Monday, January 13, 2020
Hung-Hao Chang, National Taiwan University and D. Daniel Sokol University of Florida explore Advocacy Versus Enforcement in Antitrust Compliance Programs.
ABSTRACT: We focus on the question of why firms self-regulate to avoid more severe public regulation in the area of
antitrust compliance. We distinguish the effects of an antitrust authority’s outreach and enforcement on firms'
adoption of antitrust compliance programs. Furthermore, we examine the mechanism that may drive an antitrust
authority’s actions on firms' decisions to adopt compliance programs. Using a two-year survey of 432 firms
drawn from the top three hundred Taiwanese enterprises and applying mediation analysis, we find that
“voluntary” self-regulation actions, encouraged by the antitrust authority to promote compliance programs via
advocacy, significantly increase the creation of antitrust compliance programs. Moreover, “coercive” actions of
the antitrust authority in terms of enforcement are less effective than voluntary actions for firms’ compliance
programs creation. Within “coercive” actions, large fines are more likely to lead to the adoption of antitrust
compliance programs relative to other forms of government prosecution.