Wednesday, October 31, 2018

Optimal fines for cartel agreements: the case of Slovakia

Richard Kalis (Department of Economic Policy, University of Economics in Bratislava); Martin Labaj (Department of Economic Policy, University of Economics in Bratislava); Daniela Zemanovicova discuss Optimal fines for cartel agreements: the case of Slovakia.

ABSTRACT: The paper deals with theoretical and empirical aspects of optimal fines for cartel agreements with a special focus on the practices of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic. First, we discuss the theoretical requirements in order to make fines for cartel agreements effective in the sense of preventive and repressive function. Then, we review the current literature on the empirics of fines for cartel agreements. In the empirical part, we evaluate the fines for cartel agreements in the Slovak Republic. The analysis is based on a unique dataset collected from publicly available information on cartel agreements cases of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic.

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2018/10/optimal-fines-for-cartel-agreements-the-case-of-slovakia.html

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