Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Wednesday, November 13, 2019

Family Ownership and Antitrust Violations

Mario Daniele Amore, Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology and Riccardo Marzano, Politecnico di Milano explains Family Ownership and Antitrust Violations.

ABSTRACT: We study how family ownership shapes the firms’ likelihood of being involved in antitrust indictments. Using data from Italy, we show that family firms are significantly less likely than other firms to commit antitrust violations. To achieve identification, we exploit a law change that made it easier to transfer family control. Studying the mechanisms at play, we find that family firms are especially less likely to commit antitrust violations when they feature a more prominent size relative to the city where they are located, which magnifies reputational concerns. Next, we show that family firms involved in antitrust violations appoint more family members in top executive positions in the aftermath of the indictment. Moreover, these firms invest less and curb equity financing as compared to nonfamily firms. Collectively, our findings suggest that family control wards off reputational damages but, at the same time, it weakens the ability to expand in order to keep up with fiercer competition following the dismantlement of the anticompetitive practice.

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2019/11/family-ownership-and-antitrust-violations.html

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