Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Thursday, August 8, 2019

Collusion between Retailers and Customers: The Case of Insurance Fraud in Taiwan

By: Pierre Picard (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Economie et en Statistique - ENSAE ParisTech - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique); Jennifer WangKili Wang (TKU - Tamkang University [New Taipei])
Abstract: The outsourcing of retail services is frequently at the origin of agency costs, associated with the discretion in the way retailers do their job. This is particularly the case when retailers and customers collude to exploit loopholes in the contracts between producers and customers. In this paper, we analyze how insurance distribution channels may a¤ect such misbehaviors, when car repairers join policyholders to defraud insurers. We focus attention on the Taiwan automobile insurance market by using a database provided by two large Taiwanese automobile insurers. The theoretical underpinning of our analysis is provided by a model of claims fraud with collusion and audit. Our econometric analysis confirms that fraud occurs through the postponing of claims to the end of the policy year, possibly by filing a single claim for several events. It highlights the role of car dealer agencies in the collusive fraud mechanism..
   
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02045335&r=com

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2019/08/collusion-between-retailers-and-customers-the-case-of-insurance-fraud-in-taiwan.html

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