Thursday, December 7, 2017

Assistant Professor in Competition Law position at The Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies at the University of Warsaw

The Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies at the University of Warsaw (CARS), a leading Central-European research institution in the area of competition law and policy as well as sector-specific regulation, is looking for potential candidates ready to undertake research and teaching in Warsaw, Poland. We will be launching a competition for a full-time position of Assistant Professor (in Polish: adiunkt). A PhD (or a completed PhD thesis) in law or economics and proficiency in English will be required. Previous research experience and international publications in English will be an advantage. Prior teaching experience is not necessary. The knowledge of Polish will not be required. Successful candidate will be expected to conduct high quality research, seek external research funding and actively support CARS activity.

The Centre will provide assistance with Visa formalities (for non-UE candidates) and contribute in covering the costs of moving to Poland. Remuneration will be set in accordance with the University of Warsaw’s pay grid and depending on knowledge, skills and experience of the candidate is likely to correspond to average national salary. Successful candidates will have the possibility to earn additional income by participating in the Centre’s externally commissioned research projects. The Centre will also offer assistance in applications for state-funded grants and scholarships for young scholars.

Potential candidates are kindly asked to contact Dr Maciej Bernatt, mbernatt@wz.uw.edu.pl to learn more about recruitment process and expectations. You can read about CARS at http://www.cars.wz.uw.edu.pl/news_gb.html For University of Warsaw see http://en.uw.edu.pl/

December 7, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy

Ángel L. López, Autonomous University of Barcelona and Xavier Vives, University of Navarra - IESE Business School; Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) have written on Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy.

Abstract: This paper considers cost-reducing R&D investment with spillovers in a Cournot oligopoly with overlapping ownership. We show that overlapping ownership leads to internalization of rivals’ profits by firms and find that, for demand not too convex, increases in overlapping ownership increase (decrease) R&D and output for high (low) enough spillovers while it increases R&D but decreases output for intermediate levels of spillovers. There is scope for overlapping ownership to improve welfare provided that spillovers are sufficiently large. The socially optimal degree of overlapping ownership increases with the number of firms, with the elasticity of demand and of the innovation function, and with the extent of spillover effects. In terms of consumer surplus standard, the desirability of overlapping ownership is greatly reduced even under low market concentration. When R&D has commitment value and spillovers are high the optimal extent of overlapping ownership is higher. The results obtained are robust in the context of a Bertrand oligopoly model with product differentiation.

December 7, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 4, 2017

Aetna-Humana and Algorithmic Market Definition in the Guidelines

Kostis Hatzitaskos, Nicholas Hill, and Brad T. Howells examine Aetna-Humana and Algorithmic Market Definition in the Guidelines.

ABSTRACT: The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines outline the Agencies’ enforcement policy on horizontal mergers. The Guidelines play an important role during all phases of the merger review process, including litigation. Because merger review is fact specific and because facts vary greatly across mergers, the Guidelines must be general enough to accommodate the nuances of a wide range of potential scenarios. This need to preserve generality can lead to ambiguities that can complicate counseling, merger review, and litigation. We discuss here one such ambiguity in the Guidelines, concerning whether market definition must be strictly algorithmic or may instead be a more holistic process informed by both qualitative and quantitative evidence. The recent Aetna-Humana health insurance merger trial was the first since the 2010 revisions of the Guidelines to focus squarely on this ambiguity. A number of products were at issue in the trial, but the key question was whether the merger would reduce competition in the sale of Medicare Advantage plans to seniors eligible for Medicare. In what follows, we explore the market definition questions raised at trial and their implications for practitioners

December 4, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, December 3, 2017

The Bayer-Monsanto merger kills innovation and must be stopped

Jim Miller (former Chairman of the FTC) argues The Bayer-Monsanto merger kills innovation and must be stopped.

December 3, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, December 1, 2017

EU Competition Law Cases, Texts and Context

Eleanor M. Fox, Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation, New York University School of Law, US and Damien Gerard, Director, Global Competition Law Center (GCLC) and Visiting Professor, College of Europe and Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium have published EU Competition Law Cases, Texts and Context.

BOOK ABSTRACT: This clear and concise textbook presents EU competition law in political, economic and comparative context. It combines excerpts from key EU rulings with discussions of enforcement policy issues and comparisons with US antitrust cases. Untangling the complex set of factors driving individual outcomes, it is the perfect companion for any student or practitioner in the field.

Successive chapters explore the tools used by competition authorities in Europe: to punish cartels that fix prices or divide markets; assess cooperative agreements between rival firms and supplier–customer relationships; to establish a dominant position and find abuses; and review the competitive effects of mergers and acquisitions. The book also explains how authorities determine when business restraints infringe on the principles governing the EU internal market, and when Member States contravene the rules protecting the European competition system including by means of subsidies known as State aids.

More than a reference tool, this innovative book provides a rounded account of the various dimensions of EU competition law, of its place at the heart of the EU market integration project and of its relevance for the enforcement of antitrust principles worldwide.

December 1, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: Economic Foundations and Empirical Evidence: Reply

José Azar, University of Navarra, IESE Business School, Martin C. Schmalz, University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business, and Isabel Tecu, Charles River Associates (CRA) offer The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: Economic Foundations and Empirical Evidence: Reply.

ABSTRACT: Kennedy, O’Brien, Song, and Waehrer (2017) replicate the panel results of Azar, Schmalz and Tecu (forthcoming), but argue on theoretical grounds that the estimates should not be interpreted as anti-competitive effects of common ownership. They then develop and estimate alternative models and find no significant positive effects of common ownership on airline ticket prices. This note points out features of their empirical analysis that cast doubt on the reliability of their method and results. Their conclusion that the data do not support AST’s interpretation seems unwarranted.

December 1, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Competitive Effects of Entry: Evidence from Supercenter Expansion

Peter Arcidiacono, Duke University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Paul B. Ellickson, University of Rochester - Simon Business School, Carl F. Mela, Duke University - Fuqua School of Business, John D. Singleton, University of Rochester - Department of Economics analyze The Competitive Effects of Entry: Evidence from Supercenter Expansion.  Worth reading!

ABSTRACT: Coupling weekly grocery transaction records with the exact location and opening date of entering Walmarts over an eleven year period, we examine how their entry affects prices and revenues at incumbent supermarkets. We find that Walmart Supercenter entry within one mile of an incumbent causes a sharp 16% drop in revenue, an effect that decays quickly with distance. Surprisingly, despite large cross store differences in prices of supermarkets by exposure to Walmart, our findings also indicate that Supercenter entry has no causal effect on incumbent prices. This lack of a price response is robust across many dimensions including, but not limited to, a lack of response for individual categories and brands within a category.

December 1, 2017 | Permalink | Comments (0)