Thursday, September 24, 2015

7° COLOQUIO FOROCOMPETENCIA - 20 de noviembre de 2015

7° Coloquio ForoCompetencia

20 de noviembre de 2015

Pilar, Buenos Aires, Argentina


8:30 – 9:00                         Acreditación


9:00 –9:15                            Apertura. Julián PEÑA


9:15 –10:45                           Tema I – Efectividad de los condicionamientos.

Panelista. Marcelo CALLIARI (Tozzini Freire, Brasil)

Comentarista. Oriol ARMENGOL (Pérez Llorca, España)

Comentarista. Alberto DELGOBBO (Economista Jefe, CNDC, Argentina)

Moderador.  Luis BARRY


10:45 – 11:15                        Receso para café


11:15 – 13:00                        Tema II. Restricciones verticales en contratos de distribución.

Panelista. Gastón PALMUCCI (Jefe de Investigaciones, FNE, Chile)

Comentarista. Miguel DEL PINO (Marval, O’Farrell & Mairal, Argentina)

Comentarista. Lucía OJEDA (SIL, México)

Moderador. Walter CONT


13:00 – 15:00                      Almuerzo (Salón Las Vasijas)


15:00 – 16:30                      Tema III. Métodos de pruebas de cárteles.

Panelista. Jaime CROWE (White & Case, Estados Unidos)

Comentarista. Carlos PETRE (Cámara Civil y Comercial Federal, Argentina)

Comentarista. Jorge JAECKEL (Jaeckel/Montoya Abogados, Colombia)           

Moderador. Agustín SIBOLDI


16:30 – 17:00                      Receso para café


17:00 – 18:30                      Tema IV. Nuevas tendencias en materia institucional.

Panelista. William KOVACIC (G.Washington University, Estados Unidos)

Comentarista. Javier TAPIA (Tribunal Nacional Libre Competencia, Chile)

Comentarista. Paolo BENEDETTI (Agon, México)

Moderador. Viviana GUADAGNI


18:30 – 19:00                      Cierre.  Marcelo DEN TOOM


Valor de la inscripción: 

US$ 250/AR$ 2500



Los cupos son limitados. Se considerará inscripto quien efectivice el correspondiente pago,



1°. Registrar sus datos on line en el siguiente link: Formulario de Inscripción

2°. Coordinar pago con: Pablo TREVISAN ( o Agustín WAISMAN (


Comité Organizador

Luis BARRY, Marina BIDART, Bernardo CASSAGNE, Marcelo CELANI, Germán COLOMA, Walter CONT, Miguel DEL PINO, Marcelo DEN TOOM, Viviana GUADAGNI, Ricardo INGLEZ DE SOUZA, Julián PEÑA, Pablo TREVISAN, Agustín SIBOLDI y Agustín WAISMAN.

September 24, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Post Danmark II, or the Quest for Administrability and Coherence in Article 102 TFEU

Pablo Ibanez Colomo, London School of Economics - Law Department discusses Post Danmark II, or the Quest for Administrability and Coherence in Article 102 TFEU.

ABSTRACT: The legal status of quantity rebates under Article 102 TFEU is unclear. In Post Danmark II, the ECJ has been asked to provide a substantive test to establish whether this practice amounts to an abuse of a dominant position. As the case law stands, two possible approaches can be followed. Quantity rebates can be assessed in accordance with the framework sketched by the Court in Michelin I, or they can be subject to the principles applying to other price-based strategies such as ‘margin squeeze’ abuses and selective price cuts. There are compelling reasons to follow the latter approach. The criteria set out in Michelin I were conceived for target rebates, which – unlike quantity-based schemes – are not presumptively legal under Article 102 TFEU. In addition, the said criteria are not administrable, in the sense that they do not make it possible to define in advance whether a given rebate scheme is lawful or unlawful. In practice, and in contradiction with the logic underlying Michelin I, it is sufficient for a competition authority or a claimant to identify some ‘loyalty-inducing’ features to establish an abuse. As such, they are not suitable for their application in disputes before national courts, or by national competition authorities.

September 24, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Behavioural Antitrust - A 'More Realistic Approach' to Competition Law

Andreas Heinemann, University of Zurich describes Behavioural Antitrust - A 'More Realistic Approach' to Competition Law.

ABSTRACT: The paper explores the potential of behavioural economics for competition law. After a summary of the most important behavioural findings from a competition law perspective, several applications are presented. Behavioural economics does not only influence basic concepts like the definition of relevant markets but also affects the competition law analysis of specific conduct like vertical agreements, practices on aftermarkets, tying and bundling, conditional rebates, predatory pricing and merger control. Moreover, the behavioural insights have an impact on the shaping of remedies and sanctions. In spite of these consequences, it seems more appropriate to describe this development as a “behavioural turn” than a “behavioural revolution” since traditional analysis is not replaced but complemented. Therefore, the new insights can be integrated into the existing system without major frictions. Although the behavioural approach more often makes a case for enforcement than against it, it cannot be blamed for greater interventionism. The goal of the “more realistic approach” is, no more and no less, to base competition law on a more reliable foundation.

September 24, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, September 23, 2015

Call For Papers: Special Issue of The Review of Industrial Organization on the 40th Anniversary of GTE Sylvania

Call For Papers
Special Issue of The Review of Industrial Organization

In June, 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court, with its decision in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, mandated use of a rule of reason approach deciding the legality of manufacturer-imposed restraints on distributors' locations under the antitrust laws. Along the way, the Court reversed the rule of per se illegality for restraints on distributors that had taken ownership of a product contained in its barely 10-year-old decision in Schwinn, cast vertical restraints as restricting intrabrand competition while promoting interbrand competition, and declared that "Interbrand competition ... competition among the manufacturers of the same generic product ... is the primary concern of antitrust law." One may argue that GTE Sylvania was the first step in an evolutionary process expanding the scope of the rule of reason generally, and leading to the application of the rule of reason to resale price maintenance in Leegin.

We invite submissions to a Special Issue of The Review of Industrial Organization devoted to GTE Sylvania and its aftermath, on its 40th anniversary. Contributions that highlight the impact of the decision on all aspects of U.S. antitrust and its influence on the treatment of vertical restraints in other competition policy regimes around the world are welcome.

PAPER SUBMISSION PROCEDURE: Submissions should be made by e-mail to either:

Jeroen Hinloopen Utrecht University School of Economics P.O. Box 80125 3508 TC Utrecht The Netherlands,

Stephen Martin Department of Economics Purdue University West Lafayette, IN 47906 USA,

Submissions should be received by February 29, 2016. Papers that are selected will be presented and discussed at a workshop, hosted by the Utrecht School of Economics, to take place in Utrecht on May 19, 2016. Final versions of papers will be prepared after the workshop. Limited funds are available to partially reimburse travel expenses; housing is covered for the nights of May 18, 2016 through May 20, 2016. Authors of papers that are accepted for inclusion in the Special Issue will be informed about the details of the workshop by March 31, 2016.

September 23, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

ABA Antitrust Section Scholars-in-Residence 2016 Applications Open

Scholars-in-Residence 2016

The Section of Antitrust Law International Scholar in Residence Program (“SAL SIR”) will provide funding of $10,000.00 USD each for up to two scholars to visit the United States to pursue competition policy-related research in the Spring of 2016.

Open 2016 Scholar in Residence Announcement

September 23, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Peer-to-Peer Markets

Liran Einav (Stanford), Chiara Farronato (Stanford), and Jonathan Levin (Stanford) describe Peer-to-Peer Markets.

ABSTRACT: Peer-to-peer markets such as eBay, Uber, and Airbnb allow small suppliers to compete with traditional providers of goods or services. We view the primary function of these markets as making it easy for buyers to find sellers and engage in convenient, trustworthy transactions. We discuss elements of market design that make this possible, including search and matching algorithms, pricing, and reputation systems. We then develop a simple model of how these markets enable entry by small or flexible suppliers, and the resulting impact on existing firms. Finally, we consider the regulation of peer-to-peer markets, and the economic arguments for different approaches to licensing and certification, data, and employment regulation.

September 23, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Price Distortion under Fixed-Mobile Substitution

Marc Bourreau; Carlo Cambini; and Steffen Hoernig show Price Distortion under Fixed-Mobile Substitution.

ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the impact of substitution between fixed and mobile tele- phony on call prices. We develop a model where consumers difer in the benefits of mobility and firms price discriminate between on-net and off-net calls. We find that call prices are distorted downwards due to substitution possibilities and customer heterogeneity, and that this distortion increases with the fixed-mobile termination mark-up.

September 23, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Usage-Based Pricing and Demand for Residential Broadband

Aviv Nevo ; John L. Turner; and Jonathan W. Williams have an interesting paper on Usage-Based Pricing and Demand for Residential Broadband. Worth downloading!

ABSTRACT: We estimate demand for residential broadband using high-frequency data from subscribers facing a three-part tariff. The three-part tariff makes data usage during the billing cycle a dynamic problem; thus, generating variation in the (shadow) price of usage. We provide evidence that subscribers respond to this variation, and use their dynamic decisions to estimate a flexible distribution of willingness to pay for different plan characteristics. Using the estimates, we simulate demand under alternative pricing and find that usage-based pricing eliminates low-value traffic. Furthermore, we show that the costs associated with investment in fiber-optic networks are likely recoverable in some markets, but that there is a large gap between social and private incentives to invest.

September 23, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Patent Portfolio Management of Sequential Innovations: Theory and Empirics

Jinyoung Kim (Department of Economics, Korea University) shows Patent Portfolio Management of Sequential Innovations: Theory and Empirics.

ABSTRACT: This paper develops a model for understanding a firm's decisions regarding the maintenance (renewal) and patenting of sequential innovations and studies how these decisions are affected by the model's parameters such as maintenance fees and filing fees. The model offers a discriminating testable hypothesis, predicated on the cross-price effects, to identify complementarity or substitutability across sequential innovations. Our empirical results show that higher filing fees are associated with lower probability of patent renewal, which corroborates the case of complementarity in sequential innovations.

September 23, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, September 22, 2015

Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Cobb-Douglas Continuum of Traders

Giulio CODOGNATO (Universita degli Studi di Udine) and Ludovic A. JULIEN (Universite de Dijon LEG) explore Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Cobb-Douglas Continuum of Traders.

ABSTRACT: In this paper, we revisit two models of noncooperative oligopoly in general equilibrium proposed by Busetto et al. (2008, 2011), a version of Shapley’s “window†model for mixed exchange economies following Shitovitz and its reformulation following Cournot-Walras. We introduce the assumption that the preferences of traders belonging to the atomless portion are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions. This assumption permits us to prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in Shapley’s window model, known as the Cobb-Douglas-Cournot-Nash equilibrium, without introducing further assumptions of atom endowments and preferences previously used by Busetto et al. (2011). We then show that the set of Cobb-Douglas-Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations coincides with that of Cournot-Walras equilibrium.

September 22, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Private Benefits and Product Market Competition

Jacques THEPOT (EM Strasbourg Business School, LARGE) describe Private Benefits and Product Market Competition.

ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes the impact of private benefit extraction on the value of oligopolistic firms. Private benefits are assumed to generate costs that are passed on through the organizational structure and create price distortions in the downstream market for products. We show that this may positively affect the profits (i.e., the market value) of firms because the intensity of the rivalry is curbed by the increase in cost. In an oligopoly situation, private benefit extraction may enhance profits while still generating a welfare loss. This suggests that corporate governance cannot be divorced from competition policy in industries where managerial opportunism generates expropriation costs.

September 22, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Large-Scaled Chain Stores versus Small-Scaled Local Stores

Hiroaki Sandoh (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University) ; Risa Suzuki (Yuki, Co., Ltd.) examine Large-Scaled Chain Stores versus Small-Scaled Local Stores.

ABSTRACT: In some local areas, we can occasionally observe a competition between a large-scaled chain store and a small-scaled local independent store. A large-scaled chain store usually attracts consumers by appealing its width and depth of products variety. A local independent store with limited assortments of products competes with the chain store by concentrating upon some specific kinds of products and by offering lower prices for them than the chain store. This is possible for the local store partly because of lower labor costs and for various other reasons. The present study deals with the pricing competition in a duopoly between a chain store and a local store. For the purpose of expressing the difference in product assortments between the two stores, a chain store is assumed to deal in two kinds of products, P 1 and P 2 , while a local store is assumed to sell only P 1 . Moreover, we assume all the consumers purchase P 1 at a chain store or a local store by ! referring to their prices, and P 2 at A . A Nash and a Stackelberg equilibrium are examined to show that the local store can possibly survive the competition with the chain store. The socially optimal welfare is also investigated to reveal it can be realized in a monopoly. 

September 22, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Is there an anti-competitive non-compete between Duke and UNC Chapel Hill?

Inside Higher Ed reports on the controversy in the Research Triangle in the story Good Neighbors or Conspirators?  According to the story:

A new antitrust lawsuit alleges much more than a neighborly understanding between Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, however. The suit, brought against Duke by a medical faculty member there, rather alleges a binding no-hire agreement between the two Research Triangle institutions prevented her from getting a job at Carolina that otherwise would have been hers. The faculty member alleges there are others like her, and she’s proposed a class action.

Danielle Seaman, an assistant professor of radiology at Duke, says she’s been trying to get a job at Carolina for three years. She allegedly interviewed and was told by Carolina's chief of cardiothoracic imaging in 2015 that her otherwise strong chance had been rejected because the respective deans of the medical schools at Carolina and Duke had a few years earlier formally agreed to not hire faculty members between institutions at the same rank, in order to control faculty salaries.


Maybe the administrations of Duke and UNC should have asked some of these people for advice: Leslie Marx, Barak Richman and Andrew Chin.


September 22, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Three Equivalent Salop Models and their Normative Representative Consumer

Steffen Hoernig describes Three Equivalent Salop Models and their Normative Representative Consumer.

ABSTRACT: We show that three location models on the Salop circle, involving linear or quadratic transport cost, and asymmetric locations or fixed benefits, are equivalent: they lead to the same demand functions and consumer surplus. The only exception is the case of asymmetric lo- cations with an even number of firms, which has one less degree of freedom. These models are also fully equivalent to a normative rep- resentative consumer whose indirect utility is given by the standard Salop consumer surplus. This result provides a further unification of location and representative consumer models. JEL codes: D11, D43

September 22, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, September 21, 2015

The State of Leniency Programs

Leniency Programs in Cartel Enforcement

  1. Rein Wesseling, Sep 16, 2015

    Confession Consequences in a Crowded Investigative Environment: Complexities in Cooperation with Multiple Authorities in Cartel Investigations

    The accumulation of multiple authorities' discretion in leniency-based settlement procedures itself raises further questions about due process, transparency, and accountability. Rein Wesseling (Stibbe N.V.)

  2. Marcelo Calliari, Sep 16, 2015

    Criminalization of Cartels and Leniency: An Exercise in Complexity

    If more enforcement and stiffer penalties from multiple agencies may act as a stimulus for companies and individuals to cooperate, excessive complexity, lack of coordination, and risk of cross-exposure can disincetivize potential applicants. Marcelo Calliari  (TozziniFreire Advogados)

  3. John M. Connor, Sep 16, 2015

    The Rise of ROW Anti-Cartel Enforcement

    Although the recent growth of cartel fines in the ROW is impressive, there are at least three important differences between these authorities and the more established antitrust agencies. John Connor (Purdue Univ.)

  4. Marc Abenhaim, Kristina Nordlander, Stephen Spinks, Sep 16, 2015

    To Settle or Not To Settle After Timab

    All in all, the interdependence between the different forms of cooperation unavoidably raises the stakes for the parties and ultimately locks them in an “all or nothing” logic. Marc Abenhaïm, Kristina Nordlander, & Stephen Spinks (Sidley Austin LLP)

  5. Romina Polley, Sep 16, 2015

    Is the Continued Success of Leniency in Cartel Cases in Danger? Some Comments from a Private Practitioner’s Perspective

    Companies are already weighing more carefully than ever the pros and cons of applying for leniency—a trend that will likely continue in the future as the risks and frustrations of cooperation with the authorities increase. Romina Polley (Cleary Gottlieb)

  6. Madoka Shimada, Sumito Nakano, Sep 16, 2015

    Japanese Leniency Program—Issues to be Considered

    There are some aspects in which the applicant’s interests may not be sufficiently protected, given the unique aspects of cartel investigations and leniency procedures in Japan. Madoka Shimada & Sumito Nakano (Nishimura & Asahi)

  7. Marcin Trepka, Sep 16, 2015

    Leniency—What Exactly are the Implications for the Applying Undertaking in the European Union?

    On the basis of the above-mentioned general SWOT analysis of leniency policy it seems that the weaknesses and threats of participating in a leniency program still score high. Marcin Trepka (K&L Gates)


Of Special Interest

  1. James Rill, Sep 16, 2015

    The Evolution of U.S. Antitrust Agencies’ Approach to Standards and Standard Essential Patents: From Enforcement to Advocacy

    Advocacy must be based on sound factual and economic analysis and correct legal principles—there is a serious question whether agency advocacy concerning SSOs and essential patents satisfies these criteria. James F. Rill (Baker Botts)

September 21, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Pricing Heterogeneous Goods under Ex Post Private Information

Holger Herbst is Pricing Heterogeneous Goods under Ex Post Private Information.

ABSTRACT: This paper studies the role of exchange policies as a price discrimination device in a sequential screening model with heterogeneous goods. In the first period, agents are uncertain about their ordinal preferences over a set of horizontally differentiated goods, but have private information about their intensity of preferences. In the second period, each individual privately learns his preferences and consumption takes place. Revenue maximizing mechanisms are completely characterized. They partially restrict the flexibility between the goods in the second stage for consumers that care little about which variety they obtain while granting always the favorite good to consumers that care much. The optimal design of the partial restriction of flexibility can be implemented by offering Limited Exchange Contracts. A Limited Exchange Contract consists of an initial product choice and a subset of products to which free exchange is possible in the second period. T! he use of exchange fees in contracts is not optimal for the purpose of price discrimination.

September 21, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

What do we know about the role of bank competition in Africa?

Florian Leon asks What do we know about the role of bank competition in Africa?

ABSTRACT: This paper reviews the literature regarding the consequences of interbank competition. The literature has identified three reasons why competition in the financial sector is important: firstly, for efficient functioning of financial intermediaries and markets, secondly, for firms and households access to financial services and thirdly, for stability of the financial system. While special attention is dedicated to empirical papers focusing on African banking systems, this review also considers works on other developing and developed economies.

September 21, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Bank Competition and Financial Stability: Much Ado About Nothing?

Tomas Havranek (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague); Marek Rusnak (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague); and Anna Sokolova (Higher School of Economics, Moscow) ask Bank Competition and Financial Stability: Much Ado About Nothing?

ABSTRACT: We examine 567 estimates of habit formation from 69 studies published in peer-reviewed journals. In contrast to previous results for most fields of empirical economics, we find no publication bias in the literature. The median estimated strength of habit formation equals 0.4, but the estimates vary widely both within and across studies. We use Bayesian model averaging to assign a pattern to this variance while taking into account model uncertainty. Studies using micro data report consistently smaller estimates than macro studies: 0.1 vs. 0.6 on average. The difference remains large when we control for 21 other study aspects, such as data frequency, geographical coverage, variable definition, estimation approach, and publication characteristics. We also find that estimates of external habit formation tend to be substantially larger than those of internal habits, that evidence for habits weakens when researchers use higher data frequencies, and that estimates differ systematically across countries.

September 21, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Bank bailouts and competition - Did TARP distort competition among sound banks?

Michael Koetter and Felix Noth ask Bank bailouts and competition - Did TARP distort competition among sound banks?

ABSTRACT: This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. The risk premium required by depositors was lower, and loan rates were higher for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. These effects are economically very small though. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks. JEL Classification: C30, C78, G21, G28, L51

September 21, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, September 18, 2015

Leniency and Damages

Paolo Buccirossi, Catarina Marvao, and Giancarlo Spagnolo have an interesting paper on Leniency and Damages.

ABSTRACT: Damage actions may reduce the attractiveness of leniency programs for cartel participants if their cooperation with the competition authority increases the chance that the cartel’s victims will bring a successful suit. A long legal debate culminated in an EU directive, adopted in November 2014, which seeks a balance between public and private enforcement. It protects the effectiveness of a leniency program by preventing the use of leniency statements in subsequent actions for damages. Our analysis shows such compromise is not required: limiting the cartel victims’ ability to recover their loss is not necessary to preserve the effectiveness of a leniency program and may be counterproductive. We show that damage actions will actually improve its effectiveness, through a legal regime in which the civil liability of the immunity recipient is minimized and full access to all evidence collected by the competition authority, is granted to claimants, like in the US.

September 18, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)