Tuesday, October 27, 2015

Endogenous Firms' Organization, Internal Audit and Leniency Programs

Emilie Dargaud, French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Institute of Economic Theory and Analysis (GATE) and Armel Jacques, Universite de la Reunion theorize about Endogenous Firms' Organization, Internal Audit and Leniency Programs.

ABSTRACT: When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements on different markets, they may wish to compartmentalize their agreements managing them with different individuals in order to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Sometimes the leniency programs are efficient to defeat this strategy and to induce CEO to launch internal investigations and report the obtained hard evidence to the antitrust authority. However these programs may have pro-collusive effects for centralized firms.


| Permalink


Post a comment