Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Thursday, August 18, 2016

Sequential Markets, Market Power, and Arbitrage

Koichiro Ito and Mar Reguant analyze Sequential Markets, Market Power, and Arbitrage.

ABSTRACT: We develop a framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and restricted entry in arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using microdata from the Iberian electricity market. We show that the observed price differences and firm behavior are consistent with the model. Finally, we quantify the welfare effects of arbitrage using a structural model. In the presence of market power, we show that full arbitrage is not necessarily welfare-enhancing, reducing consumer costs but increasing deadweight loss.

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2016/08/sequential-markets-market-power-and-arbitrage.html

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