Monday, June 10, 2019

All-Pay Oligopolies: Price Competition with Unobservable Inventory Choices

By: Joao MontezNicolas Schutz
Abstract: We study a class of games where stores source unobservable inventories in advance, and then simultaneously set prices. Our framework allows for firm asymmetries, heterogeneous consumer tastes, endogenous consumer information through advertising, and salvage values for unsold units. The payoff structure relates to a complete-information all-pay contest with outside options, non-monotonic winning and losing functions, and conditional investments. In the generically unique equilibrium, stores randomize their price choice and, conditional on that choice, serve all their targeted demand—thus, some inventories may remain unsold. As inventory costs become fully recoverable, the equilibrium price distribution converges to an equilibrium of the associated Bertrand game (where firms first choose prices and then produce to order). This suggests that with production in advance, the choice between a Cournot analysis and a Bertrand-type analysis, as properly generalized in this paper, should depend on whether or not stores observe rivals’ inventories before setting prices.
   
   
   
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_020&r=com

June 10, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

An Aggregative Games Approach to Merger Analysis in Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly

By: Volker NockeNicolas Schutz
Abstract: Using an aggregative games approach, we analyze horizontal mergers in a model of multiproduct-firm price competition with nested CES or nested logit demands. We show that the Herfindahl index provides an adequate measure of the welfare distortions introduced by market power, and that the induced change in the naively-computed Herfindahl index is a good approximation for the market power effect of a merger. We also provide conditions under which a merger raises consumer surplus, and conditions under which a myopic, consumer-surplus-based merger approval policy is dynamically optimal. Finally, we study the aggregate surplus and external effects of a merger.
   
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_024&r=com

June 10, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Don’t Stop Thinking About Tomorrow”: Promoting Innovation by Ensuring Market-Based Application of Antitrust to Intellectual Property

Antitrust Policy for Two-Sided Platforms: The Failure of American Express and the Path Forward

John B. Kirkwood, Seattle University School of Law discusses Antitrust Policy for Two-Sided Platforms: The Failure of American Express and the Path Forward.

ABSTRACT: Two-sided platforms serve two sets of customers and enable them to interact with each other. The five most valuable corporations in America – Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft – all operate two-sided platforms. But despite their growing power, the Supreme Court made it more difficult to stop them from stifling competition. In American Express, the Court dismissed a challenge to Amex’s anti-steering provisions, which preclude merchants from steering their customers toward cheaper credit cards. Although these provisions suppress price competition on their face, the Court held that the plaintiffs had not shown that Amex had market power or that its conduct harmed consumers in the aggregate.

This article, the first comprehensive analysis of the decision, exposes the flaws in the Court’s reasoning. It shows that Amex did possess market power. Using a method I proposed in a recent article, it establishes that Amex’s conduct almost certainly enabled it to maintain its fees above the competitive level. It also shows, contrary to the Court’s analysis, that Amex’s repeated fee increases demonstrated market power. Finally, the Court was incorrect to insist that in a two-sided platform case, the relevant market must encompass both sides of the platform. That approach systematically understates the defendant’s power.

The Court’s most fundamental error was to rule that the plaintiffs cannot carry their initial burden unless they tote up the effects of Amex’s conduct on both sides of its platform and show that consumers were harmed on balance. This is procedurally inefficient because it requires the plaintiff to anticipate the defendant’s justifications. It is also substantively wrong. Amex cannot excuse its exclusionary conduct on the ground that it used some of its supracompetitive margin to increase cardholder rewards. Absent a market failure – and Amex could not establish one – those consumer benefits are a byproduct of Amex’s exclusionary behavior, not a reason to allow it. 

American Express was deeply flawed. The final section of the article sets forth the principles that should have been adopted and explains how courts can follow them while limiting the impact of this decision.

June 10, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 7, 2019

Commercial Divisions of Public Entities and the Limits of EU Competition Law

Jasper P. Sluijs, Utrecht University School of Law identifies Commercial Divisions of Public Entities and the Limits of EU Competition Law.

ABSTRACT: Competitive behavior of public entities is generally approached in the literature as concerning the traditional State-owned enterprises pursuing public interest or political economy objectives. However, increasingly we see examples of commercial divisions of public entities aiming to generate revenue — think of a commercial branch of a forestry service selling timber to construction firms to supplement its tax-based revenues. Because these commercial divisions enjoy various competitive advantages over their private competitors, their behavior may distort competition and market entry. A survey of Member States demonstrates that commercial divisions of public entities have become prevalent throughout the EU.

Whereas anticompetitive behavior by commercial divisions is generally approached by means of competition law principles across EU Member States, this article demonstrates that competition law may not apply because these commercial divisions may not qualify as ‘undertakings’ under competition law. For the commercial divisions that would be considered undertakings, abuse of dominance might be established on a substantive level. However, competition authorities face numerous procedural and institutional challenges when enforcing against commercial divisions of public entities. 

The article then establishes two problematic consequences of the current approach to commercial divisions of public entities in the EU. First, an unequal playing field follows from the different treatment of private and public competitors in the application and enforcement of competition law. Second, the various competition law-inspired approaches towards commercial divisions of public entities hamper the internal market. The article concludes by suggesting possible remedies to these consequences: harmonization of competition law relating to anticompetitive behavior by commercial divisions, or enacting a standalone regulatory framework beyond competition law. Before resorting to these remedies, however, more research is necessary to appreciate and quantify the possible distortion of competition by commercial divisions of public entities, compile best-practice regulatory responses and further study effects on matters related to rule of law.

June 7, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Managing Competition on a Two-Sided Platform

By: Paul BelleflammeMartin Peitz
Abstract: On many two-sided platforms, users on one side not only care about user participation and usage levels on the other side, but they also care about participation and usage of fellow users on the same side. Most prominent is the degree of seller competition on a platform catering to buyers and sellers. In this paper, we address how seller competition affects platform pricing, product variety, and the number of platforms that carry trade.
Keywords: Network effects, two-sided markets, platform competition, intermediation, pricing, imperfect competition
   
   
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_028&r=com

June 7, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Who's Who Competition 2019 is out

Competition 2019: Lawyers

WWL has once again collaborated with Global Competition Review to produce the 20th edition of WWL: Competition, featuring 1,068 lawyers from over 400 firms across 55 jurisdictions who stand out as the foremost legal practitioners in the competition space. We also identify 79 state aid specialists for their market-leading expertise in the area.

Those featured are recognised for their exceptional work on a spectrum of related matters including merger control, abuse of dominance cases, cartel investigations, state aid matters and high-stakes antitrust litigation.

Below we recognise the top lawyers and firms across a range of jurisdictions.

 

Competition 2019: Plaintiff Lawyers

For the sixth year, WWL highlights the world’s best plaintiff litigators in competition. The USA remains the main arena for such work but there is an increasing caseload in Europe. In total 126 names are recommended this year.

 

Competition 2019: Economists

WWL has once again identified the leading competition economists from around the world. This year we recognise 397 individuals from 160 firms across 33 jurisdictions for their world-class work providing expert knowledge and testimony in complex antitrust matters.

 

Competition 2019: Future Leaders - Lawyers

In this edition, WWL presents the future leaders of international competition practice. This year, 288 partners and 250 non-partners aged 45 and under at the end of 2019 are selected. They have proven their excellence in a wide range of behavioural and civil competition matters, acting for clients in a huge spectrum of sectors.

 

Competition 2019: Future Leaders - Economists

WWL presents 55 economists regarded by peers and clients as future leaders in the competition space. They have been selected from over 30 firms and across 16 different countries for their experience and expertise in providing expert testimony and advisory services regarding antitrust and competition matters.

June 7, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Error Costs, Ratio Tests, and Patent Antitrust Law

Keith N. Hylton, Boston University - School of Law and Wendy Xu, Boston University discuss Error Costs, Ratio Tests, and Patent Antitrust Law.

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the welfare tradeoff between patent and antitrust law. Since patent and antitrust law have contradictory goals, the question that naturally arises is how one should choose between the two in instances where there is a conflict. One sensible approach to choosing between two legal standards, or between proof standards with respect to evidence, is to consider the relative costs of errors. The approach in this paper is to consider the ratio of false positives to false negatives in patent antitrust. We find that the relevant error cost ratio for patent antitrust is the proportion of the sum of the monopoly profit and residual consumer surplus to the deadweight loss. This error cost ratio, for a wide range of deterministic demand functions, ranges from infinity to a low of roughly three. This suggests that patent antitrust law should err on the side of protecting innovation incentives.

June 7, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 6, 2019

EU Merger Policy Predictability Using Random Forests

Pauline Affeldt, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin); Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin) writes on EU Merger Policy Predictability Using Random Forests.

ABSTRACT: I study the predictability of the EC’s merger decision procedure before and after the 2004 merger policy reform based on a dataset covering all affected markets of mergers with an official decision documented by DG Comp between 1990 and 2014. Using the highly flexible, non-parametric random forest algorithm to predict DG Comp’s assessment of competitive concerns in markets affected by a merger, I find that the predictive performance of the random forests is much better than the performance of simple linear models. In particular, the random forests do much better in predicting the rare event of competitive concerns. Secondly, post-reform, DG Comp seems to base its assessment on a more complex interaction of merger and market characteristics than pre-reform. The highly flexible random forest algorithm is ableto detect these potentially complex interactions and, therefore, still allows for high prediction precision.

June 6, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

It is not collusion unless you get caught: the case of ‘Operation Car Wash’ and unearthing of a Cartel

Regis Signor, Peter E D Love, João José C B Vallim, Alexandre B Raup, and Oluwole Olatunji explain It is not collusion unless you get caught: the case of ‘Operation Car Wash’ and unearthing of a Cartel.

ABSTRACT: In this article, we present findings from the Brazilian Federal Police’s ongoing investigation referred to as ‘Operation Car Wash’, which led to an accusation of collusive bidding being presented to a cartel that comprised 16 construction contractors. While plea bargains from several contractors within the cartel have materialized, additional evidence needs to be provided by the investigations officials to ensure the adequate application of justice. In this article, we provide scientific evidence that can be used by the Brazilian criminal courts to demonstrate the presence of collusive bidding. The contributions of this article are two-fold: (i) a robust and reliable econometric model to prove the presence of collusive bidding is implemented, which meets the basic criteria defined by the judicial system for scientific evidence; and (ii) the negative economic impact of collusive bid rigging is quantified, which was much higher than the percentage admitted by those involved in their leniency agreements.

June 6, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

What the NBA finals can teach about effective results in bar prep

Many students are torn this week from getting 8 hours a night of study time in and watching a very exciting NBA finals. The NBA is a nice case study of how to study for the bar exam. To make it to the NBA, you need to have talent. At 6’3, I cannot dunk or crossover dribble but a law professor career is longer than that of an NBA player so I am not complaining. Yet, for the Warriors and Raptors to have made it to the finals they needed a lot more than just freakish talent (Steph Curry and your 92% free throw shooting – I mean you). Most of the “action” takes place not on game day but in countless hours of practice and strategy sessions. Players go through drills daily, memorize plays, learn to break down an opponents’ game, and find ways to exploit opportunities. This is a lot like the bar exam. Just like playing in the NBA finals, taking the bar exam is an all or nothing experience – you either win or lose. To improve your chances at winning:

  • Spend 8 hours a day six days a week (with a half day on the 7th day) studying the material. A lot of the bar exam is about memorization of material and that takes time.
  • Take as many practice essays as you can. The skillset for essay taking is different than that of multiple choice. I cannot stress enough how important it is to do as many of these practice essays as possible. You only get better by identifying your weaknesses and focusing on building up those core skills.
  • Work on your rhythm. NBA players practice enough that they intuitively understand how to play the shot clock.  You need to learn to master the shot clock for the bar exam and get in a rhythm that allows you the opportunity to maximize your time.
  • Have a plan. Every essay needs to be outlined before you begin so that you hit the major points and use your time effectively.
  • Work on mindfulness. Don’t let distractions get to you during the next two months or during the actual exam to reduce the anxiety that you feel.
  • Get enough sleep. You cannot be at your best without enough sleep. Your body will break down over the next two months if you don’t sleep enough or stay physically active (30 minutes - 1 hour of exercise a day).
  • Go in with the attitude that you will give 100 percent effort.  Whether the game is decided by 1 point or 20, a player does not announce to his teammates right before the game, "With a 70% pass rate in this state, I am only going to give a C- effort." 

June 6, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (1)

Competition Policy and Sector-Specific Regulation in the Financial Sector

By: Martin F. Hellwig (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)
Abstract: Reforms of financial regulation after the crisis of 2007-2009 raise the question of what is the relation between financial regulators and competition authorities. Should competition authorities play a role in financial regulation? Should they co-operate with financial regulators? Or should they keep at a distance? The paper gives an overview over some of the issues that are involved in the discussion. Drawing on the experience of the network industries, the first part of the paper discusses the relation between competition authorities and sector-specific regulators more generally. Whereas competition policy involves the application of legal norms involving prohibitions that are formulated in abstract terms, sector-specific regulation involves authorities actually prescribing desired modes of behavior. The ongoing nature of relations makes regulators more prone to capture than competition authorities. In the financial sector, the potential for capture is particularly great because everyone is tempted by the idea that banks should fund their pet projects. Following an overview over the evolution of regulation and competition in the financial industry, the paper discusses various issues that are relevant for competition policy: Technological and regulatory barriers to entry, distortions of competition by explicit or implicit government guarantees, distortions of competition by bailouts making for artificial barriers to exit. Guarantees and bailouts in particular pose special challenges for merger control and for state aid control.
   
   
   
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2018_07&r=com

June 6, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 5, 2019

The journey from theory to practice in the field of competition law

Eyad Maher M Dabbah describes The journey from theory to practice in the field of competition law.

ABSTRACT: This article considers the important relationship between law and economics in the field of competition law. The article shows how economics has become a dominant discipline in the field and the difficulties this development has given, and is likely to give, rise to in practice. In doing so, the article considers the heavy reliance which lawyers in particular have come to place on economics. The article offers a number of illustrations taken from different areas of competition law and policy in order to support the analysis and arguments therein. The article offers a perspective on what the exact relationship between law and economics should be and what role lawyers should play in order to facilitate a smooth transition from theory to practice and ultimately ensure that competition law is developed and applied correctly and in a way that matches the realities of markets and the business world.

June 5, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Causal Mechanisms of Horizontal Shareholding

Einer Elgauge, Harvard investigates The Causal Mechanisms of Horizontal Shareholding.

ABSTRACT: Although empirical studies show that common shareholding affects corporate conduct and that common horizontal shareholding lessens competition, critics have argued that the law should not take any action until we have clearer proof on the causal mechanisms. I show that we actually have ample proof on causal mechanisms, but that antitrust enforcement should focus on anticompetitive market structures, rather than on causal mechanisms. I debunk claims that every type of causal mechanism that might produce anticompetitive effects is either empirically untested or implausible. I also show that critics are wrong in claiming that common shareholders lack incentives to influence corporations to increase portfolio value by lessening competition. Finally, I show that preventing anticompetitive horizontal shareholding need not restrict diversification or discourage desirable institutional investor influence on corporate conduct.

June 5, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Imitation Dynamics in Oligopoly Games with Heterogeneous Players

By: Daan LindemanMarius I. Ochea (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA)
Abstract: We investigate the role and performance of imitative behaviour in a class of quantity- setting Cournot games. Within a framework of evolutionary competition between ra- tional, best-response and imitators players we found that the equilibrium stability de- pends on the intensity of the evolutionary pressure and on the stability of the cheapest heuristic. When the cheapest behavioural rule is the stable heuristic (i.e. imitation), the dynamics converge to a situation where most rms use this behavioural rule and all rms produce the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity. When the cheapest heuristic is unstable one (i.e. best-response), complicated endogenous uctuations may occur along with the co-existence of heuristics.
Keywords: Competing heuristics, Imitation, Evolutionary dynamics.
   
   
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2018-15&r=com

June 5, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Latest Competition Lore podcast episode: Unlocking Digital Competition, with Philip Marsden

See here.

June 5, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wesley Wang (T&D Associates) provides his thoughts on "Mergers in the Digital Economy" for the HKU-Lingan-University of Florida Platform Competition Conference on June 20, 2019

Wesley
Wesley Wang (T&D Associates) provides his thoughts on "Mergers in the Digital Economy" for the HKU-Lingan-University of Florida Platform Competition Conference on June 20, 2019.

Wesley Wang

After ten years’ enforcement of merger control under China’s Antimonopoly Law, the antitrust authority has accumulated plenty of experience both in terms of substantive and procedural perspectives. The authority is amending the Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”) and the Draft Measures of Examination of the Concentrations between Undertakings (latest revised in 2017), which are supposed to address the problems of how to assess “change of control”, calculation of turnover, remedies, etc.

In terms of practice, until March 5, 2019, around 2600 merger control cases were closed, most of which were cleared without conditions. 40 cases were approved with conditions, 2 cases were prohibited, and tens of cases were withdrawn.

Nevertheless, although internet industry in data economy in China has witnessed its unprecedented prosperity, seldom merger control case handled by Chinese authority is related to internet industry. This somewhat curious situation gives rise to the question of whether and how the merger control regime could be imposed on internet industry in China.

We would like to try to shed some light to the answer for this question from an outside counsel’s perspective, based on our rich experience during the legislation process of the AML as well as the Law’s enforcement in this field since 2003.

June 5, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Personalized prices and uncertainty in monopsony

By: Roberto Burguet (University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL); József Sákovics (School of Economics, University of Edinburgh)
Abstract: We analyze personalized pricing by a monopsonist facing a finite number of ex ante identical, capacity constrained suppliers with privately known costs. When the distribution of costs is sufficiently smooth and regular, the buyer chooses to make the same offer to all suppliers, leading to a posted price. This price is lower than the classical monopsony price if the demand function is concave, and higher if the demand is convex. In the limit as the seller capacities tend to zero we obtain the classical monopsony price. Therefore, our model provides a decentralized micro- foundation for monopsony.
   
   
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfl:wpaper:2019-01rb&r=com

June 5, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 4, 2019

Creating platforms by hosting rivals

By: Hagiu, AndreiJullien, BrunoWright, Julian
Abstract: We explore conditions under which a multiproduct firm can profitably turn itself into a platform by "hosting rivals", i.e. by inviting rivals to sell products or services on top of its core product. Hosting eliminates the additional shopping costs to consumers of buying a specialist rival's competing version of the multiproduct firm's non-core product. On the one hand, this makes it easier for the rival to compete on the non-core product. On the other hand, hosting turns the rival from a pure competitor into a complementor: the value added by its product now helps raise consumer demand for the multi-product firm's core product. As a result, hosting can be both unilaterally profitable for the multi-product firm and jointly profitable for both firms.
   
   
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:33123&r=com

June 4, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Jevons Colloquium 2019, June 18 - London - LAST DAYS TO REGISTER

Jun 18

Jevons Institute 2019 Colloquium: Does Competition Law and Enforcement Nee...

by UCL Faculty of Laws

£0 – £150

 

Jevons Institute 2019 Colloquium

Tue, 18 Jun 2019, 09:00

£0 – £150

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Date and Time

Tue, 18 Jun 2019, 09:00

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Description

2019 Jevons Institute Colloquium

Does Competition Law and
Enforcement Need a Radical Overhaul?

at UCL Faculty of Laws, London

Tuesday 18 June 2019, 9.00 - 16:00

Organised and Moderated by
Antonio Bavasso, David Evans and Douglas Ginsburg

About the Colloquium
Demands for radical reforms in competition law policy and enforcement by politicians and pundits are growing. The Jevons Institute 2019 Colloquium will focus on 3 themes that are crucial to inform the debate over whether there is a monopoly problem and what should be done about it if there is.

  • First are markets becoming less competitive generally or in important sectors and why?
  • Secondly should we reset the balance in error cost framework for competition law enforcement?
  • Thirdly, do we need to consider new tools to remedy competition concerns, and what have we learned from past experience?

To debate these questions, we have assembled a group of leading experts from academia, competition authorities and courts across the world.

The 2019 Jevons Colloquium is organised in co-operation with the CMA who are considering a number of reforms to the UK legal regime taking into account international experience.

Keynote Speeches

  • Andrea Coscelli, CMA
  • Andreas Mundt, Bundeskartellamt

Speakers

  • Antonio Bavasso, UCL Jevons Institute / Allen & Overy
  • Sir Christopher Bellamy, Linklaters LLP
  • Sarah Cardell, CMA
  • Jan De Loecker, KU Leuven
  • David Evans, UCL Jevons Institute / Global Economics Group
  • Damien Geradin, UCL / Euclid
  • Douglas Ginsburg, US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit / George Mason University
  • Wolfgang Kirchhoff, Federal Court of Justice (BGH) Karlsruhe
  • Philip Marsden, College of Europe / FCA / Ofgem / CRA
  • Giovanni Pitruzzella, European Court of Justice
  • Tommaso Valletti, DG Comp, EC
  • Larry White, NYU Stern School of Business
  • Joshua Wright, George Mason University

The 2019 Jevons Colloquium is organized and will be moderated by Antonio Bavasso, David Evans, and Douglas Ginsburg.

The Agenda:

09:00 Welcome and Opening Speech
Andrea Coscelli Chief Executive, Competition & Markets Authority

09:30 Roundtable 1: Time to reconsider the error cost framework in competition enforcement?
Moderator: Douglas Ginsburg Judge, US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit / George Mason University.
Presenters:

  • Philip Marsden, College of Europe / FCA / Ofgem / CRA
  • Giovanni Pitruzzella, European Court of Justice
  • Sir Christopher Bellamy, Linklaters LLP
  • Joshua Wright, George Mason University

10:45 Refreshment break

11:15 Roundtable 2: Are markets becoming less competitive, generally, or in important sectors?
Moderator: David S. Evans UCL Jevons Institute / Global Economics Group
Presenters:

  • Jan De Loecker, Professor of Economics, KU Leuven
  • Tommaso Valletti, Chief Economist, DG Comp, European Commission
  • Lawrence J. White, Robert Kavesh Professor in Economics, NYU

12:30 Keynote Address:
Andreas Mundt, President, Bundeskartellamt

13:00 Lunch

14:00 Roundtable 3: Remedies: past experiences, effectiveness, new tools
Moderator: Antonio Bavasso UCL Jevons Institute / Allen & Overy LLP
Presenters:

  • Sarah Cardell, CMA
  • Damien Geradin, UCL/Euclid
  • Douglas Ginsburg Judge, US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit / George Mason University.
  • Wolfgang Kirchhoff, Federal Court of Justice (BGH) Karlsruhe
  • Ioannis Lianos, Professor of Global Competition Law & Public Policy, UCL Centre for Law, Economics & Society

15:30 Closing remarks

16:00 End of Conference

 

About the Jevons Institute
The Jevons Institute for Competition Law and Economics at UCL (The Jevons Institute), set up in 2006, constitutes a policy forum and a meeting point between academia and practice with the aim to:

  • stimulate debate concerning the application of competition law and industry regulation to the marketplace; and
  • promote interaction among academic scholars in law and economics, policymakers and enforcement officials, the judiciary, practitioners and business leaders.

Our approach in this area of law and policy is based on a strong interaction between legal principles and analysis, and applied economic theory and empirics.

The Jevons Institute has been named after William Stanley Jevons, one of the foremost economists of the 19th Century and professor of political economy at UCL.

The Jevons Institute was founded by Visiting Professor Antonio Bavasso and Visiting Professor David S. Evans and operates within the Faculty of Laws at University College London.

It is directed by three Executive Directors: visiting professors Antonio Bavasso and David S. Evans and Ioannis Lianos, chair of global competition law and policy at UCL Laws.

 

If you have any queries about this course please contact Lisa Penfold at the UCL Faculty of Laws by emailing lisa.penfold@ucl.ac.uk

Date and Time

Tue, 18 Jun 2019, 09:00

Add to Calendar

Location

UCL Faculty of Laws

Bentham House

Endsleigh Gardens

London

WC1H 0EG

United Kingdom

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Refund Policy

Refunds up to 7 days before event

 

June 4, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (0)