Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Tuesday, August 13, 2019

Vertical Integration and Foreclosure: Evidence from Production Network Data

By: Johannes Boehm (Département d'économie); Jan Sonntag (Département d'économie)
Abstract: This paper studies the prevalence of vertical market foreclosure using a novel dataset on U.S. and international buyer-seller relationships, and across a large range of industries. We find that relationships are more likely to break when suppliers vertically integrate with one of the buyers’ competitors than when they vertically integrate with an unrelated firm. This relationship holds also, among other things, when conditioning on mergers that follow exogenous downward pressure on the supplier’s stock prices, suggesting that reverse causality is unlikely to explain the result. In contrast, the relationship vanishes when using rumored or announced but not completed integration events. Firms experience a substantial drop in sales when one of their suppliers integrates with one of their competitors. This sales drop is mitigated if the firm has alternative suppliers in place.
   
   
   
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/44gofgf80399mp5fq5q50vv5t6&r=com

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2019/08/vertical-integration-and-foreclosure-evidence-from-production-network-data.html

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