Thursday, January 29, 2015

Incentive for adoption of new technology in duopoly under absolute and relative profit maximization

Etienne Billette de Villemeur, Richard Rubley, and Bruno Versaevel offer Incentive for adoption of new technology in duopoly under absolute and relative profit maximization.

ABSTRACT: We study entry in a growing market by ex-ante symmetric duopolists when sunk costs differ for the innovating and imitating firm. Strategic competition takes the form either of a preemption race or of a war of attrition, the latter being likelier when demand uncertainty is high. Industry value is maximized when rms seek neither to race nor to delay investment. Free imitation is socially costly, and if the consumer surplus resulting from imitation is not too large the socially optimal imitation cost, as may be induced by patent protection, involves preemption. Finally, we discuss endogenous entry barriers and contractual alternatives that increase the likelihood of preemption regimes, with di ering implications for imitator entry. When the cost of imitation is low for instance, innovators are shown to rely more heavily on trade secrecy and patents. Welfare-enhancing takeovers and licensing are also shown to occur.

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2015/01/incentive-for-adoption-of-new-technology-in-duopoly-under-absolute-and-relative-profit-maximization.html

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