European Competition Law: Enforcement or Regulation after Intel?

D. Daniel Sokol, University of Florida  asks European Competition Law: Enforcement or Regulation after Intel?

ABSTRACT: The EUCJ Intel decision is a reminder that European competition law looks different from that of the North American jurisdictions where economic effects drive enforcement policy and a tradition of due process and procedural fairness exists. Intel suggests limits to DG Competition’s enforcement with regard to due process and is a wake up call for DG Competition to reiterate its commitment to procedural fairness.

Although there is some gap as between North American and European views on economic effects in cases, Intel suggests that this gap may be narrowing. Intel provides a road-map for further reworking of European case law towards more of an effects based approach. Perhaps Intel offers European competition law a GTE Sylvania-like moment with regard to an effects based approach to conduct, where cases had hereunto been form based “by object.”