully join in a single conversation that addresses both antitrust and regulatory issues.