Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Understanding the appreciability requirement under Singapore competition law

Joshua Seet, Yirong Zheng are Understanding the appreciability requirement under Singapore competition law.

ABSTRACT: Singapore competition law is concerned with prohibiting conduct that has appreciable adverse effects on competition. This article examines how the requirement to show appreciability is satisfied under the Section 34 Prohibition against anti-competitive agreements, and explores how the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (CCCS) has recently adopted a more expansive approach to presuming appreciability. It also argues that the CCCS’s assessment of appreciability based on turnover and employee numbers obscures the concept of appreciability. This article further clarifies that the appreciability requirement is relevant under the Section 47 Prohibition against an abuse of dominance even though cases and guidelines have not expressly acknowledged this, and argues that a distinct assessment of appreciability should apply when finding an infringement of the Section 47 Prohibition.

 

Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency

Claudia M. Landeo, University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Kathryn E. Spier, Harvard University - Law School - Faculty; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) offer Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency.

ABSTRACT: This paper studies the design of optimal enforcement policies with ordered leniency to detect and deter harmful short-term activities committed by groups of injurers. With ordered leniency, the degree of leniency granted to an injurer who self-reports depends on his or her position in the self-reporting queue. We show that the ordered-leniency policy that induces maximal deterrence gives successively larger discounts to injurers who secure higher positions in the reporting queue. This creates a so-called "race to the courthouse" where all injurers self-report promptly and, as a result, social harm is reduced. We show that the expected fine increases with the size of the group, thus discouraging the formation of large illegal enterprises. The first-best outcome is obtained with ordered leniency when the externalities associated with the harmful activities are not too high. Our findings complement Kaplow and Shavell's (JPE 1994) results for single-injurer environments.

Endogenous vertical segmentation in a Cournot oligopoly

Endogenous vertical segmentation in a Cournot oligopoly

By:	BELLEFLAMME Paul, (CORE, UCLouvain); FORLIN Valeria, (CORE, UCLouvain and European Commission, DG Clima)
Abstract:	An arbitrary number of (ex ante symmetric) firms first choose whether to produce a high-quality or a low-quality product and then the quantity of product to put on the market. We establish the following results: (i) there exists competition within and across quality segments; (ii) firms may be better off producing the low quality if competition within this segment is sufficiently low; (iii) a firm's switch across qualities may benefit all the other firms; (iv) there exists a unique partition of the firms between the two quality segments; (v) if high quality has a larger cost-quality ratio, then the equilibrium exhibits vertical differentiation; (vi) there may be too much differentiation from the consumers' point of view.
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2019007&r=com

Collective Actions in Europe - A Comparative, Economic and Transsystemic Analysis

Csongor István Nagy, University of Szeged, Faculty of Law addresses Collective Actions in Europe - A Comparative, Economic and Transsystemic Analysis.

ABSTRACT: This open access book offers an analytical presentation of how Europe has created its own version of collective actions. In the last three decades, Europe has seen a remarkable proliferation of collective action legislation, making class actions the most successful export product of the American legal scholarship. While its spread has been surrounded by distrust and suspiciousness, today more than half of the EU Member States have introduced collective actions for damages and from those who did, more than half chose, to some extent, the opt-out system.This book demonstrates why collective actions have been felt needed from the perspective of access to justice and effectiveness of law, the European debate and the deep layers of the European reaction and resistance, revealing how the Copernican turn of class actions questions the fundamentals of the European thinking about market and public interest. Using a transsystemic presentation of the European national models, it analyzes the way collective actions were accommodated with the European regulatory environment, the novel and peculiar regulatory questions they had to address and how and why they work differently on this side of the Atlantic.

 

Populism, Fairness and Competition: Should We Care and What Could We Do?

Fred Jenny, ESSEC and OECD asks Populism, Fairness and Competition: Should We Care and What Could We Do?

ABSTRACT: The rise of populism in a number of countries is one of the most visible signs of the weakening of enthusiasm for trade liberalization and market competition. Market competition is increasingly denounced as leading to unfair results by those who lose jobs, and in some cases risk losing their employment prospects because of the pressure of competition, or those who see their wages stagnate or be reduced. Their perception is that pro‐competitive policies benefit capitalists and a small coterie of highly skilled workers to the detriment of the low‐skilled majority. In a number of countries there have been calls by politicians to reconsider the trade liberalization policy which was actively pursued in recent decades and to change the standard applied by competition law enforcers from a strict consumer welfare standard to a consideration of the trade‐off between efficiency and fairness. The competition community has, to a large extent, strongly resisted such possibilities, arguing that protectionist policies had failed in the past and that the concept of fairness is at best vague, lack economic foundation, and could lead to a weakening of incentives to achieve efficient static and dynamic performances. The article examines three issues related to this debate. First, we examine the theoretical and practical reasons for which some categories of workers lose in the competitive process. Second, we discuss the relationship between inequality and fairness and the contribution of behavioural economics to the exploration of what people consider to be fair or unfair in vertical relationships (i.e. between employees and employers or between consumers and suppliers). Third, we discuss alternative ways in which competition authorities could reconcile fairness and efficiency in their advocacy or enforcement activities.

 

 

The Decline in U.S. Criminal Antitrust Cases: ACPERA and Leniency in an International Context

Douglas H. Ginsburg, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty and Cecilia (Yixi) Cheng, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division - Rill Fellow address The Decline in U.S. Criminal Antitrust Cases: ACPERA and Leniency in an International Context.

ABSTRACT: Criminal cartel cases in the U.S. are at modern lows, spurring questions as to whether the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 (ACPERA) and the Antitrust Division’s criminal enforcement program continue to be effective and, if not, why not? In this Chapter, we offer three non-exclusive hypotheses for the recent decline:

(1) increasingly large fines in multiple jurisdictions have lessened the incentive to apply for leniency in any one jurisdiction;

(2) technology has caused the substitution of lawful tacit for unlawful express collusion; and

(3) ACPERA and the Division’s criminal program have succeeded in deterring cartel formation – at least among U.S. companies.

Our analysis of the Antitrust Case Filings database leads us to be tentatively optimistic about the third possibility: Over the last decade, the number and percentage of foreign as opposed to U.S. corporate defendants has increased dramatically.

The Decline in U.S. Criminal Antitrust Cases: ACPERA and Leniency in an International Context

Douglas H. Ginsburg, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty and Cecilia (Yixi) Cheng, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division - Rill Fellow address The Decline in U.S. Criminal Antitrust Cases: ACPERA and Leniency in an International Context.

ABSTRACT: Criminal cartel cases in the U.S. are at modern lows, spurring questions as to whether the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 (ACPERA) and the Antitrust Division’s criminal enforcement program continue to be effective and, if not, why not? In this Chapter, we offer three non-exclusive hypotheses for the recent decline:

(1) increasingly large fines in multiple jurisdictions have lessened the incentive to apply for leniency in any one jurisdiction;

(2) technology has caused the substitution of lawful tacit for unlawful express collusion; and

(3) ACPERA and the Division’s criminal program have succeeded in deterring cartel formation – at least among U.S. companies.

Our analysis of the Antitrust Case Filings database leads us to be tentatively optimistic about the third possibility: Over the last decade, the number and percentage of foreign as opposed to U.S. corporate defendants has increased dramatically.

Questions to the Competition Commissioner-designate

Matthew Heim, Research Fellow at Bruegel Institute has Questions to the Competition Commissioner-designate.

Vertical Collusion

David Gilo, Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law and Yaron Yehezkel, Coller School of Management , Tel-Aviv University have an interesting new paper on Vertical Collusion. Worth downloading!

ABSTRACT: We characterize collusion involving secret vertical contracts between retailers and their supplier – who are all equally patient ("vertical collusion"). We show such collusion is easier to sustain than collusion among retailers. Furthermore, vertical collusion can solve the supplier’s inability to commit to charging the monopoly wholesale price when retailers are differentiated. The supplier pays retailers slotting allowances as a prize for adhering to the collusive scheme and rejects contract deviations. In the presence of competing suppliers, vertical collusion can be sustained using short – term exclusive dealing.

Google Shopping in Brazil: Highlights of CADE’s Decision and Takeaways for Digital Economy Issues

Paulo Burnier da Silveira Brazilian Competition Authority (CADE) and Victor Oliveira Fernandes University of São Paulo (USP) discuss Google Shopping in Brazil: Highlights of CADE’s Decision and Takeaways for Digital Economy Issues.

ABSTRACT: This paper intends to highlight key aspects of the Google Shopping Antitrust case in Brazil in order to shed light on the Brazilian perspective of its main findings, including some takeaways of its understanding of potential competition issues in the digital market. With this in mind, the paper will focus on three aspects of CADE’s decision following the structure below (i). Theory of harm; (ii) Effects analysis and (iii) Remedies. At the end, final remarks will conclude the paper and try to inform readers on future perspectives of competition issues related to digital economy in Brazil.

The Contributory Effect of GE/Honeywell on the European Commission’s Approach to Non-Horizontal Mergers

Uboho Inyang, University of Dundee examines The Contributory Effect of GE/Honeywell on the European Commission’s Approach to Non-Horizontal Mergers.

ABSTRACT: In recent times, there has been considerable development in the assessment of non-horizontal merger in the European Union (EU). This has led to the attainment of some level of consistency in the approach adopted by the EU Commission (the Commission) to weed out mergers with anti-competitive potentialities. This development can be credited substantially to courts’ jurisprudence built over time, i.e., decisions of the General Courts (European Court of First Instance ‘CFI’ and the European Court of Justice ‘ECJ’). Whilst several of the courts’ decisions can be credited directly or indirectly as contributing to the development, one case that seems to have generated and earned much of public attention is the GE/Honeywell case which climaxed in the decision of the CFI delivered on December 14, 2005. Whilst the CFI made some profound pronouncements in their decision, the jury is still out on the impact GE/Honeywell has had generally on the development of the EU approach on non-horizontal mergers. This research paper investigates the importance of the GE/Honeywell, particularly with respect to the decision of the CFI. It concludes that, as much as GE/Honeywell is not to be solely credited with the growth witnessed today, it has however contributed greatly in its own way, to the evolution of the process to what it is today, particularly with respect to foreclosure analysis.

Twelfth Annual Federal Trade Commission Microeconomics Conference

Twelfth Annual Federal Trade Commission Microeconomics Conference

NOV 14, 2019NOV 15, 2019

CONSTITUTION CENTER400 7th St SW, Washington, DC 20024 | Directions & Nearby

 

EVENT DESCRIPTION

The Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Economics and the Tobin Center for Economic Policy at Yale will host a two-day conference to bring together scholars working in areas related to the FTC's antitrust, consumer protection, and public policy missions. Those fields include industrial organization, information economics, health policy, behavioral economics, and quantitative marketing. Examples of potentially relevant topics include healthcare provider competition, vertical contracting, advertising, merger policy, industrial policies, innovation, privacy, intellectual property, bargaining, collusion, e-commerce, demand estimation, pharmaceutical markets, competition in technology markets, and consumer decision-making.

 

Thursday, November 14

8:30 a.m.	Registration
9:00 a.m.	Welcome Bruce Kobayashi (Federal Trade Commission)
9:15 a.m.	Paper Session Chaired by Joel Sobel (University of California, San Diego) Giacomo Calzolari (European University Institute) with Emilio Calvano (Bologna University & Toulouse School of Economics), Vincenzo Denicolὸ (University of Bologna), and Sergio Pastorello (University of Bologna), Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing and Collusion Discussant: Wally P. Mullin (George Washington University) Alminas Žaldokas (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) with Thomas Bourveau (Columbia Business School) and Guoman She (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology), Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations Discussant: Leslie M. Marx (Duke University)
10:45 a.m.	Break
11:20 a.m.	Keynote Address Joel Sobel (University of California, San Diego)
12:00 p.m.	Lunch Sponsored by the Tobin Center for Economic Policy
12:45 p.m.	Keynote Address, "China’s Industrial Policy: an Empirical Evaluation” Panle Jia Barwick (Cornell University)
1:25 p.m.	Break
1:45 p.m.	Paper Session Chaired by Ted Rosenbaum and Antara Dutta (FTC) Umit G. Gurun (University of Texas at Dallas) with Noah Stoffman (Indiana University) and Scott E. Yonker (Cornell University), Unlocking Clients: Non-compete Agreements in the Financial Advisory Industry Discussant: Matthew Johnson (Duke University, Sanford School of Public Policy) Matthew C. Weinberg (The Ohio State University) with Nathan H. Miller (Georgetown University) and Gloria Sheu (Federal Reserve Board), Oligopolistic Price Leadership and Mergers: The United States Beer Industry Discussant: Gaurab Aryal (University of Virginia)
3:15 p.m.	Break
3:45 p.m.	Paper Session Chaired by Panle Jia Barwick (Cornell University) Zarek C. Brot-Goldberg (Yale University) with Mathijs de Vaan (University of California, Berkeley), Intermediation and Vertical Integration in the Market for Surgeons Discussant: José Ignacio Cuesta (Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research) Claudia Robles-Garcia (Stanford University), Competition and Incentives in Mortgage Markets: The Role of Brokers Discussant: Jean-François Houde (University of Wisconsin)
5:15 p.m.	Hors d’oeuvres Reception Sponsored by the Tobin Center for Economic Policy at Yale University

Friday, November 15

8:45 a.m.	Welcome Steven Berry (Yale University)
9:00 a.m.	Paper Session Chaired by Mark Schankerman (London School of Economics) Yizhou Jin (University of California, Berkeley) with Shoshana Vasserman (Stanford University), Buying Data from Consumers: The Impact of Monitoring Programs in U.S. Auto Insurance Discussant: Allan Collard-Wexler (Duke University) Sharat Ganapati (Georgetown University, Walsh School of Foreign Service) with Rebecca McKibbin (The University of Sydney), Non-Tariff Barriers and Bargaining in Generic and Off-Patent Pharmaceuticals Discussant: Patricia Danzon (University of Pennsylvania, Wharton)
10:30 a.m.	Break
11:00 a.m.	Keynote Address, “Screening for Patent Quality” Mark Schankerman (London School of Economics)
11:40 a.m.	Panel: Learning about Substitution and Welfare from Data Chaired by Miriam Larson-Koester (FTC) Steven Berry (Yale University) Christopher Conlon (New York University, Stern School of Business) Jean-Pierre Dubé (University of Chicago, Booth School of Business) Fiona Scott Morton (Yale School of Management)
12:40 p.m.	Close

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Michael Murray Delivers Remarks at the United States Council for International Business Competition Committee Meeting

See his remarks here.

Antitrust After Big Data

John Yu, GMU, explores Antitrust After Big Data.

ABSTRACT: With the rise of digital markets, the conventional wisdom was that big data was a new economic phenomenon that would allow incumbent firms with market power to entrench their market positions, foreclose competitors, and serve as a virtually insurmountable barrier to entry. This led to calls for greater antitrust enforcement and regulation of big data practices. Since that time, with the benefit of substantial growth in the theoretical and empirical economic literature involving big data, it is appropriate to revisit our understanding of big data’s implications for antitrust. This paper contributes to the discussion by detailing three things we have learned about big data as it applies to competition policy. First, we now have a better understanding of the role that big data plays in the production and innovation process. Second, it makes little sense to reflexively label big data as a barrier to entry. Competition policy is better served by considering actual entry conditions rather than basing competitive effects analysis on determining whether access to certain inputs are or are not barriers to entry. Third, competition authorities now have a sizeable level of experience in assessing big data in actual cases. It is notable that, thus far, big data alone has not fueled a theory of harm that has led to an agency challenge in the U.S. or Europe. All these considerations suggest that we are perhaps in a new, more mature, era regarding big data in competition policy — not because big data is any less important to innovation — but because researchers and regulators have consistently found that big data in and of itself does not represent a relevant antitrust concern.

The New Directive on Unfair Trading Practices in Food and EU Competition Law: Complementary or Divergent Normative Frameworks?

Victoria Daskalova asks The New Directive on Unfair Trading Practices in Food and EU Competition Law: Complementary or Divergent Normative Frameworks?

ABSTRACT: Promoting fairness in business-to-business relationships has been discussed in the EU for years, dating back to at least the negotiation of the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. The EU does not have competences to harmonise contract law as such (although a number of attempts at an informal process have been stimulated over the years); however, the EU can regulate contractual and other practices via its competences in competition law,³ its competences in the field of the internal market,⁴ or by relying on sector-specific competences, as in agriculture.

Legal Tests in EU Competition Law: Taxonomy and Operation

Pablo Ibanez-Colomo, LSE offers Legal Tests in EU Competition Law: Taxonomy and Operation.

ABSTRACT: The Court of Justice (hereinafter, the ‘Court’, or the ‘ECJ’) defines the conditions under which practices are in principle prohibited or allowed. These conditions form the legal test to establish liability under Articles 101 and/or 102 TFEU. There is not a unique legal test in EU competition law. Some practices are deemed unlawful without it being necessary to establish their effects. This is the case, just to mention the most obvious example, of cartel arrangements. Other practices are deemed prima facie lawful. For instance, quantity rebates fall in principle outside the scope of Article 102 TFEU.

Common Ownership and Industry Profitability: A Crossindustry View

Haifeng Wang, The Vanguard Group, Inc., Jan-Carl Plagge, The Vanguard Group, Inc., James Rowley, The Vanguard Group, Inc., and Roger A Aliaga-Diaz, The Vanguard Group, Inc.provide Common Ownership and Industry Profitability: A Crossindustry View.

ABSTRACT: Our paper contributes to the common ownership debate by empirically assessing the link between common ownership and profitability as a proxy for market competition. Rather than focusing on single industries, as most related studies do, we assess the common ownership hypothesis in the aggregate, using a panel of about 3,000 U.S. firms in about 200 industries over a 21-year period. We hypothesize that if anticompetitive effects due to common ownership were present within individual industries, then the same anticompetitive outcomes should be observed when the data is expanded to cover all industries and over an extended period of time. We explore the statistical relationship between our chosen measure of common ownership and profitability across multiple model specifications, such as (1) two alternative econometric models, (2) different sets of control variables, (3) different time periods, and (4) four variations of MHHIΔ. We do not find conclusive evidence that common ownership is associated with industry-level profit margins.

An "Image Theory" of RPM

1. An "Image Theory" of RPM

By:	Inderst, Roman
Abstract:	We show how a brand manufacturerís control over retail prices can lead to e¢ cien-cies when consumers rely on prices as a signal of quality. For this we first show how higher prices can be associated with both higher quality perception as well as higher actual quality. We next identify a conflict of interest between retailers and manufactures. Retailers do not internalize the ensuing reputation spill-over that higher prices have on demand at all outlets. And they have less incentives to support brand image through higher prices as this erodes their own position in negotiations while increasing that of the manufacturer. Our efficiency defence for RPM thus applies even when retailers need not be incentivized to undertake non-contractible activities, as in our model the key opportunism problem, with respect to quality provision, lies between the manufacturer and consumers.
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13639&r=com

Dynamic Hospital Competition Under Rationing by Waiting Times

Dynamic Hospital Competition Under Rationing by Waiting Times

By:	Luís Sá (University of Minho, Department of Economics/NIPE); Luigi Siciliani (University of York, Department of Economics and Related Studies); Odd Rune Straume (University of Minho, Department of Economics/NIPE)
Abstract:	We develop a dynamic model of hospital competition where (i) waiting times increase if demand exceeds supply; (ii) patients differ in their evaluation of health benefits and choose a hospital based on waiting times; and (iii) there are penalties for providers with long waits. We show that, if penalties are linear in waiting times, a more competitive dynamic environment does not affect waiting times. If penalties are instead non-linear, we find that waiting times are longer under the more competitive environment. The latter result is derived by calibrating the model with waiting times and elasticities observed in the English NHS for a common treatment (cataract surgery), which also shows that the difference between waiting times under the two solution concepts is quantitatively small. Policies that facilitate patient choice, an alternative measure of competition, also lead to higher steady-state waiting times, and tougher penalties exacerbate the negative effect of choice policies.
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nip:nipewp:20/2018&r=com

2nd Annual Challenges to Antitrust in Changing Economy Conference - Harvard Law School, November 8, 2019

 

 

Free

Nov

08

2nd Annual Challenges to Antitrust in a Changing Economy

by Competition Policy International + CCIA

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2nd Annual Challenges to Antitrust in a Changing Economy

Fri, November 8, 2019, 8:00 AM – 6:30 PM EST

Free

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Date and Time

Fri, November 8, 2019

8:00 AM – 6:30 PM EST

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Location

Location

Harvard Law School

1585 Massachusetts Ave

Wasserstein Building - WCC 2036 Milstein East AB (2nd floor)

Cambridge, MA 02138

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Description

 

8:00 - 8:40 am Registration & Breakfast

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8:40 - 8:45 am

WELCOME REMARKS

Einer R. ELHAUGE, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School

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8:45 - 9:00 am

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Edward J. BLACK, President & CEO, CCIA

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9:00 - 9:30 am

OPENING KEYNOTE

Makan DELRAHIM, Assistant Attorney General, US DOJ

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9:30 - 10:45 am

COMPETITION, CONCENTRATION & COMMON OWNERSHIP: WHAT ARE THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS?

Hadiye ASLAN, Assistant Professor, of Finance, J. Mack Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University*

Einer R. ELHAUGE, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School

Martin C. SCHMALZ, Associate Professor of Finance, Saïd Business School, University of Oxford

Lucian A. BEBCHUK, Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, Harvard Law School

Moderator: Terrell MCSWEENY, Partner, Covington & Burling; Former Commissioner, US FTC

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10:45 - 11:00 am Coffee Break

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11:00 am - 12:15 pm

COMPETITION IN DIGITAL ADVERTISING: IS THERE ONLINE AND OFFLINE CONVERGENCE?

Gregory K. LEONARD, Partner, Edgeworth Economics

Steve TADELIS, Professor of Economics, Business and Public Policy; Chair in Business, University of California Berkeley Haas School of Business

Daniel FRANCIS, Associate Director, Digital Markets, US FTC*

Christopher S. YOO, Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer and Information Science, Penn Law

Sam KNOX, Associate General Counsel, Competition, Facebook*

Moderator: David MCLAUGHLIN, Reporter, Bloomberg

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12:15 - 1:00 pm Lunch

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1:00 - 2:00 pm

A FIRESIDE CHAT WITH...

Nikhil SHANBHAG, Vice President and Associate General Counsel, Competition and Regulatory Law, Facebook

William E. KOVACIC, Director, The GWU Competition Law Center; Former Chairman, US FTC

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2:00 - 3:15 pm

THE ECONOMICS BEHIND DIGITAL SERVICES: HOW DO THEY COMPETE?

Catherine TUCKER, Professor of Management, MIT

Hal VARIAN, Professor of Business, Economics, and Information Management, University of California, Berkeley

Howard SHELANSKI, Professor of Law, Georgetown Law; Partner, Davis Polk

Jonathan B. BAKER, Research Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University

Moderator: Susan A. CREIGHTON, Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati

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3:15 - 3:30 pm Coffee Break

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3:30 - 4:45 pm

FTC HEARINGS & OTHER ONGOING CONSULTATIONS

Philip MARSDEN, Professor of Law and Economics, College of Europe; Deputy Chair of Enforcement Decision Making Committee, Bank of England

Reiko AOKI, Commissioner, JFTC

Henri PIFFAUT, Vice-President, Autorité de la Concurrence

Geoffrey A. MANNE, Founder & Executive Director, International Center for Law & Economics

Derek W. MOORE, Attorney Advisor, Policy Planning Office, US FTC

Moderator: D. Daniel SOKOL, Professor of Law, Levin College of Law, University of Florida

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4:45 – 6:00 pm

FORMER ENFORCERS' ROUNDTABLE

Allan FELS, Professor of Law, University of Melbourne; Former Chairman, ACCC

A. Douglas MELAMED, Professor of the Practice of Law, Stanford Law School; Former Acting Assistant Attorney General, US DOJ

Bill BAER, Partner, Arnold & Porter; Former AAG for Antitrust, US DOJ

Maureen K. OHLHAUSEN, Partner, Baker Botts; Former Acting Chairman, US FTC

Mario MONTI, Former Commissioner for Competition, EC*

Moderator: Jon LEIBOWITZ, Partner, Davis Polk; Former Chairman, US FTC

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6:00 - 6:30 pm Cocktail Reception

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* To be confirmed

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Accommodations:

Sheraton Commander Hotel -16 Garden Street, Cambridge

We have arranged a limited room block at the Sheraton Commander for the conference attendees. If you would like to take advantage of our discounted group rate, please book your room by October 11, 2019 at the latest.

Alternative Hotels:

The Charles Hotel, 1 Benner Street, Cambridge, +1-855-213-0582

Harvard Square Hotel, 110 Mount Auburn Street, Harvard Square, Cambridge +1- 617-864-5200