Thursday, June 16, 2016
ENTraNCE Annual Training
In cooperation with
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) of the European University Institute (EUI) is pleased to announce the call for applications of the first edition of the Annual Training of ENTraNCE for Executives.
The Annual Training provides participants with an advanced state-of-the-art overview of recent developments in competition law and economics, as well as State aid control. Members of ENTraNCE Scientific Committee, senior officials from the European Commission and other international organizations and practising lawyers are among the Annual Training lecturers. The Annual Training builds upon the experience gained in the past years by the RSCAS in organising ENTraNCE for Judges.
Structure of the Training
The first edition of the Annual Training will take place between September 2016 and June 2017. The programme combines an intensive residential training held at the EUI campus in Florence, and a series of e-learning activities.
The residential training is composed of 60+ hours of lectures divided in 4 blocks, each one lasting 2.5 days (from Thursday to Saturday morning).
Online activities will take place via a dedicated online platform. At the beginning of the course each participant will receive a username and password to access the platform. Via the online platform, the participants will be able to get access to preparatory reading materials for the residential training blocks in Florence. In addition, they will participate in an online forum of discussion on recent news in the field of competition policy. Finally, in each block of the online activities, participants will be required to fulfill certain assignments. Assignments could include, for instance, discussing and proposing alternative solutions for past, current or mock cases.
The Annual Training targets junior representatives of National Competition Authorities (NCAs), law firms, companies and economics consultancies who wish to deepen their knowledge in the field of competition law and economics. It is an advanced multi-disciplinary programme, which requires a sound background knowledge of either competition law or industrial economics.
The cost of participation in the full Annual Training 2016-2017 is €5,000. A special fee of €3,000 is foreseen for participants who would like to follow only two blocks of the Training of their choice, without taking part in the online activities.
Participants not coming from NCAs or ENTraNCE for Executives Donors can apply for the entire course at a fee of €10,000, or for two blocks at a fee of €6,000.
The tuition fees do not cover travel and accommodation costs in Florence during the residential blocks of training. However, lunches, coffee breaks, shuttle bus service and a number of social activities are provided.
How to apply
Online registration is open until 31 July 2016.
Patent Strategies and Competition Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector: Implications for Access to Medicines
Duncan Matthews, Queen Mary University of London - School of Law and Olga Gurgula, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law Patent Strategies and Competition Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector: Implications for Access to Medicines.
ABSTRACT: Competition policy is an under-utilised tool. Policy coherence between the IP system and competition must be strengthened in order to promote innovation and access to health technologies. Article 8(2) of the TRIPS Agreement provides flexibilities for governments to adopt competition law measures to prevent abuse of intellectual property rights, including IP rights related to the life sciences, namely the pharmaceutical industry and the biotechnology sector. Post-TRIPS, some countries have implemented competition laws but in practice are not using these effectively. This is particularly striking in the pharmaceutical sector, where abuses of intellectual property rights, such as reverse payment agreements and strategic patenting, risk allowing pharmaceutical companies to extend their market monopoly by blocking the entry of both generic and innovative medicines and, as a result, stifling competition and harming consumers. Nevertheless, these practices lack adequate attention by competition authorities. Such anti-competitive practices create particular challenges for the developing world as they can lead to significant barriers to innovation and access. Used effectively, competition policy can be in the best interests of society. It is conducive to freedom of choice and lower prices while, potentially, also serving as an important driver for innovation and access.
Elena Carletti, Bocconi University - Department of Finance; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), Steven Ongena, University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance, Jan-Peter Siedlarek, Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Giancarlo Spagnolo, Stockholm School of Economics (SITE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'; EIEF analyze The Impact of Merger Legislation on Bank Mergers.
ABSTRACT: We find that stricter merger control legislation increases abnormal announcement returns of targets in bank mergers by 7 percentage points. Analyzing potential explanations for this result, we document an increase in the pre-merger profitability of targets, a decrease in the size of acquirers and a decreasing share of transactions in which banks are acquired by other banks. Other merger properties, including the size and risk profile of targets, the geographic overlap of merging banks and the stock market response of rivals appear unaffected. The evidence suggests that the strengthening of merger control leads to more efficient and more competitive transactions.
Wednesday, June 15, 2016
This month, the Antitrust Chronicle brings you a special edition on Cartels & Concerted Practices, from A to Z. Articles in this months AC feature discussions on issues related to hybrid settlement cases in the European Union, price signaling, private damages in different jurisdictions and the impact, so far, of the Yates Memorandum on the DOJs investigations and prosecutions of individuals involved in cartels.
The articles address changes to cartel enforcement in several different jurisdictions. Are these changes fundamental? Evolutionary or even revolutionary? These developments are critical as antitrust authorities mature and hone their cartel enforcement, learning from their mistakes and success. Stay tuned; there is more to come.
By Marieke Datema & Chris Bryant – This article examines some of the issues that have arisen in relation to the European Commission’s…
By Lilly Fiedler & Nicholas Frey – This article discusses the state of the law and the increased regulatory interest in price signaling.…
By Robert E. Bloch, Kelly B. Kramer & Stephen M. Medlock – This paper suggests that the Yates Memorandum marks a significant…
By Pierre Crémieux, Marissa Ginn & Marc Van Audenrode – This article compares and contrasts the well-established system of private action that prevails in…
Nearly 16 Years of the Leniency Program in Brazil: Breakthroughs and Challenges in Cartel Prosecution
By Amanda Athayde Linhares Martins & Andressa Lin Fidelis – Since 2003, the prosecution of hardcore cartels has been a top…
By Paula W. Render – In 1978, when Congress deregulated the airline industry, there were 10 airlines that provided scheduled national and…
By Kyle Le Croy – This paper summarizes the recent judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union in the Cement…
By Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz – While investigations into Treasury auctions, FX, ISDAfix, and others are still ongoing, and more recently additional focus…
Yesterday Hannah and I dropped off our older two girls at Camp Ramah Darom in Clayton, Georgia. This is the first time the girls have gone to a sleep-away camp. We feel an emptiness in our souls. The house (with only one child left with us for the next four weeks) seems too quiet. We love our girls and want them to have a great experience that allows them to gain independent thinking, self confidence and to have fun with kids from around the region. Still, we miss them terribly.
To deal with the quiet house, we decided to have a dance party with our youngest daughter. She loved dancing to the catchy "What does the fox say."
Quelles garanties pour la procédure d’engagements en droit de la concurrence de l’Union européenne ?
Frédéric Marty & Mehdi Mezaguer ask Quelles garanties pour la procédure d’engagements en droit de la concurrence de l’Union européenne?
ABSTRACT: Alongside with the effects-based approach, the negotiated procedures constitute the second main pillar of the EU competition policy modernisation. This modernisation aims at enhancing the legal certainty of all the enforcement stakeholders, by reducing the false-positive risks and by limiting the risk of decision annulments in the judicial control process. It also aims at generating efficiency gains, especially procedural ones. Nowadays, the recourse to commitments procedures appears as overwhelmingly dominant in energy sector cases and also in the software industry ones. This dominance raises several concerns. Remedies may be sometimes seen as disproportionate, insufficiently related to the theory of damage, or harmful in terms of stakeholders’ fundamental rights. For instance, the commitments procedures are seen as limiting the scope of the Commission’s decision judicial review. Our article analyses these risks and maps out some options to master them.
Melissa A. Schilling New York University (NYU) - Department of Management and Organizational Behavior explains Towards Dynamic Efficiency: Innovation and Its Implications for Antitrust.
ABSTRACT: There is growing consensus that the goal of antitrust enforcement should be to manage for dynamic efficiency, i.e., an appropriate balance between short-run static efficiencies such as reducing costs and maximizing consumer surplus, and the longer term gains that arise from innovation. However, determining how to incorporate innovation into efficiency goals is complicated; innovation typically entails great uncertainty, long time horizons, and interdependencies across projects. This means there are no easy solutions for estimating the welfare impact of any given innovation investment or strategy. We can, however, use what we know about how firms manage the innovation process, including how they choose and value projects and ration their capital to meet their short and long-term needs, to gain insight into how we can best foster firms’ incentives to innovate in ways that improve long-run economic welfare. I provide some illustrative examples for how these insights can be incorporated into antitrust enforcement.
Kai Huschelrath, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) and Florian Smuda, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) offer The Appeals Process in the European Commission's Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment.
ABSTRACT: The appeals process is an important mechanism to correct legal errors and to improve existing laws and regulations. We use the data of 467 firm groups that participated in 88 cartels convicted by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to study both the characteristics of firm groups filing an appeal and the factors that determine their successfulness in terms of fine reduction. Applying a discrete choice and a two‐stage hurdle model, we find that while some characteristics — particularly the reform of the fine guidelines — only affect the probability of filing an appeal, other factors, such as the size of the fine imposed, in connection with characteristics such as ringleader, repeat offender, or leniency applicant, influence both the probability and the success of an appeal. We build on these results to derive conclusions for both firms and public policymakers.
Franco Mariuzzo, University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy and Peter L. Ormosi, University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy; Norwich Business School ask Post-merger Price Variation Matters, So Why Do Merger Retrospectives Ignore It?
ABSTRACT: The price effect of past mergers has been extensively researched over the past two decades. The overwhelming majority of these studies estimate the over-time average price effect of the merger. Merger guidelines agree that mergers should be approved if market dynamics, such as entry, eliminate negative welfare effects. Estimating price averages ignores key information about the post-merger dynamics of prices and is unable to identify if post-merger prices eventually revert to pre-merger levels. We provide evidence from a set of Monte Carlo experiments to show how serious this problem might be. Firstly, potentially all the studies that concluded - estimating post-merger over-time averages - that the merger led to a price increase, could have been wrong, and in fact the merger price increase disappeared within a reasonable time. Similarly, up to half of the studies that concluded that the merger did not increase prices could have been wrong in their conclusion.
Tuesday, June 14, 2016
Marianela Lopez-Galdos, GW has written on Arbitration and Competition Law: Integrating Europe Through Arbitration.
ABSTRACT: The analysis presents an insightful study of how the use of arbitration to solve antitrust-related disputes is contributing to the integration of the European Union (EU). The paper delves into the question of whether competition can be subjected to arbitration by reviewing the US, EU, and national case law. The analysis explores the relationship between arbitration and the modernised competition policy as enforced by the European Commission. The paper concludes that arbitration is a useful tool to contribute to the optimal enforcement of competition policy and ultimately to further the integration of the EU.
Daniel Herold, University of Giessen and Johannes Paha, Dept. of Economics (VWL I) are Predicting Cartel Formation.
ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes 42 cartel cases prosecuted by the European Commission from 2010 to 2013. To provide insights on cartel formation the case study examines the industries' evolution preceding the cartels' set-up. Five parameters are included, namely, demand, capacities, intensity of competition, prices and regulatory characteristics. Cartel formation is not necessarily triggered by events negatively impacting the firms' profitability as was suggested by (Grout Sonderegger 2005), however, profit shocks and the resulting (expected) disturbance in the market seem to trigger collusive behavior. Factors that are commonly deemed to destabilize cartels, like entry of new competitors, may foster cartel formation. We explain this finding in a theoretical framework which allows for situations where the Participation Constraint of the cartel is more restrictive than the Incentive Constraint.
Benjamin E. Hermalin, University of California, Berkeley and Michael L. Katz, University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group ask What's So Special about Two-Sided Markets?
ABSTRACT: An unusual feature of two-sided markets is that there is no consensus regarding what they are. Our approach to deriving a definition is to identify examples that have been found to represent an interesting phenomenon in common and then reverse engineer the outcomes to determine the drivers of what are perceived to be the distinguishing or interesting features of equilibrium. In our view, the central focus of the two-sided-markets literature has been on identifying and analyzing cross-platform externalities. We identify two critical features that give rise to such externalities at the margin: idiosyncratic matching and inefficient rationing.
Sharat Ganapati, Joseph S. Shapiro, Reed Walker study Energy Prices, Pass-Through, and Incidence in U.S. Manufacturing.
ABSTRACT: This paper studies how increases in energy input costs for production are split between consumers and producers via changes in product prices (i.e., pass-through). We show that in markets characterized by imperfect competition, marginal cost pass-through, a demand elasticity, and a price-cost markup are sufficient to characterize the relative change in welfare between producers and consumers due to a change in input costs. We find that increases in energy prices lead to higher plant-level marginal costs and output prices but lower markups. This suggests that marginal cost pass-through is incomplete, with estimates centered around 0.7. Our confidence intervals reject both zero pass-through and complete pass-through. We find heterogeneous incidence of changes in input prices across industries, with consumers bearing a smaller share of the burden than standards methods suggest.
Monday, June 13, 2016
David Arie Mayer-Foulkes (Division of Economics, CIDE) ponders The challenge of market power under globalization.
ABSTRACT: The legacy of Adam Smith leads to a false confidence on the optimality of laissez faire policies for the global market economy. Instead, the polarized character of current globalization deeply affects both developed and underdeveloped economies. Current globalization is characterized by factor exchange between economies of persistently unequal development. This implies the existence of persistent extraordinary market power in transnational corporations, reflected in their disproportionate participation in income and policy. These are shown to be steady state features of globalization in a convergence club model of development and underdevelopment including trade and FDI. Moreover, results in tax competition explain how the increased share of transnational profits under globalization leads to lower corporate taxes, more conservative policies, and weaker institutions for balancing market power. The increased level of market power under globalization poses a! serious challenge for national and global governance that deeply impacts economic development, distribution, sustainability and democracy everywhere.
Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Wey, Christian examine Structural remedies as a signalling device.
ABSTRACT: We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the Antitrust Agency (AA) cannot observe a proposed merger's efficiency type. Provided the AA follows a consumer surplus standard, an efficient merger type is doomed to over-fix with its divestiture proposal in a pooling equilibrium, which is also possible under separation.
Patricia Perennes (CES - Centre d'economie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) examines Intermodal competition: studying the pricing strategy of the French rail monopoly.
ABSTRACT: In most countries, passengers' rail transportation is characterized by a monopoly. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the monopolist-usually the national company-does not face competition, in the form of intermodal competition (planes, cars). This article focuses on the French national rail company (SNCF) that still has a monopoly on national passenger traffic. It analyses SNCF's pricing behavior on most of the origin/destination pairs it operates with high speed trains to/from Paris. It takes into account the fact SNCF enjoys a limited leeway to set its prices because ticket prices are still regulated in France. The existence of such a price cap regulation is an opportunity for an economist to analyse how a transportation company facing intermodal competition sets its prices. Usually, such an analysis is hard to conduct since transport prices are set following yield management principles.
Houngbonon, Georges Vivien looks at The Impact of Entry and Merger on the Price of Mobile Telecommunications Services.
ABSTRACT: According to static models of industrial organization, a rise in competition decreases prices. In this paper, I test whether this conclusion can be reversed in the mobile telecommunications markets where dynamic e ciency e ects might be signi cant. The empirical test relies on the change in the intensity of competition introduced by the entry of the fourth mobile operator in France and the merger between the third and the fourth mobile operators in Austria. Using a hedonic price model and a double-di erence matching identi cation strategy, I nd that the entry in the French market has raised the unit price of mobile data services by 4 dollars per Gigabyte; contrary to the merger in the Austrian market which lowers the unit price of mobile data by 6 dollars per Gigabyte. These results suggest that the dynamic e ciency e ects actually outweigh the static ones in the mobile telecommunications industry. Therefore, a merger from four to three mobile operators m! ay be welfare enhancing.
Saturday, June 11, 2016
Deputy Assistant Attorney General David Gelfand Delivers Remarks at the Bates White Antitrust Conference
According to the ACM Press Release:
“Cartels never go unnoticed.”
There are always people who know about illegal agreements between competitors. The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) will be running a campaign over the next few weeks to make people aware of cartel agreements. ACM calls on everyone to report any suspicions they might have about potential cartels.
Cartels are illegal agreements between businesses in order to eliminate the competition. For example, they could agree on raising prices or on sharing the market. In most cases, prices of products and services go up by at least 15 percent as a result of cartels. ACM tracks down cartels, ends illegal agreements, and can impose hefty fines on the businesses and individuals involved. These fines can amount to tens of millions of euros per business involved, and, from July 1, the fines on individuals can be as high as EUR 900,000.
Cartel agreements are daylight robbery. They erode a healthy, competitive economy, and they undermine public confidence in business. We are calling on everyone to track down cartels together.