Tuesday, October 23, 2018

Competition for retail deposits between commercial banks and non-bank operators: a two-sided platform analysis

Siciliani, Paolo (Bank of England) explores Competition for retail deposits between commercial banks and non-bank operators: a two-sided platform analysis.

ABSTRACT: Commercial banks’ mainstream business model, which is reliant on a stable supply of retail deposits, continues to be challenged by new and innovative sources of non-bank competition. This paper examines the implications of one such source: a substitute for commercial banks’ personal and saving accounts that provides a safer money storage option thanks to access to a central bank’s balance sheet. I model competition for retail deposits between a bank and a non-bank payment service operator by adopting the two-sided platform framework to capture the payment functionality between consumers and merchants under various configurations. I show that banks’ mainstream business model is most vulnerable when consumers perceive the two service providers as close substitutes; they have the option to sign up with both service providers; their distribution of deposit is skewed; and they are not allowed to make payments across platforms.

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2018/10/competition-for-retail-deposits-between-commercial-banks-and-non-bank-operators-a-two-sided-platform.html

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