Thursday, November 20, 2014

One-Leader and Multiple-Follower Stackelberg Games with Private Information

Tomoya Nakamura, Osaka University describes One-Leader and Multiple-Follower Stackelberg Games with Private Information.

ABSTRACT: This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with demand uncertainty. We demonstrate that the weight on public information regarding a follower's estimation of demand uncertainty determines the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower. When the relationship is strategic complement, the leader can exit from a market. The threshold is determined by the intensity of Cournot competition among the followers.

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2014/11/one-leader-and-multiple-follower-stackelberg-games-with-private-information.html

| Permalink

TrackBack URL for this entry:

https://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d8341bfae553ef01bb079ad185970d

Listed below are links to weblogs that reference One-Leader and Multiple-Follower Stackelberg Games with Private Information:

Comments

Post a comment