Monday, December 19, 2016

Ordered Consumer Search

Mark Armstrong, Oxford analyzes Ordered Consumer Search.

ABSTRACT: The paper discusses situations in which consumers search through their options in a deliberate order, in contrast to more familiar models with random search. Topics include: the existence of ordered search equilibria with symmetric sellers (all consumers first inspect the seller they anticipate sets the lowest price, and a seller which is inspected first by consumers will set the lowest price); the use of price and non-price advertising to direct search; the impact of consumers starting a new search at their previous supplier; and the incentive a seller can have to raise its own search cost. I also show how ordered search can be reformulated as a simpler discrete choice problem without search frictions or dynamic decision making.

December 19, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, December 16, 2016

Vertical Information Restraints: Pro- and Anti-Competitive Impacts of Minimum Advertised Price Restrictions

John Asker, New York University - Leonard N. School of Business - Department of Economics and Heski Bar-Isaac, University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management have a fascinating paper on Vertical Information Restraints: Pro- and Anti-Competitive Impacts of Minimum Advertised Price Restrictions.

ABSTRACT: We consider vertical contracts where the retail market may involve search frictions. Minimum advertised price restrictions (MAP) act as a restraint on customers' information and so can increase search frictions in the retail sector. Such restraints, thereby, soften retail competition - an impact also generated by resale price maintenance (RPM). However, by accommodating (consumer or retailer) heterogeneity, MAP can allow for higher manufacturer profits than RPM. We show that they can do so through facilitating price discrimination among consumers; encouraging service provision; and facilitating manufacturer collusion. Thus, welfare effects may be positive or negative compared to RPM.

December 16, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market Power and Efficiency

Bruce A. Blonigen, University of Oregon & NBER and Justin R. Pierce, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System have an interesting paper on Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market Power and Efficiency.

ABSTRACT: Study of the impact of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on productivity and market power has been complicated by the difficulty of separating these two effects. We use newly-developed techniques to separately estimate productivity and markups across a wide range of industries using detailed plant-level data. Employing a difference-in-differences framework, we find that M&As are associated with increases in average markups, but find little evidence for effects on plantlevel productivity. We also examine whether M&As increase efficiency through reallocation of production to more efficient plants or through reductions in administrative operations, but again find little evidence for these channels, on average. The results are robust to a range of approaches to address the endogeneity of firms’ merger decisions.

December 16, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, December 15, 2016

Arbitrability of EU Competition Law-Based Claims: Where Do We Stand after the CDC Hydrogen Peroxide Case?

Damien Geradin, Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC); University College London - Faculty of Laws and Emilio Villano ask Arbitrability of EU Competition Law-Based Claims: Where Do We Stand after the CDC Hydrogen Peroxide Case?

ABSTRACT:  In this paper, we discuss the extent to which EU competition rules are arbitrable. There is a wide consensus that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are fully arbitrable and we share that opinion. More challenging questions may, however, arise when the dispute subject to arbitration raises issues under the other competition provisions of the TFEU, i.e., Articles 106 to 108, as well as in secondary EU competition legislation (e.g., the EU Merger Control Regulation). Moreover, in the recent CDC Case, the question has arisen as to whether arbitration is a suitable method to settle claims for damages arising from breaches of competition law made by one of the parties to a contract containing an arbitration clause. We discuss AG Jääskinen’s controversial Opinion, the judgment of the CJEU, and their possible implications on the arbitrability of damages actions based on breaches of EU competition rules.

December 15, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, December 14, 2016

Collective Dominance: Its Intepretation and Assesment after Airtour in Merger Control

Prayogo Serevin Wisnumurti, Center for Trade Competition and Policy Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia describes Collective Dominance: Its Intepretation and Assesment after Airtour in Merger Control.

ABSTRACT:  On 6 June 2002, the European Court of Justice made its landmark judgment about collective dominance, in stated that for collective dominance to exist need the three criteria to be fulfilled. The Commission on is an assessment in merger control using a legal approach which was proving the market structure, to strengthen of collective dominance that can significantly impede competition which prohibited in the European Union legal order.

After the Judgement in which the way the Commission assess collective dominance in proposed concentration criticized by the Court. The Commission finally embrace economic nature in their assessment. It started to make the term collective dominance redundant in assessing the distortion on the market after the concentrations. Finally, the Commission focused on discovering implicit collusion. In summary, the analyses of the cases show that the assessments of collective dominance prior and then afterward the Airtours case are much varied.

December 14, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Antitrust and Socially Responsible Collaboration: A Chilling Combination?

Inara K. Scott, Oregon State University, College of Business asks Antitrust and Socially Responsible Collaboration: A Chilling Combination?

ABSTRACT: Antitrust and Socially Responsible Collaboration: A Chilling Combination? by Inara K. Scott :: Businesses are increasingly using collaboration to address concerns about sustainability, transparency, human rights, and labor conditions in global markets. Such collaborations include the development of certifications and standards, the sharing of information about factories and suppliers, and agreements to share facilities, like less than full delivery trucks. Yet at the same time, federal antitrust policies broadly prohibit agreements that restrain trade or commerce, creating the potential for innovative collaborations to result in legal prosecution. This article applies antitrust law to socially responsible and sustainable business collaboration in an effort to determine whether antitrust law chills potentially beneficial agreements. The article concludes that careful structuring of agreements can avoid many antitrust violations, but also finds that certain types of agreements, including those that could have the most impact on scarce resources and vulnerable commodity producers, are forbidden. Accordingly, this article argues that per se rules forbidding certain practices, including price fixing and resource sharing, be reconsidered in light of current economic and environmental conditions. It also questions certain assumptions about the benefits of competition in light of current environmental, human rights, and sustainability challenges.

December 14, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Welfare Effects of Metering Ties

Einer Elhauge, Harvard Law School and Barry Nalebuff, Yale School of Management discuss The Welfare Effects of Metering Ties.

ABSTRACT: Critics of current tying doctrine argue that metering ties can increase consumer welfare and total welfare without increasing output and that they generally increase both welfare measures. Contrary to those claims, we prove that metering ties always lower both consumer welfare and total welfare unless they increase capital good output. We further show that under market conditions we argue are realistic (which include a lognormal distribution of usage rates that are independently distributed from per-usage valuations), metering ties always harm consumer welfare, even when output increases. Whether metering ties raise or lower total welfare depends on the dispersion of desired usage, the cost structure, and the dissipation of profits caused by metering. For realistic cost values, metering ties will reduce total welfare if the dispersion in desired usage of the metered good is below 0.62. (For comparison, 0.74 is the dispersion of income in the United States.) If 5% of metering profits are dissipated, metering will reduce total welfare for all cost levels unless the dispersion in desired usage exceeds 150% of the dispersion of income in the United States.

 

December 14, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Rigged Results? Antitrust Lessons from Keyword Auctions

Samuel N. Weinstein, U.C. Berkeley School of Law asks Rigged Results? Antitrust Lessons from Keyword Auctions.

ABSTRACT: Bid rigging is quintessential criminal antitrust conduct. Yet search-engine optimization experts publicly advise firms to agree with competitors not to bid on each other’s trademarks in search-engine keyword auctions and evidence indicates that companies enter such agreements. Why would these experts feel confident counseling firms to suppress bids in these auctions? The answer might be a belief that bid suppression (or other anticompetitive conduct) is lawful if it involves a putative intellectual property (“IP”) right, in this case a trademark or brand-related term. Under this logic, an agreement not to bid on another firm’s trademarked terms in search-engine keyword auctions is efficient because it amounts to a commitment not to perpetrate an unlawful act ― infringing a trademark. Firms and their advisers might even believe that such agreements are procompetitive because they conserve party and judicial resources and diminish potential consumer confusion. This reasoning assumes that bidding on a competitor’s trademark for use as a keyword constitutes infringement. However, no court has found trademark liability solely based on auctioning, bidding on, or purchasing a trademarked keyword. Parties have litigated this issue repeatedly and the law is in flux. This legal uncertainty puts firms contemplating such bid-suppression agreements and courts evaluating them in a difficult position, one that requires navigating the borders between antitrust law and IP rights. Indeed, these agreements raise the broader question of how to analyze potentially anticompetitive IP settlements when it is unclear if the rights involved are valid and infringed. This is an important issue: IP settlements are common and affect billions of dollars of commerce. Achieving an appropriate balance between the exercise of IP rights, which are crucial to many forms of innovation and help spur economic expansion, and the antitrust laws, which protect competitive markets, is critical. This Article proposes a novel framework for analyzing search-engine keyword bid-suppression agreements and other forms of settlements involving uncertain IP rights. Drawing from settlement theory, this framework takes into account the value of decisional law in promoting competition and challenges the assumption many courts rely upon that settlement is necessarily procompetitive. The Article argues that courts should apply the antitrust laws to keyword bid suppression agreements and other potentially unlawful IP settlements where the validity or infringement of the underlying IP right is in question and that uncertainty affects a class of cases. It details the factors courts should take into account in undertaking this antitrust analysis. This new framework is more administrable than current approaches to IP settlements and provides increased clarity to marketplace actors. It also better balances the policy preferences inherent in the IP and antitrust laws.

December 14, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 13, 2016

Antitrust Policy for a New Administration - Tuesday, January 24, 2017

Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies

 INVITATION

 Antitrust Policy for a New Administration

 A Trump Administration will bring major leadership changes at the two federal antitrust agencies, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission. Will this usher in major changes in the antitrust review of mergers and business conduct, the treatment of regulations and intellectual property, and international cooperation? Our panels of top antitrust officials from recent Administrations will address these topics, which will influence business plans here and abroad.

 

10:00 a.m.         Registration                                                                                                                         

 

10:30 a.m.         Welcome and Introduction

                        Alden Abbott, Deputy Director, and the John, Barbara, and Victoria Rumpel Senior Legal Fellow,

Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, The Heritage Foundation

10:40 a.m.         Opening Keynote Remarks: “The Next Administration’s Antitrust Policy”

 

                        William Kovacic, Former Chairman, Federal Trade Commission,

                                        and Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School

11:30 a.m.         Panel I – The United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC)                                              

                        Susan Creighton, Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, and former Director, Bureau of Competition, FTC

                        William (Bill) Blumenthal, Partner, Sidley & Austin, and former FTC General Counsel

                        William MacLeod, Partner, Kelley Drye, and Chair, ABA Antitrust Section                                                    

                        Dr. Jeffrey Eisenach, Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, and former Chief of Staff

to FTC Chairman James C. Miller III – Moderator

12:45 p.m.        Lunch                                                                                                                                  

1:45 p.m.        Panel II – The United States Department of Justice (DOJ)                                                     

                        Thomas Barnett, Partner, Covington & Burling LLP and former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, DOJ

  1. Mark Gidley, Partner, White & Case LLP, and former Acting Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, DOJ

                                The Honorable Douglas Ginsburg, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit;

Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law; and former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, DOJ

                                Stephen Weissman, Partner, Baker Botts, and former Deputy Director, Bureau of Competition, FTC

                        Hill Wellford, Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, and former Chief of Staff, Antitrust Division, DOJ – Moderator

3:00 p.m.        Break

3:15 p.m.        Panel III – Antitrust Abroad                                                                                                  

                        Jennifer Driscoll, Partner, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP and Member, ABA International Task Force

                        Abbott (Tad) Lipsky, Jr., Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP, and former Deputy Assistant Attorney

General for Antitrust, DOJ

                        James Rill, Senior Counsel, Baker & Botts LLP; former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, DOJ;

and former ABA Antitrust Section Chief

                        Bilal Sayyed, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, and former Attorney-Advisor to the FTC Chairman – Moderator

4:30 p.m.        Closing Comments

 

                        Alden Abbott, Deputy Director, and the John, Barbara, and Victoria Rumpel Senior Legal Fellow,

                                        Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, The Heritage Foundation

Tuesday, January 24, 2017 – The Heritage Foundation’s Lehrman Auditorium

 

RSVP online at heritage.org/Events/  | or call (202) 675-1752

Terms and conditions of attendance are posted at heritage.org/Events/terms.cfm

All events may be viewed live at heritage.org

News media inquiries, call (202) 675-1761

 

December 13, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Power of Arbitral Tribunals to Raise Public Policy Rules Ex Officio: The Case of EU Competition Law

Damien Geradin, Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC); University College London - Faculty of Laws discusses The Power of Arbitral Tribunals to Raise Public Policy Rules Ex Officio: The Case of EU Competition Law.

ABSTRACT: Whether arbitral tribunals should be allowed to adjudicate disputes on the basis of legal grounds different from those submitted by the parties is a question that is subject to considerable debate in the international arbitration community. On the one hand, arbitration is a creature of contract and arbitral tribunals should be careful not to exceed the mandate that has been extended to them by the parties. On the other hand, there may be circumstances where the ignorance of certain legal regimes may be fatal to the validity and enforceability of the award, and where the tribunal may thus well be advised to raise the applicability of such regimes even if the parties failed to do so. In order to illustrate the type of circumstances in which arbitral tribunals may be well advised to raise legal grounds on an ex officio basis in order to ensure the validity and enforceability of the award, I refer to contractual disputes where the agreement under scrutiny, which one of the parties is seeking to enforce, may breach EU competition law, which according to the Eco-Swiss judgment of the CJEU belongs to public policy. This paper argues that whether arbitral tribunals should raise EU competition rules on their own motion largely depends on the circumstances of each case and arbitral tribunals should be guided by pragmatism rather than theoretical considerations.

December 13, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Innovation Economics for Antitrust Lawyers Conference - Friday 3 February 2017 I 08.30 - 18.00 King's College London, Strand, WC2R 2LS London

Twenty Years in Antitrust and Lessons for a New Administration, Thursday, February 23, 2017

George Mason Law Review 20th Annual Antitrust Symposium

 

Twenty Years in Antitrust and Lessons for a New Administration Thursday, February 23, 2017 George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School - Arlington, VA

George Mason Law Review's 20th Annual Antitrust Symposium on Thursday, February 23, 2017 at George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School in Arlington, Virginia. The conference is organized by the George Mason Law Review and the Law & Economics Center's Henry G. Manne Program in Law & Economics Studies.

The last twenty years has seen a massive proliferation of competition agencies around the globe, increasing to nearly 130 to date. On the 20th Anniversary of the George Mason Antitrust Symposium, global leaders in the field of antitrust will discuss changes in antitrust over the last twenty years and identify key lessons for the new administration. Specifically, the morning will be focused on merger enforcement domestically and abroad. The first panel will consider developments in Chinese merger law, which is increasingly important to global businesses. The second panel will use the Staples/Office Depot (1997) case and its recent replay to consider changes that have occurred in United States merger enforcement and draw lessons going forward. The afternoon will address two other important areas of antitrust: the globalization of cartel enforcement and the intersection of intellectual property and competition law. Both of these areas have undergone significant change over the last twenty years and face important questions going forward. In fact, nearly 20 years ago the DOJ and FTC jointly published “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property” and recently released a proposed update to these guidelines for public comment. The symposium will be an excellent occasion to consider some of these important issues. The symposium has been approved for 5.0 Virginia MCLE credits.

You may view the current agenda.

 

December 13, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Entry into Complementary Good Markets with Network Effects

Gaston Llanes, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Andrea Mantovani, University of Bologna, and Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile examine Entry into Complementary Good Markets with Network Effects.

ABSTRACT: We study whether complementarities can help a €rm enter a market with strong network e‚ffects and incumbency advantages. We fi€nd that bundling the network good with a complementary good, or using the network good as a loss leader (i.e., pricing below marginal cost) can facilitate entry, but that these strategies involve costs that may render them undesirable for the entrant. We also fi€€nd that the entrant always prefers to make the complementarity general (so that the incumbent benefi€€ts from it as well) over having a fi€€rm-specifi€€c complementarity and using a loss leading strategy. Pricing and product design strategies are interdependent: bundling (unbundled pricing) should be used if and only if the complementarity is specifi€€c (general). Finally, we €fi€nd that bundling may be socially optimal because it allows entrants to challenge incumbents in markets with network e‚ffects, thereby expanding the complementary benefi€€ts enjoyed by consumers. ThŒis fi€€nding contrasts wit the standard view of regulators, who see bundling as a way to foreclose entry and prevent competition, as in the recent case of the European Commission vs. Google.

 

 

December 13, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Countervailing Power Hypothesis When Dominant Retailers Function as Sales Promoters

Noriaki Matsushima, Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research and Shohei Yoshida, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, define The Countervailing Power Hypothesis When Dominant Retailers Function as Sales Promoters.

ABSTRACT: We consider a downstream oligopoly model with one dominant and several fringe retailers, who purchase a manufacturing product from a monopoly supplier. We then examine how the supplier's outside option influences the relation between the dominant retailer's bargaining power and the equilibrium retail price. If the market demand shrinks due to a breakdown of bargaining between the supplier and the dominant retailer, who works as a sales promoter for the product, there is a negative relation between the bargaining power and the retail price. Furthermore, retailers' efficiency improvements increase the retail price if the dominant retailer's bargaining power is strong.

December 13, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Cartels and Leniency: Taking Stock of What We Learnt

Giancarlo Spagnolo, Stockholm School of Economics (SITE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'; EIEF and Catarina Moura Pinto Marvao, Economics Department, University College Dublin; Stockholm School of Economics - Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) have a nice overview paper on Cartels and Leniency: Taking Stock of What We Learnt.

ABSTRACT: Cartels remain widespread and constitute a major problem for society. Leniency policies reduce or cancel the sanctions for the first firm(s) that self-report being part of a cartel and have become the main enforcement instrument used by competition authorities around the world in their fight against cartels. Such policies have shown to be a powerful tool in inducing firms to self-report or cooperate with a cartel investigation in exchange for a reduction in sanctions. Since they reduce sanctions for successful leniency applicants, these programs may also be abused to generate many successful convictions for the competition authority at the expense of reduced cartel deterrence and social welfare. Hence, it is vital for competition authorities and society to understand how leniency programs affect firms’ incentives, in order to optimize their design and administration. A rich theoretical, empirical and experimental economic literature developed in the last two decades to meet the challenge.

In this chapter, we review some of the key studies which have been undertaken to date, with emphasis on more recent contributions and without claiming to be exhaustive (we apologize in advance to the authors of papers we could not discuss), highlighting and comparing the main results, and setting out their limitations. We conclude with a general assessment and an agenda for future research on this topic at the core of competition policy.

December 13, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 12, 2016

Patent Disclosures and Standard-Setting

Josh Lerner, Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Haris Tabakovic, Harvard Business School, and Jean Tirole, University of Toulouse explore Patent Disclosures and Standard-Setting.

ABSTRACT: A key role of standard setting organizations (SSOs) is to aggregate information on relevant intellectual property (IP) claims before deciding on a standard. This article explores the firms’ strategies in response to IP disclosure requirements — in particular, the choice between specific and generic disclosures of IP — and the optimal response by SSOs, including the royalty rate setting. We show that firms with a stronger downstream presence are more likely to opt for a generic disclosure, as are those with lower quality patents. We empirically examine patent disclosures made to seven large SSOs, and find results consistent with theoretical predictions.

 

 

December 12, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Effect of Competition Level and Banking Concentration to Systemic Risks: Indonesia Case

I G. B. Erri Wibowo, Universitas Indonesia, Graduate School of Management and Buddi Wibowo, Graduate School of Management University of Indonesia measure The Effect of Competition Level and Banking Concentration to Systemic Risks: Indonesia Case.

ABSTRACT: This article analyzes relationship between Indonesian banking competition, concentration, and systemic risk considering individual bank charateristics and state variable as control variables. This article uses Panzar-Rosse Model and Concentration Ratio to measure banking competition and CoVaR for systemic risk measurement. The empirical result shows concentration and competition increase the systemic risk. This means increasing competition leads banks to take higher risks (competition-fragility) and banks with high market power tends to charge higher interest rate thus increasing systemic risk. Net Interest Margin as control variable is statistically significant for both models. This shows further support. Size and interbank deposit ratio are significant, meanwhile, profitability, capital structure, and demand deposit to total funding ratio are not significant.

December 12, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Public Policy and Breach of Competition Law in International Arbitration: A Competition Law Practitioner's Viewpoint

Damien Geradin, EDGE Legal offers Public Policy and Breach of Competition Law in International Arbitration: A Competition Law Practitioner's Viewpoint.

ABSTRACT: In its March 2016 Opinion in the Genentech case, Advocate General Wathelet raised the complex question of the standard of review that should be applied by domestic courts when asked to set aside or declare unenforceable arbitral awards on the ground that they breach EU competition rules, which in the EU legal order have a public policy nature. Although the Court of Justice of the EU eventually did not take position on this question in its subsequent judgment, Advocate General Wathelet’s Opinion brought once again the complex interface between competition law, arbitration and public policy to the fore.

The objective of this paper is to discuss this interface from a competition law practitioner’s standpoint. The existing literature on the relationship between competition law, arbitration and public policy has been essentially authored by arbitration experts or at least academics or practitioners whose primary area of expertise lies in arbitration. As a result, the existing literature tends to treat competition law in a fairly abstract manner and often fails to sufficiently take into account its objectives, intricacies and the intensely factual analysis its enforcement requires. As a competition law practitioner involved in arbitral proceedings, I attempt to give a competition-law oriented perspective of the questions raised by the interface between arbitration and public policy.

December 12, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Effect of a Merger on Investments

Massimo Motta, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Emanuele Tarantino, University of Mannheim - Department of Economics; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) analyze The Effect of a Merger on Investments.

ABSTRACT: It has been suggested that mergers, by increasing profitability, will also result in higher investments. To deal with this claim, we first study a general model with simultaneous cost-reducing investments and price choices. Absent scope economies, the merger is anti-competitive: it lowers both total output and investment. With sequential choices, we provide a sufficient condition in a general model for the merger to be anti-competitive. The results are confirmed in a standard Shubik-Levitan parametric model. Only if the merger entails sufficient scope economies, will it be pro-competitive. We also show that a Network Sharing Agreement (by which parties set their investment cooperatively) is preferable to a merger. Finally, we identify a class of models where the same qualitative results extend to quality-enhancing investments.

 

 

December 12, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Cartel Cases and the Cartel Enforcement Process in the European Union 2001-2015: A Quantitative Assessment

Michael Hellwig, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) - Competition and Regulation Research Group and Kai Huschelrath, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) examine Cartel Cases and the Cartel Enforcement Process in the European Union 2001-2015: A Quantitative Assessment.

ABSTRACT: We provide a comprehensive quantitative assessment of cartels and the related cartel enforcement process in the European Union (EU) from 2001 to 2015. In a first step, we present a detailed characterization of all cartel cases decided by the European Commission (EC) with respect to various criteria such as the number of involved firm groups, cartel market shares and market share asymmetries, involved industries, affected countries, types of infringement, types of cartel breakdown as well as cartel duration. In a second step, we complement this cartel-based analysis with a quantitative assessment of the public cartel enforcement process in the European Union – subdivided further into its duration, types of cartel detection, the leniency program, the settlement procedure, overall fines imposed, and the conclusive appeals process with the General Court (GC) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

 

 

December 12, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)