Wednesday, December 12, 2018

Optimal Cross-Licensing Arrangements: Collusion versus Entry Deterrence

Choi, Jay Pil (Michigan State University, Department of Economics) and Gerlach, Heiko (University of Queensland) identify Optimal Cross-Licensing Arrangements: Collusion versus Entry Deterrence.

ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes optimal cross-licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants. The optimal cross-licensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis-a-vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation. We show that a positive cross-licensing royalty rate, which would otherwise relax competition and sustain a collusive outcome, dulls incentives to litigate against entrants. Our analysis can shed light on the puzzling practice of royalty free cross-licensing arrangements between competing firms in the same industry as such arrangements enhance incentives to litigate against any potential entrants and can be used as entry-deterrence mechanism.

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2018/12/optimal-cross-licensing-arrangements-collusion-versus-entry-deterrence.html

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