Tuesday, April 21, 2015

A dynamic model of price signaling, consumer learning, and price adjustment

Matthew Osborne (University of Toronto, Rotman School of Management) and Adam Hale Shapiro (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco) offer A dynamic model of price signaling, consumer learning, and price adjustment.

ABSTRACT: We examine a model of consumer learning and price signaling where price and quality are optimally chosen by a monopolist. We find that price signaling causes the firm to raise prices, lower quality, and dampen the degree to which it passes on cost shocks to price. We identify two mechanisms through which signaling affects pass-through and find that signaling can lead to asymmetric pass-through.

April 21, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, April 20, 2015

Limit pricing and secret barriers to entry

Luigi Brighi and Marcello D’Amato (both Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia) explain Limit pricing and secret barriers to entry.

ABSTRACT: We study a two periods entry game where the incumbent .rm, who has private information about his own production costs, makes a non observable long run investment choice, along with a pricing decision observed by the entrant. The investment choice affects both post-entry competition and first period cost of production, so that the cost of signaling becomes endogenous. The game is solved following Bayes-Nash requirements, the intuitive criterion is used to constrain off-equilibrium beliefs. When investment is publicly observable, it is shown that the unique intuitive equilibrium is the separating equilibrium with limit pricing and no entry deterrence. When investment is not observable, quite remarkably, there exists a unique intuitive pooling equilibrium which is Pareto superior, from the incumbent's point of view, to the unique intuitive separating equilibrium. In the pooling equilibrium no entry takes place and the price is below the low cost monopoly price. Thus, when investment is secret, a limit pricing policy supports entry deterrence. Our model provides an example of secret barriers to entry and their relationship with limit pricing. We also contribute to the analysis of a relatively under-researched class of games where the cost of signaling unobservable characteristics is endogenously determined by unobserved actions.

April 20, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Non-Reservation Price Equilibria And Search Without Priors

Alexei N. Parakhonyak (National Research University Higher School of Economics) and Anton Sobolev (Vienna Graduate School of Economics) discuss Non-Reservation Price Equilibria And Search Without Priors.

ABSTRACT:  In this paper we analyse a model of oligopolistic competition in which consumers search without priors. Consumers do not have prior beliefs about the distribution of prices charged by firms and thus try to use a robust search procedure: they minimise the loss relative to the searcher, who knows the price distribution, in the worst case scenario. We derive the optimal stopping rule and show that it does not possess the reservation price property. This means that for a range of prices for which consumers stop searching with a probability strictly between zero and one. We show that for any distribution of search costs there is a unique market equilibrium characterised by price dispersion. Therefore search without priors helps resolve the famous Diamond (1971) paradox. We show that although listed prices approach the monopoly price as the number of firms increases, the effective price paid by consumers does not depend on the number of firms. We show that prices in our model are lower than those in a model where consumers know the distribution of prices. The reason is that consumers actively search in equilibrium, and this pushes prices down. This eect is so strong that the price decrease more than compensates consumers for their extra search costs.

April 20, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

CPI Antitrust Chronicle - April 2015 - Number 1 - Case Studies from Developing Competition Regimes

A particularly effective way to highlight key antitrust issues that may fall under the radar is to look at case studies from developing competition regimes. In this issue, our authors discuss several issues that should get more visibility. From India, we have the problems of defining "enterprises," vexatious litigation, and a major change in a political regime. And from Iran, Israel, and Pakistan we have, respectively, risks of defining competition within a privatization framework, foreign competition activity triggering domestic follow-on activity, and regulatory capture. All challenging issues, and not easily solved.

Case Studies from Developing Competition Regimes
  1. Abdullah Hussain, Apr 14, 2015

    Defining “Enterprises” Poses a Jurisdictional Challenge


    Is there a need to remind the Commission of the need to strictly limit the application of the sovereignty exemption? Abdullah Hussain (Luthra & Luthra)

  2. Ravisekhar Nair, Shivanghi Sukumar, Apr 14, 2015

    Competition Law Scrutiny of Vexatious Litigation in India: Recent Developments


    The Order passed by the Commission does not prescribe a prima facie legal standard for the characterization of pursuit of legal action as abusive or anticompetitive. Ravisekhar Nair & Shivanghi Sukumar (Economic Laws Practice)

  3. K K Sharma, Apr 14, 2015

    Expectations from the CCI after Five Years of Existence and a Change in Federal Government


    The best course for the regulator should be to ensure compliance of the law while evoking caution, but not fear, while dealing with the realities of the economy. KK Sharma (KK Sharma Law Offices)

  4. Mina Hosseini, Apr 14, 2015

    An Introduction to Iranian Competition Law and Policy


    Although there are some problems regarding the enforcement of competition rules in Iran, having a competition law and policy is a big step. Mina Hosseini (Shahid Beheshti University)

  5. Tal Eyal-Boger, Ziv Schwartz, Apr 14, 2015

    Israel—"Follow-On" Class Actions Against International Cartels


    The petitioners wish to walk (at least partially) in a "plowed pathway" even though it has been "plowed by a foreign plow." Tal Eyal-Boger & Ziv Schwartz (Fischer Behar Chen Well Orion & Co.)

  6. Joseph Wilson, Apr 14, 2015

    Regulatory Capture: Private Interests Deriving Public Policy—The International Clearing House Case in Pakistan


    This case shows how private interests find their way in forming public policy. Joseph Wilson (Competition Commission of Pakistan)

April 20, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

The ObamaCare Effect: Hospital Monopolies

Marty Makary, Johns Hopkins has ahn op-ed in the Wall Street Journal on The ObamaCare Effect: Hospital Monopolies.

April 20, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)


Giovanni Alberto Tabacco, University of Swansea has written on MARKET STRUCTURE AND INTENSITY OF PRICE COMPETITION IN EU BANKING.

ABSTRACT: The goal of this article is to analyze both determinants of market structure and the intensity of price competition in the European Union (EU) banking industry. For this purpose, the first part of the article applies John Sutton's framework for empirically measuring the relationship between market size and market concentration. Next, the analysis turns to assessing the degree of price competition by applying a method of measuring banking competition that I have recently developed. Results suggest that there is a null relationship between market size and concentration, and that the estimated lower bound to concentration is well above zero. These two pieces of empirical evidence support Sutton's endogenous sunk costs model. Moreover, empirical estimates of a measure of competition—distance to the lower bound to concentration—suggest that the majority of EU national banking markets have low intensity of price competition. In contrast, Estonia, Netherlands, Finland, and Lithuania appear to have the most competitive banking industries.

April 20, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

FTC To Examine Competition, Consumer Protection, and Economic Issues Raised by the Sharing Economy at June Workshop - Public Workshop Will Explore Range of Issues Relating to Fast-Emerging Internet and Mobile Peer-to-Peer Business Platforms

On June 9, 2015, the Federal Trade Commission will host a workshop to examine competition, consumer protection, and economic issues raised by the proliferation of online and mobile peer-to peer business platforms in certain sectors of the economy, often referred to as the “sharing economy.” The workshop will take place in Washington, D.C., at the FTC’s Constitution Center conference space.

Peer-to-peer platforms, which enable suppliers and consumers to connect and do business, have led to the emergence of new business models in industries that have been subject to regulation. The FTC’s sharing economy workshop will explore how regulatory frameworks can accommodate new sharing economy business models while maintaining appropriate consumer protections and a competitive marketplace.

“We are seeing a dramatic growth in products and services that are built on peer-to-peer platforms, such as ride-sharing and property rentals, as more entrepreneurs harness the power of technology to reach more consumers,” said FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez. “The resulting business models have great potential to benefit our economy and consumers. Through our workshop, we want to better understand the competitive impact of these new business models, as well as their interactions with existing regulatory frameworks.”

Unlike platforms that link buyers with a single seller of a product or service, sharing economy platforms create virtual marketplaces in which many buyers and sellers, often individuals or small entities, can connect with one another and do business. These platforms take advantage of increasing network connections and computing power, including the proliferation of mobile internet-enabled devices, to reduce the time and costs of matching buyers and sellers that have not previously done business with each other, based primarily on the product or service being demanded or offered. Sharing economy transactions have increased rapidly in recent years, reaching an estimated value of $26 billion globally in 2013, and some estimates predict that the sharing economy will generate as much as $110 billion annually in the near future.

Given these estimates, the development of the sharing economy can stimulate economic growth by encouraging entrepreneurship and promoting more productive and efficient use of assets. However, the rapid expansion of commercial activity involving smaller suppliers on these platforms may tax the abilities and resources of regulators, who are confronted with the challenge of applying regulations that were written with conventional suppliers in mind. Through this workshop, the FTC seeks to gain a systematic understanding of these virtual marketplaces and to reflect on the competition, consumer protection, and regulatory issues that they raise.

To this end, the staff of the Federal Trade Commission are seeking public comment on a number of questions, both in advance of and following the workshop. These questions include:

  • How can state and local regulators meet legitimate regulatory goals (such as protecting consumers, and promoting public health and safety) in connection with their oversight of sharing economy platforms and business models, without also restraining competition or hindering innovation?
  • How have sharing economy platforms affected competition, innovation, consumer choice, and platform participants in the sectors in which they operate? How might they in the future?
  • What consumer protection issues—including privacy and data security, online reviews and disclosures, and claims about earnings and costs—do these platforms raise, and who is responsible for addressing these issues?  
  • What particular concerns or issues do sharing economy transactions raise regarding the protection of platform participants? What responsibility does a sharing economy platform bear for consumer injury arising from transactions undertaken through the platform?
  • How effective are reputation systems and other trust mechanisms, such as the vetting of sellers, insurance coverage, or complaint procedures, in encouraging consumers and suppliers to do business on sharing economy platforms?

Comments intended for discussion at the workshop will be accepted on or before May 26, 2015, but the record will be held open to receive comments until August 4, 2015. Comments can be submitted online.

The workshop will be held in the FTC’s Constitution Center offices in the A, B and C conference rooms located at 400 7th Street, SW, Washington, DC. The workshop is free and open to the public.

April 20, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Last Taxi to Europe

Alberto Heimler, National School of Public Administration (Italy) has written an op-ed on Uber titled Last Taxi to Europe.

April 20, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Bundling of Rand-Committed Patents

Anne Layne-Farrar, Charles River Associates; Northwestern University and Michael A. Salinger, Boston University - School of Management discuss Bundling of Rand-Committed Patents.

ABSTRACT: We assess the implications of the literatures on bundling and tying and on patent bundling in particular for whether a company that makes a RAND (reasonable and non-discriminatory) commitment on a patent may license that patent only in a bundle with patents on which it has not made a RAND-commitment. Patent bundling/tying is a common practice that often has sound efficiency justifications, but forcing a licensee to accept a license on a patent it does not want to obtain a RAND-committed patent that it does want can be a way of circumventing the RAND-commitment. Mixed bundling, where the licensor offers licensees the option of taking a license to RAND-committed patents only or taking a license to the full portfolio, is the most straightforward solution. However, we argue that a licensor can nonetheless offer a RAND-committed patent only in a bundle with patents on which it has not made a RAND-commitment, provided that the royalty would be RAND for the RAND-committed patents alone. The patent owner cannot deduct the value of non-RAND-committed patents from the license fee from the bundle and argue that it has honored its RAND-commitment as long as the difference is RAND for the RAND-committed patents.

April 20, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, April 19, 2015

Price Fixer Alfred Taubman Dead at 91

Perhaps the best known imprisoned cartelist in the world, Alfred Taubman is dead at 91.

The current Sotheby's Code of Conduct includes a discussion of antitrust on pages 38-40.

April 19, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, April 17, 2015

Lateral News: Scott Hemphill to NYU

I am happy to announce that Scott Hemphill is moving across town from Columbia Law to NYU Law.  NYU now has the following antitrust team:

Harry First
Eleanor Fox
Scott Hemphill
Dan Rubinfeld

Others on the NYU faculty who have written on antitrust in the past include Richard Epstein and Chris Sprigman.

This is a treasure of antitrust riches.  Columbia, on the other hand, has lost its two regular antitrust teachers - the late Harvey Goldschmid and now Scott.  The antitrust law tradition has been a rich one, starting with the great Milton Handler.  Hopefully Columbia will be able to retool soon with some tenure stream hires. 

April 17, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Margin Squeeze: An Above-Cost Predatory Pricing Approach

Germain Gaudin, Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) and Despoina Mantzari, University of Reading - School of Law; Centre for Commercial Law and Financial Regulation offer Margin Squeeze: An Above-Cost Predatory Pricing Approach.

ABSTRACT: We provide a new legal perspective for the antitrust analysis of margin squeeze conducts. Building on recent economic analysis, we explain why margin squeeze conducts should solely be evaluated under adjusted predatory pricing standards. The adjustment corresponds to an increase in the cost benchmark used in the predatory pricing test by including opportunity costs due to missed upstream sales. This can reduce both the risks of false-positives and false-negatives in margin squeeze cases. We justify this approach by explaining why classic arguments against above-cost predatory pricing typically do not hold in vertical structures where margin squeezes take place and by presenting case law evidence supporting this adjustment. Our approach can help to reconcile the divergent US and EU antitrust stances on margin squeeze.


April 17, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

2015 ANTITRUST WRITING AWARDS - Winners - Concurrences

2015 Winning Award Articles



When the State Harms Competition – The Role for Competition Law Eleanor M. Fox and Deborah Healey, 79(3) Antitrust Law Journal, p. 769, 2014.


Robust Exclusion and Market Division Through Loyalty Discounts Einer Elhauge and Abraham L. Wickelgren, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 14-12, 2014.


Is There a Market for Organic Search Engine Results and Can Their Manipulation Give Rise to Antitrust Liability? James D. Ratliff and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, pp. 1-25, May 2014.


Merger control and the public interest: balancing EU and national law in the protectionist debate John Davies and Alison Jones, European Competition Journal, 2014 (forthcoming).


Effects of Antitrust Leniency on Concealment Effort Colluding Firms, Leslie Marx and Claudio Mezzetti, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, pp. 1–28, 2014.


Antitrust Class Proceedings - then and now Michael D. Hausfeld, Gordon C. Rausser, Gareth J. Macartney, Michael P. Lehmann, and Sathya S. Gosselin, Research in Law and Economics, Vol. 26, 2014.


Strategic Patent Acquisitions Fiona Scott Morton and Carl Shapiro, 79 Antitrust Law Journal 463, 2014.


Bureaucratic Politics and China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Angela Huyue Zhang, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 48, Issue 1, 2014, Forthcoming; King’s College London Law School Research Paper No. 2014-9.


Schrödinger’s Cat and Extraterritoriality John DeQ. Briggs, Antitrust, Vol. 29, No. 1, Fall 2014.


Data Protection in the Context of Competition Law Investigations: An Overview of the Challenges Monika Kuschewsky and Damien Geradin, Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 020/2013.



Legal doctrine, economic screens and other distortions in antitrust agency decisions Roy Hoffinger, Concurrences Journal, Art. N° 70582, N°4 2014.


Industry Collaborations on Cybersecurity: Protecting Against Antitrust Violations Evan Wolff, David Laing, Kate M. Growley, and Elizabeth Blumenfeld, ABA Section of Criminal Justice, Vol. 29, No. 3, Fall 2014.


The EU General Court upholds the European Commission’s decision regarding exclusivity rebates on the microprocessor market (Intel) James S. Venit, e-Competitions Bulletin June 2014, Art. N° 67164.


Expanding EU Merger Control To Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings: A Sledgehammer To Crack A Nut? Nicholas Levy, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, December 2014.


The Discount Attribution Test and the Competitive Effects of Loyalty Discounts Sean Durkin, Monopoly Matters, Vol. 12, No. 1, Fall 2014.


Class Action Plaintiffs Can Obtain Wiretap Evidence Michael Osborne, The Litigator Blog, October, 2014.


Privateers and trolls join the global patent wars; can competition authorities disarm them? Maurits Dolmans, Computerrecht, 2014.


Rainbow v. Johnson & Johnson: RPM Litigation in China Fei Deng and Su Sun, ABA’s Distribution Newsletter, March 2014.


Global Antitrust Compliance Roxane C. Busey, PLI Compliance Institute, May 2014.


Antitrust and Due Process Christopher Hockett, American Bar Association, Antitrust, Vol. 28, No. 2, April 2014.

April 17, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Muzzling Antitrust: Information Products, Innovation and Free Speech

Hillary Greene, University of Connecticut School of Law has written on Muzzling Antitrust: Information Products, Innovation and Free Speech.

ABSTRACT: How well does the American legal system balance the diverse values society espouses? Courts must often navigate values that are not consistent, commensurate, or subject to ordinal ranking. This article examines the confluence of incommensurate values within the important context of antitrust challenges to information product redesigns (e.g., Google, Nielsen). The information economy has given rise to the emergence of powerful firms in the business of information products. Some of these firms have had product redesigns challenged as anticompetitive. This article examines two defenses to these challenges. First, the products constitute protected speech and should be immunized entirely from antitrust scrutiny. Second, the product changes embody procompetitive innovations and, therefore, are not anticompetitive. When addressing antitrust challenges to search engine modifications, for example, the courts must account for free speech — a value exogenous to antitrust — as well as competition and innovation, two goals often considered in tandem within an antitrust framework focused on consumer welfare. Navigating speech and consumer welfare considerations presents a classic incommensurability problem. Moreover, even competition and innovation have proven to be largely incommensurate in practice, notwithstanding their shared consumer welfare orientation. Despite antitrust’s ostensible facility with more nuanced tradeoffs, the courts have been largely unwilling or unable to transcend binary “all-or-nothing” outcomes when either speech or innovation-based defenses are implicated. When those product redesigns are decidedly incremental and arguably anticompetitive, the application of all-or-nothing legal standards provides inadequate protections for the underlying First Amendment rights and competition policy values at stake. This article explains why legal middle grounds, while potentially difficult, can and must be established to deal with speech and innovation.

April 17, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Litigation And Arbitration In EU Competition Law

Mel Marquis (EUI) and Roberto Cisotta have edited Litigation And Arbitration In EU Competition Law.

BOOK ABSTRACT: With courts and arbitrators functioning daily as front line decision-makers applying EU competition law, this book reflects on a variety of issues related to the litigation and arbitration of cases in this field. It provides expert analysis from perspectives of substance, procedure, fundamental rights, as well as inter-institutional dialogue and coherence.

April 17, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, April 16, 2015

Paving the Way for Future Innovations: The Music Industry as a Case Study

David Balto and Matthew Lane have a paper on Paving the Way for Future Innovations: The Music Industry as a Case Study.

April 16, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

GCR 2015 Award Winners

The GCR Award dinner was held last night. 


My daughters were very happy to learn that Brazil's CADE won Agency of the Year for the Americas. My eldest celebrated by wearing her Brazilian World Cup shirt (shirt courtesy of my friends at Mattos Filho).

View this photo


As for the GCR Award Winners:


Matter of the Year

GlaxoSmithKline/Novartis/Eli Lilly

Counsel GlaxoSmithKline


David Rea

Cleary Gottlieb Steen and Hamilton

Partners Romina Polley, Patrick Bock and counsel Silke Heinz in Cologne, partner George Cary and counsel Kathleen Bradish in Washington, DC

Blake Cassels & Graydon

Partners Brian Facey and Navin Joneja, assisted by David Rosner and Emma Costante in Toronto

Veirano Advogados

Partners Fábio Figueira in Rio de Janeiro and Olavo Chinaglia in São Paulo

Compass Lexecon

Jorge Padilla in Madrid, Kirsten Edwards-Warren in London and Alison Oldale in Washington, DC

Counsel to Novartis


Roy Papatheodorou, Susan Jones and David Emanuelson

Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

Partner Paul Yde and counsel Mary Lehner in Washington, DC, assisted by Hiram Andrews, Craig Minerva, Justin Stewart-Teitelbaum, Laura Collins, Ilana Kattan, Valeria Losco and Jenny Leahy; partners Rod Carlton in London assisted by Angeline Woods, Colin Raftery and Imogen Ditchfield; Thomas Janssens in Brussels, assisted by Amaryllis Mueller and Sara Bacchio; partner Alexander Viktorov in Moscow; Partner Alvaro Iza in Madrid assisted by Enrique Carrera, Rafael Piqueras and Ana Lapiedra; counsel Ninette Dodoo in Beijing assisted by Paul van den Berg and Kailun Ji; Kaori Yamada in Tokyo assisted by Shunsuke Inoue


Partners Jeffrey Schmidt in Washington, DC, and Thomas McGrath in New York, partners Sir Christopher Bellamy QC and Simon Pritchard in London, partner Annamaria Mangiaracina in Brussels and partner Fay Zhou in Beijing 


Partners Dr A. Neil Campbell, Mark Opashinov and Casey Halladay in Toronto

Barbosa, Müssnich & Aragão Advogados

Partners Barbara Rosenberg and Luís Bernardo Coelho Cascão in São Paulo

Charles River Associates

Gary Roberts in Washington, DC and Cristina Caffarra in Brussels and London

Counsel to Eli Lilly

Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft 

Partners Charles F. (Rick) Rule and Andrew Forman in Washington, DC

Latham & Watkins 

Partners Howard T Rosenblatt and Héctor Armengod in Brussels

Merger Control Matter of the Year - Americas

Kroton’s acquisition of Anhanguera, Brazil

Counsel to Anhanguera Educacional Participações SA


Khalil Kaddissi

Mattos Filho, Veiga Filho, Marrey Jr. e Quiroga Advogados

Partners Lauro Celidonio Gomes dos Reis Neto and Marcio Dias Soares, and associate Paula Camara Baptista de Oliveira in São Paulo

Counsel to Kroton Educacional SA


Leonardo Augusto Leão Lara

Barbosa, Müssnich & Aragão Advogados

Partners Barbara Rosenberg and José Carlos da Matta Berardo, and associate Amanda Fabbri Barelli in São Paulo

Merger Control Matter of the Year - Asia Pacific, Middle East & Africa

Merck/AZ Electronics, China

Counsel to Merck

Allen & Overy

Counsel François Renard in Beijing

Counsel to AZ Electronic Materials

Clifford Chance

Partner Richard Blewett in Beijing

Merger Control Matter of the Year - Europe

Holcim/Lafarge, EU

Counsel to Holcim


Xavier Dedullen and Juhani Kostka

Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

Partners Frank Montag and Rafique Bachour in Brussels and Peter Niggemann in Düsseldorf, assisted by Karen Bonne Slaney, Foad Hoseinian, Babette Kacholdt, Thomas McGrath, Matthias Eisenbarth, Aaron Green, Katrin Gaßner, Maximilian Janssen and Enrique Carrera


Partners Franz Hoffet, Gerald Brei and counsel Martin Thomann in Zurich, assisted by Kerstin Schiwow-Amrhein and Bettina Meyer 

Counsel to Lafarge


Bi Yong Chungunco

Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton

Partners Antoine Winckler, Nicholas Levy and François-Charles Laprévote in Brussels assisted by Paul Gilbert, Niklas Maydell, Jacopo Figus Diaz, Charlotte Emin, Sven Frisch, Pierre Moullet and Anna Iasmi Vallianatou, Henry Mostyn, Esther Bitton, Victor Levy and Philippe Prigent

Behavioural Matter of the Year - Americas

Defence of McWane against Federal Trade Commission, US

Counsel for McWane, Inc.

Baker Botts

Partners Joseph Ostoyich and Erik Koons assisted by Heather Souder Choi and William Lavery in Washington, DC

Maynard Cooper & Gale PC

Partners J. Alan Truitt and Thomas W Thagard, III in Birmingham, Alabama

Behavioural Matter of the Year - Asia Pacific, Middle East & Africa

Defence of Air New Zealand and Garuda, Australia

Counsel to Air New Zealand

Corrs Chambers Westgarth

Partner Michelle Carr in Sydney

Counsel to Garuda

Norton White

Partner Mark Mackrell in Sydney

Behavioural Matter of the Year - Europe

Samsung SEP settlement, EU

Counsel to Samsung

Peter Camesasca Advocaat BVBA

Peter Camesasca (now at Covington & Burling)

Clifford Chance

Partner Thomas Vinje in Brussels

Shearman & Sterling

Partners Trevor Soames and Miguel Rato in Brussels

Allen & Overy

Partner Michel Struys in Paris, assisted by associates Charles Pommiès, Diane Souffront-Vendeuvre, and Jean-François Willems

Charles River Associates

Cristina Caffarra and Damien Neven in Brussels

Litigation of the Year - Cartel Prosecution

National Grid follow-on litigation, UK

Counsel to National Grid

Berwin Leighton Paisner

Partner Bob Maynard assisted by Ed Coulson in London

Monckton Chambers

Jon Turner QC and Daniel Beard QC in London


Partners Helen Jenkins and Robin Noble in Oxford

Litigation of the Year - Cartel Defence

Motorola Mobility v AU Optronics et al, US

Counsel to AU Optronics


Partner Christopher Nedeau in San Francisco

Counsel to Chi Mei

Davis Polk & Wardwell

Partner Christopher Hockett in Menlo Park, assisted by Emmet Ong and Samantha Knox

Counsel to Chunghwa Picture Tubes

Farmer Brownstein Jaeger

Partners David Brownstein and William Farmer in San Francisco

Counsel to HannStar Display

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett

Partners James Kreissman, Harrison J. (Buzz) Frahn, Jason Bussey and asociates Elizabeth Gillen and Melissa Derr Schmidt in Palo Alto, California

Counsel to LG Display

Eimer Stahl

Partner Nathan Eimer in Chicago

Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton

Partner Michael Lazerwitz in New York

Counsel to Sanyo

Davis Wright Tremaine

Allison Davis and Sanjay Nangia in San Francisco

Counsel to Samsung

Covington & Burling

Partners Robert Wick and Derek Ludwin in Washington, DC, and Jeffrey Davidson in San Francisco, assisted by John Playforth

Counsel to Samsung SDI

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton

Partners Gary Halling and James McGinnis in San Francisco

Counsel to Sharp Corporation

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison

Partners Kenneth A. Gallo and Joseph J Simons in Washington, DC

Counsel to Toshiba

White & Case

Partner Christopher Curran in Washington, DC

Litigation of the Year - Non-Cartel Prosecution

Edward O’Bannon et al v National Collegiate Athletics Association, US

Counsel to Ed O’Bannon and plaintiff class


Partners Michael Hausfeld, Hilary Scherrer and Sathya Gosselin in Washington, DC and Michael Lehmann in San Francisco are assisted by Bruce Wecker and Swathi Bojedla

Boies, Schiller & Flexner

Partner William Isaacson in Washington, DC

Massey & Gail

Partner Jonathan Massey in Washington, DC

Stanford University

Roger Noll

Litigation of the Year - Non-Cartel Defence

Apple iPod/iTunes Antitrust Litigation, US

Counsel to Apple

Boies, Schiller & Flexner

Partners William Isaacson and Karen Dunn in Washington, DC and John F Cove Jr in Oakland, are assisted by Martha Goodman and Meredith Dearborn

Jones Day

Partner David Kiernan in San Francisco

Agency of the Year - Americas

Brazil’s CADE

Agency of the Year - Asia Pacific, Middle East & Africa

Japan’s Fair Trade Commission

Agency of the Year - Europe

France’s Competition Authority

Enforcement Matter of the Year

EU v Intel, General Court decision

Regional Firm of the Year - Europe

Slaughter and May, UK

Regional Firm of the Year - Asia Pacific, Middle East & Africa

Nishimura & Asahi, Japan

Regional Firm of the Year - Americas

Mattos Filho, Veiga Filho, Marry Jr e Quiroga, Brazil

Lawyer of the Year

Barbara Rosenberg, Barbosa Müssnich & Aragão Advogados

Lawyer of the Year - Under 40

Anna Lyle-Smythe, Slaughter and May

Litigator of the Year

Margaret Zwisler, Latham & Watkins

Dealmaker of the Year

Nicholas Levy, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton

Economist of the Year

Roger Noll, Stanford University

Corporate Counsel of the Year

David Rea, GlaxoSmithKline

Academic Excellence Award

Herbert Hovenkamp, The University of Iowa College of Law

Lifetime Achievement Award

Kazuhiko Takeshima, Mori Hamada & Matsumoto

April 16, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission: Shedding Light on What Is not a ‘by object’ Restriction of Competition

Javier Ruiz Calzado and Andreas Scordamaglia-Tousis, Latham, observe Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission: Shedding Light on What Is not a ‘by object’ Restriction of Competition.

ABSTRACT: The European Court of Justice, in setting aside the judgment of the General Court, endorses a narrow interpretation of ‘by object’ restrictions of competition and rules that the contested pricing measures adopted by the French Payment System ‘CB’ could not qualify as a ‘by object’ restriction.

April 16, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Recent Developments in EU Merger Control 2014

Paul McGeown and Aude Barthelemy both Wilson Sonsini, have published Recent Developments in EU Merger Control 2014.

ABSTRACT: The decisions adopted during the period under consideration indicate that the Commission continues to resort to ‘reconstructed’ market share data, notably in several Phase I commitments cases. Another striking feature of the jurisprudence adopted in 2014 is the apparent emergence of a new tool to test closeness of competition—the so-called ‘aggressive competitor’ test. Generally, the Commission seems to pay more attention to claims by notifying parties that spare capacity in the hands of competitors would render unprofitable a price increase by the merged entity. The jurisprudence confirms that an inherited FRAND commitment negates the ability of the merged entity to pursue a foreclosure strategy.

April 16, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Getting Merger Control Clearances for Corporate Deals: EU and multi-jurisdictional merger control in practice Thursday 18 June 2015, 08:45 - 16:00

Getting Merger Control Clearances for Corporate Deals: EU and multi-jurisdictional merger control in practice

Thursday 18 June 2015, 08:45 - 16:00

at UCL Laws, Bentham House, Endsleigh Gardens, London WC1H 0EG

A CPD Course organised by the Centre for Law, Economics and Society


  • Kyriakos Fountoukakos (Herbert Smith Freehills LLP)
  • Peter Rowland  (Herbert Smith Freehills LLP)
  • Nick Root  (Herbert Smith Freehills LLP)

About the course

Merger control is an essential part of a competition practitioner’s every day work and is also of importance to other advisors (corporate lawyers, bankers) involved in transactions. It needs to be considered in every corporate deal including private acquisitions of whole companies, shares or assets, public takeover bids, minority investments in companies and joint venture agreements. This is because merger control will impact key aspects of a transaction: the transaction time table (“when can I close the deal?”) and even the “deliverability” of a transaction (“can I do the deal?” “Will remedies be imposed?”).

More than 100 countries around the world now have merger control laws. Most of them, like the EU regime, are “mandatory” and “suspensory” regimes: a filing must be made and the deal cannot close before clearance has been received from the relevant regulators.

Despite the central importance of merger control for competition lawyers, corporate lawyers, investment bankers and businesses, merger control is a topic that is often not taught in detail and from a hands-on perspective in undergraduate or even post-graduate courses.

With the aid of a practical case study, this course will cover the key basic aspects of what an advisor needs to know from a practical perspective to:

  • analyse corporate transactions to decide whether a transaction triggers a merger filing requirement with the EU and/or in other jurisdictions around the world;
  • deal with timelines of each relevant jurisdiction as well as consequences for failure to file (fines, unwinding the transaction etc.) to assess exact possible impact on the transaction;
  • negotiate corporate documentation such as conditions precedent, cooperation between purchaser and seller in making filings, and conduct pre-completion. The course will also cover other aspects of the corporate documentation relevant to competition law such as exchange of information in the due diligence process (e.g. Non-Disclosure Agreements and clean team processes), non-compete clauses, warranties and indemnities;
  • prepare an EU merger control filing on Form CO (information needed and process, practical tips); and
  • guide clients through the procedures for clearance (emphasis on the EU procedure).

The key focus of the course will be on jurisdictional and procedural issues with only a brief discussion of substantive issues (how regulators review a merger from a substantive perspective). The course will aim to give participants the practical experience needed to understand and/or work on merger control aspects of a corporate deal, by simulating as closely as possible the work that a practitioner would undertake in a live transaction.

Who should attend

The course is mainly designed associates, trainees or prospective trainees wishing to gain practical experience which they can apply in a post with an international law firm doing merger control work. It is also suitable for post-graduate students on competition law or mergers and acquisitions courses.

Attenders need not have day-to-day experience of corporate deals or merger control, however some understanding (academic or practical) of transaction agreements would be useful.

The course is split into two distinct sessions which can be attended independently: The Morning Sessions:  covering where to file and the consequences, and negotiating the corporate documents; and The Afternoon Session: covering drafting filings and procedural aspects of the process.

View the programme and booking details online at:  http://www.laws.ucl.ac.uk/event/merger-control-clearances/

Fees:  Early Bird Tickets (available until 15 May 2015):  Standard Ticket = £200 Group Standard Ticket = £180 Morning or Afternoon only Ticket = £110
Full price tickets (from 16 May 2015) Standard Ticket = £250 Group Standard Ticket = £230 Morning or Afternoon only Ticket = £125
Queries:  If you have any queries about this course please email Lisa Penfold, Events & CPD Manager at UCL Faculty of Laws. 

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