Tuesday, March 24, 2020

Bidder Collusion: Accounting for All Feasible Bidders

By: Jean-François Richard
Abstract: The Idaho Department of Lands (IDL) sells timber from state lands bymeans of ascending bid auction. In our empirical analysis of all IDL scaleauctions from 2004 through 2015, accounting for all auction-specific feasiblebidders, we find significant evidence of bidder collusion. Given the complexityof the empirical model and the absence of analytic results, we apply the methodof simulated moments to estimate the parameters and Monte Carlo simulationsto produce standard deviations of the estimates. The loss to Idaho from thebidder collusion is estimated to be approximately $43 million over this timeperiod.
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:6759&r=com


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