Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Friday, September 9, 2016

Regulation versus Regulated Monopolization of a Cournot Oligopoly with Unknown Costs

Ismail Saglam (Department of Economics, Ipek University) examines Regulation versus Regulated Monopolization of a Cournot Oligopoly with Unknown Costs.

ABSTRACT:  This paper studies whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should be left unregulated, or regulated according to the optimal mechanism of Gradstein (1995), or first monopolized and then regulated according to the optimal mechanism of Baron and Myerson (1982). We show that the answer to this question depends on the number o the oligopolistic firms and the size of their fixed costs, as well as on the weight of the producer welfare in the social objective function.

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2016/09/regulation-versus-regulated-monopolization-of-a-cournot-oligopoly-with-unknown-costs.html

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