Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Friday, July 6, 2018

Signaling a New Version in Durable-Good Oligopoly

William Caylor Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Department of Economics is Signaling a New Version in Durable-Good Oligopoly.

ABSTRACT: In some industries, firms reveal forthcoming improved products through (credible) announcements. In other industries, future product improvements are not announced. In a durable goods market where sellers have private information about their future products, but do not announce those products, the market outcome is one where information about future products is signaled through prices; the signaling distortion may lead to higher or lower prices and therefore decrease or increase welfare, depending on the degree of product differentiation. Asymmetric information augments the sellers’ willingness to invest in product improvement, compared to full information.

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