Tuesday, October 28, 2014

Precluding Collusion in the Vickrey Auction

Olga Gorelkina (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) explores Precluding Collusion in the Vickrey Auction.

ABSTRACT: This paper studies collusion in one-shot auctions, where a buyer can bribe his competitors into lowering their bids. We modify the single-unit Vickrey auction to incite deviations from the designated-winner scenario and thus undermine collusion. The construction of mechanism does not require the knowledge of colluders’ identities or distributions of valuations, in which sense it is entirely detail-free.

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2014/10/precluding-collusion-in-the-vickrey-auction-.html

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