Friday, November 14, 2014

Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading. Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets

Benjamin Lester (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia), Ludo Visschers (The University of Edinburgh & Universidad Carlos III, Madrid), and Ronald Wolthoff (University of Toronto) explain Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading. Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets.

ABSTRACT: In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller receives no better offers. Despite their prevalence in a variety of real world markets, asking prices have received little attention in the academic literature. We construct an environment with a few simple, realistic ingredients and demonstrate that using an asking price is optimal: it is the pricing mechanism that maximizes sellers’ revenues and it implements the efficient outcome in equilibrium. We provide a complete characterization of this equilibrium and use it to explore the positive implications of this pricing mechanism for transaction prices and allocations.

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2014/11/meeting-technologies-and-optimal-trading-mechanisms-in-competitive-search-markets-.html

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