Wednesday, May 25, 2016
The European Commission has appointed Professor Tommaso Valletti as the new Chief Economist of the Directorate General for Competition. Professor Valletti , who is an Italian national, currently holds teaching positions at both Imperial College Business School and at the University of Rome "Tor Vergata". He is also an Academic Director at the Centre for Regulation in Europe (CERRE) in Brussels, sits in the panel of academic advisors of OFCOM, the UK’s communications regulator and is a member of DG Competition’s Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy. He will take up his duties as the fifth competition Chief Economist on 1 September 2016. The role entails assisting in the evaluation of the economic impact of the Commission’s actions in the competition field and providing independent guidance on methodological issues of economics and econometrics in the application of EU competition rules.
Valletti is a serious economist. His recent papers include:
Valletti T, Ahlfeldt G, Koutroumpis P, Speed 2.0: Evaluating access to universal digital highways, Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN: 1542-4774
This paper shows that having access to a fast Internet connection is an important determinant ofcapitalization effects in property markets. Our empirical strategy combines a boundarydiscontinuity design with controls for time-invariant effects and arbitrary macro-economicshocks at a very local level to identify the causal effect of broadband speed on property pricesfrom variation that is plausibly exogenous. Applying this strategy to a micro data set fromEngland between 1995 and 2010 we find a significantly positive effect, but diminishing returnsto speed. Our results imply that disconnecting an average property from a high-speed firstgenerationbroadband connection (offering Internet speed up to 8 Mbit/s) would depreciate itsvalue by 2.8%. In contrast, upgrading such a property to a faster connection (offering speeds upto 24 Mbit/s) would increase its value by no more than 1%. We decompose this effect by incomeand urbanization, finding considerable heterogeneity. These estimates are used to evaluateproposed plans to deliver fast broadband universally. We find that increasing speed andconnecting unserved households passes a cost-benefit test in urban and some suburban areas,while the case for universal delivery in rural areas is not as strong.
Reggiani C, Valletti T, 2016, Net neutrality and innovation at the core and at the edge, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol: 45, Pages: 16-27, ISSN: 0167-7187
How would abandoning Internet net neutrality affect content providers that have different sizes? We model an Internet broadband provider that can offer a different quality of service (priority) to heterogeneous content providers. Internet users can potentially access all content, although they browse and click ads with different probabilities. Net neutrality regulation effectively protects innovation done at the edge by small content providers. Prioritization, instead, increases both infrastructure core investment and welfare only if it sufficiently stimulates innovation from the large content provider.
Valletti T, Peitz M, Greenstein S, 2016, Net Neutrality: A Fast Lane to Understanding the Trade-offs, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol: 30, Pages: 127-150, ISSN: 1944-7965
The “net neutrality” principle has triggered a heated debate and advocates have proposed policy interventions.In this paper, we provide perspective by framing issues in terms of the positive economic factors at work. We stress the incentives of market participants, and highlight the economic conflicts behind the arguments put forward by the different parties. We also identify several key open questions.
Bourreau M, Kourandi F, Valletti T, 2015, NET NEUTRALITY WITH COMPETING INTERNET PLATFORMS,JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Vol: 63, Pages: 30-73, ISSN: 0022-1821
Genakos C, Valletti T, 2015, Evaluating a Decade of Mobile Termination Rate Regulation, ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Vol: 125, Pages: F31-F48, ISSN: 0013-0133
Kourandi F, Kraemer J, Valletti T, 2015, Net Neutrality, Exclusivity Contracts, and Internet Fragmentation,INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH, Vol: 26, Pages: 320-338, ISSN: 1047-7047
Nardotto M, Valletti T, Verboven F, 2015, UNBUNDLING THE INCUMBENT: EVIDENCE FROM UK BROADBAND, JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, Vol: 13, Pages: 330-362, ISSN: 1542-4766
Peitz M, Valletti T, 2015, Reassessing competition concerns in electronic communications markets,TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, Vol: 39, Pages: 896-912, ISSN: 0308-5961
Stavropoulou C, Valletti T, 2015, Compulsory licensing and access to drugs, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, Vol: 16, Pages: 83-94, ISSN: 1618-7598
Bennato AR, Valletti T, 2014, Pharmaceutical innovation and parallel trade, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, Vol: 33, Pages: 83-92, ISSN: 0167-7187
Hoernig S, Inderst R, Valletti T, 2014, Calling circles: network competition with nonuniform calling patterns,RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol: 45, Pages: 155-175, ISSN: 0741-6261
Iozzi A, Valletti T, 2014, Vertical Bargaining and Countervailing Power, AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS, Vol: 6, Pages: 106-135, ISSN: 1945-7669
Valletti T, 2014, Special Issue: Selected Papers, European Association for Research in Industrial Economics 40th Annual Conference, Evora, Portugal/30 August-1 September 2013 Foreword, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, Vol: 34, Pages: 36-36, ISSN: 0167-7187
Haskel J, Iozzi A, Valletti T, 2013, Market structure, countervailing power and price discrimination: The case of airports, JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS, Vol: 74, Pages: 12-26, ISSN: 0094-1190
Calzada J, Valletti TM, 2012, Intertemporal Movie Distribution: Versioning When Customers Can Buy Both Versions, MARKETING SCIENCE, Vol: 31, Pages: 649-667, ISSN: 0732-2399
Genakos C, Valletti T, 2012, Regulating prices in two-sided markets: The waterbed experience in mobile telephony, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, Vol: 36, Pages: 360-368, ISSN: 0308-5961
Genakos C, Valletti T, 2011, TESTING THE "WATERBED" EFFECT IN MOBILE TELEPHONY, JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, Vol: 9, Pages: 1114-1142, ISSN: 1542-4766
Genakos C, Valletti T, 2011, Seesaw in the air: Interconnection regulation and the structure of mobile tariffs,INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Vol: 23, Pages: 159-170, ISSN: 0167-6245
Hoernig S, Valletti TM, 2011, When Two-Part Tariffs are Not Enough: Mixing with Nonlinear Pricing, B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, Vol: 11, ISSN: 1935-1704
Inderst R, Valletti T, 2011, Incentives for input foreclosure, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol: 55, Pages: 820-831, ISSN: 0014-2921
Inderst R, Valletti TM, 2011, BUYER POWER AND THE 'WATERBED EFFECT', JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Vol: 59, Pages: 1-20, ISSN: 0022-1821
Genakos C, Valletti T, 2010, Mobile regulation and the 'waterbed' effect, Promoting New Telecom Infrastructures: Markets, Policies and Pricing, Pages: 284-300, ISBN: 9781849804455