Thursday, June 30, 2016

The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement

Eric van Damme and Jun Zhou study The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement.

ABSTRACT: The authors study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1996 and 2014. The start of a Commission investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply for leniency in the market investigated, but increases the rate of application in separate markets in which a conspirator in the investigated market also engaged in collusion. The revision of the Commission’s leniency programme in 2002 increased the rate of pre-investigation applications. Our results shed light on enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2016/06/the-dynamics-of-leniency-application-and-the-knock-on-effect-of-cartel-enforcement.html

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