Tuesday, December 17, 2019

2020 summer fellowship program co-sponsored by the Antitrust Section of the New York State Bar Association and the New York Bar Foundation

2020 summer fellowship program co-sponsored by the Antitrust Section of the New York State Bar Association and the New York Bar Foundation
 
There is a new opportunity to work in New York in the corporate legal department of The American Express Company. Briefly, here are the key details:
 
Antitrust Section Law Student Fellowship
·       Value: $6,000          
·       Deadline: February 7, 2020
·       The Fellowship will be awarded to up to four current first (1L) or second (2L) year law students to work on antitrust and related matters in the public and private sector in the State of New York during the Summer of 2020.
 
The application link is:
 
 
As the announcement describes, the program will:
 
Provide law students an opportunity to experience antitrust and government investigations practice during the summer after their first or second year of law school and to increase the representation of lawyers from a diverse range of backgrounds in the practice of antitrust law in New York. The ultimate goal of the Fellowship is to forge relationships among antitrust practitioners throughout the State of New York and foster greater diversity in the antitrust bar. Through the Fellowship, a student will be provided a meaningful and appropriately supervised work experience in the New York Office of New York Attorney General, Antitrust Bureau; the Federal Trade Commission, Northeast Region; the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, New York Office or the legal department of The American Express Company, New York Office.”
 
In past years, Fellows in our Fellowship Program reflected diversity in many different ways, including having diverse backgrounds, educational and work experience, and unique perspectives and interests in antitrust law and enforcement.

December 17, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Beating Coase at Monopoly

By: Lluis BruDaniel CardonaJozef Sakovics
Abstract: We study how a buyer unable to price discriminate should satisfy his demand in the presence of diseconomies of scale in production. Defying the Coase Conjecture, we show that auctioning contracts for lots (block sourcing) followed by setting a price to realize (part of) the residual gains from trade a ways leads to higher buyer surplus than simply setting a price.
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:esedps:291&r=com

December 17, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 16, 2019

Call for Papers: The Competition Law Scholars Forum (CLaSF) and Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge - The Fundamentals of Competition Law at University of Cambridge, United Kingdom on 16 April 2020

Call for Papers

The Competition Law Scholars Forum (CLaSF) and Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge

invite contributions to a workshop on

 

The Fundamentals of Competition Law

 

at University of Cambridge, United Kingdom on 16 April 2020.

 

The Competition Law Scholars Forum (CLaSF) will be running its XXXIV workshop on 16 April 2020, at the Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge. The workshop is on the broad theme of “The fundamentals of competition law.” We invite abstract paper proposals from researchers, scholars, practitioners and policy-makers in relation to any issue within this broad theme. We welcome theoretical, economics-driven, practice-based or policy-focused papers, and we are interested in receiving abstracts for papers which may be focused on perspectives or experience at national, regional (eg EU), or international levels, or a combination.

 

The aim of the workshop is to discuss fundamental concepts that we rely on in competition law. We are seeking to examine issues in competition law, long since considered settled, that are currently being or ought to be re-examined. For example, though we proscribe certain “agreements” or “concerted practices” do we still have faith in our understanding of what it means to “agree” or “concert” and how these concepts are distinct from “independent action” in an increasingly connected and inter-connected world? Though we have a method of assessment that varies depending on whether we are seeking to identify a restriction “by object” or “by effect” are we sure of what is meant? Is the “rule of reason”, long a staple of competition law discussion, dead? If so, have all the concerns that were advanced by that doctrine died with it? Or have they been relocated or re-emerged elsewhere? Dominance now dominates—but what is dominance, how does it manifest itself, and does our conception of “abuse” capture new modes of exercising “dominance”? Though looking at how firms conduct themselves in the “market”, are our techniques for identifying a “market” sufficiently attuned to address modern day concerns? Have we agreed that consumer welfare is our mission and do we have a shared conception of consumer welfare? We have long thought of consumers as capable—now we hear of the vulnerable consumer. How does the substantive law and enforcement practice respond to this changed perception of the supposed beneficiary of competition law?

 

The Workshop will consist of a mix of invited speakers and contributions chosen following this call for papers. Any person interested in being considered on the basis of the call for papers at the workshop is asked to contact Professor Barry Rodger at barry.j.rodger@strath.ac.uk. An abstract is required of approximately 500-1,000 words, to be submitted by no later than February 3 2020, and decisions on successful submissions will be taken by February 17 2020. Submission of presentation/draft paper is also required a week prior to the workshop.

 

Papers presented at the conference can be submitted to the Competition Law Review editorial board with a view to being published in the Review. Note that the Review is a fully refereed scholarly law journal: submission does not guarantee publication.

December 16, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The World Economic Forum White Paper on Competition Policy

The World Economic Forum White Paper on Competition Policy in a Globalized, Digitalized Economy has just been published. I thought that it might be of interest: https://www.weforum.org/whitepapers/competition-policy-in-a-globalized-digitalized-economy

December 16, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Phil Marsden Competition Rap

 

 

December 16, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Antitrust in Life Science conference - March 23, 2020

23 March 2020

Antitrust in Life Sciences

Register

Date & place

Monday 23 March 2020 13:30-18:30

Add to calendar
Fordham Law School

150 West 62nd Street

10023 New York United States of America
Show map

Schedule

Registration

1:00pm

Welcome Remarks

1:20pm

James Keyte | Director, Fordham Competition Law Institute

Opening Keynote Discussion: US/EU, A Transatlantic Gap?

1:30pm

Noah Joshua Phillips | Commissioner, US Federal Trade Commission, Washington DC
Paul Csiszár | Director, Antitrust Unit Pharma and Health services, European Commission - DG COMP, Brussels
Discussant: Dr. Lisa Cameron | Principal, The Brattle Group, Boston

Panel 1: Generics Exclusion: What Conduct Crosses the Lines? - Product Hoping, Patent Settlement, Class Certification...

2:00pm

Elinor Hoffmann | Deputy Chief, Antitrust Bureau, Office of the NY State Attorney General, New York
Eric Stock | Partner, Gibson Dunn, New York
Jeffrey Bank | Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Washington, DC*
Mark Gidley | Partner, White & Case, Washington, DC*
George Gordon | Partner, Dechert, Philadelphia*
Christine Siegwarth Meyer | Managing Director, NERA Economic Consulting, White Plains
Moderator: Martin Gaynor | Professor of Economics & Health Policy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh

Break

3:00pm

Panel 2: Do Pharmaceutical Mergers Harm Consumers?

3:15pm

Max Miller | Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust, Office of the Iowa State Attorney General, Des Moines*
Marc Brotman | VP & Assistant General Counsel, Chief Antitrust Counsel, Pfizer, New York
Patricia Danzon | Professor of Healthcare Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia
George Rozanski | Partner, Bates White, Washington, DC
Moderator: Robert Willig | Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, Princeton University

Break

4:15pm

Panel 3: The Counsel’s Perspective: How to ensure Antitrust Compliance?

4:30pm

Ryan Foley | Sr. Corporate Counsel, Antitrust Americas, Novartis, New York
Brian Savage | General Counsel, US Generics, Teva Pharmaceuticals, Parsippany
Erin Darling | Associate Vice President & Counsel, Federal Policy, Merck, Washington, DC*
F. Ty Edmondson | Chief Corporation Counsel, Biogen, Boston*
Agnieszka Gallagher | General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer, ViiV Healthcare, Chapel Hill*
Lara Levitan | Vice President, Legal, AbbVie, Chicago*
Jill Ondos | Global Deputy General Counsel, Mylan, Pittsburgh*
Moderators:
Boris Bershteyn | Partner, Skadden, New York*
Paul Greenberg | Managing Principal, Analysis Group, Boston*

Closing Keynote Discussion

5:30pm

Gail Levine | Deputy Director, Bureau of Competition, US Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC
Scott Hemphill | Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, New York

Drinks

6:00pm

* To Be Confirmed

All conference attendees will be eligible for complimentary 48-hour Concurrences+ subscription.

Organizers

This is the inaugural edition of this joint conference co-organized by Concurrences and Fordham Competition Law Institute, in partnership with the sponsors. Attendance is by registration only. No on-site registration. Seats are limited.

Upon request, Fordham Law School will submit applications to state bar associations in New York, or New Jersey for up to 3 continuing legal education (CLE) credits. Please note that CLE credit approval is ultimately at the discretion of individual states and no advance assurance can be given that credit will be granted in all cases.

The conference and its speakers will be filmed by Concurrences to be posted online. Photos of the speakers and of the attendees will also be taken. By entering the conference premises, you understand that you may be photographed and you hereby give Concurrences the unqualified right to take pictures and/or recordings of you.

In case of over registration, attendance will be limited to one representative per institution, at the discretion of the organizer.

December 16, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The effects of private damage claims on cartel stability: Experimental evidence

By: Bodnar, OliviaFremerey, MelindaNormann, Hans-TheoSchad, Jannika
Abstract: Private damage claims against cartels may have negative effects on leniency: whereas whistleblowers obtain full immunity regarding the public cartel fines, they have no or only restricted protection against private third-party damage claims. This may stabilize cartels. We run an experiment to study this issue. Firms choose whether to join a cartel, may apply for leniency afterwards, and then potentially face private damages. We find that the implementation of private damage claims decreases cartel formation but makes cartels indeed more stable. The overall impact of private damage claims is positive: cartel prevalence declines.
Keywords: private damage claims,cartel stability,laboratory experiment,leniency
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:315&r=com

December 16, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Entry games for the airline industry

By: Christian Bontemps (ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile); Bezerra Sampaio
Abstract: In this paper we review the literature on static entry games and show how they can be used to estimate the market structure of the airline industry. The econometrics challenges are presented, in particular the problem of multiple equilibria and some solutions used in the literature are exposed. We also show how these models, either in the complete information setting or in the incomplete information one, can be estimated from i.i.d. data on market presence and market characteristics. We illustrate it by estimating a static entry game with heterogeneous firms by Simulated Maximum Likelihood on European data for the year 2015.
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02137358&r=com

December 16, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, December 13, 2019

Markups and Inequality

By: Corina BoarVirgiliu Midrigan
Abstract: We study the aggregate and distributional impact of product market interventions and profit taxes using a model of firm dynamics, credit constraints and incomplete markets. A key ingredient of our model is that markups are endogenous so that the markup a producer charges depends on the amount of competition it faces. We show that size-dependent subsidies that remove the distortions due to markup dispersion lead to sizable welfare gains and reduce inequality, even though they increase firm concentration and long-run misallocation. In contrast, policies that reduce concentration lead to large output, TFP and welfare losses and increase inequality. A tax on profits greatly depresses the incentives to create new firms, reducing labor demand, after-tax wages and welfare.
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25952&r=com

December 13, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Pricing Patterns in Wholesale Electricity Markets: Unilateral Market Power or Coordinated Behavior?

By: Brown, David P. (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Eckert, Andrew (University of Alberta, Department of Economics)
Abstract: We examine allegations that firms in Alberta's electricity industry manipulated public information to coordinate in the wholesale market. We investigate whether bids by firms who employed unique pricing patterns were consistent with unilateral expected profit maximization. Our results suggest that these firms could have increased expected profits through unilateral deviations. For one firm, the potential to increase profits is greater on days when certain offer patterns are observed, providing support for the claim that such patterns may have assisted coordination on high-priced outcomes. These results suggest that regulators should exercise caution when designing information disclosure policies in concentrated electricity markets.
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2019_009&r=com

December 13, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, December 12, 2019

Vertical Mergers: Ex Post Evidence and Ex Ante Evaluation Methods

By: Slade, Margaret E.
Abstract: This article assesses recent empirical evidence on efficiencies and competitive harm that are associated with vertical mergers. It evaluates both ex post or retrospective empirical studies that rely on post merger data and ex ante or forecasting techniques that use premerger data. It develops the idea that, although there is a need for vertical merger screening tools, there are a number of problems that are associated with attempts to adapt horizontal screens to the vertical context. Mergers in the technology, media, and telecom sectors are emphasized because they tend to dominate contested vertical mergers.
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ubc:pmicro:margaret_e._slade-2019-10&r=com

December 12, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition

By: Joachim Heinzel (Paderborn University)
Abstract: We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium.
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pdn:ciepap:120&r=com

December 12, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Competitive differential pricing

By: Chen, YongminLi, JianpeiSchwartz, Marius
Abstract: This paper analyzes welfare under differential versus uniform pricing across oligopoly markets that differ in costs of service. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions on demand properties---cross/own elasticities and curvature---for differential pricing by symmetric firms to raise aggregate consumer surplus, profit, and total welfare. The analysis reveals intuitively why differential pricing is generally beneficial though not always---including why profit can fall, unlike for monopoly---and why it is more beneficial than oligopoly third-degree price discrimination. When firms have asymmetric costs, however, differential pricing can reduce profit or consumer surplus even with `simple' demands such as linear.
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:94381&r=com

December 12, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, December 11, 2019

Dispensing with Indispensability

Niamh Dunne, London School of Economics - Law Department is Dispensing with Indispensability.

ABSTRACT: ‘Indispensability’ is the central concept underpinning the treatment of refusal to deal claims under Article 102 TFEU. Since its adoption in Magill and Bronner, however, the conventional wisdom that instances of refusal to deal constitute an abuse only in the presence of indispensability has been challenged from multiple directions. This article surveys the departures from the orthodoxy that can be found in the jurisprudence. In doing so, it measures the purported explanations for such derogations against the justifications for restraint encapsulated in the indispensability concept. Finally, it asks whether the weight of exceptions may reach the point of overwhelming, or ‘dispensing with,’ the original rule.

December 11, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Mergers and Acquisitions, Local Labor Market Concentration, and Worker Outcomes

David Arnold, Princeton addresses Mergers and Acquisitions, Local Labor Market Concentration, and Worker Outcomes.

ABSTRACT: Thousands of establishments employing millions of workers change ownership each year, sometimes leading to large changes in local labor market concentration that potentially increase labor market power. Using matched employer-employee data from the U.S., this paper estimates the direct and indirect effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and resulting local labor market concentration changes on worker outcomes. To measure local concentration, I derive an index of concentration that uses job-to-job mobility patterns to incorporate information on substitutability across industries. Causal effects are estimated using a matched difference-in-differences design and cross-sectional variation in the predicted impacts of M&As on local concentration. In mergers that have little impact on local labor market concentration, annual earnings for workers in M&A firms remain stable after the ownership change. In sharp contrast, earnings fall by 2 percent for M&A workers in mergers that increase local labor market concentration, with the largest effects in already concentrated markets. These patterns are similar in tradable industries, suggesting the effects are not driven by changes in product market power. Mergers generating the largest concentration changes also generate negative spillovers on other firms in the same labor market, with an implied elasticity of earnings with respect to local concentration equal to -0.22. Viewed through the lens of a standard Cournot model, the results imply local concentration depresses wages by about 4-5 percent relative to a fully competitive benchmark.

December 11, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Consumer Welfare Without Consumers? Illinois Brick after Apple V. Pepper

Andy Gavil, Howard asks Consumer Welfare Without Consumers? Illinois Brick after Apple V. Pepper.

ABSTRACT: For forty years U.S. antitrust law has lived with an anomaly of the Supreme Court’s making: having declared its commitment to interpreting those laws as a “consumer welfare prescription,” the Court in Illinois Brick nonetheless effectively barred consumers from suing for damages by limiting the right to sue to direct purchasers. Although the Court appeared poised to further extend Illinois Brick in Apple v. Pepper, it instead turned away from Illinois Brick's emphasis on deterrence to once again consider the role that compensation plays in private damage actions. In doing so, it has invited reconsideration of questions deemed long-settled under Illinois Brick about how U.S. law understands "antitrust injury" and how it strikes the balance between the goals of deterrence and compensation.

December 11, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 10, 2019

An Agenda for Competition Law and Policy in the Digital Economy

Pinar Akman, Leeds offers An Agenda for Competition Law and Policy in the Digital Economy.

ABSTRACT: The ongoing debate on competition law and policy in the digital economy raises the question whether the current competition rules and tools are sufficient to deal with competition cases involving technology companies such as online platforms. Competition authorities find themselves under increasing pressure to do something, anything, about—in particular, but not only—big tech, with some commentators suggesting that they should even consider forsaking the paradigm that has reigned supreme in modern competition policies for decades: the consumer welfare standard. When as much as the shaping of an entire industrial revolution is at stake, legislators should resist an overhaul of the rules, and competition authorities should resist the pressure to abandon the standard that has long guided their enforcement. This is so not least because global companies with global business models giving rise to global issues require global responses. Global cooperation and convergence cannot be achieved if nations increasingly diverge in their approaches to the question of what to do to about the digital economy, and start pursuing undertheorised, uncertain, and untested objectives in their enforcement of the competition rules.

December 10, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Hindsight Bias in Antitrust Law

Christopher R. Leslie, University of California, Irvine School of Law underscores Hindsight Bias in Antitrust Law.

ABSTRACT: Many areas of law require the factfinder to predict how probable a particular outcome was before it happened even though the factfinder knows the actual outcome. For example, police officers often conduct searches without a warrant. After such a search has happened, a judge must sometimes decide whether, before the police officers began the search, the officers had probable cause to conduct the search. But the judge knows that the search did, in fact, uncover evidence of a crime. The fact that the search was successful, however, is not supposed to affect the judge’s determination of whether the officers had probable cause before the search. In such instances, the judge must determine an ex ante probability in an ex post world.

December 10, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

THE EFFECTS OF BROADCASTING DIGITIZATION ON EU COMPETITION LAW: A TALE OF EU COPYRIGHT POLICIES

ABSTRACT: In recent years, buzz terms such as “geo-blocking”, “online content portability”, and “digital copyright” have been making rounds in EU policy circles. This is largely attributed to the “Digital Single Market Strategy”, an ambitious reform the objective of which is to ensure seamless cross-border access to online services. Pursuit of this objective appears to be largely driven by the assumption that limiting the exclusivity of copyright would stimulate intra-Union competition in content markets. Against the background of EU competence limitations in the field of copyright and the increasing popularity of global U.S. firms in European audiovisual markets, this paper argues that EU Competition Law has vainly been instrumentalized to complete a single market for content. More particularly, based on legal and policy developments, which appear to challenge widespread licensing practices, sector-specific economics, and the case law that sets the conditions under which competition enforcement may introduce limits to copyright protection, this study develops the following twofold argument: in an attempt to create a single market for copyright-protected broadcast content, the EU has stretched the boundaries of competition law in an excessive manner and such unjustified interference with copyright is simply inadequate to promote competition and market integration.

December 10, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 9, 2019

Antitrust Enforcement and Privacy Standards

Renato Nazzini, King's College London – The Dickson Poon School of Law addresses Antitrust Enforcement and Privacy Standards.

ABSTRACT: The current prominence of digital platforms that compete for customers’ attention by offering them free services and generate revenue by monetising the data obtained from customers on different markets, for example on online advertising markets, has brought to the forefront of the antitrust debate the question as to whether privacy standards are a parameter of antitrust enforcement. This paper asks what role, if any, the standard of privacy protection offered by online platforms to consumers plays in antitrust enforcement.

December 9, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)